CZBB and CZBC v Minister for Immigration

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FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA

CZBB & CZBC v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & ANOR [2013] FCCA 310
Catchwords:
MIGRATION – Meaning of “to consider” – use of “Tribunal emphasised” country information not disclosed to Applicants – considerations regarding jurisdictional error – “illogicality” and “unreasonableness” as opposed to evidence on which reasonable minds may differ.
Legislation:
Migration Act 1958, ss.420, 424(1), (2A), (3)(a), 424AA, 477(1) & (2)
Migration Amendment (Complementary Protection) Act2011

Cases cited:
Appellant S395/2002 v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs; Appellant S396/2002 v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs (2003) 216 CLR 473
Applicant VEAL of 2002 v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2005) 225 CLR 88
Attorney-General (NSW) v Quin (1990) 170 CLR 1
Kirk v Industrial Relations Commission (2010) 239 CLR 531
Minister for Aboriginal Affairs v Peko-Wallsend (1986) 162 CLR 24
Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v Khadgi (2010) 190 FCR 248
Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v MZYYL [2012] FCAFC 147
Minister for Immigration & Citizenship v SZHXF (2008) 166 FCR 298
Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZJSS  (2010) 243 CLR 164
Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZMDS (2010) 240 CLR 611
Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Wu Shan Liang (1996) 185 CLR 259
Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Yusuf (2001) 206 CLR 323
Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs v NAMW (2004) 140 FCR 572
Minister for State for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Teoh (1995) 183 CLR 273
Muin v Refugee Review Tribunal (2002) 190 ALR 601
NABD of 2002 v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2005) 216 ALR 1
Plaintiff M13/2011 v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (2011) 121 ALD 466; (2011) 277 ALR 667
Randhawa v Minister for Immigration, Local Government and Ethnic Affairs (1994) 52 FCR 437
Re Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs; Ex parte Lam (2003) 214 CLR 1
Re Refugee Review Tribunal; Ex Parte Aala (2000) 204 CLR 82
SAAP v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2005) 228 CLR 294
SCMCD v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (2009) 174 FCR 415
Shi v Migration Agents Registration Authority (2008) 235 CLR 286
SZATV v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (2007) 233 CLR 18
SZBYR v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (2007) 235 ALR 609
SZEEU v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2006) 150 FCR 214
SZMCD v Minister for Immigration & Citizenship (2009) 174 FCR 415
SZOQQ v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (2013) 296 ALR 409; [2013] HCA 12
Tickner v Chapman (1995) 57 FCR 451

M. Aronson, B. Dyer, M. Groves, Judicial Review of Administrative Action (Fourth Edition) (Sydney: Lawbook Co., 2009)
M. Crock & L. Berg, Immigration, Refugees and Forced Migration: Law, Policy and Practice in Australia, (Sydney: The Federation Press, 2011)
P. Keane, “Judicial Power and the Limits of Judicial Control,” in Centenary Essays for the High Court of Australia (ed. P. Cane) (Sydney: LexisNexis Butterworths, 2004) 295-313

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Details
Case
[2013] FCCA 310
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

This matter concerned an appeal by CZBB and CZBC (the applicants) against a decision of the Minister for Immigration. The applicants sought to challenge the Minister's decision, which had implications for their immigration status. The case was heard by Judge Neville.

The central legal issues before the court were whether the Minister's decision involved jurisdictional error, specifically concerning the assessment of the applicants' claims under the Convention definition of "refugee." This involved determining whether the decision-maker had properly considered the objective element of the refugee definition, which requires an assessment of what may happen to the applicant if they return to their country of nationality. The court also had to consider the proper use of country information and the risk of making assumptions based on broad classifications rather than individual circumstances.

Judge Neville's reasoning drew heavily on established High Court authority. The court emphasised that the assessment of a refugee claim must be an individual and fact-specific inquiry, focusing on how the particular applicant may be treated upon return to their country of nationality. The court cautioned against the "inversion of the proper order of inquiry" by relying on a priori classifications, which risks assuming an applicant will be treated the same as others of a similar background without proper attention to the accuracy or applicability of such classifications. Furthermore, the court noted that country information, often general in nature, must be carefully considered, particularly when assessing the reasonableness of an internal relocation option. The court also addressed the standard for jurisdictional error based on illogicality or irrationality, stating that such error arises only if the decision reached is one that no rational or logical decision-maker could arrive at on the same evidence. If probative evidence can support different reasoning processes and conclusions, a decision preferring one conclusion over another cannot be deemed illogical or irrational.

