Director of Public Prosecutions (SA) v King

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SUPREME COURT OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA

(Magistrates Appeals: Criminal)

DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC PROSECUTIONS (SA) v KING

[2019] SASC 42

Judgment of The Honourable Justice Bampton

22 March 2019

MAGISTRATES - APPEAL AND REVIEW - SOUTH AUSTRALIA - APPEAL TO SUPREME COURT

APPEAL AND NEW TRIAL - APPEAL - PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE - SOUTH AUSTRALIA - WHEN APPEAL LIES - BY LEAVE OF COURT

CRIMINAL LAW - EVIDENCE - JUDICIAL DISCRETION TO ADMIT OR EXCLUDE EVIDENCE

CRIMINAL LAW - PROCEDURE - WARRANTS, ARREST, SEARCH, SEIZURE AND INCIDENTAL POWERS - WARRANTS - SEARCH WARRANTS - GENERALLY, ISSUE AND VALIDITY - VALIDITY

Appeal by Director of Public Prosecutions against interlocutory judgment of a Magistrate – where Magistrate ruled to exclude the evidence obtained under the authority of four warrants issued by the Independent Commissioner Against Corruption on the trial of the respondent – where permission to appeal required – whether special reasons exist – whether the warrants were issued within power – whether the warrants lacked specificity.

Held, granting permission to appeal and allowing the appeal:  the warrants were issued within power – the warrants did not lack specificity.

Independent Commissioner Against Corruption Act 2012 (SA) s 3, s 5, s 31, s 56A; Magistrates Court Act 1991 (SA) s 3, s 42; Independent Commissioner Against Corruption (Miscellaneous) Amendment Act 2014 (SA) s 12(8); Public Sector (Honesty and Accountability Act 1995 (SA) s 26; Criminal Procedure Act 1921 (SA) s 68; Motor Vehicles Act 1959 (SA), referred to.
White v State of South Australia (2007) 96 SASR 581; Siewertsz van Reesema v Police [2009] SASC 8; Project Blue Sky Inc v Australian Broadcasting Authority (1998) 194 CLR 355; K-Generation Pty Ltd v Liquor Licensing Court (2009) 237 CLR 501; Lend Lease Real Estate Investments Ltd & Anor v GPT RE Ltd [2006] NSWCA 207; Federal Commissioner of Taxation v Applegate (1979) 27 ALR 114; Department for Health & Ageing v Li [2018] SASCFC 52; Inco Europe Ltd v First Choice Distribution (a firm) [2000] 2 All ER 109; Jones v Wrotham Park Settled Estates (or Wentworth Securities Ltd) [1980] AC 74; Electrolux Home Products Pty Ltd v Australian Workers’ Union (2004) 221 CLR 309; Joukhador v Commissioner of Police (NSW) [2018] NSWSC 872; Caratti v Commissioner of the Australian Federal Police (2017) 257 FCR 166; Hart v Commissioner of Australian Federal Police (2002) 124 FCR 384, applied.
R v Tillett; Ex Parte Newton (1969) 14 FLR 101, distinguished.
Question of Law Reserved in Acquittal (No. 5 of 1999) (2000) 76 SASR 356, discussed.
Bunning v Cross (1978) 141 CLR 54; Obeid v The Queen (2016) 329 ALR 372; Frugtniet v Victoria (1997) 71 ALJR 1598; Director of Public Prosecutions (SA) v B (1998) 194 CLR 566, considered.

WORDS AND PHRASES CONSIDERED/DEFINED

"public officer", "use"

DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC PROSECUTIONS (SA) v KING
[2019] SASC 42

Magistrates Appeal:  Criminal

  1. BAMPTON J:      The Director of Public Prosecutions (“the Director”)…

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Details
Case
[2019] SASC 42
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In this case, the Director of Public Prosecutions for South Australia appealed an interlocutory judgment of a Magistrate in the Magistrates Court of South Australia. The Magistrate had ruled to exclude evidence obtained under the authority of four warrants issued by the Independent Commissioner Against Corruption (ICAC) on the trial of the respondent. The court was required to decide whether special reasons existed to grant permission to appeal and whether the warrants were issued within power and lacked specificity. The Supreme Court of South Australia granted permission to appeal and allowed the appeal, finding that the warrants were issued within power and did not lack specificity.

The legal issues in this case included whether the warrants were issued within the powers granted under the Independent Commissioner Against Corruption Act 2012 (SA) and whether the warrants lacked specificity. The Magistrate had ruled that the warrants were invalid, but the Supreme Court disagreed. The court found that the warrants were issued within power and did not lack specificity, as they complied with the requirements of the Act and authorised the Commissioner to issue warrants for the purposes of an investigation into a potential issue of corruption in public administration. The court also found that there were special reasons to grant permission to appeal, as the Magistrate's ruling had a substantial and broad impact on all warrants issued by ICAC since 2012.

