SUPREME COURT OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA
(Magistrates Appeals: Criminal)
DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC PROSECUTIONS (SA) v KING
[2019] SASC 42
Judgment of The Honourable Justice Bampton
22 March 2019
MAGISTRATES - APPEAL AND REVIEW - SOUTH AUSTRALIA - APPEAL TO SUPREME COURT
APPEAL AND NEW TRIAL - APPEAL - PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE - SOUTH AUSTRALIA - WHEN APPEAL LIES - BY LEAVE OF COURT
CRIMINAL LAW - EVIDENCE - JUDICIAL DISCRETION TO ADMIT OR EXCLUDE EVIDENCE
CRIMINAL LAW - PROCEDURE - WARRANTS, ARREST, SEARCH, SEIZURE AND INCIDENTAL POWERS - WARRANTS - SEARCH WARRANTS - GENERALLY, ISSUE AND VALIDITY - VALIDITY
Appeal by Director of Public Prosecutions against interlocutory judgment of a Magistrate – where Magistrate ruled to exclude the evidence obtained under the authority of four warrants issued by the Independent Commissioner Against Corruption on the trial of the respondent – where permission to appeal required – whether special reasons exist – whether the warrants were issued within power – whether the warrants lacked specificity.
Held, granting permission to appeal and allowing the appeal: the warrants were issued within power – the warrants did not lack specificity.
Independent Commissioner Against Corruption Act 2012 (SA) s 3, s 5, s 31, s 56A; Magistrates Court Act 1991 (SA) s 3, s 42; Independent Commissioner Against Corruption (Miscellaneous) Amendment Act 2014 (SA) s 12(8); Public Sector (Honesty and Accountability Act 1995 (SA) s 26; Criminal Procedure Act 1921 (SA) s 68; Motor Vehicles Act 1959 (SA), referred to.
White v State of South Australia (2007) 96 SASR 581; Siewertsz van Reesema v Police [2009] SASC 8; Project Blue Sky Inc v Australian Broadcasting Authority (1998) 194 CLR 355; K-Generation Pty Ltd v Liquor Licensing Court (2009) 237 CLR 501; Lend Lease Real Estate Investments Ltd & Anor v GPT RE Ltd [2006] NSWCA 207; Federal Commissioner of Taxation v Applegate (1979) 27 ALR 114; Department for Health & Ageing v Li [2018] SASCFC 52; Inco Europe Ltd v First Choice Distribution (a firm) [2000] 2 All ER 109; Jones v Wrotham Park Settled Estates (or Wentworth Securities Ltd) [1980] AC 74; Electrolux Home Products Pty Ltd v Australian Workers’ Union (2004) 221 CLR 309; Joukhador v Commissioner of Police (NSW) [2018] NSWSC 872; Caratti v Commissioner of the Australian Federal Police (2017) 257 FCR 166; Hart v Commissioner of Australian Federal Police (2002) 124 FCR 384, applied.
R v Tillett; Ex Parte Newton (1969) 14 FLR 101, distinguished.
Question of Law Reserved in Acquittal (No. 5 of 1999) (2000) 76 SASR 356, discussed.
Bunning v Cross (1978) 141 CLR 54; Obeid v The Queen (2016) 329 ALR 372; Frugtniet v Victoria (1997) 71 ALJR 1598; Director of Public Prosecutions (SA) v B (1998) 194 CLR 566, considered.
WORDS AND PHRASES CONSIDERED/DEFINED
"public officer", "use"
DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC PROSECUTIONS (SA) v KING
[2019] SASC 42Magistrates Appeal: Criminal
BAMPTON J: The Director of Public Prosecutions (“the Director”)…
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- Case
- [2019] SASC 42
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The legal issues in this case included whether the warrants were issued within the powers granted under the Independent Commissioner Against Corruption Act 2012 (SA) and whether the warrants lacked specificity. The Magistrate had ruled that the warrants were invalid, but the Supreme Court disagreed. The court found that the warrants were issued within power and did not lack specificity, as they complied with the requirements of the Act and authorised the Commissioner to issue warrants for the purposes of an investigation into a potential issue of corruption in public administration. The court also found that there were special reasons to grant permission to appeal, as the Magistrate's ruling had a substantial and broad impact on all warrants issued by ICAC since 2012.