Orders

Orders of the court

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Background

Background to the litigation

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Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

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Decision

Reasons for decision

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Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

In the joint judgment of Gummow and Hayne JJ in Appellant S395/2002 v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs; Appellant S396/2002 v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs, at [73] and [78], their Honours said (internal citations omitted; unless otherwise specified, emphasis in original text):[26][73] The objective element [of the Convention definition of “refugee”] requires the decision-maker to decide what may happen if the applicant returns to the country of nationality. That is an inquiry which requires close consideration of the situation of the particular applicant. [emphasis added][77] Further, there is a serious risk of inverting the proper order of inquiry by arguing from an a priori classification given to the applicant, or the applicant's claim, to a conclusion about what may happen to the applicant if he or she returns to the country of nationality, without giving proper attention to the accuracy or applicability of the class chosen. That is, there is a real risk of assuming (wrongly) that a particular applicant will be treated in the same way as others of that race, religion, social class or political view are treated in that country…. [78] The central question in any particular case is whether there is a well-founded fear of persecution. That requires examination of how this [emphasis in original text] applicant may be treated if he or she returns to the country of nationality. Processes of classification may obscure the essentially individual and fact-specific inquiry which must be made. [emphasis added][26] Appellant S395/2002 v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs; Appellant S396/2002 v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs (2003) 216 CLR 473. Subject to what is said later in relation to s.424A(3), it is sufficient to note the caution expressed by Kirby J in SZATV, at [82], in relation to the utility and reliability of “country information.” His Honour said:[27]In the nature of things, country information available to refugee adjudicators is often expressed at a high level of generality. It may not extend in sufficient detail to establish, in a convincing way, the differential safety of other towns, districts or regions of the one country. The fact that in Australia the inquiry is relevant only to the well-foundedness of the fear of persecution on the part of the refugee applicant indicates that, where otherwise a relevant "fear" is shown, considerable care will need to be observed in concluding that the internal relocation option is a reasonable one when, by definition, the applicant has not taken advantage of its manifest convenience and arguable attractions.[27] SZATV v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (2007) 233 CLR 18. In relation to this aspect of the review/appeal raised by the Applicants, I note the detailed instruction provided in the joint judgment of Crennan and Bell JJ in Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZMDS. Beginning at [121], their Honours said, at [130] – [131]:[28][130] In the context of the Tribunal's decision here, "illogicality" or "irrationality" sufficient to give rise to jurisdictional error must mean the decision to which the Tribunal came, in relation to the state of satisfaction required under s 65, is one at which no rational or logical decision maker could arrive on the same evidence. In other words, accepting, for the sake of argument, that an allegation of illogicality or irrationality provides some distinct basis for seeking judicial review of a decision as to a jurisdictional fact, it is nevertheless an allegation of the same order as a complaint that a decision is "clearly unjust" or "arbitrary" or "capricious" or "unreasonable" in the sense that the state of satisfaction mandated by the statute imports a requirement that the opinion as to the state of satisfaction must be one that could be formed by a reasonable person. The same applies in the case of an opinion that a mandated state of satisfaction has not been reached. Not every lapse in logic will give rise to jurisdictional error. A court should be slow, although not unwilling, to interfere in an appropriate case.[131] What was involved here was an issue of jurisdictional fact upon which different minds might reach different conclusions. The complaint of illogicality or irrationality was said to lie in the process of reasoning. But, the test for illogicality or irrationality must be to ask whether logical or rational or reasonable minds might adopt different reasoning or might differ in any decision or finding to be made on evidence upon which the decision is based. If probative evidence can give rise to different processes of reasoning and if logical or rational or reasonable minds might differ in respect of the conclusions to be drawn from that evidence, a decision cannot be said by a reviewing court to be illogical or irrational or unreasonable, simply because one conclusion has been preferred to another possible conclusion.[28] Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZMDS (2010) 240 CLR 611.