BFBZ v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

BFBZ v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs [2025] FCA 234  

File number(s): NSD 1086 of 2024
Judgment of: SHARIFF J
Date of judgment: 21 March 2025
Catchwords: MIGRATION – judicial review of decision of Minister – where Minister exercised personal power conferred by s 501BA of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) to set aside decision of Administrative Appeals Tribunal – where Minister found visa cancellation to be in the national interest – whether Minister’s decision affected by legal unreasonableness – no error established – application dismissed with costs
Legislation:

Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) ss 37AF, 37AG(1)(a), 37AI, 37AJ

Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss 501(3A), 501(6)(a), 501(7)(c), 501BA

Cases cited:

Carrascalao v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCAFC 107; (2017) 252 FCR 352

Graham v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] HCA 33; (2017) 263 CLR 1

Ibrahim v Minister for Home Affairs [2019] FCAFC 89; 270 FCR 12

Kirk v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2025] FCA 150

LJTZ v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2022] FCA 1209

Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v Sabharwal [2018] FCAFC 160

Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v Li [2013] HCA 18; (2013) 249 CLR 332

Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZMDS [2010] HCA 16; 240 CLR 611

Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs v Lieu [2023] FCAFC 57; (2023) 297 FCR 162

Palmer v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs [2024] FCAFC 154; (2024) 306 FCR 156

Plaintiff S156/2013 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2014] HCA 22; (2014) 254 CLR 28

Tereva v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2022] FCAFC 142; (2022) 294 FCR 270

Vargas v Minister for Home Affairs [2021] FCAFC 162; (2021) 286 FCR 387

Division: General Division
Registry: New South Wales
National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights
Number of paragraphs: 49
Date of hearing: 5 February 2025
Counsel for the Applicant Mr A Chowdhury
Counsel for the Respondent Mr G Johnson
Solicitors for the Respondent Sparke Helmore Lawyers

 

ORDERS

NSD 1086 of 2024
BETWEEN:

BFBZ

Applicant

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION, CITIZENSHIP AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS

Respondent

ORDER MADE BY:

SHARIFF J

DATE OF ORDER:

21 MARCH 2025

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The further amended originating application filed on 6 February 2025 be dismissed.

2.The applicant is to pay the respondent’s costs as agreed or taxed.

3.Pursuant to s 37AF(1) of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) (the FCAAct), and on the ground specified in s 37AG(1)(a) of the FCA Act:

(a)the applicant be assigned the pseudonym ‘BFBZ’; and 

(b)the Court file in these proceedings may not be accessed by third parties without leave of the Court,

for a period of 50 years commencing from the date of these orders.

Note:   Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011

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Details
Case
[2025] FCA 234
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the matter of BFBZ v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs, the applicant, a non-citizen, sought judicial review of a decision made by the Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs. The Minister exercised his personal power under section 501BA of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) to set aside a decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (AAT) that had refused to cancel the applicant’s visa. The Minister found that cancelling the visa was in the national interest. The applicant contended that the Minister’s decision was legally unreasonable because he failed to have regard to relevant material and because he incorrectly found that the applicant’s rehabilitative efforts were in their infancy. The Federal Court was required to determine whether the Minister’s decision was legally unreasonable and whether the applicant had established any error in the decision-making process.

The court found that the Minister had considered the evidence and submissions before the AAT, including the applicant’s evidence of her past offending and rehabilitative efforts. The court held that the Minister’s assessment and evaluation of the national interest were largely political questions, but this did not mean the power was unconstrained. The Minister had regard to the protection of the community, the seriousness of the criminal conduct, and the risk of future offending, as well as other factors such as the best interests of minor children, the applicant’s ties to Australia, the legal consequences of the decision, and the impediments the applicant would face if removed to New Zealand. The court found that the Minister’s decision to exercise his discretion to cancel the visa was not legally unreasonable. The applicant’s contention that the Minister should have come to the same conclusions as the AAT did not establish legal unreasonableness. The court also found that the Minister’s characterisation of the applicant’s rehabilitative efforts as being in their infancy was not factually incorrect, and the applicant had not established that no rational or logical decision maker could arrive at that finding on the same evidence. The application for judicial review was dismissed.

The court further ordered that the further amended originating application be dismissed, the applicant pay the respondent’s costs as agreed or taxed, and the applicant be assigned the pseudonym ‘BFBZ’ and the Court file in these proceedings may not be accessed by third parties without leave of the Court, for a period of 50 years commencing from the date of these orders.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The further amended originating application filed on 6 February 2025 be dismissed.

2. The applicant is to pay the respondent’s costs as agreed or taxed.

3. Pursuant to s 37AF(1) of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) (the FCA Act), and on the ground specified in s 37AG(1)(a) of the FCA Act:

(a) the applicant be assigned the pseudonym ‘BFBZ’; and

(b) the Court file in these proceedings may not be accessed by third parties without leave of the Court,

for a period of 50 years commencing from the date of these orders.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

