FKP17 & Ors v Minister for Immigration & Anor

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FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA

FKP17 & ORS v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & ANOR [2018] FCCA 2053

Catchwords:

PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – Application for recusal – whether manner in which judge presided over a hearing gave rise to a reasonable apprehension of bias – application for recusal refused.

Legislation:
Migration Act 1958 (Cth), ss.476, 477

Evidence Act 1995 (Cth), ss.118, 119, 122, 135

Cases cited:
Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Cadbury Schweppes Pty
Barakat v Goritsas (No 2) [2012] NSWCA 36
Ebner v Official Trustee in Bankruptcy (2000) 205 CLR 337
Galea v Galea (1990) 19 NSWLR 263
Isbester v Knox City Council [2015] HCA 20
Johnson v Johnson [2000] HCA 48
Liberty Funding Pty Ltd v Phoenix Capital Ltd [2005] FCAFC 3
Ltd [2009] FCAFC 32
Macedonian Orthodox Church St Petka Inc v His Eminence Petar, the Diocesan Bishop of the Macedonian Orthodox Church of Australia and New Zealand & Anor. [2006] NSWCA 160
Re Refugee Review Tribunal; Ex parte H [2001] HCA 28
RPS v The Queen (2000) 168 ALR 729
Vakauta v Kelly (1988) 13 NSWLR 502
Visy Board Pty Ltd v Attorney-General (Cth), (1984) 2 FCR 113
First Applicant: FKP17
Second Applicant: FKW17
Third Applicant: FKY17
First Respondent: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & BORDER PROTECTION
Second Respondent: ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL
File Number: SYG 3842 of 2017
Judgment of: Judge Manousaridis
Hearing dates: 21 June 2018 & 17 July 2018
Date of Last Submission: 17 July 2018
Delivered at: Sydney
Delivered on: 27 July 2018

REPRESENTATION

Counsel for the Applicants: Mr A Silva
Counsel for the First Respondent: Mr N Swan
Solicitor for the First Respondent: Australian Government Solicitor

ORDERS

  1. The applicants’ application for recusal is dismissed.

  2. The costs of the application for recusal are reserved.

  3. The matter be set down for directions at a time and date convenient to the Court and the parties.

FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT
OF AUSTRALIA
AT SYDNEY

SYG 3842 of 2017

FKP17

First Applicant

FKW17

Second Applicant

FKY17

Third Applicant

And

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & BORDER PROTECTION

First Respondent

ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL

Second Respondent

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

Introduction

  1. The applicants apply that I recuse myself. The basis of the application is the manner in which I presided over a hearing that took place on 15 June 2018. Although the language the applicants and their counsel have used in the documents they have submitted in support of their application for recusal could be taken to suggest actual bias, the applicants say “the recusal is asked for based on an allegation of apprehension of bias”.[1]

    [1] An Outline of the Submissions of the Applicants in Relation to the Recusal Application, [5]: “Whatever language has been or is being used that may at times appear to be related to actual bias the intention is always an allegation of apprehended bias.”

  2. Before I consider the grounds on which the applicants claim I should recuse myself, it will be necessary to describe in some detail what occurred at the hearing on…

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Details
Case
[2018] FCCA 2053
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the Federal Court of Australia, Judge Manousaridis presided over proceedings involving FKP17 and other applicants, and the Minister for Immigration and another respondent. The central dispute concerned an application for recusal, where the applicants alleged that the manner in which the judge had conducted a prior hearing gave rise to a reasonable apprehension of bias.

The primary legal issue before the court was whether the judge's conduct during the hearing, specifically in relation to the admissibility of an affidavit and the assertion of legal professional privilege by the applicants, demonstrated bias. This involved determining whether the Minister had laid a sufficient foundation to exercise the discretion under section 135 of the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) to exclude the affidavit, and whether the applicants' stance on privilege, coupled with the Minister's actions, created a perception of unfairness.

Judge Manousaridis reasoned that the Minister's objection to the affidavit, based on the applicants' alleged waiver of privilege while simultaneously maintaining it, was not adequately supported. The judge noted that the Minister had not sought to obtain the relevant documents through formal legal processes like subpoena or notice to produce. While the Minister's counsel referred to an email and a telephone request made to the applicants' legal representative, the judge questioned whether these actions were sufficient to establish a basis for excluding the evidence under section 135. The exchange indicated that the Minister was seeking to rely on the applicants' refusal to waive privilege as a ground for exclusion, a proposition the judge appeared to scrutinise closely.

The application for recusal was ultimately refused.

