Viscariello v Legal Profession Conduct Commissioner

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SUPREME COURT OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA

(Civil: Application)

VISCARIELLO v LEGAL PROFESSION CONDUCT COMMISSIONER

[2015] SASC 132

Judgment of The Honourable Justice Parker

27 August 2015

STATUTES - ACTS OF PARLIAMENT - STATUTORY POWERS AND DUTIES - EXERCISE - DELEGATION OF POWER CONFERRED BY ACT

PUBLIC SERVICE - DUTIES AND OFFENCES IN RELATION TO OFFICE - DUTIES

The plaintiff challenged the delegation of investigative and determinative powers by the Legal Profession Conduct Commissioner to two legal practitioners. The delegations were made because of a conflict of interest the Commissioner had in respect of various complaints lodged with the former Legal Practitioners Conduct Board by the plaintiff against certain legal practitioners. The plaintiff challenged the delegations on the basis that the Board, the Commissioner and the delegates had failed to comply with obligations and duties imposed on persons exercising statutory powers, including those regulating conflicts of interests. The primary relief sought by the plaintiff was orders that the delegations were unlawful and that the matter be referred to the Attorney-General to appoint an acting Commissioner to carry out investigations into the complaints and to act in relation to legal actions initiated by the plaintiff.

Held, dismissing the application:

(1) Duties imposed on statutory corporations under the Public Corporations Act 1993 did not apply to the Board because there was no regulation to that effect. The duties did not apply to the Commissioner or the Commissioner’s first delegate because neither was a “body corporate”.

(2) Duties to declare conflicts of interest under the Public Sector (Honesty and Accountability) Act 1995 did not apply to the Board because it was a body corporate. The duties did apply to the Board members and to the Commissioner.

(3)  Board members did not face a conflict that precluded them from deciding that the Board should defend its own actions as the Hardiman principle is concerned only with avoiding the possibility that a reasonable apprehension of bias might arise in the future.

R v Australian Broadcasting Tribunal; Ex parte Hardiman (1980) 144 CLR 13, applied.

(4)  The Board and its members did not have a personal interest such that they would be precluded from participating in decision-making in situations where there was a duty to accord procedural fairness.

Isbester v Knox City Council (2015) 89 ALJR 689, distinguished.

(5) The Board and its members did not have a pecuniary interest within the meaning of the Public Sector (Honesty and Accountability) Act 1995.

(6) The delegation made to the first delegate by the Commissioner on 15 July 2013 was not authorised in writing by the Attorney-General as required by s 17(1) of the Public Sector (Honesty and Accountability) Act 1995, but the delegation was not thereby invalid as invalidity had not been intended by the legislature. Each of the other delegations had been authorised by the Attorney-General.

Project Blue Sky v Australian Broadcasting Authority (1998) 194 CLR 355, applied.

Kirkham v Industrial Relations Commission (2015) 121 SASR 471, discussed.

Australian Broadcasting Corporation v Redmore Pty…

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Details
Case
[2015] SASC 132
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

Viscariello took the Legal Profession Conduct Commissioner to court over a decision made by the Board, a body corporate. The dispute centred on whether the Board could lawfully defend its decision or actions in a legal context. The South Australian Supreme Court was tasked with resolving this issue.

The central legal question was whether the Board, as a body corporate, could lawfully defend its decision in a legal context. Additionally, the court had to determine if the Board's members had a conflict of interest, as per section 8 of the Public Sector Governance (Public Sector Human Resources Act) 1999. The court also needed to decide if the Commissioner, by virtue of his position as a senior official under the Legal Profession Act, was subject to the same conflict of interest provisions.

The court found that the Board, as a body corporate, was not subject to the conflict of interest provisions outlined in the Public Sector Governance Act and the Public Sector Human Resources Act. However, these provisions did apply to Board members in their capacity as corporate agency members. The court also held that the Commissioner was subject to section 17 of the Public Sector Governance Act due to his status as a senior official. The court rejected Viscariello's argument that the Board had a conflict of interest in defending its decision, stating that such a principle would have extensive implications for all public sector decision-makers. The court distinguished between the principle from the High Court's decision in R v Australian Broadcasting Tribunal; Ex parte Hardiman and the bias rule, and concluded that neither principle applied to the case.

The court ordered that the Commissioner was not required to disclose certain documents to Viscariello.

Orders

Orders of the court

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

I have found that the Board as a body corporate was not subject to the duties in relation to conflicts of interest placed on various classes of office holder by the PC Act and the PSHA Act. However, s 8 of the PSHA Act did apply to Board members in their capacity as corporate agency members. Section 17 of that Act also applies to the Commissioner by virtue of his status as a senior official under s 75 of the LP Act. Defending the Board’s decision Mr Viscariello contended that, in the period prior to 1 July 2014, the Board had a conflict of interest in defending his application for orders in the nature of mandamus. It seems that he is intending to refer to a personal interest within the meaning of s 8 of the PSHA Act. If that submission is correct, it would have enormous implications. Provisions in similar terms to s 8 are included elsewhere, such as in the PSHA Act (eg s 17), the PC Act, the Local Government Act 1999 and certain other Acts, and apply to most categories of decision maker in the State and local government sector. Thus, the principle advanced by Mr Viscariello would apparently extend to all South Australian public sector decision-makers involved in any form of legal action, whether they be ministers, statutory authorities, local councils or other holders of public office or statutory powers. The suggested personal interest would also seemingly extend to directors and others making decisions on behalf of private sector bodies corporate. Mr Viscariello could not refer me to any authority in support of the proposition but instead invited me to make new law. For the reasons that follow, I have declined that invitation. Before further considering Mr Viscariello’s submission that the Board could not lawfully defend its own decision or actions, there are two principles that must be distinguished. The first principle emerged from the judgment of the High Court in R v Australian Broadcasting Tribunal; Ex parte Hardiman.[11] The second principle to be distinguished is that which requires a person with an interest in the outcome, or a perceived interest, not to participate in decision-making in circumstances where there is a duty to accord procedural fairness, ie the bias rule.[11] (1980) 144 CLR 13 at 35–36.The Hardiman principle The High Court observed in Hardiman that in certain circumstances a decision maker should not defend its own decision in litigation.[12] For the reasons that follow, I do not consider that this principle applies in the present case. [12] (1980) 144 CLR 13 at 35–36. The High Court noted in Hardiman that the usual course where a decision made by a tribunal is challenged in a judicial review is for the tribunal to submit to such order as the court may make. Thus, in practice, tribunals (and also inferior courts) instruct their legal representative to attend at the first opportunity and to give an undertaking to abide the decision of the court save as to costs. If there is no other contravener, the Attorney-General (or in some cases another Minister) may then intervene or appear as amicus curiae. The High Court made clear that there is a risk if a tribunal actively defends its own decision that it will endanger its impartiality should the matter be remitted for further consideration.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established