The Supreme Court of South Australia granted permission to appeal and allowed the appeal, setting aside the Magistrate's ruling that the warrants were invalid and excluding the admission of evidence obtained under the authority of the ICAC warrants. The court found that the warrants were issued within power and did not lack specificity, as they complied with the requirements of the Act and authorised the Commissioner to issue warrants for the purposes of an investigation into a potential issue of corruption in public administration. The court also found that there were special reasons to grant permission to appeal, as the Magistrate's ruling had a substantial and broad impact on all warrants issued by ICAC since 2012.

This case highlights the importance of ensuring that warrants issued by ICAC are within power and do not lack specificity. The Supreme Court of South Australia found that the warrants in this case were issued within power and did not lack specificity, and granted permission to appeal and allowed the appeal. This decision has significant implications for all warrants issued by ICAC since 2012 and may impact the admissibility of evidence obtained under the authority of such warrants in future trials.

Background

Background to the litigation

Prior to considering whether special reasons exist, I set out the relevant sections of the Act and a brief description of the background to the issuing of the warrants.BackgroundThe Act One of the primary objects of the Act was to establish the ICAC with functions designed to further the identification and investigation of corruption in public administration.[2] Section 3(2) provides that while the Commissioner may perform functions under the Act in relation to any potential issue of corruption, misconduct or maladministration in public administration it is intended that the primary object of the Commissioner be to investigate serious or systemic corruption in public administration and “to refer serious or systemic misconduct or maladministration in public administration to the relevant body, giving directions or guidance to the body or exercising the powers of the body as the Commissioner considers appropriate”.[2] Independent Commissioner Against Corruption Act 2012 (SA) s 3(1)(a)(i). Section 31(1), in force as at the date the Commissioner issued the ICAC warrants, gave the Commissioner power to issue warrants in investigations into potential issues of corruption in public administration:31—Enter and search powers under warrant(1)The Commissioner may, on application by an investigator or on his or her own initiative, issue a warrant authorising an investigator to enter and search—(a) a place occupied or used by an inquiry agency, public authority or public officer; or(b) a vehicle owned or used by an inquiry agency, public authority or public officer. Section 31(2) empowered a judge of the Supreme Court to issue a warrant authorising an investigator to enter and search:(a)a private place or private vehicle that is reasonably suspected of being, or having been, used for or in connection with a prescribed offence; or (b)a private place or private vehicle in which it is reasonably suspected there may be records relating to a prescribed offence or anything that has been used in, or may constitute evidence of, a prescribed offence. Section 31(3) provided that:A warrant may only be issued if the Commissioner or the judge was satisfied that the warrant to search [was] reasonably required in the circumstances for the purposes of an investigation into a potential issue of corruption in public administration. The grounds of an application for a warrant had to be verified by a statutory declaration if the application was made to the Commissioner, or by affidavit if the application was made to a judge of the Supreme Court.[3][3] Independent Commissioner Against Corruption Act 2012 (SA) s 31(5). Section 31(6) prescribed that a warrant must:(a)specify the place or vehicle to which the warrant relates; and(b)state whether entry is authorised at any time of the day or night or during specified hours of the day or night. Section 31(7) specified the powers which could be exercised by the investigator during searches pursuant to a warrant, including the power to seize and retain objects and documents found in the course of the search.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

