SZQYM v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

SZQYM v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2014] FCA 427

Citation: SZQYM v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2014] FCA 427
Appeal from: SZQYM v Minister for Immigration; SZQYN v Minister for Immigration [2012] FMCA 1116
Parties:

SZQYM v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP

SZQYN v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP

File number(s): NSD 5 of 2013
NSD 6 of 2013
Judge: FARRELL J
Date of judgment: 1 May 2014
Catchwords:

MIGRATION – appeal from decision of Federal Magistrates Court – judicial review of decision of delegate – appellants North Korean nationals – whether appellants also South Korean citizens – whether protection visa applications invalidated by virtue of s 91P of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) – jurisdictional fact – onus of proof – standard of proof – whether sufficient evidence to support judicial finding of citizenship

EVIDENCE – receipt of expert evidence – leave sought to adduce new evidence on appeal – expert evidence concerning foreign law – discretionary considerations – utility of evidence – expense and delay – leave refused  

Legislation: Evidence Act 1995 (Cth)
Federal Circuit Court of Australia Amendment Act 2012 (Cth)
Migration Act 1958 (Cth)
Cases cited: Briginshaw v Briginshaw (1938) 60 CLR 336
Brunetto v Collector of Customs (1984) 4 FCR 92
Corporation of the City of Enfield v Development Assessment Commission (2000) 199 CLR 135
Haque v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (No 3) [2010] FCA 772
Industrial Equity Ltd v Deputy Commissioner of Taxation (1990) 170 CLR 649
Maroun v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2009] FCA 1284
Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v Le (2007) 164 FCR 151
Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZGUR (2011) 241 CLR 594
Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZLSP (2010) 187 FCR 362
Plaintiff M70/2011 v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship  (2011) 244 CLR 144
R v Foster; Ex parte The Commonwealth Life (Amalgamated) Assurances Ltd (1952) 85 CLR 138
Re IBM Global Services Australia Ltd [2005] FCAFC 66
SZOAU v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (2012) 199 FCR 448
SZOAU v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2011] FMCA 820
SZOUY & Ors v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2011] FMCA 347
SZQYM v Minister for Immigration; SZQYN v Minister for Immigration [2012] FMCA 1116
Twist v Randwick Municipal Council (1976) 136 CLR 106
Zubair v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2004) 139 FCR 344
Date of hearing: 7 May 2013
Date of last submissions: 9 April 2014
Place: Sydney
Division: GENERAL DIVISION
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 69

Solicitor for the Appellants:

Counsel for the Respondent:

Mr C McArdle of McArdle Legal

Mr D Godwin

Solicitor for the Respondent: DLA Piper

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY

GENERAL DIVISION

NSD 5 of 2013

ON APPEAL FROM THE FEDERAL MAGISTRATES COURT OF AUSTRALIA
BETWEEN:

SZQYM
Appellant

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP
Respondent

JUDGE:

FARRELL J

DATE OF ORDER:

1 MAY 2014

WHERE MADE:

SYDNEY

THE COURT ORDERS THAT: 

1.The appeal be…

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Details
Case
[2014] FCA 427
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The appellants, North Korean nationals, appealed against the decision of the Federal Magistrates Court which dismissed their applications for protection visas on the ground that they held South Korean citizenship. The appeal centred on whether the appellants were also citizens of South Korea, a jurisdictional fact that would invalidate their visa applications under section 91P of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth). The primary judge had concluded that the appellants' visa applications provided a legally sufficient basis for the delegate's decision that they had dual nationality. The appellants argued that the delegate made an assumption of fact without any opportunity for them to comment on the issue of their South Korean citizenship, which they claimed was a failure of procedural fairness.

The legal issues before the court were whether the primary judge correctly determined the jurisdictional fact of the appellants' South Korean citizenship and whether the appellants bore the onus of proving this fact. The court had to decide whether the primary judge applied the correct legal standard and onus of proof in determining the jurisdictional fact, and whether the evidence was sufficient to support a judicial finding of South Korean citizenship. Additionally, the court had to consider the admissibility of expert evidence on South Korean law and whether the Minister's application for further evidence was appropriate.

The court found that the primary judge had correctly applied the law and the onus of proof. The court held that the determination of dual nationality was a jurisdictional fact to be decided under section 91N of the Act, and that the onus of proof lay with the appellants. The court noted the seriousness of a court determining a person's nationality but found that the evidence presented was sufficient for the purposes of the appeal, especially given the parties' agreement on the relevant effect of South Korean law. The court also rejected the Minister's application for further evidence, considering the utility and potential expense and delay. The court concluded that the primary judge's decision was not affected by any denial of procedural fairness, as the de novo hearing in the Federal Magistrates Court provided the appellants with an opportunity to be heard and present evidence.

