FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
De Tarle v Comcare [2022] FCA 175
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- AGLC
- De Tarle v Comcare [2022] FCA 175
- Case
- [2022] FCA 175
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court considered whether the AAT misapplied the test for “injury” as established in previous cases such as Military Rehabilitation and Compensation Commission v May, Federal Broom Co Pty Ltd v Semlitch, and State Transit Authority of New South Wales v Chemler. The court also examined whether the AAT failed to consider the “eggshell skull rule,” which acknowledges that a person may suffer a more serious injury than another in the same circumstances due to pre-existing conditions. Furthermore, the court assessed if the AAT denied the applicant procedural fairness by considering information not raised at the hearing, and whether the AAT’s reasons were inconsistent. After thorough analysis, the court found no error in the AAT's decision.
The court dismissed the application, finding that the AAT had properly applied the statutory framework and was not in error in its determination. The Tribunal’s finding that the applicant ceased taking his antidepressant medication during the course of employment was upheld, and this fact was considered relevant in assessing the aggravation of his pre-existing psychiatric condition. The court concluded that the Tribunal's reasons were consistent and that no procedural unfairness or irrelevant considerations were involved. Consequently, the applicant's appeal was dismissed, and the costs of the application were to be paid by the applicant to the respondent.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The application is dismissed.
2. The applicant is to pay the respondent’s costs, to be agreed or assessed.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Full text does not contain this section.
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Full text does not contain this section.
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Whilst accepting that subjective experiences of feeling unwell do not qualify as an injury, the applicant also submitted in reply that an increase in psychological symptoms in accordance with May, can be described as an aggravation. The increased symptoms included “depression and paranoia” which, the applicant submitted, are well known symptoms of psychiatric illness and contrary to the Tribunal’s finding, constituted a “psychiatric change”. That the Tribunal considered the most “relevant fact” to be that the applicant ceased taking his medication is a distraction from the principles in Chemler and Semlitch in a psychiatric case of taking the victim as one finds them. Consideration The respondent’s submission must be accepted. At the outset it is appropriate to recall three factual matters. First, the chronology of events recited above as well as the factual findings made by the Tribunal are unchallenged. This reflects that the applicant suffered from a longstanding and significant pre-existing psychiatric disease which had been the subject of ongoing intensive medical treatment, including prescription of medication, and that was subject to worsening of symptoms in previous employment. However, at the time that the applicant was employed by ASIC in May 2010, for the first 12 months, his own evidence was that he was happy with his job, and thereafter in August 2011 he voluntarily ceased taking his medication. He presented himself to the emergency department of a hospital with a florid intensification of symptoms accompanied by suicidal ideation in April 2012, about halfway through his employment at ASIC. Second, the Tribunal found that the applicant had ceased taking his medication. The applicant’s evidence-in-chief was that notwithstanding that this was an idea floated by his treatment providers before or at the time of his employment with ASIC, he did not receive advice to go off his medication and he never did. That is, there was a factual dispute as to whether the applicant ceased taking his medication, which was resolved against him. It was open to the Tribunal to so find. Although he was given prescriptions from his treatment providers he did not have them filled. At [92]-[93] the Tribunal concluded: [92]In my view the most relevant issue is the fact that Mr De Tarle’s DHS-Individual Prescribing reveals that the last prescription for paroxetine was supplied 5 August 2011 and that there is no record of any other antidepressant, or any other medication, being supplied until sertraline was supplied on 22 April 2013 in respect of a prescription provided by Dr Unsen, dated 28 February 2013.[93]As the only access, in Australia, to subsidised antidepressant medication is by prescription via the Pharmaceutical Benefits Scheme, the only conclusion I can make is that at some time after August 2011, Mr De Tarle stopped taking his antidepressant medication and did not start with the new medication until on, or after 22 April 2013. The reason for Mr De Tarle’s cessation of his long term antidepressant is unclear.