IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF NEW ZEALAND
CA157/2010
[2010] NZCA 425BETWEENBROWNS REAL ESTATE LIMITED
Appellant
ANDGRAND LAKES PROPERTIES LIMITED
Respondent
Hearing:19 August 2010
Court:Glazebrook, Venning and Simon France JJ
Counsel:P R W Chisnall for Appellant
D M Lester for Respondent
Judgment:20 September 2010 at 4.30 pm
JUDGMENT OF THE COURT
A The appeal is dismissed.
BCosts for a standard appeal on a band A basis plus usual disbursements are awarded to the respondent.
____________________________________________________________________
REASONS OF THE COURT
(Given by Glazebrook J)
Introduction
[1] On 27 November 2009 Grand Lakes Properties Ltd (Grand Lakes) served a statutory demand on Browns Real Estate Ltd (Browns) for the sum of $134,931.00. The demand is for money owing pursuant to a lease of retail units in Queenstown.
[2] On 10 March 2010 Associate Judge Osborne refused Browns’ application, under s 290(4)(b) of the Companies Act 1993, to set aside the statutory demand.[1] Browns appeals against that decision.
Relevant legislation
[1]Browns Real Estate Ltd v Grand Lakes Properties Ltd HC Invercargill CIV-2009-425-670, 10 March 2010.
[3] The relevant legislation is s 290(4) of the Companies Act. It provides:
(4) The Court may grant an application to set aside a statutory demand if it is satisfied that:
(a)There is a substantial dispute whether or not the debt is owing or is due; or
(b)The company appears to have a counterclaim, set-off, or cross-demand and the amount specified in the demand less the amount of the counterclaim, set-off, or cross-demand is less than the prescribed amount; or
(c)The demand ought to be set aside on other grounds.
Judgment of Associate Judge Osborne
[4] In the High Court, Browns sought to set aside the statutory demand under s 290(4)(b) on the basis that it had a counterclaim which exceeded the sum demanded. The counterclaim arose from alleged misrepresentations about the quality and characteristics of the retail precinct made by the lessor (Grand Lakes’ predecessor in title) or its agent during discussions and negotiations regarding the lease that occurred throughout 2006. Associate Judge Osborne accepted that Browns had an arguable case that Grand Lakes’ predecessor in title as lessor misrepresented the qualities and characteristics of the retail precinct. The Associate Judge also accepted that the misrepresentation arguably resulted in damage to Browns in excess of the statutory demand amount.
[5] However, the Associate Judge held that cl 3.1 of the lease precluded Browns from raising a set-off, counterclaim or cross-demand as an excuse for not paying rent. Clause 3.1 of the lease (the no set-off clause) provides:
Payment: The Lessee shall in each year during the Term, pay the Rent and any other money required to be paid by the Lessee pursuant to this Lease, to the Lessor without demand from the Lessor and free of any deduction, withholding, set-off or reduction on any account.
[6] The Associate Judge was of the view that cl 3.1 could be described as a traditional no set-off clause, designed to deal with the finding of the Court…
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- Case
- [2010] NZCA 425
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court was required to decide whether a contractual no set-off clause precluded a party from making a successful application to set aside a statutory demand under s 290(4)(b) of the Companies Act. The court had to consider whether the clause prohibiting withholding of rent on any account prevented Browns from raising a set-off, counterclaim, or cross-demand as an excuse for not paying rent. The court also had to determine whether the limitation in the arbitration clause precluded the counterclaim asserted by Browns.
The court held that the no set-off clause in the lease agreement precluded Browns from raising a set-off, counterclaim, or cross-demand as an excuse for not paying rent. The court reasoned that just as in the Construction Contracts Act 2002 context, similar reasoning applied where there was a contractual no set-off provision. The efficacy of a no set-off contractual provision would be undermined if statutory demands could be set aside on the basis of a set-off, counterclaim, or cross-demand a commercial party had by contract expressly agreed could not be raised. The court also held that there were strong grounds for considering that the claim by Browns was barred by the limitation in the arbitration clause, although it made no definitive finding on that point.
The appeal was dismissed, and costs for a standard appeal on a band A basis plus usual disbursements were awarded to the respondent.
Orders
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Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi