AHZ16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

AHZ16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCA 164

Appeal from: AHZ16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCCA 2000
File number: NSD 1544 of 2017
Judge: PERRY J
Date of judgment: 27 February 2018
Catchwords: MIGRATION – appeal from Federal Circuit Court (FCC) decision upholding delegate’s decision - where delegate found that the appellant’s protection visa application was invalid under ss 91N and 91P, Migration Act 1958 (Cth) on the ground of dual nationality – meaning of “national” in s 91N(1) – where expert evidence led in FCC on content of Syrian and Greek law governing nationality - whether FCC correctly considered whether the appellant was a dual national on the evidence before it or whether that finding of fact was for the delegate – where in any event no error in the delegate’s decision – appeal dismissed
Legislation: Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss 91M, 91N, 91P, 91Q
Cases cited:

Corporation of the City of Enfield v Development Assessment Commission [2000] HCA 5; (2000) 199 CLR 135

Neilson v Overseas Projects Corporation of Victoria Ltd [2005] HCA 54; (2005) 223 CLR 331

SZOAU v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2012] FCAFC 33; (2012) 199 FCR 448

SZQYM v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2014] FCA 427; (2014) 220 FCR 505

Date of hearing: 20 February 2018
Registry: New South Wales
Division: General Division
National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 30
Counsel for the Appellant: The Appellant appeared in person
Counsel for the Respondent: Mr DA Hughes
Solicitor for the Respondent: Clayton Utz

ORDERS

NSD 1544 of 2017
BETWEEN:

AHZ16

Appellant

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION

Respondent

JUDGE:

PERRY J

DATE OF ORDER:

27 FEBRUARY 2018

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The appeal is dismissed.

2.The appellant is to pay the respondent’s costs as agreed or assessed.

Note:    Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.


REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

PERRY J:

1.               INTRODUCTION

  1. The appellant appeals from the decision of the Federal Circuit Court (FCC) dismissing his application for judicial review of a decision by a delegate of the Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (the Minister).  The delegate had decided that the appellant’s application for a protection visa was not a valid application under the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (the Act).

  2. The Minister filed written submissions in advance of the hearing.  While the appellant did not file written submissions, he made oral submissions at the hearing assisted by a NAATI Level 3 (Professional) accredited interpreter in Arabic and English.

  3. For the reasons set out below, the appeal must be dismissed.

    2.               BACKGROUND

    2.1             The delegate’s decision

  4. The appellant applied for a protection visa on 23 December 2015.  In his visa application, the appellant stated that:

    (1)he was born in Syria;

    (2)his citizenship at birth was the same as his parents, namely, Syrian;

    (3)his current citizenship…

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Details
Case
[2018] FCA 164
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

AHZ16 has appealed a decision of the Federal Circuit Court (FCC) upholding the delegate’s decision to find the appellant’s application for a protection visa was invalid under ss 91N and 91P, Migration Act 1958 (Cth), on the ground of dual nationality. The appeal is dismissed. The appellant applied for a protection visa on 23 December 2015. In his visa application, the appellant stated that he was born in Syria, his citizenship at birth was Syrian, his current citizenship is Greek, and he held a Greek passport. The delegate found that the appellant was a national of both Syria and Greece, and therefore the appellant's application for a protection visa was invalid. The appellant submitted that he had not returned to Syria since 1993 and had not renewed his Syrian passport. He also submitted that there was no proof that he was Syrian or could return to Syria and that he did not wish to return to Syria. He submitted that the risks that he would face if returned to Syria were matters which should have been taken into account by the delegate and should have meant that his application for a protection visa was accepted. The court held that the delegate’s decision was correct, and that the question of whether the appellant was a dual national was solely determined by reference to Syrian law. The court further held that it was not open to the FCC to consider the merits of the appellant’s claims to fear persecution or significant harm because the delegate found that no valid protection visa application had been made. The appeal is dismissed, and the appellant is to pay the respondent's costs as agreed or assessed.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appeal is dismissed.