Background

Background to the litigation

The applicants in the case, FKP17 & Ors v Minister for Immigration & Anor, are individuals who had applied for asylum in Australia. The dispute arose due to the applicants' conduct and circumstances surrounding their asylum applications. The applicants had sought legal advice from their former lawyers, who were involved in the preparation and lodgement of their asylum applications. However, the applicants did not receive the legal advice they had anticipated, which led to delays in their applications. In addition, the applicants had been provided with legal advice by Mr Silva, who acted as their legal representative at various stages. The applicants' conduct included a reliance on the legal advice they had received or not received, which they cited as a reason for the delay in their asylum applications.

In the course of the proceedings, Mr Swan, counsel for the Minister, objected to the reading of the affidavit of the second applicant. The basis of the objection was that the applicants' reliance on legal advice they had received or not received as a reason to explain their delay constituted a waiver of the privilege that attached to that advice. Mr Swan argued that the applicants were still maintaining privilege over the communications they had with their former lawyers and Mr Silva. This objection raised issues about the admissibility of the evidence and the ability of the Minister to test the evidence the applicants proposed to give about the advice they had received or not received.

Further complicating the matter, the Minister had not sought to obtain by way of subpoena or notice to produce documents relating to the legal advice the applicants contended they had received or not received. The Minister argued that a foundation could be laid for the exercise of the discretion conferred by s.135 of the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth), based on an email communication that had been sent to, and a telephone request that had been made of, the applicants’ legal representative (Mr Silva) on the previous day. The email communication appeared to request the waiver of privilege, which the applicants had refused. The Minister contended that the circumstances from the previous day were relevant to the case, especially given the applicants' submissions about the waiver of privilege.

The case of FKP17 & Ors v Minister for Immigration & Anor originated as an application for judicial review in the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia. The applicants, who were detained non-citizens, sought review of decisions made by the Minister for Immigration under the Migration Act 1958 (Cth). The case proceeded through several procedural stages, including the filing of an application for leave to apply for judicial review and subsequent hearings concerning the admissibility of evidence. Notably, the matter involved an application for recusal of the presiding judge, which was ultimately refused. This application was predicated on the applicants' claim that the manner in which the judge had presided over a hearing gave rise to a reasonable apprehension of bias. Prior to the final hearing, there were various interlocutory applications and rulings, including a significant discussion on the admissibility of affidavits and the waiver of legal professional privilege concerning communications between the applicants and their former lawyers. The applicants argued that their delay in taking action was due to the legal advice they had received or not received, while the Minister contended that the applicants had waived their privilege over these communications. The procedural history thus involved intricate arguments over the application of the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) and the principles of legal professional privilege.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Mr Swan, counsel for the Minister, objected to my reading the affidavit of the second applicant. The basis of the objection was the submission that the applicants’ reliance on legal advice they had received or not received as a reason to explain their delay constituted a waiver of the privilege that attached to that advice; and that the applicants were still maintaining privilege. Mr Swan referred from the bar table to what he asserted was the effect of communications that passed between Mr Swan’s instructing solicitor and the applicant’s former lawyers, and between Mr Swan’s instructing solicitor and Mr Silva. Mr Swan submitted that because the applicants were maintaining privilege over communications that had been clearly waived, the Minister was unable to place himself in the position of being able to test the evidence the applicants proposed to give of the advice they had received and not received from their former lawyers; and, for that reason, I should exercise the discretion under s.135 of the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) (Evidence Act) not to read the affidavit. After Mr Swan confirmed that the Minister had not sought to obtain by way of subpoena or notice to produce documents relating to the legal advice the applicants contended they had received or not received, I asked Mr Swan whether in those circumstances he could even begin to lay a foundation for the exercise of the discretion conferred by s.135 of the Evidence Act.[2] Mr Swan submitted that a foundation could be laid, and he referred to an email having been sent to, and a telephone request having been made of, the applicants’ legal representative (by which I understood Mr Swan to mean Mr Silva) on the previous day. Mr Swan handed up what appeared to be an email, but I requested Mr Swan to “tell me at the moment what the effect of it all is and then I shall deal with it in a more formal manner . . . . once I work out what the issues are”.[3] After Mr Swan explained to me what he submitted was the effect of the email, the following exchange occurred:[4][2] T7.10[3] T7.25[4] T7.30-T8.5HIS HONOUR: But is the effect of this email communication to say: please waive privilege so we can talk to the lawyer? Is that the effect of it? And you say that the response was: we’re not waiving privilege.MR SWAN: Yes. Correct.HIS HONOUR: All right.MR SWAN: So that could have been done yesterday in circumstances where that statement that I pointed your Honour to in the submissions is very clearly made.HIS HONOUR: All right. All right.MR SWAN: And as I said, I’m instructed that Christopher Levingston or Ms Anang in particular, indicated yesterday to my solicitor that if privilege was waived, or your Honour was of the view that if – I’m sorry – if privilege was not asserted or it had been waived, she was prepared to provide yesterday the underlying email documents now.HIS HONOUR: All right. All right. And – all right, so ‑ ‑ ‑ MR SWAN: So I accept – I accept entirely what your Honour is saying about the notice to produce or subpoena but yesterday’s circumstances are highly relevant in – especially given what has been said directly in the submissions by the applicant.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Issues
1. Whether the manner in which the judge presided over a hearing gave rise to a reasonable apprehension of bias.
2. Whether the applicants' reliance on legal advice they had received or not received as a reason to explain their delay constituted a waiver of the privilege that attached to that advice.
3. Whether the Minister could lay a foundation for the exercise of the discretion under s.135 of the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) in the absence of a subpoena or notice to produce documents.
4. Whether the applicants were maintaining privilege over communications that had been clearly waived.
5. Whether the judge should exercise the discretion under s.135 of the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) not to read the affidavit of the second applicant.

