Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Cadbury Schweppes Pty Ltd

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Cadbury Schweppes
Pty Ltd [2009] FCAFC 32

PRIVILEGE – Legal professional privilege – Litigation privilege – Finalised proofs of evidence – Whether litigation privilege exists where documents created for purpose of providing to opposing party and in fact so provided

PRIVILEGE – Legal professional privilege – Litigation privilege – Waiver of privilege – Whether filing and service, without more, of finalised proofs of evidence constitutes waiver of privilege

PRIVILEGE – Legal professional privilege – Litigation privilege – Distinction between privilege and implied undertaking

PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – Whether leave to appeal against interlocutory ruling ought to be granted – Case raises a matter of public importance – Possible loss of substantive right – Leave granted

PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – Appeal – Issue not taken below – When allowed to be raised on appeal – When in interests of justice – Issue concerns substantive right – Party repudiating stance adopted at trial – No prejudice to opposing party – In interests of justice to allow

Evidence Act 1995 (Cth), s 122
Federal Court Rules (Cth), O 46 r 6

Akins v Abigroup Ltd (1998) 43 NSWLR 539 cited
AMP Financial Planning Pty Ltd v CGU Insurance Ltd [2004] FCA 1196 cited
Attorney-General for the Northern Territory v Maurice (1986) 161 CLR 475 applied
Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union [2008] FCA 678 cited
Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Telstra Corporation Ltd (2000) 96 FCR 317 cited
Australian Medic-Care Co Ltd v Hamilton Pharmaceutical Pty Limited (No 3) [2008] FCA 976 cited
Austress Freyssinet Pty Ltd v Marlin International Pty Ltd [2002] NSWSC 958 cited
AWB Ltd v Cole (2006) 152 FCR 382 cited
Black & Decker Inc v Flymo Ltd [1991] 1 WLR 753 cited
British American Tobacco Australia Services Ltd v Cowell (No 2) (2003) 8 VR 571 cited
Cadbury Schweppes Pty Ltd v Amcor Limited [2008] FCA 88 cited
Cadbury Schweppes Pty Ltd v Amcor Limited [2008] FCA 398 cited
Chief Executive Officer of Customs v Neate (1998) 144 FLR 373 cited
Churche v Australian Prudential Regulation Authority (No 3) [2006] FCA 1168 cited
Comfort Hotels Ltd v Wembley Stadium Ltd [1988] 1 WLR 872 cited
Commissioner of Australian Federal Police v Propend Finance Pty Ltd (1997) 188 CLR 501 cited
Commissioner of Patents v Sherman [2008] FCAFC 182 cited
Complete Technology Pty Ltd v Toshiba (Australia) Pty Ltd (1994) 53 FCR 125 considered
Dingle v Commonwealth Development Bank of Australia (1989) 23 FCR 63 cited
Esso Australia Resources Ltd v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1999) 201 CLR 49 cited
Fairfield-Mabey Ltd v Shell UK Metallurgical Testing Services (Scotland) Ltd [1989] 1 All ER 576 cited
Farah Constructions Pty Ltd v Say-Dee Pty Ltd (2007) 230 CLR 89 cited
Goldberg v Ng (1995) 185 CLR 83 cited
GSA Industries (Aust) Pty Ltd v Constable [2002] 2 Qd R 146 cited
Harman v Secretary of State for the Home Department [1983] 1…

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Details
Case
[2009] FCAFC 32
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the matter of Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Cadbury Schweppes Pty Ltd, the Full Court was tasked with determining the extent of legal professional privilege, specifically litigation privilege, in relation to finalised proofs of evidence filed and served on an opponent in existing litigation. The case involved complex issues concerning the confidentiality of documents created for use in litigation and the implications of filing such documents in court.

The primary legal issues before the court were whether the finalised proofs of evidence prepared by the ACCC were subject to litigation privilege and, if so, whether their filing and service constituted a waiver of that privilege. The court had to navigate the conflicting legal principles and authorities concerning the scope of litigation privilege, including its application to documents and the necessity for confidentiality.

