BTX17 v Minister for Immigration (No.2)

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FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA

BTX17 & ANOR v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION (No.2) [2020] FCCA 2270
Catchwords:
MIGRATION – Application for extension of time to make application for remedies under s.476 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (Act) in relation to decisions that applications for protection visas are not valid applications because of s.91P of the Act because the applicants are said to be nationals of Kenya and Zimbabwe – order made – whether question whether applicants are nationals of two or more countries is a question about the existence of a jurisdictional fact – question is about a jurisdictional fact – whether applicants are nationals of both Kenya and Zimbabwe – applicants nationals of Kenya but not satisfied nationals of Zimbabwe – relief granted.

Legislation:

Australian Constitution, s.44
Evidence Act 1995 (Cth), ss.79, 174, 175, 177
Federal Circuit Court Rules 2001 (Cth), r.9.03

Migration Act 1958 (Cth), ss.46, 47, 65, 91N, 91P, 476, 477(1), 477(2)

Cases cited:

AHZ16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCA 164

Anisminic Ltd v Foreign Compensation Commission [1969] 2 AC 147

Australian Securities and Investment Commission v Edensor Nominees Pty Ltd [2001] HCA 1; (2001) 204 CLR 559

Bankstown Municipal Council v Fripp (1919) 26 CLR 385

Bunbury v Fuller (1853) 9 Ex 111

Corporation of the City of Enfield v Development Assessment Commission & Anor (2000) 199 CLR 135; [2000] HCA 5
IBM Global Services Australia Limited in the matter of an Application for Writs of Certiorari and Prohibition, against the Australian Industrial Relations Commission [2005] FCAFC 66

Lichtenstein v Guatemala [1955] I.C.J. 4

Maroun v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2009] FCA 1284

Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v Le [2007] FCA 1318

Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs v SGLB [2004] HCA 32

National Mutual Holdings Pty Ltd v Sentry Corporation (1989) 22 FCR 209

Neilson v Overseas Projects Corporation of Victoria Ltd [2005] HCA 54

Plaintiff M70/2011 v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship; Plaintiff M106 of 2011 v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2011] HCA 32
Public Service Association of South Australia Incorporated v Industrial Relations Commission of South Australia [2012] HCA 25
Re Canavan; Re Ludlam; Re Waters; Re Roberts [No 2]; Re Joyce; Re Nash; Re Xenophon [2017] HCA 45

Sykes v Cleary (No 2) (1992) 176 CLR 77

SZOAU v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2012] FCAFC 33

SZQYM v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2014] FCA 427

The King v Burgess; Ex parte Henry (1936) 55 CLR 608

Timbarra Protection Inc v Ross Mining NL [1998] NSWCA 8

First Applicant: BTX17
Second Applicant: BTY17
Respondent: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION, CITIZENSHIP, MIGRANT SERVICES AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS
File Number: SYG 1250 of 2017
Judgment of: Judge Manousaridis
Hearing date: 13 February and 16 March 2020
Date of Last Submission: 19 April 2020
Delivered at: Sydney
Delivered on: 21 August 2020

REPRESENTATION

Litigation guardian in person, on behalf of the first and second applicants, and assisted by Mr H Ford with…
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Details
Case
[2020] FCCA 2270
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

This case concerned an application for an extension of time to seek remedies under section 476 of the *Migration Act 1958* (Cth). The applicants sought to challenge a decision by the Minister for Immigration that their applications for protection visas were invalid. This invalidity was asserted under section 91P of the Act, which states that a protection visa application is not valid if the applicant is a national of two or more countries. The Minister’s decision was based on the premise that the applicants were nationals of both Kenya and Zimbabwe. The matter came before Judge Manousaridis in the Federal Circuit Court.

The central legal issues before the court were whether the question of whether the applicants were nationals of two or more countries constituted a jurisdictional fact, and if so, whether the applicants were indeed nationals of both Kenya and Zimbabwe. The court was required to determine the ultimate authority on the existence of these facts, as opposed to the Minister's satisfaction being the sole determinant.

The court reasoned that the question of whether an applicant is a national of two or more countries is a jurisdictional fact, meaning a court has the ultimate authority to determine its existence. The Minister’s argument that the applicants were nationals of Zimbabwe, based on purported birth registrations, was rejected. The court found that the expert evidence did not support the assertion that these registrations were made in accordance with Zimbabwean law, and any perceived discretion by officials to register births contrary to statutory provisions was not a basis for establishing legal nationality. The court was satisfied that the applicants were nationals of Kenya but was not satisfied that they were nationals of Zimbabwe.

Consequently, the court granted the applicants' request for an extension of time to make their application for remedies. The court found that the applicants were nationals of Kenya but not of Zimbabwe, meaning they were not nationals of "2 or more countries" as required by section 91P of the *Migration Act 1958* (Cth) to render their protection visa applications invalid.

Orders

Orders of the court

Full text does not contain this section.

Background

Background to the litigation

Before a power repository can exercise a power conferred on him or her he or she must be satisfied that certain facts or state of affairs exist or do not exist (relevant facts). The relevant facts of whose existence or non-existence a power repository in any given case must be satisfied depends on the terms of the particular legislative provision that confers the power on the power repository. In most cases – probably in the vast majority of cases – whether relevant facts exists or do not exist is a matter solely for the power repository to determine. The power repository’s determination in these circumstances is not immune from challenge in a court for jurisdictional error; but on such challenge a court cannot decide whether the relevant facts exist or do not exist. A successful challenge, at least in most cases, will result in the power repository being required to consider again whether he or she should be satisfied of the existence or non-existence of the relevant facts. In some cases, however, it is not within the sole power of the power repository to determine relevant facts; a court whose jurisdiction has been properly invoked must do so. The expression “jurisdictional facts” is used to denote this class of relevant facts. They are relevant facts that a power repository must determine exist or do not exist before they can exercise the power reposed in them; but it is a court whose jurisdiction has been properly invoked that has the ultimate authority to determine whether the relevant facts exist or do not exist. There are general statements in the cases which attempt to describe facts a power repository is required to make that are “jurisdictional facts”. A basic and well-rehearsed idea is that jurisdictional facts are facts that must exist at the outset before a tribunal or inferior court with limited jurisdiction can lawfully commence to do that which it has jurisdiction to do. Sometimes such facts were referred to as “collateral facts” as opposed to the “merits”, being facts the tribunal or inferior court had jurisdiction to determine. This distinction appears in the following passage from the judgment of Coleridge J in Bunbury v Fuller:[22]Now it is a general rule, that no court of limited jurisdiction can give itself jurisdiction by a wrong decision on a point collateral to the merits of the case upon which the limit to its jurisdiction depends; and however its decision may be final on all particulars, making up together that subject-matter which, if true, is within its jurisdiction, and, however necessary in many cases it may be for it to make a preliminary inquiry, whether some collateral matter be or be not within the limits, yet upon this preliminary question, its decision must always be open to inquiry in the superior court.[22] Bunbury v Fuller (1853) 9 Ex 111, at page 140 (quoted in Anisminic Ltd v Foreign Compensation Commission [1969] 2 AC 147, at pages 196 and 189-190) A common legislative drafting technique to limit the range of facts that could be characterised as jurisdictional facts has been to predicate a power repository’s jurisdiction on the power repository’s holding an opinion, or being satisfied, that certain facts exist or do not exist.[23] In those circumstances, a power repository’s holding or not holding an opinion, or being satisfied or not satisfied that certain facts exist or do not exist, are themselves treated as jurisdictional facts liable to be reviewed for jurisdictional error.[24][23] See Bankstown Municipal Council v Fripp (1919) 26 CLR 385, at page 403 [24] See, for example, Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs v SGLB [2004] HCA 32, at [37], where Gummow and Hayne JJ said: “The satisfaction of the Minister is a condition precedent to the discharge of the obligation to grant or refuse to grant the visa, and is a “jurisdictional fact” or criterion upon which the exercise of that authority is conditioned.”

