SZTXS v Minister for Immigration

[2016] FCCA 311

FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA

SZTXS v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & ANOR [2016] FCCA 311

Catchwords:
MIGRATION – Application for review of the decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal – whether the Tribunal complied with s.425 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) –whether the Tribunal’s decision was illogical or irrational – allegation of bias – whether the Tribunal failed to take into account a relevant consideration – whether the applicant was afforded procedural fairness – jurisdictional error – application dismissed.

Legislation:

Migration Act 1958 (Cth), ss.425, 424A, 476, Part 7

Appellant  P119/2002 v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2003] FCAFC 230
SZRMQ  v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2013] FCAFC 142
SZSEI v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2014] FCA 465
Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Wu Shan  Liang & Ors [1996] HCA 6; (1996) 185 CLR 259
Minister for Immigration v SZIAI [2009] HCA 39; (2009) 83 ALJR 1123
Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs v SGLB [2004] HCA 32; (2004) 207 ALR 12
Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v  SZMDS  [2010] HCA 16; (2010) 144 CLR 1
SZOOR v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2012] FCAFC 58; (2012) 202 FCR 1
Minister for Aboriginal Affairs v Peko-Wallsend Ltd [1986] HCA 40; (1986) 162 CLR 24
Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZRKT [2013] FCA 317; (2013) 212 FCR 99
Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v  SZSRS  [2014] FCAFC 16
Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs v Jia Legeng [2001] HCA 17 (2001) 205 CLR 507
SBBS v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2002] FCAFC 361; (2002) 194 ALR 749
VFAB v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2003] FCA 872; (2003) 131 FCR 102
Re Refugee Review Tribunal; Ex parte H [2001] HCA 28; (2001) 179 ALR 425
Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZJSS & Ors [2010] HCA 48; (2010) 243 CLR 164

Applicant: SZTXS

First Respondent: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & BORDER PROTECTION

Second Respondent: ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL

File Number: SYG 452 of 2014

Judgment of: Judge Nicholls

Hearing date: 5 November 2015

Date of Last Submission: 5 November 2015

Delivered at: Sydney

Delivered on: 18 February 2016

REPRESENTATION

Solicitors for the Applicant: In Person

Solicitors for the Respondents: Ms C Hillary of DLA Piper

ORDERS

1. The name of the second respondent is amended to read “Administrative Appeals Tribunal”.

2. The application made on 27 February 2014 and amended on 14 May 2014 is dismissed.

3. The applicant pay the first respondent’s costs set in the amount of $7500.

FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT
OF AUSTRALIA
AT SYDNEY

SYG 452 of 2014

SZTXS

Applicant

And

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & BORDER PROTECTION

First Respondent

ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL

Second Respondent

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

1. This is an application made pursuant to s.476 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (“the Act”) on 27 February 2014 and amended on 14 May 2014 seeking review of the decision of the Refugee Review Tribunal, now known as the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (“the Tribunal”), which affirmed the decision of the Minister’s delegate to refuse a Protection (Class XA) visa to the applicant.

Evidence

1. In evidence before the Court is a bundle of relevant documents filed by the Minister (“the Court Book” – “CB”). The applicant also sought to rely on his affidavit of 3 July 2014 which annexed a number of documents that the applicant now claims were before the Tribunal.

2. A number of these documents were already reproduced in the Court Book. The applicant’s affidavit essentially makes reference to a number of these documents with the assertion that he produced them to the Tribunal, or, in context, to the delegate, and the documents were not considered.

3. It was clear, both having regard to the evidence in the Court Book, and what the applicant stated to the Court, that the applicant’s complaint, in relation to these documents, was not that the Tribunal did not consider them, as that term is generally understood in matters of this type, but that he had given these documents to the Tribunal, and the Tribunal still found adversely to him.

4. A number of other documents in the annexures to the affidavit were not before the Tribunal. Nor did the applicant’s affidavit assert that they were. It appears the applicant sought to provide these documents to the Court in support of his contention that the Tribunal should have found that he would face serious or significant harm if he were to return to Pakistan.

5. The applicant’s affidavit also annexed a transcript (“T”) of the Tribunal hearing, said to have been provided by “Legal Transcripts Pty Ltd”. The applicant made no reference to the transcript in his affidavit.

6. The documents that were before the Tribunal were admitted into evidence. These documents are listed at Schedule 1 to this judgment. The documents that are listed in Schedule 2 to this judgment were not admitted into evidence on the basis of their not being relevant to a fact in issue before the Court. The transcript of the Tribunal hearing was admitted into evidence. Those parts of the applicant’s affidavit which asserted that the Tribunal failed to have considered his documents were not admitted into evidence, but have been treated as submissions by the applicant.

