Winslade Partners Pty Ltd v Steri-Flow Filtration Systems (Aust) Pty Ltd

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SUPREME COURT OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA

(Magistrates Appeals: Civil)

WINSLADE PARTNERS PTY LTD v STERI-FLOW FILTRATION SYSTEMS (AUST) PTY LTD

[2011] SASC 157

Judgment of The Honourable Justice Stanley

29 September 2011

MAGISTRATES - APPEALS AND REVIEW - SOUTH AUSTRALIA - APPEAL TO SUPREME COURT

APPEAL AND NEW TRIAL - APPEAL - GENERAL PRINCIPLES - INTERFERENCE WITH JUDGE'S FINDINGS OF FACT - FUNCTIONS OF APPELLATE COURT - WHERE FINDINGS BASED ON CREDIBILITY OF WITNESSES - NECESSITY FOR FINDING TO BE CLEARLY WRONG

CONTRACTS - GENERAL CONTRACTUAL PRINCIPLES - CONSTRUCTION AND INTERPRETATION OF CONTRACTS - IMPLIED TERMS - GENERALLY

RESTITUTION - RESTITUTION RESULTING FROM UNENFORCEABLE, INCOMPLETE, ILLEGAL OR VOID CONTRACTS - RECOMPENSE FOR SERVICES RENDERED - QUANTUM MERUIT

Appellant claimed appellant and respondent had entered into two agreements for the appellant to provide work for the respondent.  The first agreement concerned work for a tax concession claim and the second was to prepare a Commercial Ready Grant application.  The appellant sought to recover money for that work relying on the contracts, or in the alternative a contractual quantum meruit.

The magistrate found no contract had come into existence in relation to the tax concession claim work.  The magistrate further found that no monies were owed to the appellant in respect of the Commercial Ready Grant application in accordance with the contract.

Whether a valid contract existed for the tax concession claim work – whether the appellant had a claim on the basis of a contractual quantum meruit although they had abandoned a claim for quantum meruit at trial – whether the contract for the Commercial Ready Grant application had expired or whether the contract contemplated resubmission – whether the appellant’s claims had been discharged by a settlement of the parties in July 2005.

Held:  Appeal dismissed.  No basis to interfere with the magistrate’s finding that no contract existed for the tax concession claim – the appellant was not entitled to a quantum meruit claim – the contract for the Commercial Ready Grant application expired when the application was lodged and there was an implied term in the contract that the work became the property of the respondent thereafter – the July 2005 settlement did not discharge all of the appellant’s claims and the magistrate erred in this finding.

Magistrates Court Act 1991 (SA) s 8(2), s 31, referred to.
B.P. Refinery (Westernport) Pty Ltd v Shire of Hastings (1977) 180 CLR 266; Battye v Shammall (2005) 91 SASR 315, applied.
Pacific Carriers Ltd v BNP Paribas (2004) 218 CLR 451; Investors Compensation Scheme v West Bromwich Building Society [1988] 1 WLR 896; Bank of Credit and Commerce International SA v Ali [2002] 1 AC 251; Toll (FGCT) Pty Ltd v Alphapharm Pty Ltd (2004) 219 CLR 165; Lake v Simmons [1927] AC 487; Watson v Phipps (1985) 63 ALR 321, discussed.
Fox v Percy (2003) 214 CLR 118; Pavey & Matthews Pty Ltd v Paul (1987) 162 CLR 221; Warren v Coombes

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Details
Case
[2011] SASC 157
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

Winslade Partners Pty Ltd appealed against a decision of the Magistrates Court of South Australia that rejected their claim for a contract sum of $103,175. The dispute arose from a series of agreements between Winslade Partners and Steri-Flow Filtration Systems (Aust) Pty Ltd, a manufacturing company specialising in stainless steel fabrication. Winslade Partners provided consultancy services to Steri-Flow from 2001 to 2005. In 2003, the parties entered into an "equity for fees arrangement," where Winslade Partners forgave certain payments in exchange for 10% of Steri-Flow's share capital. The dispute centred around the interpretation of this arrangement and the existence of a subsequent contract for grant application services. The primary legal issue was whether the learned magistrate erred in finding that the appellant had failed to prove the existence of a contract for the grant application services. The court had to determine if the magistrate's findings on the content of a critical telephone conversation were clearly erroneous or contrary to compelling inferences. The court held that the magistrate's findings, based on the credibility of the witnesses, could not be set aside on appeal unless there were incontrovertible facts or uncontested testimony demonstrating error. The court concluded that the magistrate's decision was not glaringly improbable or contrary to compelling inferences, and thus, the appeal was dismissed.

The court further addressed the claim for restitution under quantum meruit, which the appellant had abandoned during the trial. The court noted that the claim's abandonment meant the magistrate did not consider it, but it became significant on appeal. The court reiterated that findings based on witness credibility could only be set aside if clearly erroneous. The court found no such error in the magistrate's decision. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed, and the court directed that the parties be heard on the question of costs.