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Under the common law, where foreign law applies to the determination of a dispute, the foreign law is treated as a fact which must be proved by expert evidence.[47] This has been modified by s.174 and s.175 of the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) (Evidence Act). Relevant to the evidence that has been adduced before me is s.174(1) of the Evidence Act which relevantly provides that evidence of a statute may be adduced in a proceeding by producing “a copy of the statute”. [47] Neilson v Overseas Projects Corporation of Victoria Ltd [2005] HCA 54, at [115] The rule provided for by s.79(1) of the Evidence Act applies to a person who purports to give evidence of foreign law. That person must have “specialised knowledge based on the person’s training, study or experience”; and the opinion such person expresses about foreign law must be “wholly or substantially based on that knowledge”. The cases have drawn a distinction between evidence of the rules and principles of foreign law, and “the application of those rules and principles, as so ascertained, to the particular facts and circumstances of the instant case”. The application of the principles of foreign law so ascertained to the facts of the case “is a question of law for the court of the forum, upon which evidence is not receivable”. Where, however, the rules of the foreign law confer discretions on the courts that administer them, “evidence is receivable as to the manner in which those discretions are exercised, with reference to any pattern or course of decision”.[48][48] National Mutual Holdings Pty Ltd v Sentry Corporation (1989) 22 FCR 209, at page 226; referred to with approval by Gummow and Hayne JJ in Neilson v Overseas Projects Corporation of Victoria Ltd [2005] HCA 54, at [120] The Minister relies on an expert’s report prepared by Dr Bronwen Manby. The report is not in the form of an affidavit, and it may be taken that it has been tendered as an “expert’s certificate” under s.177 of the Evidence Act. The Minister did not prove service of the certificate. The report, however, was annexed to the affidavit of Mr Moss which was filed on 28 May 2018. Mr Ford did not submit he had not been served with the affidavit at around the time it was filed. In her report, Dr Manby says she was admitted as a solicitor in England and Wales in 1989, although she has not practised as a solicitor; she has had 25 years professional experience related to human rights and democracy in Africa; and she is the author of several publications of citizenship law in Africa. Dr Manby was also awarded a doctorate by the faculty of Law of Maastricht University on comparative African citizenship law, and its development over time. The thesis on the basis of which Dr Manby was awarded her doctorate includes case studies on the application of citizenship law in both Kenya and Zimbabwe. Dr Manby then addressed particular questions, first in relation to the law of Kenya, and then in relation to the law of Zimbabwe. As to the law of Kenya, Dr Manby expresses opinions and statements that include the following:a)Kenyan citizenship is governed by Chapter 3 of the Constitution of Kenya (Kenya Constitution) and by the Citizenship and Immigration Act No.12 of 2011 (Kenya Citizenship Act).[49][49] Dr Manby’s report, [7]b)The Kenya Constitution provides for two categories of citizenship, namely, by birth or registration.[50][50] Dr Manby’s report, [8]c)The acquisition of citizenship by birth is provided for by Art.14 of the Kenya Constitution, which (as reproduced by Dr Manby) provides as follows:[51][51] Dr Manby’s report, [9](1)A person is a citizen by birth if on the day of the person’s birth, whether or not the person is born in Kenya, either the mother or father of the person is a citizen.(2)Clause (1) applies equally to a person born before the effective date [the date of entry into force of the constitution, 27 August 2010], whether or not the person was born in Kenya, if either the mother or father of the person is or was a citizen.(3)Parliament may enact legislation limiting the effect of clauses (1) and (2) on the descendants of Kenyan citizens who are born outside Kenya.(4)A child found in Kenya who is, or appears to be, less than eight years of age, and whose nationality and parents are not known, is presumed to be a citizen by birth.d)Section 7 of the Kenya Citizenship Act, as amended by “the 2015 amendments” responds to Art.14(3) of the Kenya Constitution and provides that a “person born outside Kenya shall be a citizen by birth if on the date of birth that person’s mother or father was or is a citizen”.[52]e)The Kenya Constitution does not provide for the loss or deprivation of citizenship in the case of a citizen by birth, although a person who has acquired citizenship by registration may be deprived of citizenship in certain circumstances involving conviction for a serious crime.[53]f)On the basis of these laws, a child born in Australia to a father who is a Kenyan citizen would acquire Kenyan citizenship automatically at birth; and that would be so even if the mother is not a Kenyan citizen.[54]g)Before 2010 a Kenyan citizen would in most cases automatically lose Kenyan citizenship on voluntarily acquiring another. Since 2010, this has not been the case; but a Kenyan citizen who does acquire another citizenship is required by legislation to notify the Kenyan authorities. Failure to disclose is an offence, but the Kenya Citizenship Act does not establish what the consequences are for entitlement to Kenyan citizenship if disclosure is not made.[55]h)Neither the Kenya Constitution nor the Kenya Citizenship Act include any provision relating to persons who are born with two citizenships, or the potential to hold two citizenships, although the Citizenship and Immigration Regulations adopted in 2012 include the possibility of a person declaring that two citizenships are held “by birth”, and that possibility is manifested by a form in a schedule to the regulations.[56][52] Dr Manby’s report, [11][53] Dr Manby’s report, [13][54] Dr Manby’s report, [15][55] Dr Manby’s report, [23][56] Dr Manby’s report, [24]