Application before the Court

1. The grounds of the application, as amended, are in the following terms:

   “1. The Refugee Review Tribunal made a jurisdictional error by concluding the applicant was not a credible witness when the applicant found it difficult to understand the interpreter.

   Particulars

   The representative of the applicant submitted from his own dealings with the applicant that he believed that applicant's understanding of the questions put to him was poor and he responded according to his own perceptions.

   2. The Tribunal's failure to understand that the applicant had to conclude religious work before he could leave Pakistan manifest an attempt to undermine the religion of the applicant.

   Particulars

   The Tribunal states that the applicant may have wanted to fulfil his religious obligations but the applicant also decided that his life was in danger in Pakistan, a danger brought about by those very activities he hand gone to the trouble of applying for a visa to come to Australia.

   3. The Refugee Review Tribunal made a jurisdictional error by failing to make further enquiries before concluding that documents presented by the applicant contained false information.

   Particulars

   The Tribunal stated that there is no need to make enquiries into documents submitted by the applicant and the fact that they are purportedly certified and originals are available. This does not demonstrate to the Tribunal that their contents and the applicant's claims about suffering harm in Pakistan are true.

   4. The Tribunal's conclusion that the applicant did not have a well-founded fear of persecution in Pakistan were illogical or irrational, manifested a misunderstanding or misconstruction of the Convention test or arose out of a failure to take relevant information into account.

   Particulars

   The Tribunal found that there is not a real chance that the applicant will suffer serious harm in Pakistan based on his religion (or any Convention ground). He does not hold a well-founded fear of persecution.

   5. The applicant was not afforded natural justice.

   Particulars

   The applicant believes that he was not afforded a fair hearing. The Member's judgment was clouded by his own pre-conceived beliefs, notions and as such the applicant could not be afforded an unbiased hearing. Such pre-conceived views are displayed by the Member where evidence is simply regarded as not credible. An example of this is where the Member considered a First Incident Report as not credible without verifying its authenticity.”

   [Errors in original.]

2. As can be seen, ground one asserts that the applicant had difficulty in understanding the interpreter. Whether it was the interpreter at the Tribunal hearing or the interview with the delegate is not clear. I have addressed both below.

3. In his submissions in relation to this ground, the Minister relied on Appellant  P119/2002 v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2003] FCAFC 230 (“P119”) as authority for what the applicant would need to establish to make out his ground.

4. In a more recent case, SZRMQ v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2013] FCAFC 142 (“SZRMQ”), the Full Court considered aspects of P119. In SZRMQ, the Full Court was concerned with the requirements of procedural fairness under the common law. That is whether the independent merits reviewer, in that case, denied procedural fairness (under the general law) to the applicant.

5. I understood, with respect, that Allsop CJ and Robertson J found that the application of the test set out in P119 (at [17]) was not correct for the purpose of determining the procedural fairness requirements at common law (see SZRMQ at [9], [24] and [75]).

6. Ground one in the current case does not, in the circumstances, relate to procedural fairness at common law. The applicant was invited to a hearing before the Tribunal pursuant to s.425 of the Act. Nonetheless in SZSEI v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2014] FCA 465 (“SZSEI”) at [77], Griffiths J did consider the application of SZRMQ to a case involving s.425 of the Act and found that certain observations of Allsop CJ in SZRMQ “appl[ied] equally to a complaint that there ha[d] been non-compliance with the requirements of s.425” of the Act.

7. In light of this, at the hearing of this matter, I invited further submissions from the Minister as to the relevant approach for this Court in relation to ground one. Leave was granted to the parties to file and serve written submissions on this question.

8. The Minister subsequently filed written submissions directed to the question raised above on 18 November 2015. The applicant also provided written submissions on 10 December 2015 which went beyond the scope of the leave granted and attached yet further documents directed to the merits of his claim to fear harm if he were to return to his home country. The applicant’s submissions did not address the question of the application of SZRMQ to the current case. However, I have had regard to those parts of the applicant’s submissions directed to the question of interpretation error at the Tribunal hearing, and in that context, the transcript of the hearing. I have not had regard to the remainder which in effect, and in any event, repeat the assertions that the Tribunal did not consider his claims and seek to challenge the Tribunal’s credibility findings.

Background

1. The following relevant background can be ascertained from the documents in evidence before the Court. The applicant is a citizen of Pakistan who arrived in Australia on 8 June 2012 on a visitor visa (CB 5 and CB 16). The applicant applied for a protection visa on 4 July 2012 (CB 1 to CB 47), and was assisted by a registered migration agent (CB 10 and CB 67 to CB 69). The applicant provided a written statement and supporting documentation with his application (CB 48 to CB 66 and CB 70 to CB 110).

