Winslade Partners Pty Ltd v Steri-Flow Filtration Systems (Aust) Pty Ltd

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SUPREME COURT OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA

(Full Court)

WINSLADE PARTNERS PTY LTD v STERI-FLOW FILTRATION SYSTEMS (AUST) PTY LTD

[2012] SASCFC 65

Judgment of The Full Court

(The Honourable Chief Justice Doyle, The Honourable Justice Vanstone and The Honourable Justice Peek)

6 June 2012

APPEAL AND NEW TRIAL - APPEAL - GENERAL PRINCIPLES - POINTS AND OBJECTIONS NOT TAKEN BELOW - WHEN NOT ALLOWED TO BE RAISED ON APPEAL - QUESTIONS NOT RAISED ON PLEADINGS OR IN ARGUMENT

RESTITUTION - RESTITUTION RESULTING FROM UNENFORCEABLE, INCOMPLETE, ILLEGAL OR VOID CONTRACTS - RECOMPENSE FOR SERVICES RENDERED - QUANTUM MERUIT - GENERAL PRINCIPLES

APPEAL AND NEW TRIAL - APPEAL - PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE - SOUTH AUSTRALIA - HEARING OF APPEAL - PROOF AND EVIDENCE

In 2004 the respondent entered into a contract with the appellant for the appellant to prepare an application to AusIndustry for a Commercial Ready grant in the name of the respondent – the work was to be carried out by the appellant on a ‘success fee basis only’, which was to be 10 per cent of the value of the grant if the application was successful – the application prepared by the appellant was rejected by AusIndustry – in 2005, the respondent contracted with another company to prepare another Commercial Ready grant application – the application was successful – the appellant became aware of this and claimed a payment of 10 per cent of the amount of the grant, relying on the agreement of 2004 – at trial, a Magistrate found in favour of the respondent – on appeal to this Court, a single Judge upheld the decision of the Magistrate, although on a slightly different basis.

The issues on appeal were: (1) whether a claim in copyright could be advanced on appeal to the Full Court when it had not been raised before the Magistrate at trial or on appeal before the single Judge of this Court; (2) whether the single Judge of this Court erred in allowing the appellant to advance a claim to a quantum meruit that had not been considered by the Magistrate – whether the evidence before the Magistrate established the benefit the respondent received from having before it the first application that had been prepared by the appellant, when the respondent was preparing the second application; (3) whether, assuming that the agreement of December 2004 did not entitle the appellant to payment, the appellant was nevertheless entitled to the payment claimed on the basis that the respondent had been unjustly enriched to the extent of an amount equal to the fee claimed; and (4) whether the single Judge of this Court erred in implying a term that ‘the work done in the form of the application became the property of the respondent’, when no implied term had been pleaded by the respondent, nor argued at trial or on appeal that such a term should be implied.

Held (Doyle CJ, Vanstone and Peek JJ): (1) it was too late to now assert that copyright in…

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Details
Case
[2012] SASCFC 65
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

Winslade Partners Pty Ltd (the appellant) appealed a decision of a single judge of the Supreme Court of South Australia, which upheld a Magistrate's finding in favour of Steri-Flow Filtration Systems (Aust) Pty Ltd (the respondent). The dispute arose from a contract where the appellant agreed to prepare a grant application for the respondent on a success fee basis. The application was unsuccessful, but the respondent later obtained a similar grant through another company. The appellant then claimed a success fee based on the original agreement.

The Full Court was required to determine several legal issues. These included whether a claim based on copyright could be raised for the first time on appeal, and whether the single judge erred in allowing the appellant to advance a quantum meruit claim that had not been considered by the Magistrate. The court also had to consider whether the evidence established that the respondent had benefited from the appellant's work on the initial application, and whether the respondent had been unjustly enriched. Finally, the court considered whether the single judge had erred in implying a term that the work done by the appellant became the property of the respondent, despite this not being pleaded or argued at trial.

The Court held that it was too late to raise a claim based on copyright, as this had not been pursued at trial or before the single judge, and the claim was abandoned during the appeal hearing. The quantum meruit claim was also abandoned at trial. The Court found that the contract had not failed or been frustrated, and the case did not fall under the principles of restitution for unjust enrichment as articulated in *Roxborough v Rothmans of Pall Mall Australia Ltd*. Crucially, there was insufficient evidence to establish the extent to which the respondent had made use of or benefited from the appellant's work. The Court also noted that the contractual arrangements were inconsistent with the grant of relief sought by the appellant, rendering it unnecessary to definitively decide whether the single judge had erred in implying a term regarding ownership of the work.

Consequently, the appeal was dismissed.

