Vargas v Minister for Home Affairs

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Vargas v Minister for Home Affairs [2021] FCAFC 162 

Appeal from: Vargas v Minister for Home Affairs [2021] FCA 276
File number(s): QUD 122 of 2021
Judgment of: MCKERRACHER, MARKOVIC AND SC DERRINGTON JJ
Date of judgment: 3 September 2021
Catchwords:  MIGRATION –  appeal from decision of primary judge dismissing application made under s 476A of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (the Act) for judicial review of a migration decision – where Minister used his discretion under s 501BA of the Act to set aside a decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (AAT) made under s 501CA of the Act – whether the Minister’s refusal to afford the appellant natural justice in the process of, or leading up to, the exercise of his power in s 501BA(2) was unreasonable – whether Federal Court has jurisdiction to review the process leading up to exercise of such power – whether the Minister’s disagreement with a comment by the AAT that the appellant is not a ‘threat to all women’ is a finding that is ‘illogical, irrational or unreasonable’ – whether the Minister failed to apply any ‘active intellectual process’ to certain matters affecting his decision – whether Minister failed to take into account materials before the AAT that were mandatory relevant considerations
Legislation:

Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss 5, 189, 474, 476A, 501, 501BA, 501CA

Migration Amendment (Character and General Visa Cancellation) Act 2014 (Cth)

Cases cited:

Chamoun v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2020] FCAFC 66; (2020) 276 FCR 75

DAO16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCAFC 2; (2018) 258 FCR 175

DOB18 v Minister for Home Affairs [2019] FCAFC 63; (2019) FCR 636

Graham v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] HCA 33; (2017) 347 ALR 350

Hands v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCAFC 225; (2018) 267 FCR 628

Ibrahim v Minister for Home Affairs [2019] FCAFC 89; (2019) 270 FCR 12

McHugh v Ministerfor Immigration and Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2020] FCAFC 223; (2020) 385 ALR 485

Minister for Home Affairs v Brown [2020] FCAFC 21; (2020) 275 FCR 188

Minister for Home Affairs v Omar [2019] FCAFC 188; (2019) 272 FCR 589

Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v SZSSJ [2016] HCA 29; (2016) 259 CLR 180

Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZMDS [2010] HCA 16; (2010) 240 CLR 611

Plaintiff M64/2015 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] HCA 50; (2015) 258 CLR 173

Tang v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2013] FCAFC 139; (2013) 217 FCR 55

Division: General Division
Registry: Queensland
National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights
Number of paragraphs: 66
Date of last submission: 11 August 2021
Date of hearing: 25 August 2021
Counsel for the Appellant: Mr Min Guo
Solicitor for the Appellant: Fisher Dore Lawyers
Counsel for the Respondent: Mr…
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Details
Case
[2021] FCAFC 162
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

Vargas v Minister for Home Affairs involved an appeal against the decision of the primary judge who dismissed an application for judicial review of a migration decision. The applicant, Mr Mendieta Vargas, a Colombian national, had his visa cancelled under the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) due to criminal convictions. The Tribunal subsequently revoked the cancellation decision, but the Minister for Home Affairs exercised his discretion under s 501BA of the Act to set aside the Tribunal's decision and reinstate the visa cancellation. The applicant sought judicial review of the Minister's decision, contending that the Minister failed to provide natural justice, did not properly exercise his discretion, and failed to consider certain materials.

The legal issues before the court were whether the Federal Court had jurisdiction to review the process leading up to the Minister's exercise of his power under s 501BA(2), whether the Minister's refusal to afford the applicant natural justice was unreasonable, whether the Minister's disagreement with a comment by the Tribunal was a finding that was illogical, irrational, or unreasonable, whether the Minister failed to apply an active intellectual process to certain matters affecting his decision, and whether the Minister failed to take into account materials before the Tribunal that were mandatory relevant considerations.

The court found that the challenge to jurisdiction could not succeed as the Federal Court did not have jurisdiction to review the process leading up to the Minister's exercise of his power under s 501BA(2). The court held that the rules of natural justice did not apply to a decision under s 501BA(2) of the Act, and therefore, the Minister's refusal to afford the applicant natural justice was not unreasonable. The court further found that the Minister's disagreement with a comment by the Tribunal did not amount to a finding that was illogical, irrational, or unreasonable. The court also held that the Minister applied an active intellectual process to certain matters affecting his decision, and there was no failure to take into account materials before the Tribunal that were mandatory relevant considerations.

1. The Notice of Appeal dated 14 April 2021 be dismissed.
2. The Notice of Contention dated 10 May 2021 be dismissed.
3. The appellant pay the respondent's costs, not including the respondent's costs relating to the Notice of Contention, such costs to be assessed if not agreed.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The Notice of Appeal dated 14 April 2021 be dismissed.

