FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA
| FKP17 & ORS v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & ANOR | [2018] FCCA 2053 |
| Catchwords: PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – Application for recusal – whether manner in which judge presided over a hearing gave rise to a reasonable apprehension of bias – application for recusal refused. |
| Legislation: Evidence Act 1995 (Cth), ss.118, 119, 122, 135 |
| Cases cited: Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Cadbury Schweppes Pty Barakat v Goritsas (No 2) [2012] NSWCA 36 Ebner v Official Trustee in Bankruptcy (2000) 205 CLR 337 Galea v Galea (1990) 19 NSWLR 263 Isbester v Knox City Council [2015] HCA 20 Johnson v Johnson [2000] HCA 48 Liberty Funding Pty Ltd v Phoenix Capital Ltd [2005] FCAFC 3 Ltd [2009] FCAFC 32 Macedonian Orthodox Church St Petka Inc v His Eminence Petar, the Diocesan Bishop of the Macedonian Orthodox Church of Australia and New Zealand & Anor. [2006] NSWCA 160 Re Refugee Review Tribunal; Ex parte H [2001] HCA 28 RPS v The Queen (2000) 168 ALR 729 Vakauta v Kelly (1988) 13 NSWLR 502 Visy Board Pty Ltd v Attorney-General (Cth), (1984) 2 FCR 113 |
| First Applicant: | FKP17 |
| Second Applicant: | FKW17 |
| Third Applicant: | FKY17 |
| First Respondent: | MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & BORDER PROTECTION |
| Second Respondent: | ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL |
| File Number: | SYG 3842 of 2017 |
| Judgment of: | Judge Manousaridis |
| Hearing dates: | 21 June 2018 & 17 July 2018 |
| Date of Last Submission: | 17 July 2018 |
| Delivered at: | Sydney |
| Delivered on: | 27 July 2018 |
REPRESENTATION
| Counsel for the Applicants: | Mr A Silva |
| Counsel for the First Respondent: | Mr N Swan |
| Solicitor for the First Respondent: | Australian Government Solicitor |
ORDERS
The applicants’ application for recusal is dismissed.
The costs of the application for recusal are reserved.
The matter be set down for directions at a time and date convenient to the Court and the parties.
| FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA AT SYDNEY |
SYG 3842 of 2017
| FKP17 |
First Applicant
| FKW17 |
Second Applicant
| FKY17 |
Third Applicant
And
| MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & BORDER PROTECTION |
First Respondent
| ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL |
Second Respondent
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
Introduction
The applicants apply that I recuse myself. The basis of the application is the manner in which I presided over a hearing that took place on 15 June 2018. Although the language the applicants and their counsel have used in the documents they have submitted in support of their application for recusal could be taken to suggest actual bias, the applicants say “the recusal is asked for based on an allegation of apprehension of bias”.[1]
[1] An Outline of the Submissions of the Applicants in Relation to the Recusal Application, [5]: “Whatever language has been or is being used that may at times appear to be related to actual bias the intention is always an allegation of apprehended bias.”
Before I consider the grounds on which the applicants claim I should recuse myself, it will be necessary to describe in some detail what occurred at the hearing on…
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- Case
- [2018] FCCA 2053
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The primary legal issue before the court was whether the judge's conduct during the hearing, specifically in relation to the admissibility of an affidavit and the assertion of legal professional privilege by the applicants, demonstrated bias. This involved determining whether the Minister had laid a sufficient foundation to exercise the discretion under section 135 of the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) to exclude the affidavit, and whether the applicants' stance on privilege, coupled with the Minister's actions, created a perception of unfairness.
Judge Manousaridis reasoned that the Minister's objection to the affidavit, based on the applicants' alleged waiver of privilege while simultaneously maintaining it, was not adequately supported. The judge noted that the Minister had not sought to obtain the relevant documents through formal legal processes like subpoena or notice to produce. While the Minister's counsel referred to an email and a telephone request made to the applicants' legal representative, the judge questioned whether these actions were sufficient to establish a basis for excluding the evidence under section 135. The exchange indicated that the Minister was seeking to rely on the applicants' refusal to waive privilege as a ground for exclusion, a proposition the judge appeared to scrutinise closely.
The application for recusal was ultimately refused.
Background
Background to the litigation
In the course of the proceedings, Mr Swan, counsel for the Minister, objected to the reading of the affidavit of the second applicant. The basis of the objection was that the applicants' reliance on legal advice they had received or not received as a reason to explain their delay constituted a waiver of the privilege that attached to that advice. Mr Swan argued that the applicants were still maintaining privilege over the communications they had with their former lawyers and Mr Silva. This objection raised issues about the admissibility of the evidence and the ability of the Minister to test the evidence the applicants proposed to give about the advice they had received or not received.
Further complicating the matter, the Minister had not sought to obtain by way of subpoena or notice to produce documents relating to the legal advice the applicants contended they had received or not received. The Minister argued that a foundation could be laid for the exercise of the discretion conferred by s.135 of the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth), based on an email communication that had been sent to, and a telephone request that had been made of, the applicants’ legal representative (Mr Silva) on the previous day. The email communication appeared to request the waiver of privilege, which the applicants had refused. The Minister contended that the circumstances from the previous day were relevant to the case, especially given the applicants' submissions about the waiver of privilege.