Here, when the Minister’s Decision at [33]-[42] is read as a whole, it is plain that the Minister not only had before him the materials and evidence that were before the Tribunal, but also that the Minister had in fact considered the evidence and submissions that the applicant made to the Tribunal. This included the applicant’s evidence and submissions as to the relationships she had formed with those who were abusive and had a negative influence on her. Specifically, at [33], the Minister stated that: In terms of an explanation for her past offending, I have been guided by the factors identified by [the applicant] in her Statement of Facts, Issues and Contentions provided to the AAT and the factors identified in the report of Dr Jacqui Yoxall (Attachments P and R). [The applicant] has disclosed having been raped when she was aged 16 or 17, and that as a result her mental health declined, and she became involved in escorting or sex work from the age of 19. [The applicant] stated that she commenced experimenting with drugs in 2011 when she was about 15 years old, and her use of harder drugs commenced when she became involved in escorting or sex work in 2015 (age 19). This eventually developed into a drug addiction (primarily GHB and crystal methylamphetamine), resulting in her entering violent relationships and being influenced by negative peers (Attachments E, F, I, P, Q and R). (Emphasis added.) The Minister also noted at [37]-[42] the applicant’s evidence as to her rehabilitation, and that of her family and partner to the effect that she had matured and was drug free. The Minister accepted that “the influence of [the applicant’s] family, partner and friends would serve to lower the risk of reoffending”. As is apparent from the above passages, the Minister did not disregard the evidence before him as to the applicant’s relationships and their negative influence on her. As a result, I am not satisfied that the Minister failed to have regard to relevant material that was before him in making an assessment on reasonable grounds as to the national interest. The applicant’s contentions here did no more than allege that the Minister should have come to the same conclusions that the Tribunal had reached. These contentions did not establish legal unreasonableness. Ground 1 fails. GROUND 2 By Ground 2, the applicant contended that the Minister’s Decision was legally unreasonable because the Minister found that the applicant’s rehabilitative efforts were in their “infancy”. The applicant accepted that in order to establish that a decision maker’s finding is unreasonable (or “illogical” or “irrational”), it must be established that no rational or logical decision maker could arrive at that finding on the same evidence: citing Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZMDS [2010] HCA 16; 240 CLR 611 at [130] (Crennan and Bell JJ). The applicant submitted that the high threshold to establish error had been satisfied because it was factually incorrect for the Minister to characterise the applicant’s rehabilitative efforts as being in their “infancy” at the time that the Minister’s Decision was made. The applicant submitted that the evidence before the Minister was to the effect that, apart from a brief relapse in mid-2020 (during the COVID-19 pandemic) the applicant had been undertaking considerable rehabilitative efforts since February 2019 including abstaining from drugs, completing responsible service of alcohol and gambling qualifications, gaining employment, completion of various counselling and treatment programs. It was submitted that these steps were regarded as being prominent by the sentencing Judge and that the Minister’s assessment of them as being in their “infancy” had no logical or rational basis.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

Section 501BA of the Migration Act is an exceptional power which may only be exercised by the Minister personally: s 501BA(4). The section provides as follows:501BA Cancellation of visa — setting aside and substitution of non-adverse decision under section 501CA(1) This section applies if:(a)a delegate of the Minister; or (b) the AAT;makes a decision under section 501CA (the original decision) to revoke a decision under subsection 501(3A) to cancel a visa that has been granted to a person.(2)The Minister may set aside the original decision and cancel a visa that has been granted to the person if:(a) the Minister is satisfied that the person does not pass the character test because of the operation of:(i)paragraph 501(6)(a), on the basis of paragraph 501(7)(a), (b) or (c); or (ii)paragraph 501(6)(e); and (b)the Minister is satisfied that the cancellation is in the national interest.… The conferral of this power expressly excludes any obligation to afford the person affected natural justice (s 501BA(3)), but that does not mean the Minister cannot give a person an opportunity to be heard: see Ibrahim v Minister for Home Affairs [2019] FCAFC 89; (2019) 270 FCR 12 at [23] (White, Perry and Charlesworth JJ). The Minister’s assessment and evaluation of the “national interest” is largely a “political question”: Plaintiff S156/2013 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2014] HCA 22; (2014) 254 CLR 28 at [40] (French CJ, Hayne, Crennan, Kiefel, Bell and Keane JJ). However, this “…does not mean that the power is unconstrained”: LJTZ v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2022] FCA 1209 at [40] (Charlesworth J) and the cases there cited. The Minister’s Decision records that the Minister was satisfied that the refusal decision was in the national interest: at [7]. The Minister noted that the power in s 501BA(2) of the Migration Act may only be exercised by the Minister personally and that the rules of natural justice did not apply to a decision under s 501BA(2): at [8]. However, the Minister also noted that he was not prohibited from providing the applicant an opportunity to be heard, but that he had decided not to afford such an opportunity: at [9]. The Minister recognised that the effect of this was that the applicant would not have the opportunity to advance reasons why an adverse decision should not now be made. The Minister found that the applicant did not pass the character test because she had a substantial criminal record as defined in s 501(6)(a) and s 501(7)(c) of the Migration Act: at [11]-[13]. This finding was not challenged by the applicant. Turning to the question of the national interest, the Minister had regard to the protection of the community (focussing on the seriousness of the criminal conduct and the risk to the Australian community by way of future offending) and the expectations of the Australian community: at [18]-[51]. The Minister concluded that the use of his discretionary power to cancel the visa was in the national interest in light of his assessment of these matters: at [54]. However, in considering whether to exercise this discretion, the Minister also had regard to other factors including the best interests of minor children (at [58]-[61]), the applicant’s ties to Australia (at [62]-[71]), the legal consequences of the decision (at [72]) and the impediments the applicant would face if removed to New Zealand: at [73]-[78]. Having weighed these matters in the balance, the Minister nevertheless decided to exercise his discretion to set aside the Tribunal’s decision, and cancel the applicant’s visa: at [79]-[86]. GROUND 1

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established