Decision

Reasons for decision

By letters dated 16 February 2017 addressed to each of the applicants, however, a different officer of the Department recorded a decision (Decision) that each of the applications for a Protection visa was not valid because of s.91N and s.91P of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (Act). The effect of these provisions is that an application for a protection visa made in the migration zone by a non-citizen is not a valid application if the non-citizen “is a national of 2 or more countries”. The officer decided the applicants were citizens of both Zimbabwe and Kenya; and the officer so found because the applicants’ father (father) is a national of Zimbabwe, and the applicants’ mother (mother) is a national of Kenya; and, under the laws of Zimbabwe and Kenya, both of the applicants are citizens of Zimbabwe and of Kenya. On 20 April 2017 the applicants filed an application in this Court for remedies under s.476 of the Act in relation to the Decision. This occurred more than the 35 day period provided for by s.477(1) of the Act. The applicants did not, however, in their form of application claim an order under s.477(2) of the Act extending the time prescribed by s.477(1) of the Act. This deficiency was remedied at the hearing on 13 February 2020 when I permitted the applicants’ father, who had been appointed litigation guardian of the applicants, to prepare and file in Court an application for an order under s.477(2) of the Act. The Minister did not oppose my making an order extending time under s.477(2); and I am satisfied that it is necessary in the interests of the administration of justice that an order be made under s.477(2) of the Act. Before I identify the questions that arise on the application before me, it will be necessary to describe the background to the applications for the Protection visas, and the course of the proceeding before me. In 2008 the father applied at the Department’s office in Nairobi for a subclass TU-572 (Student (Temporary)) visa.[1] In support of that application the father submitted a joint affidavit he made with his former wife on 2 September 2004.[2] In that affidavit the father and his former wife deposed they were both Kenyan citizens by birth.[1] Affidavit of A M Moss 28.05.2018, [5(a)][2] Affidavit of A M Moss 28.05.2018, [6]; annexure “AM-3” On 26 August 2016 the applicants and their parents applied for a subclass WE-050 Bridging E (Class WE) visa.[3] In support of that application the father and the mother submitted the following documents:a)A “Notice of the Birth of a Child born outside Zimbabwe to citizens of Zimbabwe otherwise than by descent” dated 25 August 2016.[4] That document relates to the first applicant, whose name is recorded as [EMK]. It purports to be issued by the Zimbabwe Embassy in Canberra. It records the father’s and mother’s names, [LKM] and [SK] respectively.b)A “Notice of the Birth of a Child born outside Zimbabwe to citizens of Zimbabwe otherwise than by descent” dated 25 August 2016.[5] That document relates to the second applicant, whose name is recorded as [JTK]. It, too, purports to be issued by the Zimbabwe Embassy in Canberra. It records the father’s and mother’s names, [LKM] and [SK] respectively.c)A certificate of marriage issued on 2 November 2012 in relation to the marriage of the applicants’ parents on 19 October 2012.[6]d)A document titled “Certified Copy of an Entry of Birth Registered in the District of Mutare in Zimbabwe” in relation to the mother.[7] The document appears to have been issued in 2016 by the Zimbabwean Registrar-general of Births and Death.e)A document titled “Certificate of Birth” in relation to the father issued in 1999 under the Kenyan Births and Deaths Registration Act.[8][3] Affidavit of A M Moss 28.05.2018, [5(b)][4] Affidavit of A M Moss 28.05.2018, [7(a)]; annexure “AM-4”[5] Affidavit of A M Moss 28.05.2018, [7(b)]; annexure “AM-4”[6] Affidavit of A M Moss 28.05.2018, [7(c)]; annexure “AM-4”[7] Affidavit of A M Moss 28.05.2018, [7(d)]; annexure “AM-4”[8] Affidavit of A M Moss 28.05.2018, [7(e)]; annexure “AM-4”

