Department for Health and Ageing v Li

Link copied
Case Copied 60 min read

SUPREME COURT OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA

(Full Court)

DEPARTMENT FOR HEALTH AND AGEING v LI

[2018] SASCFC 52

Judgment of The Full Court

(The Honourable Chief Justice Kourakis, The Honourable Justice Stanley and The Honourable Justice Bampton)

12 June 2018

APPEAL AND NEW TRIAL - APPEAL - GENERAL PRINCIPLES - INTERFERENCE WITH JUDGE'S FINDINGS OF FACT - FUNCTIONS OF APPELLATE COURT - IN GENERAL

APPEAL AND NEW TRIAL - APPEAL - GENERAL PRINCIPLES - RIGHT OF APPEAL - WHEN APPEAL LIES - ERROR OF LAW - PARTICULAR CASES INVOLVING ERROR OF LAW - FAILURE TO GIVE REASONS FOR DECISION - ADEQUACY OF REASONS

APPEAL AND NEW TRIAL - APPEAL - PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE - SOUTH AUSTRALIA - POWERS OF COURT

WORKERS' COMPENSATION - ENTITLEMENT TO COMPENSATION - PARTICULAR INJURIES, DISEASES AND DISABILITIES - OTHER INJURIES, DISEASES OR DISABILITIES

WORKERS' COMPENSATION - ENTITLEMENT TO COMPENSATION - EMPLOYMENT RELATED INJURY, DISABILITY OR DISEASE

WORKERS' COMPENSATION - PROCEEDINGS TO OBTAIN COMPENSATION - DETERMINATION OF CLAIMS - GENERALLY

Appeal by the Department for Health and Ageing against a determination by the Full Bench of the South Australian Employment Tribunal that it is liable to pay the respondent compensation for depressive illness. In making that determination, the Full Bench reversed the order of a Deputy President who heard the respondent’s claim and dismissed it on the grounds that the predominant employment cause of Ms Li’s depressive illness was reasonable administrative action.

In the present appeal before the Full Court, the Department for Health and Ageing appeals against the decision of the Full Bench on the ground that the literal construction it gave s 30A of the Workers Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 1986 (SA) was wrong in law. It contends that because the only, or predominant, employment cause(s) of the respondent’s depressive illness was the Department’s reasonable administrative action, her claim was precluded by s 30A even if personal stressors, extraneous to her employment, were the predominant cause of her illness.

The respondent filed a Notice of Alternative Contention supporting the decision of the Full Bench on two grounds. First, that the Deputy President did not address the question whether her employment, other than administrative action, was a substantial cause. Secondly, the reasons given by the Deputy President were inadequate in finding that no employment cause was contributing to Ms Li’s depressive illness at the time of her admission to Modbury Hospital, and reasonable administrative action was the predominant employment cause of Ms Li’s injury thereafter.

Held, per Kourakis CJ:

1. Both the construction of s 30A adopted by the Deputy President at first instance and the construction given to it by the Full Bench on appeal respectively were wrong in law (at [7]).

2. It is an implied condition of s 30A(a) that to qualify for compensation, an employment cause, which is not administrative action, must be a substantial cause of the injury (at [7]).

3. On a proper construction of s 30A, the question is whether an employment cause, other than reasonable administrative action, is…

CaseChat AU logo

Keep reading for free

Create a free CaseChat account to read Department for Health and Ageing v Li and more:

  • Read every judgment in full
  • Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
  • See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
  • Download judgments as PDF or Word
Continue with Google

One click creates your free account or signs you in.

By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.

Details
Case
[2018] SASCFC 52
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

This matter concerned an appeal by the Department for Health and Ageing against a decision of the Full Bench of the Supreme Court of South Australia, which had upheld a worker's compensation claim made by Ms Li. The dispute centred on whether Ms Li's mental illness was compensable under the Workers Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 1986 (SA), specifically concerning the interpretation of section 30A of that Act.

The primary legal issues before the court were the proper construction of section 30A of the Act, particularly the requirement for employment to be a "substantial cause" of the injury, and how this interacted with the exclusion for injuries predominantly caused by reasonable administrative action. The court also considered whether the Deputy President's original decision and the Full Bench's subsequent decision adequately addressed these legal requirements and the factual findings necessary to determine Ms Li's claim.

The court reasoned that both the Deputy President and the Full Bench had erred in their construction of section 30A. The Chief Justice held that for an employment cause, other than reasonable administrative action, to qualify for compensation, it must be a substantial cause of the injury. If such a substantial employment cause exists, then section 30A(b) only precludes compensation if reasonable administrative action was the predominant cause of the mental illness when considered alongside all other employment and non-employment causes. The court found that the Deputy President had failed to make a factual finding on whether there was a substantial employment cause of Ms Li's condition due to an erroneous interpretation of the section.

Consequently, the Full Bench's decision to uphold Ms Li's claim without a finding that her employment, apart from reasonable administrative action, was a substantial cause of her illness was also deemed incorrect. The court allowed the appeal, ordering that Ms Li's matter be remitted for a rehearing to determine the factual question of whether her employment was a substantial cause of her mental condition.