The court allowed the appeal, setting aside the orders of the Federal Magistrates Court and ordering the respondent to reconsider the appellants' visa applications according to law. The respondent was also ordered to pay the appellants' costs in both the Federal Magistrates Court and the appeal.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appeal be allowed.

2. The orders made by the Federal Magistrate on 7 December 2012 dismissing the appellant’s application be set aside and in lieu thereof:

(a) there be an order in the nature of certiorari to quash the decision of the delegate of the respondent advised to the appellant by letter of 7 November 2011 that her application for a protection visa lodged on 30 May 2011 is invalid;

(b) there be an order in the nature of mandamus requiring the respondent to consider her protection visa application lodged on 30 May 2011 according to law; and

(c) the respondent pay the costs of the appellant in the Federal Magistrates Court as agreed or assessed.

3. The respondent pay the appellant’s costs of the appeal as agreed or as assessed.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

1. The appeal be allowed.

2. The orders made by the Federal Magistrate on 7 December 2012 dismissing the appellant’s application be set aside and in lieu thereof:

(a) there be an order in the nature of certiorari to quash the decision of the delegate of the respondent advised to the appellant by letter of 7 November 2011 that his application for a protection visa lodged on 20 April 2011 is invalid;

(b) there be an order in the nature of mandamus requiring the respondent to consider his protection visa application lodged on 20 April 2011 according to law; and

(c) the respondent pay the costs of the appellant in the Federal Magistrates Court as agreed or assessed.

3. The respondent pay the appellant’s costs of the appeal as agreed or as assessed.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

On the day before the hearing, the appellants foreshadowed an application to the Court to issue a notice to admit the following facts:With respect to each of these applicants, having regard to the years of their births, the relevant consideration pursuant to the Laws of South Korea is the birthplace of each of their fathers.The Minister foreshadowed a notice of dispute of the truth of that fact. At the hearing, the representatives of the parties indicated that they would not be filing the notices.Further expert evidence rejected Three business days before the hearing of the appeal, the Minister filed an application to the Court to abridge time to file an application to receive further evidence on the appeal. This is the only additional evidence which any party sought to adduce on the appeal. The Minister noted that the primary judge had indicated that he would have been assisted by evidence of this kind. The Minister submitted that the evidence was in support of the Minister’s notice of contention in the event that the Court accepted the appellants’ arguments that the primary judge applied the wrong onus or standard of proof with the result that the Court had to make findings as to the jurisdictional fact of the nationality of the appellants. The delay in filing the application was caused by the fact that the expert evidence had not been received earlier and the difficulty in identifying an appropriately qualified expert. The evidence was two reports by an expert in South Korean law. The reports provided an expert opinion regarding the application of South Korean nationality laws to citizens of North Korea. The Minister relied on the decision of the Full Court in Reece v Webber (2011) 192 FCR 254 at [15] per Jacobson, Flick and Reeves JJ in relation to the considerations relevant to a Court in exercising its discretion to permit further evidence to be adduced on appeal under s 27 of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth):The result, it is considered, is that the discretion conferred by s 27 to adduce further evidence is thus unconfined by any express limitations. But the discretion is to be exercised in a statutory context where the appeal being entertained is an appeal by way of rehearing for the purpose of determining the rights of the parties in accordance with law. Although not constrained by common law principles, the considerations to which the common law had regard remain considerations relevant to the exercise of the discretion conferred by s 27. The exercise of the discretion conferred by s 27 may be informed by reference to these principles but is not to be constrained by them. In saying this, the Court followed the reasoning of the Full Court in Sobey v Nicol (2007) 245 ALR 389 at [69]-[72] per Branson, Lindgren and Besanko JJ. This reasoning stresses that in exercising the discretion to admit further evidence, the Court must act consistently with proper judicial process and in the interests of justice, but without obliterating the distinction between original and appellate jurisdiction.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Having noted the seriousness of a determination by a Court (as opposed to an administrative decision maker) as to a person’s nationality (SZQYM/SZQYN at [16]-[18]), he said at [27]:I retain some hesitation as to the sufficiency for a judicial determination by an Australian court as to a person’s South Korean nationality, of the evidence as to South Korean laws of nationality which was tendered before me, particularly in the absence of any expert opinions on the relevant issues of foreign law. However, ultimately, the parties’ representatives were in agreement as to the relevant effect of South Korean law. They agreed that each of the applicants could be found not to have South Korean nationality, if the Court was satisfied that their respective fathers had not been born within the Korean peninsula. In view of their consensus on this, and also, importantly, in view of my inability (which I shall explain below) to make any confident finding one way or the other as to the probable locations of birth of the two fathers, I am content to proceed on the assumption of the parties that sufficient evidence of foreign law has been presented to me. I would, however, flag that better evidence of foreign law might be required in other cases.Conclusion of the primary judge The primary judge concluded in respect of each of Ms SZQYM and Mr SZQYN that the visa application provided a legally sufficient basis for the delegate to make the decision that the appellants had dual nationality. Mr SZQYN had made an unequivocal statement that his father was born in North Korea and Ms SZYQYM’s form contained inconsistency but her responses were “open to the interpretation” that she had asserted that her father had acquired North Korean citizenship by birth in 1938 within territory over which both North and South Korea subsequently claimed sovereignty: [62]. The primary judge was not persuaded that the decisions could be quashed on the ground that there was no evidence in the material before the delegate upon which the finding of dual nationality could be made. Nor did he consider the decisions were affected by any denial of procedural fairness or other procedural irregularity: the Department did not have any obligation to seek further information or to raise the issue of dual nationality with the appellants before making its decision: see [63]-[64]. The appellants had given evidence at the hearing and been cross examined. He considered the evidence of both appellants unreliable and not sufficient for the Court to arrive at satisfaction one way or the other as to the critical jurisdictional facts bearing on a determination under s 91N and s 91P: he would therefore not make a declaration either that the appellants were not citizens of South Korea or that the visa applications were invalid, as he had he been asked by the Minister: see [69]-[71]. There was nothing final and conclusive about the Department’s decision and it was open to the appellants to ask for redetermination and to present additional evidence and submissions: [65].

