FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Kirk v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2025] FCA 150
File number: WAD 170 of 2024 Judgment of: CHARLESWORTH J Date of judgment: 4 March 2025 Catchwords: MIGRATION – judicial review of a decision of a Minister substituting a non-adverse decision of a Tribunal – power of the Minister not subject to rules of natural justice – decision amenable to review on legal unreasonableness grounds – whether Minister acted unreasonably by having regard to representations the applicant had previously made without affording the applicant an opportunity to be heard Legislation: Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss 474, 501, 501AB, 501BA, 501CA Cases cited: Abebe v Commonwealth (1999) 197 CLR 510
Craig v South Australia (1995) 184 CLR 163
Kruger v Commonwealth (1997) 190 CLR 1
LJTZ v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs (2022) 179 ALD 299
Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v Stretton (2016) 237 FCR 1
Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v Li (2013) 249 CLR 332
Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZMDS (2010) 240 CLR 611
Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Eshetu (1999) 197 CLR 611
Palmer v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs (2024) 306 FCR 156
Plaintiff S157/2002 v Commonwealth (2003) 211 CLR 476
Re Refugee Review Tribunal; Ex parte Aala (2000) 204 CLR 82
Division: General Division Registry: Western Australia National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights Number of paragraphs: 26 Date of hearing: 26 February 2025 Counsel for the Applicant: Mr B Tomasi Counsel for the Respondent: Ms C Taggart Solicitor for the Respondent: Australian Government Solicitor ORDERS
WAD 170 of 2024 BETWEEN: WILLIAM PAUL KIRK
Applicant
AND: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS
Respondent
ORDER MADE BY:
CHARLESWORTH J
DATE OF ORDER:
4 MARCH 2025
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The amended originating application is dismissed.
2.The applicant is to pay the respondent’s costs of and incidental to the amended originating application in a fixed sum to be determined by a Registrar of the Court.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
CHARLESWORTH J
The applicant is a citizen of New Zealand. He has previously resided in Australia as the holder of a Class TY Subclass 444 Special Category (Temporary) visa issued under the Migration Act 1958 (Cth). By reason of his criminal offending, the applicant is a person who cannot pass the character test defined in s 501(6)(e) of the Act.
On 10 December 2021 a delegate of the now-named Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs cancelled the visa on character grounds in the mandatory exercise of a power conferred by s 501(3A) of the Act (cancellation decision). In response to an invitation given under s 501CA(3), the applicant made representations in which he put forward reasons why…
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- Case
- [2025] FCA 150
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court examined the statutory power granted to the Minister under section 501BA(2) of the Migration Act 1958 and whether it required a logical foundation in its exercise. It noted that although the power did not explicitly require procedural fairness, it was inherently conditioned by an obligation to be exercised reasonably. The court referenced previous decisions which established that any statutory power must be exercised within the bounds of legal reasonableness, meaning that the decision cannot be so lacking in rational foundation as to be considered beyond the power's scope.
The court concluded that the Minister's consideration of the applicant's previous representations did not constitute a jurisdictional error because it did not stray from the statutory purpose. The process by which the Minister reached the decision, though possibly illogical, did not render it legally unreasonable. The court emphasised that its role was to evaluate the quality of the decision by reference to the statutory source of the power, rather than substituting its own judgment on what might be reasonable.
The High Court dismissed the application and ordered the applicant to pay the respondent's costs of the amended originating application. This ruling underscores the importance of statutory interpretation and the limitations of judicial review in the context of ministerial decisions under the Migration Act.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The amended originating application is dismissed.
2. The applicant is to pay the respondent’s costs of and incidental to the amended originating application in a fixed sum to be determined by a Registrar of the Court.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Full text does not contain this section.
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Full text does not contain this section.
Decision
Reasons for decision
Full text does not contain this section.
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The applicant has emphasised that he does not assert that the outcome of the Minister’s consideration has “strayed from the statutory purpose of the power”. Rather, he submits that the power under s 501BA(2) was conditioned by a requirement that the process by which the Minister reaches a decision have “some logical foundation”. He submits that the particular process by which the decision was arrived at was so illogical that it must be set aside. He emphasised that his submissions should not be understood to import a requirement to afford procedural fairness, acknowledging that such a requirement is expressly precluded by s 501AB(3) of the Act.CONSIDERATION Like all statutory powers, the power under s 501BA is conditioned by an implied requirement that it be exercised within the bounds of legal reasonableness: Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v Li (2013) 249 CLR 332 (at [72], [76]). As Gaudron J explained in Abebe v Commonwealth (1999) 197 CLR 510 (at [116]), the obligation to exercise a statutory power reasonably arises as a matter of statutory construction:… [I]t is difficult to see why, if a statute which confers a decision-making power is silent on the topic of reasonableness, that statute should not be construed so that it is an essential condition of the exercise of that power that it be exercised reasonably, at least in the sense that it not be exercised in a way that no reasonable person could exercise it. …See also Kruger v Commonwealth (1997) 190 CLR 1, Brennan CJ (at 36); Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Eshetu (1999) 197 CLR 611, Gummow J (at [126]); Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZMDS (2010) 240 CLR 611, Crennan and Bell JJ (at 645). The Court’s task in identifying jurisdictional error of this kind was explained by Allsop CJ in Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v Stretton (2016) 237 FCR 1 as follows:11The boundaries of power may be difficult to define. The evaluation of whether a decision was made within those boundaries is conducted by reference to the relevant statute, its terms, scope and purpose, such of the values to which I have referred as are relevant and any other values explicit or implicit in the statute. The weight and relevance of any relevant values will be approached by reference to the statutory source of the power in question. The task is not definitional, but one of characterisation: the decision is to be evaluated, and a conclusion reached as to whether it has the character of being unreasonable, in sufficiently lacking rational foundation, or an evident or intelligible justification, or in being plainly unjust, arbitrary, capricious, or lacking common sense having regard to the terms, scope and purpose of the statutory source of the power, such that it cannot be said to be within the range of possible lawful outcomes as an exercise of that power. The descriptions of the lack of quality used above are not exhaustive or definitional, they are explanations or explications of legal unreasonableness, of going beyond the source of power.12Crucial to remember, however, is that the task for the Court is not to assess what it thinks is reasonable and thereby conclude (as if in an appeal concerning breach of duty of care) that any other view displays error; rather, the task is to evaluate the quality of the decision, by reference to the statutory source of the power and thus, from its scope, purpose and objects to assess whether it is lawful. The undertaking of that task may see the decision characterised as legally unreasonable whether because of specific identifiable jurisdictional error, or the conclusion or outcome reached, or the reasoning process utilised.