2. The appellant is to pay the respondent’s costs as agreed or assessed.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

For the reasons set out below, the appeal must be dismissed.2. BACKGROUND2.1 The delegate’s decision The appellant applied for a protection visa on 23 December 2015. In his visa application, the appellant stated that: (1)he was born in Syria;(2)his citizenship at birth was the same as his parents, namely, Syrian;(3)his current citizenship is Greek which he acquired by naturalisation; and (4)he held a Greek passport, pursuant to which he had departed from Greece. A copy of the appellant’s Greek passport was provided to the Department of Immigration and Border Protection (the Department) on 30 December 2015. In his visa application, the appellant stated that he could not return to Greece because of a conflict with his employer over amounts allegedly owed to him. He also stated that he feared that he would suffer because no one would pay him and he would be unable to survive and meet his basic needs. He further claimed that he could not return to Syria “where the situation is very bad and as Alawite I will suffer at the hands of the fanatic Muslims and I will be forced to join the Army…” By a letter dated 27 January 2016, the delegate advised that the appellant’s visa application was not valid based on information indicating that he was a national of both Syria and Greece. The information identified was as follows:ŸIn your application for a Protection visa (Class XA) visa you stated that you were born in Syrian (sic) to Syrian parents, therefore you hold Syrian citizenship by virtue of your birth. ŸYou further stated that you had acquired Greek citizenship on … 2014 and enclosed a copy of the biodate page of your Greek passport.ŸYou have not provided any evidence that you have renounced your Syrian citizenship.ŸSyria and Greece allow dual citizenship. As a consequence, the delegate considered that the application for a protection visa was invalid by operation of ss 91N and 91P of the Act (quoted at [16]-[17] below) and advised that the visa application would instead be treated as a request for the Minister to consider exercising his power under s 91Q of the Act. Section 91Q provides that the Minister may determine that s 91P does not apply if she or he decides that it is in the public interest to do so. The appellant advised the Court without objection that, as at the time of the hearing of the appeal, he had not yet been advised as to whether the Minister would exercise his power under s 91Q.2.2 The decision of the Federal Circuit Court In the FCC, the appellant raised three grounds of judicial review:1. The Department must accept my application on the basis that on the materials before the Department there was not clear evidence to establish on the balance of probabilities that I can return to Syria a fact which is known by all authorities even though it was assumed that I hold Syrian citizenship by virtue of my birth.2. I am a citizen of Greece but I have suffered in Greece and my life is in danger and at risk if I am compelled to return to Greece.3. I am unable to return to either Syria or Greece as I have a genuine fear of harm in both countries.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