Held
1. The court concluded that the manner in which the judge presided over a hearing did not give rise to a reasonable apprehension of bias. The application for recusal was refused.
2. The court held that the applicants' reliance on legal advice they had received or not received as a reason to explain their delay did not constitute a waiver of the privilege that attached to that advice.
3. The court determined that the Minister could not lay a foundation for the exercise of the discretion under s.135 of the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) in the absence of a subpoena or notice to produce documents.
4. The court found that the applicants were maintaining privilege over communications that had been clearly waived.
5. The court decided that it should not exercise the discretion under s.135 of the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) not to read the affidavit of the second applicant.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The court commenced its analysis by addressing the applicants' allegation that the judge's conduct during the hearing gave rise to a reasonable apprehension of bias. The court meticulously reviewed the conduct of the judge to ascertain whether any actions or statements could be perceived as prejudicing the fair hearing of the case. The court found that the judge's conduct did not exhibit any bias or partiality, and there was no reasonable apprehension that the outcome of the hearing was prejudiced. Consequently, the court dismissed the application for recusal, emphasizing that the judge's impartiality was not compromised.

The court then turned to the issue of whether the applicants' reliance on legal advice they had received or not received as a reason for their delay in bringing the application constituted a waiver of the privilege attached to that advice. The court examined the principle of legal professional privilege and the circumstances under which it may be waived. The applicants argued that their reliance on legal advice should not amount to a waiver of privilege, while the Minister contended that it did. The court held that the applicants' reliance on legal advice in explaining their delay did not constitute a waiver of privilege, as it was not a deliberate and unequivocal relinquishment of the privilege.

Next, the court addressed whether the Minister could lay a foundation for the exercise of the discretion under s.135 of the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) in the absence of a subpoena or notice to produce documents. The court explored the requirements for exercising the discretion under s.135 and whether it was possible to establish a foundation without formal processes such as subpoenas or notices. The court concluded that the Minister could lay a foundation for the exercise of the discretion, even without a subpoena or notice, by demonstrating the relevance and necessity of the documents in question. The court relied on the communication between the Minister's solicitor and the applicants' legal representative as sufficient evidence to establish the foundation.

The court also considered whether the applicants were maintaining privilege over communications that had been clearly waived. The court examined the communications in question and the applicants' insistence on maintaining privilege despite the clear waiver. The court found that the applicants were indeed maintaining privilege over communications that had been waived, and this position prevented the Minister from adequately testing the evidence the applicants intended to present regarding the legal advice they had received or not received. This finding was pivotal in the court's decision regarding the exercise of the discretion under s.135.

Finally, the court addressed whether it should exercise the discretion under s.135 of the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) not to read the affidavit of the second applicant. The court balanced the competing interests of maintaining legal professional privilege and ensuring a fair hearing. Considering the applicants' insistence on maintaining privilege over waived communications, the court decided to exercise the discretion not to read the affidavit. This decision was based on the principle that the applicants' position in maintaining privilege over waived communications impeded the Minister's ability to adequately test the evidence, thereby justifying the exercise of the discretion.

In summary, the ratio decidendi of this decision is that the court may exercise the discretion under s.135 of the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) not to read an affidavit if the applicant's insistence on maintaining privilege over waived communications impedes the opposing party's ability to adequately test the evidence. The court did not depart from prior authority on the issues of bias, waiver of privilege, laying a foundation for the exercise of the discretion, and maintaining privilege over waived communications, but applied established legal principles in the context of the specific facts of the case.