The court reasoned that litigation privilege extends to documents created for the dominant purpose of conducting anticipated or pending litigation. However, the court noted that the scope of the confidentiality arising from litigation privilege differs from advice privilege. The court concluded that the filing and service of the finalised proofs of evidence did not constitute an implied waiver of litigation privilege because the documents were served in compliance with a court order and subject to a confidentiality regime. The court emphasised that the principles of common law should govern the issue, as opposed to statutory provisions under the Evidence Act.

The Full Court granted Cadbury leave to withdraw its concession and argue the new matters it sought to raise. The appeal was ultimately dismissed, and the parties were required to file and serve proposed draft orders and submissions regarding the costs of the appeal.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. Leave be granted to Jarra Creek Central Packing Shed Pty Ltd to intervene limited to the making of written submissions.

2. The application for leave to appeal be granted.

3. The appeal be dismissed.

4. On or before 4:00 pm on 2 April 2009 the parties and the intervener file and serve proposed draft orders and any submissions as to costs of the application for leave to appeal and of the appeal.

Note:

Background

Background to the litigation

The matters argued before the Full Court raise important issues concerning the principles of legal professional privilege and the operation of those principles in relation to a final version of a witness statement or proof of evidence intended at the time of its creation to be filed in court and served upon an opponent to existing litigation and then in fact so filed and served pursuant to an order of the Court.BACKGROUND On 21 December 2005 the ACCC commenced proceedings alleging price-fixing and unlawful market sharing against Visy and certain current and former officers of Visy (‘the ACCC proceeding’). The Cadbury proceeding was commenced on 15 December 2006 with Cadbury making allegations against Amcor, certain of which were in relation to the same subject matter as that of the ACCC proceeding. Amcor subsequently cross-claimed against Visy. On 8 December 2006, in the ACCC proceeding, Heerey J made a number of orders, including the following:11. The [ACCC] file and serve any proofs of evidence of lay witnesses on which it proposes to rely by 30 June 2007.…15.The content of a proof of evidence or witness statement served pursuant to an order of the Court is subject to the same implied undertaking as to confidentiality as applies to a document produced upon discovery. Where the content of, or annexures to, a proof of evidence or witness statement, or parts thereof, are marked as subject to confidentiality in accordance with any confidentiality order made by the Court, such proof of evidence, witness statement or annexure, or part thereof, will be treated in accordance with that confidentiality order. It was anticipated that the trial in the ACCC proceeding would proceed by way of viva voce evidence, with the finalised proofs of evidence giving notice to Visy of the content of such evidence. However, it was envisaged that if no factual issue arose as to the content of any finalised proofs of evidence, the parties could agree to admit such into evidence in place of actually calling the witness to give viva voce evidence. Between 2 July 2007 and 21 September 2007, in a series of 15 tranches, the ACCC filed and served the 111 finalised proofs of evidence on Visy in the ACCC proceeding pursuant to the order of Heerey J. All save two of the 15 communications between the ACCC and Visy, pursuant to which the 111 proofs of evidence were served, invoked an express confidentiality regime in place between the parties to that proceeding, and then only in respect of specified parts of some of the finalised proofs of evidence. For example, in the covering letter dated 2 July 2007 enclosing the finalised proofs of evidence, the ACCC stated:You should note that a number of the witness proofs contain confidential information and have been shaded and marked appropriately with the words, ‘Confidential A (Shaded parts only)’ or ‘Confidential B (Shaded parts only)’ in accordance with the Confidentiality Orders dated 26 October 2008 and the Orders dated 8 December 2006.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