The Supreme Court of South Australia granted permission to appeal and allowed the appeal, setting aside the Magistrate's ruling that the warrants were invalid and excluding the admission of evidence obtained under the authority of the ICAC warrants. The court found that the warrants were issued within power and did not lack specificity, as they complied with the requirements of the Act and authorised the Commissioner to issue warrants for the purposes of an investigation into a potential issue of corruption in public administration. The court also found that there were special reasons to grant permission to appeal, as the Magistrate's ruling had a substantial and broad impact on all warrants issued by ICAC since 2012.
This case highlights the importance of ensuring that warrants issued by ICAC are within power and do not lack specificity. The Supreme Court of South Australia found that the warrants in this case were issued within power and did not lack specificity, and granted permission to appeal and allowed the appeal. This decision has significant implications for all warrants issued by ICAC since 2012 and may impact the admissibility of evidence obtained under the authority of such warrants in future trials.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Corruption in public administration was defined in s 5(1) of the Act to mean:(1)Corruption in public administration means conduct that constitutes—(a) an offence against Part 7 Division 4 (Offences relating to public officers) of the Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935, which includes the following offences:(i)bribery or corruption of public officers;(ii)threats or reprisals against public officers;(iii)abuse of public office;(iv)demanding or requiring benefit on basis of public office;(v)offences relating to appointment to public office; or(b) an offence against the Public Sector (Honesty and Accountability) Act 1995 or the Public Corporations Act 1993, or an attempt to commit such an offence; or(c) any other offence (including an offence against Part 5 (Offences of dishonesty) of the Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935) committed by a public officer while acting in his or her capacity as a public officer or by a former public officer and related to his or her former capacity as a public officer, or by a person before becoming a public officer and related to his or her capacity as a public officer, or an attempt to commit such an offence; or(d) any of the following in relation to an offence referred to in a preceding paragraph:(i)aiding, abetting, counselling or procuring the commission of the offence;(ii)inducing, whether by threats or promises or otherwise, the commission of the offence;(iii)being in any way, directly or indirectly, knowingly concerned in, or party to, the commission of the offence;(iv)conspiring with others to effect the commission of the offence. As submitted by the Director, corruption in public administration is not confined to normal office hours, the standard 38 hour working week, and government buildings. Public officers engaged in such corruption will most likely act covertly to avoid detection by non-complicit work colleagues or whistle-blowers. They most likely will attempt to conceal evidence of their activities in places they occupy or use other than in their capacity as public officers. A simple example of a public officer concealing acts of corruption is an officer who appropriates equipment owned by the public authority he or she works for and conceals it in his or her home or private vehicle or in the home or vehicle of a relative or friend. Section 31(1)(a) in force as at 18 September 2014, on my reading, empowered the Commissioner, if satisfied a warrant was reasonably required for the purposes of an investigation into a potential issue of corruption in public administration, to issue a warrant authorising an investigator to enter and search the public officer’s home, being a place occupied or used by the public officer. Section 31(1)(b) granted the Commissioner an equivalent power to issue warrants in respect of a vehicle registered in the public officer’s name being a vehicle owned by the public officer. Section 31(2) empowered a Supreme Court judge, acting persona designata, to issue warrants authorising an investigator to enter and search private places and private vehicles defined by s 31(14) to be places and vehicles other than those encompassed in s 31(1). By defining private places and private vehicle the legislature clearly indicated the intention to depart from the ordinary meaning of “private”.[22][22] Dennis Pearce and Robert Geddes, Statutory Interpretation in Australia (LexisNexis Butterworths, 8th ed, 2014) at 155 [4.8].