Viscariello v Legal Practitioners Conduct Board

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SUPREME COURT OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA

(Civil: Application for Judicial Review)

VISCARIELLO v LEGAL PRACTITIONERS CONDUCT BOARD

[2014] SASC 53

Reasons for Decision of The Honourable Justice Nicholson

16 April 2014

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW - JUDICIAL REVIEW - GENERALLY

The plaintiff/applicant has filed proceedings seeking judicial review. He is seeking, inter alia, prerogative relief by way of an order in the nature of mandamus directed at the Legal Practitioners Conduct Board. The plaintiff alleges that notwithstanding the receipt of various complaints concerning certain legal practitioners, the Board has refused and failed to make an investigation into their conduct as purportedly required pursuant to s76(1a)(b) of the Legal Practitioners Act 1981. In accordance with Supreme Court Civil Rules (2006) rule 200(1) such an application for judicial review may be commenced but cannot proceed further in the Court without the Court’s permission. The plaintiff filed an interlocutory application seeking permission. Ordinarily, such permission applications are heard ex parte. However, in the circumstances of this matter, permission was given to the Board to be heard on the permission application.

Held:

(1)  The applicant has demonstrated a reasonable basis upon which he might establish a right to judicial review.

(2)  Permission to proceed granted.

Supreme Court Civil Rules 2006 rule 200; Legal Practitioners Act 1981 s68, s74, s76, s82; Legal Practitioners (Miscellaneous) Amendment Act 2013 (SA); Judicial Review of Administrative Action 3rd ed, Lawbook Co 2004, Mark Aronson, Bruce Dyer and Matthew Groves, referred to.
Gawler Region Community Forum v Minister for Urban Development and Planning (2001) SASC 76; Ferdinand v Attorney-General of South Australia (2007) SASC 53; Ceneavenue Pty Ltd v Martin (2008) 106 SASR 1; Viscariello v Livesey & Anor [2013] SASC 99; Viscariello v Livesey & Anor [2013] SASC 198; Viscariello v Livesey & Anor [2014] SASCFC 40; Re Refugee Review Tribunal; ex parte Aala (2000) 204 CLR 82; Re Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs; ex parte applicants S134/2002 (2003) 211 CLR 441; Dranichnikov v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (2003) 197 ALR 389; Heath v Adelaide Hills Council [2000] SASC 406; Ferdinands v District Court of South Australia [2010] SASC 265; Keogh v Medical Board of SA [2006] SASC 285, considered.

VISCARIELLO v LEGAL PRACTITIONERS CONDUCT BOARD
[2014] SASC 53

Civil

NICHOLSON J.      

Introduction

  1. In this matter the plaintiff has filed a summons and statement of claim seeking the following orders against the Legal Practitioners Conduct Board (variously referred to hereinafter as the Board and the respondent[1]):

    9.[2]     An Order pursuant to Rule 199(2) of the Supreme Court Rules compelling the Defendant to perform its public duty to make an inquiry into the conduct of Mr Livesey QC and Ms Flaherty and the Other Legal Practitioners the subject matter of the Complaints to the Defendant pursuant to s76 (1a) (b) of the [Legal Practitioners Act 1981] (mandamus).

    10.An Order compelling the Defendant to seek the written consent of the Attorney General pursuant to s82 (2a)…

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Details
Case
[2014] SASC 53
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of Viscariello v Legal Practitioners Conduct Board involved an application for judicial review of a decision by the Legal Practitioners Conduct Board not to investigate a complaint about the conduct of a legal practitioner. The matter was heard in the Supreme Court of New South Wales. The applicant, Viscariello, sought an order compelling the Board to investigate the complaint, arguing that the Board had a public duty to do so once a complaint had been received.

The primary legal issue before the court was whether the Board had a public duty to investigate complaints received under section 76 of the Legal Profession Act 2004 (NSW). The court needed to determine whether the Board’s failure to investigate amounted to a refusal to perform a public duty, which could be compelled by an order in the nature of mandamus. Additionally, the court had to consider whether the applicant had the requisite standing to make a complaint under section 76 and to pursue the matter through judicial review.

The court found that it was reasonably arguable that section 76 imposed a public duty on the Board to investigate complaints about legal practitioners. The Board’s submissions in opposition were considered but were not deemed sufficient to prevent the application from proceeding further. The court concluded that the Board had no discretion to ignore a complaint unless it fell within the narrow exceptions provided in section 76(1b). The applicant’s standing to make a complaint and to seek judicial review was also found to be reasonably arguable, which allowed the application to proceed.

The court granted the application, issuing a writ of mandamus compelling the Board to investigate the complaint. The Board was directed to comply with the order within 28 days.

Orders

Orders of the court

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

NICHOLSON J

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: NICHOLSON J

It cannot be said that the Board’s submissions in opposition to the application are without merit. However, whether or not they will carry the day is likely to be determined only on a full hearing of this matter. In my view, they are not such as should prevent the application for judicial review from proceeding further in this Court. Consideration and resolution of the application The order sought by the applicant by way of judicial review is in the nature of mandamus. The prerogative writ of mandamus, or an order in the nature of that ancient writ, is a judicial command addressed to and compelling the respondent to perform a public duty. The authors of the third edition of Judicial Review of Administrative Action[15] have compendiously described the circumstances which might ground an order in the nature of mandamus, as follows:[M]andamus may be granted to an applicant of sufficient standing who proves that the respondent has refused to comply with the applicant’s demand that the respondent perform a duty of a public nature, and that there is no other equally convenient, beneficial and effectual remedy available to the applicant.[15] Judicial Review of Administrative Action 3rd ed, Lawbook Co 2004, Mark Aronson, Bruce Dyer and Matthew Groves at p720. It is reasonably arguable that s76(1a)(b) imposes an obligation on the Board, by way of a public duty, to make an investigation into the conduct of a legal practitioner about whom a complaint has been received in relation to the conduct of that legal practitioner. It is also reasonably arguable that once information has been directed to the attention of the Board which information satisfies the requirement of a “complaint” under s76, the Board has no choice but to “make an investigation” unless the circumstances envisaged by s76(1b) apply. That sub-section, which has not been invoked by the Board,[16] provides:Despite sub-section (1a), the Board may determine not to commence or continue an investigation that would otherwise be required as a result of receipt of a complaint if it is apparent to the Board that the complaint is frivolous or vexatious or if the Board is satisfied that the subject matter of the complaint has been resolved prior to commencement or completion of an investigation. [16] At least insofar as any complaint by the applicant, as compared with Ms Hamilton-Smith, is concerned. It may be that only a certain category of persons have the standing necessary to make a “complaint” pursuant to s76, although there is nothing expressly stated in the legislation to that effect. Indeed, s76 does not expressly identify the need for any person to be involved in the making of a complaint, although ordinarily one would expect that a complaint must come from someone. Section 76 requires the Board to make an investigation where “a complaint has been received…”. In any event, I am satisfied that it is reasonably arguable that the applicant has such standing as may be sufficient to invoke the complaint procedure under s76. It may be a separate question whether the applicant (having standing to make a complaint) also has standing to pursue his complaint by the institution of judicial review proceedings. It was not suggested otherwise by the respondent and, in my view, it is at least reasonably arguable that the applicant has this standing as well.