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The appellants contend that, rather than making a finding of fact, a jurisdictional fact, the delegate of the Minister made an assumption of fact, without any opportunity for the appellants to make a submission concerning the question of whether they had dual nationality for the purposes of s 91N having regard to their particular circumstances. They say that on this basis, the primary judge’s remark at [64] that he was not persuaded that the decision made on 7 November 2011 was affected by any denial of procedural fairness or other procedural irregularity was ill founded. Although s 57 of the Migration Act may only apply to the obligation of the Minister to provide information to an applicant with a valid application about reasons why it might not be granted, equivalent standards should be observed before making a decision that a visa application is not valid. CONSIDERATION As the proceedings in the court below were a hearing de novo at which the appellants had an opportunity to be heard and give evidence, those proceedings cured any of the failures of procedural fairness alleged by the appellants because the delegate did not give the appellants an opportunity to be heard and comment on the issue of the validity of their applications before he issued the Delegate’s Letters: Twist v Randwick Municipal Council (1976) 136 CLR 106 at 116 per Mason J; Zubair v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2004) 139 FCR 344 at [32] per Finn, Mansfield and Gyles JJ. I have therefore not otherwise considered the validity of the appellants’ submission concerning any alleged want of procedural fairness in the delegate issuing the Delegate’s Letters without affording the appellants an opportunity to comment or be heard. It is not contentious between the parties that the determination of whether a non-citizen is a national of, or entitled to re-enter and reside in, more than one country is a jurisdictional fact to be determined under s 91N as a precondition to the operation of s 91P in relation to the validity of an application for a visa by the non-citizen. Subsection (6) of s 91N is explicit that the question of whether a non-citizen is a national of a particular country is to be determined solely by reference to the law of that country. While it is undoubtedly true that the content of the foreign law is a question of fact, because its application to a non-citizen is a jurisdictional fact I do not accept the Minister’s submission that any error by the delegate in the determination of the content and application of South Korean law to the appellants is an error of fact “within jurisdiction”. Rather, as also submitted by the Minister, it was the task of the primary judge to determine a question of jurisdictional fact on the evidence before him, and in this case on the agreed basis that South Korean law conferred nationality on a person born on the Korean peninsula dependent on the factual circumstances of where his or her father was born: see SZQYM/SZQYN at [27]. I accept the Minister’s submission that this does not change the onus on the appellants to establish that there has been jurisdictional error: see Maroun at [15] per Jagot J:As a general proposition, the characterisation of a matter as a jurisdictional fact does not alter the appellant’s onus of proof. The legal onus to prove jurisdictional error by the Tribunal lies with the appellant. The legal onus may be discharged by reference to any and all parts of the evidence, but it does not shift from the appellant merely because the fact in issue may be described as a jurisdictional fact (and thus is a matter a court must decide for itself).