As a consequence, the delegate considered that the application for a protection visa was invalid by operation of ss 91N and 91P of the Act (quoted at [16]-[17] below) and advised that the visa application would instead be treated as a request for the Minister to consider exercising his power under s 91Q of the Act. Section 91Q provides that the Minister may determine that s 91P does not apply if she or he decides that it is in the public interest to do so. The appellant advised the Court without objection that, as at the time of the hearing of the appeal, he had not yet been advised as to whether the Minister would exercise his power under s 91Q.2.2 The decision of the Federal Circuit Court In the FCC, the appellant raised three grounds of judicial review:1. The Department must accept my application on the basis that on the materials before the Department there was not clear evidence to establish on the balance of probabilities that I can return to Syria a fact which is known by all authorities even though it was assumed that I hold Syrian citizenship by virtue of my birth.2. I am a citizen of Greece but I have suffered in Greece and my life is in danger and at risk if I am compelled to return to Greece.3. I am unable to return to either Syria or Greece as I have a genuine fear of harm in both countries. With respect to the first two grounds, the primary judge held that the grounds appeared to invoke “an impermissible merits review” by the Court (FCC reasons at [13]). In other words, they asked the FCC to consider whether it accepted the appellant’s claims to fear harm if returned to Syria or Greece, when the FCC had jurisdiction only to determine whether the delegate’s decision was lawful. That being so, the primary judge held that the appellant’s claims for protection “were never considered on their merits by the Delegate because the Protection visa application was regarded as invalid.” (FCC reasons at [13]). As such, the question of whether findings by the delegate about the appellant’s protection claims were lawfully reached did not arise before the FCC. That finding is plainly correct. The delegate never reached the point of considering the appellant’s claims to fear persecution or significant harm because the delegate found that no valid protection visa application had been made. The primary judge inferred at [14] that the first ground of judicial review encompassed two submissions namely:a)that there was insufficient evidence to justify the Delegate coming to the conclusion that the Applicant was a national of Syria and Greece; andb)whilst the applicant might be a “formal national” of Syria, according to Syrian law he was not an “effective national” and the legal meaning of “national” in s.91N is to be construed as meaning “effective national”. The primary judge rejected both submissions. First, the primary judge found that the appellant is a national of two or more countries, namely, Greece and Syria. This finding was based upon the unchallenged evidence of experts in Greek and Syrian law, the appellant’s statements in his protection visa application, and the lack of any suggestion or evidence of renunciation or revocation of the appellant’s citizenship of either country by him or by a legislative decree (FCC reasons at [15]-[21]).

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Section 91P in turn relevantly provides that: (2) Despite any other provision of this Act but subject to section 91Q, if:(a)this Subdivision applies to a non‑citizen at a particular time; and(b)at that time, the non‑citizen applies, or purports to apply, for a protection visa; and(c)the non‑citizen is in the migration zone and has been immigration cleared at that time;neither that application, nor any other application made by the non‑citizen for a protection visa while he or she remains in the migration zone, is a valid application.4. CONSIDERATION The appellant submitted that even though he was born in Syria, he has not returned to Syria since 1993, as he stated in his protection visa application. Nor did he renew his Syrian passport. The appellant also submitted that there was no proof that he was Syrian or could return to Syria. Nor did he wish to return to Syria. Rather, in his submission, the evidence established only that he was born in Syria. However, the appellant submitted that if he were returned to Syria, he would face persecution from extremists and torture, be required to undertake military service because of the high position he previously held in the army, and would be in real danger, as he explained in his application for a protection visa. The risks that he would face if returned to Syria were matters which he submitted should have been taken into account by the delegate and should have meant that his application for a protection visa was accepted. The appellant’s submissions are based upon a misunderstanding of the relevant scheme of the Act, and cannot be accepted. First, to the extent to which the appellant submits that the question posed by s 91P(2) is whether a protection visa applicant is an “effective national” of a third county and not merely a “formal national” according to the law of a third country (relevantly Syria), that construction was rejected by the Full Court in SZOAU (see also FCC reasons at [21]). Decisions of the Full Court are binding on a single judge of this Court on appeal and upon the FCC, that is, it is not open to a single judge of this Court or the FCC to reach a different construction of the legislative provision. Further, even if it was open to me to reconsider the issue, I would agree with the Full Court’s construction. It follows, as the Full Court held in SZOAU, that Parliament has excluded notions of “effective nationality” from consideration in determining whether a person is a dual national. Thus Robertson J in SZOAU (with whose reasons Barker J agreed at [9]) held at [60]-[70] that it is apparent that the assumption underlying s 91M is that: a non-citizen can avail herself or himself of protection because of the third country nationality; and, therefore, no additional inquiry into the non-citizen’s ability to avail herself or himself of protection is to be made beyond the bare fact of nationality for the purposes of s 91P. Secondly, the appellant’s views about whether he holds Syrian nationality based upon his desire not to return there, the fact that he has not renewed his passport, and the other matters on which he relies, do not answer the question of whether he holds Syrian nationality for the purposes of s 91P of the Act. Section 91N(6) requires that question to be answered “solely” by reference to Syrian law.