FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Kumar v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection
[2015] FCA 898
Citation: Kumar v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] FCA 898 Appeal from: Application for leave to appeal: Kumar v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2015] FCCA 1115 Parties: SURENDER KUMAR v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION and ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL File number: NSD 538 of 2015 Judge: WIGNEY J Date of judgment: 3 August 2015 Catchwords: MIGRATION – visas – refusal of visa application by a delegate of the Minister for Immigration and Border Protection – review of delegate’s decision in the Migration Review Tribunal – where the Migration Review Tribunal held it did not have jurisdiction to entertain application as prescribed fee had not been paid pursuant to s 347(1) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) – application filed in Federal Circuit Court pursuant to s 476 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) – where primary judge summarily dismissed the application on first court date – appeal from the summary dismissal
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – appeals – procedural fairness – whether applicant was denied procedural fairness by having his application in the Federal Circuit Court summarily dismissed at the first court date – where applicant put on notice that his claim may be dismissed
Legislation: Federal Circuit Court Rules 2001 (Cth), r 44.12
Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth), s 24(1A)
Migration Act 1958 (Cth), ss 65, 338, 347(1), 476
Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth), reg 4.13Cases cited: AAV15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] FCA 700
Braganza v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (2001) 109 FCR 364
Decor Corporation Pty Ltd v Dart Industries Inc (1991) 33 FCR 397
Kirk v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (1998) 87 FCR 99
MZXGP v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2006] FCA 1075
Shrestha v Migration Review Tribunal (2015) 229 FCR 301
Singh v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2014] FCA 1209
SZWBH v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2015) 229 FCR 317Date of hearing: 3 August 2015 Place: Sydney Division: GENERAL DIVISION Category: Catchwords Number of paragraphs: 51 Counsel for the Applicant: The applicant appeared in person with the assistance of an interpreter Solicitor for the First Respondent: Mr E D Elliott of DLA Piper Australia Counsel for the Second Respondent: The second respondent filed a submitting appearance save as to costs.
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY
GENERAL DIVISION
NSD 538 of 2015
BETWEEN: SURENDER KUMAR
ApplicantAND: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION
First RespondentADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL
Second Respondent
JUDGE:
WIGNEY J
DATE OF ORDER:
3 AUGUST 2015
WHERE MADE:
SYDNEY
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The name of the second respondent be amended to the “Administrative Appeals Tribunal”.
2.Leave to appeal be granted.
3.The appeal be dismissed.
4.The applicant to pay the first respondent’s costs as agreed or assessed.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011
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- Case
- [2015] FCA 898
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The central legal issue in the appeal is whether the primary judge denied Mr Kumar procedural fairness by summarily dismissing his application without providing an opportunity for Mr Kumar to be heard. The Tribunal's decision, grounded in Kirk v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs, found that the prescribed fee was a mandatory requirement for jurisdiction, and since Mr Kumar did not pay the fee, the Tribunal lacked jurisdiction to review the decision. Mr Kumar argues that he was not given adequate time to pay the fee, despite having applied for a waiver and being granted an extension. The appeal hinges on whether the primary judge's decision, which found no arguable case of jurisdictional error, was attended by sufficient doubt to warrant reconsideration by the Full Court.
The Court considered whether Mr Kumar's appeal grounds sufficiently demonstrated doubt in the primary judge's decision. It noted that the grounds did not raise any arguable contention of jurisdictional error. The Court concluded that the primary judge's finding that Mr Kumar's application did not disclose an arguable case of jurisdictional error was not in doubt, as Mr Kumar did not pay the prescribed fee within the mandated period. The Court further observed that the requirement for the prescribed fee was strict and mandatory, as established in Kirk, and it was not persuaded that Kirk was wrongly decided. Consequently, the Court found that Mr Kumar had not demonstrated sufficient doubt in the primary judge's decision to warrant reconsideration by the Full Court.
The final orders of the Court were to amend the name of the second respondent to the "Administrative Appeals Tribunal", to grant leave to appeal, to dismiss the appeal, and to order Mr Kumar to pay the first respondent's costs as agreed or assessed. The Court's decision underscores the mandatory nature of fee payment requirements in visa application reviews under the Migration Act 1958.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The name of the second respondent be amended to the “Administrative Appeals Tribunal”.
2. Leave to appeal be granted.
3. The appeal be dismissed.
4. The applicant to pay the first respondent’s costs as agreed or assessed.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Full text does not contain this section.
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Full text does not contain this section.
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
It is well-accepted that in considering whether to grant leave to appeal from an interlocutory judgment, the Court is generally required to consider whether the decision at first instance was attended with sufficient doubt to warrant it being reconsidered by the Full Court, and whether substantial injustice would result if leave were refused supposing the decision at first instance was wrong: see Decor Corporation Pty Ltd v Dart Industries Inc (1991) 33 FCR 397 (Decor Corporation). The Minister’s submissions did not directly address the question of leave, though it is clear that the Minister’s case is that the decision of the primary judge is not attended with sufficient doubt to justify it being reconsidered by the Full Court. No submissions were made in relation to the question of prejudice if leave is not granted. It is clear that Mr Kumar will suffer prejudice in the Decor Corporation sense if leave is refused. The refusal of leave would effectively spell the end of his attempt to challenge the adverse visa decision. The only question, then, is whether Mr Kumar has demonstrated that the primary judge’s decision is attended with sufficient doubt to warrant the grant of leave. The only issue raised by Mr Kumar’s proposed appeal grounds and submissions is whether the primary judge erred in holding that Mr Kumar’s application failed to disclose any arguable case of jurisdictional error. Putting to one side, for the moment, the question of procedural fairness, there is no basis for concluding that the primary judge’s finding that Mr Kumar’s application did not disclose any arguable case of jurisdictional error is attended with any doubt. The main difficulty for Mr Kumar is that there is simply no arguable basis for concluding that the Tribunal erred in finding that it had no jurisdiction to entertain Mr Kumar’s review application. Grounds 1 to 4 of Mr Kumar’s application in the Federal Circuit Court did not raise any arguable contention of jurisdictional error on the part of the Tribunal. They are devoid of any meaningful particulars. Ground 5 was that the Tribunal did not give Mr Kumar time to pay the fee. That contention was unsupported by evidence and contrary to the Tribunal’s recitation of the facts, including the fact that Mr Kumar was given an extension of time to pay the prescribed fee. There is no dispute that Mr Kumar did not pay the prescribed fee within the prescribed period. Whilst he applied for a waiver of the fee, that application was refused. Following the refusal, he was given a specific time in which to pay the fee. That time would appear to have been reasonable and was, in any event, extended. Mr Kumar did not pay the fee within the new time period set by the Tribunal. The decision in Kirk establishes that the requirement in s 347(1)(c) of the Act in relation to the payment of the prescribed fee is a strict or mandatory requirement. Whilst the Full Court in Braganza did not decide whether Kirk was correctly decided, and (perhaps not surprisingly) Mr Kumar did not submit that it was incorrectly decided, there is no sound basis for finding that Kirk was wrongly decided. It should be followed, subject to the proviso or qualification read into the operation of the section by the Full Court in Braganza.