Orders

Orders of the court

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

I would hold that both the construction of s 30A of the Act adopted by the Deputy President at first instance and the construction given to it by the Full Bench on appeal respectively were wrong in law. I would hold that it is an implied condition of s 30A(a) of the Act that to qualify for compensation, an employment cause, which is not reasonable administrative action, must be a substantial cause of the injury. If there is such a cause, s 30A(b) of the Act only precludes compensation if reasonable administrative action is the predominant of all employment and non‑employment causes of the mental illness. On that construction of s 30A, it was necessary to determine whether or not there was a substantial employment cause of Ms Li’s mental condition. Even though it is implicit in the reasons that the Deputy President was not so satisfied, the reasons fail to disclose why his Honour was not. Indeed, the Deputy President did not expressly address the question at all because of the erroneous construction his Honour gave s 30A of the Act. The Full Bench’s order setting aside the Deputy President’s decision should therefore be upheld on the first of the grounds in the Notice of Alternative Contention. However, the Full Bench was wrong to uphold Ms Li’s claim in the absence of a factual finding that her employment, other than reasonable administrative action, was a substantial cause of her illness. The Full Bench should have ordered that Ms Li’s matter be remitted for rehearing so that the factual question might be determined. The evidence In February 2012, within a month of Ms Li starting work at the Hospital, other staff members complained about her demeanour. A meeting was held between Ms Li, her supervisor, Ms Dorothy (Dot) Pannell and Ms Lois Scaife, a work colleague, on 15 February 2012 concerning her ‘aggressive’ communication style. Ms Li testified, but Ms Pannell denied, that she complained to Ms Pannell about the rudeness and aggressive communication styles of other staff to her but that she was ignored. Notes of the meeting record that it was an agreed outcome that Ms Li was to lower her voice and slow her speech. There was no record of any plan to make Ms Li’s colleagues aware of the personal and cultural factors which affected the way she communicated. The reform of Ms Li’s communication style was taken further by the Director of Nursing, Ms Heather Saunders, and the Nurse Manager of Surgery and Intensive Care, Ms Elaine Roberts, at the Hospital. The Nurse Manager wrote to Ms Li on 7 March 2012 noting ‘with disappointment’ matters concerning her ‘professional behaviour and communication methods’. The letter described Ms Li’s communication as ‘hostile, aggressive, rude and non‑respectful in nature’. The letter concluded that the ‘issues are serious in nature’ and ‘would represent a breach in the Australian Nursery and Midwifery Council Code of Professional Conduct…’. A meeting with Ms Li was requested. The Deputy President, with respect, correctly concluded that the administrative action of writing that letter was not reasonable. I agree. The letter was heavy handed. It adjudged Ms Li guilty of unprofessional conduct without according her the procedural fairness required by such a serious charge. The judgment failed to have regard to Ms Li’s personal and cultural circumstances.

Decision

Reasons for decision

(b) if so, whether her illness was predominantly caused by reasonable administrative action.Conclusions I would allow the appeal because of the error of construction made by the Full Bench. On a proper construction of s 30A of the Act, the Full Bench should have remitted the matter to a Deputy President to determine the matter in accordance with these reasons. I would so order. STANLEY J: This appeal raises the proper construction of s 30A of the Workers Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 1986 (SA) (the Act). The proper construction of the Act is a matter of text, context and purpose. It is necessary to start with the text construed in the context of the language and purpose of the statute as a whole. The Court must give the text the meaning that the legislature intended it to have. Usually that meaning will correspond with the grammatical meaning of the section, although the context, consequences of any particular construction and the purpose of the statute may sometimes require a non‑literal interpretation to be adopted.[8] As the High Court said in Project Blue Sky Inc v Australian Broadcasting Authority[9], citing with approval the reasons of Dixon CJ in Commissioner for Railways (NSW) v Agalianos,[10] the context, the general purpose and policy of the provision and its consistency and fairness are surer guides to its meaning than the logic with which it is constructed.[8] Project Blue Sky Inc v Australian Broadcasting Authority (1998) 194 CLR 355 at 384.[9] (1998) 194 CLR 355 at 381.[10] [1955] HCA 27, (1955) 92 CLR 390 at 397. Since the judgment of this Court in Rubbert,[11] the Parliament has been concerned to confine the compensability of illnesses or disorders of the mind. The enactment of s 30A of the Act was one such measure.[11] Workers Rehabilitation Compensation Corporation v Rubbert (1991) 160 LSJS 257. Section 30A imposed a two-limb test for compensability in respect of that category of injury. The first limb is that employment must be a substantial cause of the injury. The second limb is that the injury did not arise wholly or predominantly from:[12]...(i) reasonable action taken in a reasonable manner by the employer to transfer, demote, discipline, counsel, retrench or dismiss the worker; or(ii) a decision of the employer, based on reasonable grounds, not to award or provide a promotion, transfer, or benefit in connection with the worker's employment; or(iii) reasonable administrative action taken in a reasonable manner by the employer in connection with the worker's employment; or(iv) reasonable action taken in a reasonable manner under this Act affecting the worker.[12] Workers Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 1986 (SA) s 30A(b). That two-limb test, however, poses a particular difficulty of construction in the circumstances of this case, as disclosed by the approach of the Full Bench to the interpretation of s 30A. As the Chief Justice has identified, the adoption of a literal interpretation of s 30A leads to an absurd result, contrary to the purpose of the provision.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established