Orders

Orders of the court

Background

Background to the litigation

The appeal raises an issue that was not argued before the Magistrate, but was raised before the Judge. It is whether, assuming that the agreement of December 2004 did not entitle Winslade to payment, Winslade was nevertheless entitled to the payment claimed on the basis that Steri-Flow had been unjustly enriched to the extent of an amount equal to the fee claimed. The unjust enrichment was said to lie in the circumstance that in making the second application Steri-Flow had taken the benefit of Winslade’s work, had gained a profit from that work, and so would be unjustly enriched if it did not pay Winslade the 10 per cent fee. The single Judge referred to this claim, no doubt reflecting the submission to him, as “a restitutionary quantum meruit”: Winslade Partners Pty Ltd v Steri-Flow Filtration Systems (Aust) Pty Ltd [2011] SASC 157 at [93]. Facts Steri-Flow was “a manufacturing company specialising in stainless steel fabrication for the food and beverage industry:” Magistrate’s reasons at [10]. Winslade provided “consultancy services”. It provided such services to Steri‑Flow from about 2001. There was, then, a background of a business relationship between the two companies relating to projects or matters other than the one that gave rise to this litigation. The application form provided by AusIndustry describes a “Commercial Ready grant” as:... a competitive merit-based grant program which supports innovation and its commercialisation by supporting research and development, proof-of-concept activities and/or early-stage commercialisation activities. There was some urgency about the matter. The application apparently had to be lodged by 20 December 2004. On 5 December 2004 Winslade (writing under another name, but nothing turns on that) wrote to Steri-Flow enclosing “our quotation to prepare a Commercial Ready grant application”. In the letter Winslade stated: (AB 79)Given the extensive business planning work previously conducted for Steri-flow we confirm there is no requirement for Winslade to charge an up-front fee for performing this work. We are therefore offering to do the application on a success fee basis only. The quote below also includes work associated with the deed of agreement, reporting throughout the life of the project and assisting with managing the grant relationship. This fee structure assumes the grant achieved will be more than $1,000,000.The attached quotation outlined the work to be done by Winslade. The quotation stated: (AB 80)[Winslade] will prepare ready for lodgement a full Commercial Ready Programme application to Steri-flow’s satisfaction. This will include the development of an R&D Plan (written document and MS Project Plan) and a reworking of Steri-flow’s existing business and market plans to fit the style of Commercial Ready application.The application will be finalised in consultation with Steri-flow and upon agreement that it is ready to submit, [Winslade] will produce:· Three application packs (two colour and one black and white)· One CD ROM (containing all documents in the application pack) and· A draft cover letter to the programme administrators ready for Steri-flow’s signature.Although the Magistrate made no findings to this effect, I gather (as one would expect) that Winslade was to use information about Steri-Flow and its business and about the proposal the subject of the grant, to develop a detailed application in a form acceptable to AusIndustry. The quotation went on to state:Should Steri-flow be formally offered grant assistance, a fee of 10% of the value of the grant will be payable to [Winslade]. The offer of grant assistance will mean that 75% of the fee will be payable to [Winslade] irrespective of whether Steri-flow takes up the grant. The remaining 25% of the additional fee will only be payable to [Winslade] when grant payments are received by Steri-flow.There is no doubt that a substantial amount of work by Winslade was required to prepare the application. I assume that Steri-Flow also had to expend time and effort identifying and compiling information for use by Winslade in formulating the application.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

The circumstance that elements of the first application, indeed substantial elements, might appear in the second application establishes no basis for inferring that in preparing the second application Steri-Flow benefitted from the work of Winslade. The factual basis for a finding in favour of Winslade is not made out. It is not enough to say, as Mr Manetta argued, that Winslade’s work was valued at ten per cent of the anticipated grant, and that significant similarities between the first application and the second application establish that Steri-Flow had benefitted by using or taking advantage of work performed by Winslade to the value of ten per cent of the original grant.Conclusion For those reasons I would dismiss the appeal. VANSTONE J: I agree that the appeal should be dismissed, and with the reasons given by the Chief Justice. PEEK J: I agree with the orders proposed by the Chief Justice and with his reasons.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The Judge dismissed the claim based on “restitutionary quantum meruit”. The Judge said:[97]The appellant submits it has an entitlement to restitutionary quantum meruit on the basis that the respondent, in making further use of the appellant’s work pursuant to the December 2004 contract, when it resubmitted the Commercial Ready grant application in March 2006, is obliged to pay the appellant a reasonable remuneration by way of restitution. I do not consider this to be correct. The Judge rejected the claim by finding an implied term of the contract to the effect that “… the work in the form of the application became the property of the respondent”: Judge’s reasons at [99]. Winslade challenges the Judge’s finding that such a term was to be implied. It submits that if the term that the Judge implied is rejected, the claim of restitution can and should succeed. I add that before this Court Mr Manetta submitted that if the claim of restitution succeeded, Winslade should be awarded an amount equal to ten per cent of the amount of the grant, less the amount paid by Steri-Flow for the work done on the second application, an amount of about $30,000: Judge’s reasons at [58].Consideration of appeal Winslade complains that the Judge implied the term referred to above although Steri-Flow had not pleaded any such term, nor argued at trial or on appeal that such a term should be implied. That may be so. Mr Geyer did not submit to the contrary. But it is not apparent that Winslade has been unfairly treated in the circumstances. However, I pass by that point for the moment. In his outline of submissions Mr Manetta submitted:The contract is silent as to who was to have the “ownership” of the appellant’s work. What the appellant produced was an original piece of creative writing. It was a literary work for copyright purposes and, according to the normal rule, the intellectual property remains with the creator unless it is sold or given away. The work was not sold and, in the context of an arms’ length commercial agreement, it is not to be supposed, in the absence of clear indication, that work embodying hundreds of hours of the labour of one party and having a substantial commercial value is intended to be freely given away for the commercial exploitation of another. This submission was put as part of the argument against the implication of the term that the Judge implied. I consider that it is now too late to assert that copyright in the first application vested in Winslade. If Winslade had based its claim on copyright, there would have been no need to consider a claim in restitution. A claim could then have been advanced for infringement of Winslade’s copyright. The Magistrate would have had to consider whether the first application was the subject of copyright, and whether Winslade was the owner of that copyright, either alone or jointly with Steri-Flow. The Magistrate would no doubt have heard evidence about the work done on the application by each of the parties, evidence of a kind not presented to the Magistrate, as Mr Manetta accepted. Had the quantum meruit claim been pursued before the Magistrate, evidence necessary to decide the copyright issue might have emerged, but such a claim was not pursued before the Magistrate. In my opinion Winslade cannot now assert that it owns the copyright in the first application, and that any later use of that material infringes its copyright. There is no evidence before the Court to provide an appropriate basis for a decision on the issue of infringement, even if copyright vested in Winslade.