At the commencement of the hearing on 21 September, counsel for the Director raised an issue arising under s 56A of Independent Commissioner Against Corruption Act 2012 (SA) (“the Act”). Counsel for Mr King in turn raised issues regarding the construction and validity of s 56A of the Act. The s 56A issue was adjourned to 16 November 2018 and the Magistrate ruled that the three Supreme Court warrants were invalid “on their face”. Just prior to the Court adjourning, counsel for the Director said:… the Director has been waiting for your Honour’s judgment in relation to both warrants to consider what direction the matter might take. I can indicate to your Honour that your Honour’s rulings have a substantial and broad impact on all the warrants issued by ICAC since 2012 and the Director will be considering whether to refer a question of law.The 16 November 2018 ruling excluding the evidence obtained under the ICAC warrants On 16 November 2018, the Solicitor-General appeared for the Attorney‑General, who had intervened following the raising of the s 56A issue. The Solicitor-General formally informed the Court that the s 56A issue would not be pursued. The Magistrate then delivered his ruling “in favour of exclusion of the fruits of the search” conducted under the authority of the ICAC warrants (“the 16 November 2018 ruling”). On 12 December 2018, Mr King made application for a permanent stay of proceedings. On 21 December 2018, the Magistrate delivered his ruling refusing the application. On 15 and 25 February 2019, argument was heard regarding the discretion to exclude the evidence obtained under the authority of the Supreme Court warrants. I am informed by the parties that the Magistrate will hear final submissions on this issue on 26 March 2019.The notice of appeal On 21 November 2018, the Director filed a notice of appeal seeking permission to appeal the 16 November 2018 ruling. The first proposed ground of appeal encompasses complaint about the 28 August 2018 ruling that the ICAC warrants are invalid. It asserts that the Magistrate erred in finding that the ICAC warrants were invalid:1in his construction of the Act by holding that s 31(1) of the Act did not authorise the Commissioner to issue the warrants; and2in importing as prerequisites for valid warrants requirements beyond those contained in the Act (namely information on the face of the warrants as to the precise nature of the offences being investigated and things to be seized). In the alternative to proposed ground 1, the Director complains that the Magistrate erred in the exercise of the Bunning v Cross discretion excluding the evidence obtained under the authority of the ICAC warrants. Section 3 of the Magistrates Court Act 1991 (SA) (“the MCA”) includes in the definition of interlocutory judgment “an order or ruling relating to the admissibility or giving of evidence”. Accordingly, the 16 November 2018 ruling is an interlocutory judgment. Section 42(1a) of the MCA permits appeals from interlocutory judgments in limited circumstances. The Director seeks permission under s 42(1a)(c) of the MCA which provides that an appeal lies only if the Court “is satisfied that there are special reasons why it would be in the interests of the administration of justice to have the appeal determined before commencement or completion of the trial and grants its permission for an appeal”.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Each warrant disclosed on its face that it was issued for the purposes of an investigation into a potential issue of corruption into public administration pursuant to the Act. There was no requirement for an offence to be specified on the face of the ICAC warrants. The warrants complied with the requirements of s 31(6) of the Act.Conclusion I grant permission to appeal. The Commissioner was authorised by s 31(1) of the Act to issue the ICAC warrants and each warrant was validly issued pursuant to the requirements of the Act on 18 September 2014. I find that ground 1 of the appeal is made out. I allow the appeal. I set aside the 28 August 2018 ruling that the ICAC warrants are invalid. I set aside the 16 November 2018 ruling excluding the admission of evidence obtained under the authority of the ICAC warrants. In view of my findings, it is unnecessary to consider the alternative ground of appeal.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Corruption in public administration was defined in s 5(1) of the Act to mean:(1)Corruption in public administration means conduct that constitutes—(a) an offence against Part 7 Division 4 (Offences relating to public officers) of the Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935, which includes the following offences:(i)bribery or corruption of public officers;(ii)threats or reprisals against public officers;(iii)abuse of public office;(iv)demanding or requiring benefit on basis of public office;(v)offences relating to appointment to public office; or(b) an offence against the Public Sector (Honesty and Accountability) Act 1995 or the Public Corporations Act 1993, or an attempt to commit such an offence; or(c) any other offence (including an offence against Part 5 (Offences of dishonesty) of the Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935) committed by a public officer while acting in his or her capacity as a public officer or by a former public officer and related to his or her former capacity as a public officer, or by a person before becoming a public officer and related to his or her capacity as a public officer, or an attempt to commit such an offence; or(d) any of the following in relation to an offence referred to in a preceding paragraph:(i)aiding, abetting, counselling or procuring the commission of the offence;(ii)inducing, whether by threats or promises or otherwise, the commission of the offence;(iii)being in any way, directly or indirectly, knowingly concerned in, or party to, the commission of the offence;(iv)conspiring with others to effect the commission of the offence. As submitted by the Director, corruption in public administration is not confined to normal office hours, the standard 38 hour working week, and government buildings. Public officers engaged in such corruption will most likely act covertly to avoid detection by non-complicit work colleagues or whistle-blowers. They most likely will attempt to conceal evidence of their activities in places they occupy or use other than in their capacity as public officers. A simple example of a public officer concealing acts of corruption is an officer who appropriates equipment owned by the public authority he or she works for and conceals it in his or her home or private vehicle or in the home or vehicle of a relative or friend. Section 31(1)(a) in force as at 18 September 2014, on my reading, empowered the Commissioner, if satisfied a warrant was reasonably required for the purposes of an investigation into a potential issue of corruption in public administration, to issue a warrant authorising an investigator to enter and search the public officer’s home, being a place occupied or used by the public officer. Section 31(1)(b) granted the Commissioner an equivalent power to issue warrants in respect of a vehicle registered in the public officer’s name being a vehicle owned by the public officer. Section 31(2) empowered a Supreme Court judge, acting persona designata, to issue warrants authorising an investigator to enter and search private places and private vehicles defined by s 31(14) to be places and vehicles other than those encompassed in s 31(1). By defining private places and private vehicle the legislature clearly indicated the intention to depart from the ordinary meaning of “private”.[22][22] Dennis Pearce and Robert Geddes, Statutory Interpretation in Australia (LexisNexis Butterworths, 8th ed, 2014) at 155 [4.8].