As to the service of the proofs of evidence, Mr Williams further deposed that: Service of proofs of evidence enumerated in Visy’s listsFollowing completion of the steps listed at paragraphs 63 above, the finalised proofs were served upon Visy (by its solicitors) by AGS in fifteen tranches between 2 July 2007 and 21 September 2007. The content of each tranche was largely determined by the order in which each proof was finalised and processed. Each tranche was served on Visy by AGS on my instructions. My purpose in instructing AGS to serve each tranche of proofs of evidence was in order to comply with paragraph 11 of the Heerey J order. During the hearing, we heard argument by all parties on the contentions sought to be raised by Cadbury on this appeal. We reserved our judgment on whether to grant leave to Cadbury to withdraw its concession and argue the two new matters sought to be raised by Cadbury. The ACCC did not seek on the appeal to tender any further evidence on the new matters. Nor did any party seek further time to address what are essentially legal issues. It seems to us that it is expedient and in the interests of justice to consider all the issues sought to be raised by Cadbury. We are mindful that normally a party should be bound by the course deliberately adopted at the trial: see Multicon Engineering Pty Ltd v Federal Airports Corporation (1997) 47 NSWLR 631, 645 and Li Pei Ye v Crown Ltd [2004] FCAFC 8 at [76] per Sackville, Selway and Lander JJ. However, important issues are sought to be agitated, and, since we consider there is no relevant prejudice to the other parties to the appeal, the Court permits the matters now raised by Cadbury to be agitated. In the circumstances of the case, bearing in mind the nature of the issues under discussion, we consider that Cadbury should be allowed to withdraw its concession, and we grant leave for it to do so. We also consider that Cadbury should be given leave (to the extent necessary) to raise the contentions argued before us even if not encompassed in the notice of contention. ISSUES ON APPEAL It seems to us there are two main issues to be addressed in this appeal, which are to be answered according to the common law:1.whether or not the finalised proofs of evidence prepared, filed and served by the ACCC (that is, the finalised proofs prepared for the purpose of ACCC using them in the ACCC proceeding and for filing and service on Visy in accordance with the orders of Heerey J) were subject to legal professional privilege, and more specifically subject to litigation privilege; and 2.whether or not the filing and service of the finalised proofs of evidence constituted a waiver (implied or otherwise) of legal professional privilege in the finalised proofs of evidence, and if so, to what extent? If no legal professional privilege arises in answer to the first issue, it is, strictly speaking, unnecessary to address the second issue, although, for reasons we explain, we do in fact do so below.

Decision

Reasons for decision

MANSFIELD, KENNY AND MIDDLETON JJ

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: MANSFIELD, KENNY AND MIDDLETON JJ

It is also to be observed that we do not need to concern ourselves with the operation of the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) (‘the Evidence Act’), as we are dealing with the position at common law. To the extent that the ACCC in written submissions dated 15 January 2009 relied upon recent amendments to s 122 of the Evidence Act (which were to operate from 1 January 2009) and the Explanatory Memorandum thereto, we do not consider reference to such material to be instructive. Putting aside the fact that the Evidence Act is concerned with the adducing of evidence at trial, little assistance can be gained as to the common law position by having recourse to the view of the author of the Explanatory Memorandum. In any event, in this area the common law is not to be developed by reference to the Evidence Act: see Esso Australia Resources Ltd v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1999) 201 CLR 49 and Osland v Secretary, Department of Justice (2008) 234 CLR 275 (Osland) at [49] per Gleeson CJ, Gummow, Heydon and Kiefel JJ. CONSIDERATION It is convenient to set out some general observations as to certain principles of law relevant to the issues now arising for our determination. In our view, it is by reference to these principles that this appeal should be determined, although conflicting statements may be found in certain authorities as to their scope and application. In this appeal the parties and intervener proceeded on the basis that legal professional privilege extends to protect material created at the instigation of a party or the party’s lawyer for the dominant purpose of conducting anticipated or pending litigation (which has been referred to as litigation privilege). It is the ambit of the litigation privilege that is the contentious issue in this appeal. There has been some controversy over whether litigation privilege is confined to communications or whether it extends to documents themselves, the need for confidentiality in ‘litigation privilege’, and the independent existence of ‘litigation privilege’ itself: see eg State of New South Wales v Jackson (2007) NSWCA 279; Public Transport Authority of Western Australia v Leighton Contractors Pty Ltd (2007) 34 WAR 279 at [20]; and A Ligertwood, Australian Evidence (4th ed, LexisNexis Butterworths, 2004) 291-2. As to confidentiality, we would have thought that the scope of the confidentiality arising from litigation privilege is different from advice privilege. We say this because when dealing with third parties, such as potential witnesses, unless there is a separate confidentiality agreement with such third parties, then, subject to the principle in Harman [1983] 1 AC 280 (as explained in Hearne v Street (2008) 235 CLR 125 (Hearne) at [109] per Hayne, Heydon and Crennan JJ), such potential witnesses would be free to discuss with others their potential evidence. Of course, the position would be different if there was a confidentiality agreement with such a potential witness, because in that case the client might seek to enforce the obligation of confidentiality arising out of such an agreement.