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The Minister submits that each of the “Certified Cop[ies] of an Entry of Birth Registered in the District of Harare in Zimbabwe” (purported birth registrations) is evidence that each of the applicants has been registered under the Zimbabwe BDR Act and, therefore, each of the applicants is a citizen of Zimbabwe. The Minister makes this submission even though, according to Dr Manby, the Zimbabwe BDR Act contains no provision for the registration of a child born outside Zimbabwe in wedlock to a mother who is a citizen of Zimbabwe. The Minister submits that, according to Dr Manby, it “appears that the applicants’ births have been registered in accordance with the terms of the Zimbabwe Constitution but contrary to the terms of the [Zimbabwe BDR Act]”, and that in “that regard, Dr Manby notes that there is a degree of discretion given to Zimbabwean officials in the administration of the applicable rules”. The Minister submits it may therefore “be inferred that the issuing of the birth registrations was within the zone of discretion”.[70] I do not accept these submissions.[70] First Respondent’s Outline of Submissions, [39] First, Dr Manby does not say that the applicants’ births “have been registered in accordance with the terms of the Zimbabwe Constitution”. Dr Manby says that the “embassy has (to its credit) decided to respect the constitution rather than the discriminatory provisions of the act”.[71] It may be inferred that Dr Manby does not say “in accordance with the constitution” because Art.37 of the Zimbabwe Constitution requires that the birth be “registered in Zimbabwe in accordance with the law relating to the registration of births”, not in accordance with the Zimbabwe Constitution. Art.37 of the Zimbabwe Constitution expressly contemplates that the registration of a birth would be effected under a particular law that relates to the registration of births; and the only law which answers that description Dr Manby has identified is the Zimbabwe BDR Act. Dr Manby’s reference to an official respecting “the constitution” appears to be an appeal to a meaning or principle underlying Art.37 of the Zimbabwe Constitution that is not expressed in the text of that Article or anywhere else in the Zimbabwe Constitution; but she has not identified any principle of the law of Zimbabwe that permits Art.37 to be read in a manner that would permit the registration of a birth directly under its terms.[71] Dr Manby’s report, [39] Second, although Dr Manby says there “is a degree of discretion to officials in the administration of the statutory rules”, she does not identify the nature or source of the discretion. In particular, Dr Manby does not identify any statutory provision or any principle of any unwritten law which permits an official to act in a manner not authorised or contrary to statutory provisions. The most that can be inferred Dr Manby’s intends to convey by her statement that there “is a degree of discretion to officials in the administration of the statutory rules” is that those with authority in Zimbabwe tolerate officials not complying with the statutory law of Zimbabwe. If that is what Dr Manby intends to convey, it is not an opinion she is qualified to give, because it is not an opinion about any principle of the law of Zimbabwe; and even if she were qualified to give such opinion, it would be irrelevant, and that is because officials not complying with laws is not reasonably capable of answering the description of “law”.