Orders

Orders of the court

Background

Background to the litigation

In relation to the tax concession claim, the appellant originally claimed, in the alternative, an entitlement to recover from the respondent the sum of $16,715.30 as a quantum meruit but abandoned that claim during the course of the trial. Unsurprisingly, the learned magistrate did not deal with any claim for a quantum meruit. Nonetheless, this assumes some significance on appeal.Background The respondent is a manufacturing company specialising in stainless steel fabrication for the food and beverage industry. Mr Gilbert Erskine is a director of the respondent company and was principally responsible for its day-to-day management. His wife, Lorna Erskine, had authority to speak on behalf of the company at all relevant times. The appellant company is the corporate vehicle through which Dr Steven Winslade and Mrs Sharon Winslade provide consultancy services. The company was previously named Technology Investments Australia Pty Ltd. The appellant provided consultancy services to the respondent from 2001 to 2005. In 2003 the parties entered into an agreement pursuant to which the appellant forgave any entitlement to be paid for certain outstanding work, future success fees, and fees in respect of the equivalent of ten days work per month for the next year in consideration of the respondent issuing to the appellant 10 per cent of its share capital. This became known as the “equity for fees arrangement”. It appears clear the shares were issued to the appellant, pursuant to this agreement, but the evidence does not establish when this occurred. In about February 2004 the appellant loaned the respondent the sum of $50,000. The loan was repayable “upon receipt by Steri-Flow of tax offset arising from Steri-Flow’s tax return for the financial year 2003/2004”. By July 2005 the unpaid balance of this loan was $12,000. In or about January 2005 the appellant loaned a further sum of $18,000 to Mr and Mrs Erskine. While they were identified in the loan agreement of 12 January 2005 (exhibit P7) as the borrowers, the parties treated the respondent company as the actual borrower. In the meantime, on 5 December 2004 the parties entered into the Commercial Ready grant contract. The agreement is evidenced by a letter of that date from the appellant to the respondent together with an attached quotation (exhibit P6). Relevantly, the quotation includes the following:Payment ScheduleUpon receipt of grant funds over the life of the project. Ten percent of the grant payment received. Pursuant to the contract the parties agreed that the appellant would prepare, ready for lodgement, on behalf of the respondent, a full Commercial Ready program application to AusIndustry for a grant of more than $1,000,000. The agreement was that the application would be prepared on a success fee basis only. The success fee was 10 per cent of the grant payment received. This is the Commercial Ready grant contract. The Commercial Ready grant application was lodged with AusIndustry in December 2004. By letter from AusIndustry to the respondent dated 9 March 2005, the respondent was advised that its Commercial Ready grant application had been unsuccessful.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

Accordingly, while I consider the learned magistrate erred in the finding he made concerning the proper construction of the July 2005 settlement agreement, it makes no difference to the result of the case. Conclusion I would dismiss the appeal. I will hear the parties as to the question of costs.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

In this regard the respondent submitted that the court was entitled to consider the circumstances surrounding the settlement to determine its aim, object and commercial purpose. It submitted that the learned magistrate had correctly found that there had been a change in the relationship between the parties because the Winslades would not agree to convert debt to equity as required by Mr Yap. This resulted in a mutual determination between the parties that the relationship should be severed once and for all, which was the intended effect of the settlement. This was consistent with the appellant’s insistence on the respondent granting it an indemnity and the use of debt collectors by the appellant to recover the monies alleged to be owed by the respondent in relation to the tax concession claim, and the absence of any follow up by the Winslades after July 2005 concerning any resubmission of the Commercial Ready grant application. ConsiderationThe tax concession claim The learned magistrate rejected the tax concession claim on the basis that the appellant had failed to prove the existence of the contract. This conclusion turned on the finding the learned magistrate made in relation to the content of the telephone conversation between Mrs Winslade and Mr Erskine a few days after the email of 5 May 2005. Whether a binding contract came into existence at this time for payment by the respondent to the appellant of the fee claimed, turned on the content of this conversation. The learned magistrate preferred the evidence of Mr Erskine to that of Mrs Winslade on this issue. A finding of fact by a trial judge, based on the credibility of a witness, may only be set aside upon appeal where incontrovertible facts or uncontested testimony demonstrate that the trial judge’s conclusions are erroneous or where it is concluded that the decision at the trial was glaringly improbable or contrary to compelling inferences in the case.[4] [4] Warren v Coombes (1979) 142 CLR 531; Jones v Hyde (1989) 63 ALJR 349; Abalos v Australian Postal Commission (1990) 171 CLR 167; Devries v Australian National Railways Commission (1993) 177 CLR 472; Fox v Percy (2003) 214 CLR 118. In this case the learned magistrate has made a finding as to the content of the conversation which is a finding based on the credibility of the two witnesses. That finding is decisive on the issue of whether a contract was concluded between the parties as claimed by the appellant. The appellant cannot point to incontrovertible facts or uncontested testimony which would demonstrate that the learned magistrate’s findings as to what was said in the course of this conversation is erroneous. Neither can it be said that the learned magistrate’s acceptance of Mr Erskine’s evidence as to the content of the conversation is glaringly improbable or contrary to compelling inferences. The appellant complains that the finding was made some years after the conversation occurred and some years after the learned magistrate heard the evidence of this conversation. But an appellate court is only entitled to set aside a trial judge’s finding based expressly or inferentially on demeanour, if there is something that points decisively, and not merely persuasively, to error on the part of the judge in acting on his or her impressions of a witness.[5] Neither the mere effluxion of time nor any reliance placed by the learned magistrate on credit findings in relation to extraneous issues points decisively to error on the part of the magistrate in accepting the evidence of Mr Erskine as to what was said in the critical conversation. [5] Fox v Percy (2003) 214 CLR 118 per McHugh J at 146-147.