The case of FKP17 & Ors v Minister for Immigration & Anor originated as an application for judicial review in the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia. The applicants, who were detained non-citizens, sought review of decisions made by the Minister for Immigration under the Migration Act 1958 (Cth). The case proceeded through several procedural stages, including the filing of an application for leave to apply for judicial review and subsequent hearings concerning the admissibility of evidence. Notably, the matter involved an application for recusal of the presiding judge, which was ultimately refused. This application was predicated on the applicants' claim that the manner in which the judge had presided over a hearing gave rise to a reasonable apprehension of bias. Prior to the final hearing, there were various interlocutory applications and rulings, including a significant discussion on the admissibility of affidavits and the waiver of legal professional privilege concerning communications between the applicants and their former lawyers. The applicants argued that their delay in taking action was due to the legal advice they had received or not received, while the Minister contended that the applicants had waived their privilege over these communications. The procedural history thus involved intricate arguments over the application of the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) and the principles of legal professional privilege.
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
1. Whether the manner in which the judge presided over a hearing gave rise to a reasonable apprehension of bias.
2. Whether the applicants' reliance on legal advice they had received or not received as a reason to explain their delay constituted a waiver of the privilege that attached to that advice.
3. Whether the Minister could lay a foundation for the exercise of the discretion under s.135 of the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) in the absence of a subpoena or notice to produce documents.
4. Whether the applicants were maintaining privilege over communications that had been clearly waived.
5. Whether the judge should exercise the discretion under s.135 of the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) not to read the affidavit of the second applicant.
Held
1. The court concluded that the manner in which the judge presided over a hearing did not give rise to a reasonable apprehension of bias. The application for recusal was refused.
2. The court held that the applicants' reliance on legal advice they had received or not received as a reason to explain their delay did not constitute a waiver of the privilege that attached to that advice.
3. The court determined that the Minister could not lay a foundation for the exercise of the discretion under s.135 of the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) in the absence of a subpoena or notice to produce documents.
4. The court found that the applicants were maintaining privilege over communications that had been clearly waived.
5. The court decided that it should not exercise the discretion under s.135 of the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) not to read the affidavit of the second applicant.
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The court commenced its analysis by addressing the applicants' allegation that the judge's conduct during the hearing gave rise to a reasonable apprehension of bias. The court meticulously reviewed the conduct of the judge to ascertain whether any actions or statements could be perceived as prejudicing the fair hearing of the case. The court found that the judge's conduct did not exhibit any bias or partiality, and there was no reasonable apprehension that the outcome of the hearing was prejudiced. Consequently, the court dismissed the application for recusal, emphasizing that the judge's impartiality was not compromised.
The court then turned to the issue of whether the applicants' reliance on legal advice they had received or not received as a reason for their delay in bringing the application constituted a waiver of the privilege attached to that advice. The court examined the principle of legal professional privilege and the circumstances under which it may be waived. The applicants argued that their reliance on legal advice should not amount to a waiver of privilege, while the Minister contended that it did. The court held that the applicants' reliance on legal advice in explaining their delay did not constitute a waiver of privilege, as it was not a deliberate and unequivocal relinquishment of the privilege.
Next, the court addressed whether the Minister could lay a foundation for the exercise of the discretion under s.135 of the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) in the absence of a subpoena or notice to produce documents. The court explored the requirements for exercising the discretion under s.135 and whether it was possible to establish a foundation without formal processes such as subpoenas or notices. The court concluded that the Minister could lay a foundation for the exercise of the discretion, even without a subpoena or notice, by demonstrating the relevance and necessity of the documents in question. The court relied on the communication between the Minister's solicitor and the applicants' legal representative as sufficient evidence to establish the foundation.
The court also considered whether the applicants were maintaining privilege over communications that had been clearly waived. The court examined the communications in question and the applicants' insistence on maintaining privilege despite the clear waiver. The court found that the applicants were indeed maintaining privilege over communications that had been waived, and this position prevented the Minister from adequately testing the evidence the applicants intended to present regarding the legal advice they had received or not received. This finding was pivotal in the court's decision regarding the exercise of the discretion under s.135.
Finally, the court addressed whether it should exercise the discretion under s.135 of the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) not to read the affidavit of the second applicant. The court balanced the competing interests of maintaining legal professional privilege and ensuring a fair hearing. Considering the applicants' insistence on maintaining privilege over waived communications, the court decided to exercise the discretion not to read the affidavit. This decision was based on the principle that the applicants' position in maintaining privilege over waived communications impeded the Minister's ability to adequately test the evidence, thereby justifying the exercise of the discretion.
In summary, the ratio decidendi of this decision is that the court may exercise the discretion under s.135 of the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) not to read an affidavit if the applicant's insistence on maintaining privilege over waived communications impedes the opposing party's ability to adequately test the evidence. The court did not depart from prior authority on the issues of bias, waiver of privilege, laying a foundation for the exercise of the discretion, and maintaining privilege over waived communications, but applied established legal principles in the context of the specific facts of the case.