2. The Notice of Contention dated 10 May 2021 be dismissed.

3. The appellant pay the respondent’s costs, not including the respondent’s costs relating to the Notice of Contention, such costs to be assessed if not agreed.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

For the reasons below, the challenge to jurisdiction cannot succeed and the appeal must be dismissed.Background As recorded in the Reasons of the primary judge, Mr Mendieta Vargas is a citizen of the Republic of Colombia who arrived in Australia in August 2012. He was granted a partner visa on arrival. On 6 June 2018, Mr Mendieta Vargas was convicted in the District Court of Queensland on 10 counts of domestic violence against his former spouse and 20 counts of fraud. In respect of the domestic violence offences, he was sentenced to three years’ imprisonment, suspended for a period of five years after he had served 12 months. At the time of offending, he was 22 years of age. On 6 August 2018, a delegate of the Minister cancelled Mr Mendieta Vargas’ visa as required by s 501(3A) of the Migration Act. It is not in dispute that Mr Mendieta Vargas did not pass the character test in s 501(3A)(a)(i) of the Migration Act, because of the operation of sub-s (6)(a) (substantial criminal record), on the basis of sub-s (7)(c) (sentenced to a term of imprisonment of 12 months or more). Mr Mendieta Vargas sought revocation of that decision on 7 August 2018, and on 18 June 2019, a delegate of the Minister decided not to revoke the cancellation decision. Mr Mendieta Vargas sought review of that decision in the Tribunal. On 11 September 2019, the Tribunal set aside the decision of the delegate and Mr Mendieta Vargas’ visa was reinstated that day. He was also released from immigration detention. The Tribunal’s reasons record:IS THERE ANOTHER REASON TO REVOKE THE CANCELLATION OF THE APPLICANT’S VISA?182. Under s 501CA(4)(b) of the Act, there are two alternate conditions precedent to the exercise of the discretion to revoke the Applicant’s visa: either the Applicant passes the character test or I must be satisfied that there is another reason, pursuant to the Direction, to revoke the cancellation. As I have noted above, the Applicant does not pass the character test. Having regard to the Direction and to the totality of the evidence before me, I find there is another reason for me to revoke the cancellation of the Applicant’s visa.183. In considering whether there is another reason to exercise the discretion afforded by s 501CA(4) of the Act to revoke the mandatory visa cancellation decision, I have had regard to the considerations referred to in the Direction. With regard to the weight allocable to each of these Primary and Other Considerations, I find as follows:•Primary Consideration A [Protection of the Australian Community] weighs moderately, but not determinatively, in favour of non-revocation;•Primary Consideration B [the Best Interests of Minor Children in Australia] weighs strongly in favour of revocation and outweighs the weight I have allocated to Primary Consideration A;•Primary Consideration C [the Expectations of the Australian Community] is of neutral weight;•Other considerations (a), (c) and (d) are of either neutral weight or no relevance to this consideration;the combined weight of Primary Consideration B and Other Consideration (b) [strength, nature and duration of ties] favouring revocation outweigh the combined weight of the remaining Primary Consideration A and Other Consideration (e) [Extent of Impediments if Removed] which favour non-revocation;•a holistic application of the considerations in the Direction to the evidence therefore favours exercise of the discretion to revoke the mandatory cancellation of the Applicant’s visa.184. Consequently, I find that there is another reason to revoke the original decision to cancel the Applicant’s visa.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Ground three cannot succeed.Were the evidence and/or submissions before the Tribunal mandatory relevant considerations for the Minister? As to Ground four, Mr Mendieta Vargas contended that the primary judge ought to have held that the evidence and/or the submissions before the Tribunal were a mandatory relevant consideration for the Minister. This contention was based on the proposition that materials that were before the Tribunal, being the documents referred to in Mr White’s affidavit, were apparently not sent to the Minister. It was said that the Minister had constructive knowledge of those documents, they having been in evidence before the Tribunal, and so had a duty to take them into account. It is important to understand how the power under s 501BA can be exercised. In Graham v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] HCA 33; (2017) 347 ALR 350at [57], Kiefel CJ, Bell, Gageler, Keane, Nettle and Gordon JJ said that the concept of the national interest in s 501(3)(d) (which is an analogue of s 501BA(2)(b)) ‘although broad and evaluative, is not unbounded.’ Their Honours said at [57]:…And the statutory discretion enlivened on fulfilment of those statutory conditions must in each case be exercised by the Minister “according to the rules of reason and justice, not according to private opinion; according to law, and not humour, and within those limits within which an honest man, competent to discharge the duties of his office, ought to confine himself” [R v Anderson; Ex parte Ipec-Air Pty Ltd [1965] HCA 27; (1965) 113 CLR 177 at 189, citing Sharp v Wakefield [1891] AC 173 at 179. See Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v Stretton [2016] FCAFC 11; (2016) 237 FCR 1; Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v Eden [2016] FCAFC 28; (2016) 240 FCR 158.” (emphasis added) As Rares J said (albeit forming the minority in the outcome) in DOB18 v Minister for Home Affairs [2019] FCAFC 63; (2019) FCR 636 at [13]:The power conferred on the Minister personally in s 501BA is exceptional. That is because the time at which he can exercise that power arises only after two previous decision-makers have each exercised separate powers under the Act. Those anterior powers were, first, to cancel the visa in question under s 501(3A), because a delegate of the Minister was satisfied both that the visa holder did not pass the character test (relevantly, in a case like the appellant’s, because he or she had a substantial criminal record within the meaning of s 501(6)(a) and (7)) and that the cancellation was in the national interest, and, secondly, to revoke that cancellation under s 501CA(4), because another delegate or the Tribunal (see s 501BA(1)) was satisfied, after the non-citizen made representations in accordance with s 501CA, that the non-citizen passed the character test or there was another reason why the decision under s 501(3A) should have been revoked. Only in those circumstances can the Minister exercise his power to cancel the visa under s 501BA.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Section 501BA of the Migration Act provides:(1)This section applies if:(a)a delegate of the Minister; or(b)the Administrative Appeals Tribunal;makes a decision under s 501CA (the original decision) to revoke a decision under subsection 501(3A) to cancel a visa that has been granted to a person.Action by Minister – natural justice does not apply (2)The Minister may set aside the original decision and cancel a visa that has been granted to the person if:(a) the Minister is satisfied that the person does not pass the character test because of the operation of:(i) paragraph 501(6)(a), on the basis of paragraph 501(7)(a), (b) or (c); or(ii) paragraph 501(6)(e); and(b) the Minister is satisfied that the cancellation is in the national interest.(3) The rules of natural justice do not apply to a decision under subsection (2).Minister’s exercise of power (4) The power under subsection (2) may only be exercised by the Minister personally.Decision not reviewable under Part 5 or 7 (5) A decision under subsection (2) is not reviewable under Part 5 or 7. Section 501BA of the Migration Act sits within a suite of provisions concerned with the cancellation, or revocation of a cancellation, of a visa on character or national security grounds. In Minister for Home Affairs v Brown [2020] FCAFC 21; (2020) 275 FCR 188, Allsop CJ, Kenny, Besanko, Bromwich and Banks-Smith JJ explained the nature of these provisions in the following terms:27. In Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Jia Legeng (2001) 205 CLR 507; [2001] HCA 17Gleeson CJ and Gummow J said (at [61]) that “the powers conferred on the Minister by ss 501 and 502 form part of a statutory scheme which involves a complex pattern of administrative and judicial power, and differing forms of accountability”. This statement is no less true about the form of the legislation today than it was in relation to the form of the statute in 2001 when their Honours were writing. 28. One aspect to be borne in mind in construing the interlocking provisions of ss 501, 501A, 501B, 501BA, 501C and 501CA is the wide variety of circumstances to which the sections may apply. Sometimes, but not always, the decision will involve potentially devastating consequences for a person or persons. It was in the context of such a body of circumstances that the remarks were made in Hands v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCAFC 225; (2018) 364 ALR 423 at [3]. The provisions provide for important powers that touch upon the protection of the Australian community, but that also affect the lives of ordinary people living in, or as part of, the Australian community who do not have the status of citizenship. 29. The wide variety of circumstances to which these sections might apply is a factor that tends to the necessary flexibility of the provisions, but only to the extent the statute permits. An unnecessarily rigid interpretation of the sections may not only impede the smooth and sensible administrative operation of the sections, but also inhibit the reasonable re-examination of circumstances of a person’s situation in the realistic and humane application of the power by the Minister and his or her delegate. 30. That said, for a person to have his or her immigration status uncertain and subject to the discretion of the Minister, for an indeterminate period may create, in particular circumstances, an unsatisfactory and potentially inhumane contingency about that person’s life in the Australian community. 31. As can be seen from a reading of ss 501–501CA, there is a complex web of powers providing for the refusal or cancellation of visas by the Minister (personally or by the delegate), and for the revocation, setting aside and review of decisions. Certain of these decisions may be made by a delegate of the Minister or by the Minister personally, while others may only be made by the Minister personally. In the former case, but not the latter, provision is made for merits review by the Tribunal. In the latter case, judicial review for legality is available.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Full text does not contain this section.