2. The applicant’s claims to fear harm arose out of his claimed membership of a particular Shi’a religious organisation “Matmi Sangat Duai Zainab (“MSDZ”), part of the Shiite Muslim community in Rawalpindi, Pakistan, and the “terror” he said he had suffered at the hands of the “powerful fundamentalists among majority Sunni Community” (CB 70 to CB 73).

3. The delegate refused the grant of a protection visa to the applicant on 28 December 2012 (CB 116 to CB 131). Essentially, the delegate was not satisfied that the applicant was a credible witness and found his “testimony” to be “inconsistent and implausible” (CB 123).

The Tribunal

1. The applicant applied for review to the Tribunal on 18 January 2013 and was again assisted by a registered migration agent (CB 132 to CB 138). The applicant provided written submissions and further supporting documents to the Tribunal before the hearing (CB 173 to CB 195). These documents were:

   i)A news article, “Rawalpindi residents appealed to stay at home” from The International News (CB 181).

   ii)A news article, “LHC CJ forms Judicial Commission to probe Rawalpindi mayhem” from The International News (CB 182).

   iii)A news article, “Rawalpindi incident to be thoroughly probed: Nisar” from The International News (CB 183).

   iv)A news article, “Situation remains volatile post Rawalpindi clashes, 8 arrested” from The International News (CB 184).

   v)A letter of 19 November 2013 from the Muhammadi Welfare Association Incorporated indicating the applicant’s acceptance of membership for that association (CB 185).

   vi)A statement of Shahid Mahmood Raja of 12 November 2013 before the Kharian Court (CB 186).

   vii)An original and translated copy of a “First Information Report” of 9 June 2007 (CB 187 to CB 190).

   viii)An original and translated copy of a “First Information Report” of 21 October 2011(CB 192 to CB 195).

2. The applicant and his representative attended a hearing before the Tribunal on 21 November 2013 (CB 195 to CB 199). The applicant provided yet further documentation to the Tribunal at the hearing. These included further pages from the applicant’s passport and a copy of what is said to be a judgement of a “judicial magistrate” of Kharian in the matter of “The State v Manza Abbas etc” (CB 200 to CB 210).

3. The applicant provided further documents to the Tribunal’s Registry on 14 January 2014. This included a request for information/documents (CB 211), a copy of a photo card (CB 212), a “change of contact details” form (CB 214) and an article from The News Tribe, “Suicide attack hits Imambargah in Rawalpindi, 20 killed, over 40 injured” of 20 November 2013 (CB 216).

4. The applicant, through his representative, sent a fax to the Tribunal on 4 February 2014 enclosing even further supporting documents (CB 219). This facsimile included a number of news reports “regarding the latest bomb blast near the applicant’s place of residence” (CB 220 to CB 225), a “discharge summary” of 26 December 2013 (CB 227), and a copy of the applicant’s brother’s ID card (CB 228 to CB 229).

5. The applicant claimed protection on the basis of his religion. The applicant and his family are from Rawalpindi, Pakistan where the applicant attended a Shi’a mosque. When he was 28 years old he joined MSDZ and the Muhktar Student Organisation (“MSO”). The applicant claimed that he undertook a leadership role in these organisations. As part of his leadership role, the applicant was responsible for taking and accompanying members of his organisation to other places for “programs”, and accompanying religious leaders when they travelled. During 2006, these “programs” were held “once or twice” a week, especially during the periods of “Muharram” and “Safar”. The applicant claimed to have received threatening telephone calls in 2006 because of these activities and was told to stop ([9] – [13] at CB 237).

6. The applicant claimed that in June 2007 he had taken a group of followers to a religious program in a nearby village on a rental bus. The applicant claimed that, in a town called Karinya, a group of 15 men threw rocks at the side of the bus. The rocks broke some windows. The applicant claimed that the 15 men were Sunni Muslims who knew that the applicant and his group were “Shi’as travelling to a Shi’a religious programme”. The applicant claimed that the driver stopped the bus, the Sunni men approached and boarded the bus, and a “fight took place”. The applicant’s group outnumbered the Sunni men who fled into the courtyard of a nearby college where they were chased and the fight continued. The applicant claimed that the staff of the college contacted the police and told them that the applicant and his group instigated the events. The applicant (and 14 others) were identified as the leaders and were taken to the police station and detained for 15 days. Members of their religious community had them released on bail ([14] at CB 237 to [17] at CB 238).

7. The applicant also claimed that a court case was commenced against him (and others) which was resolved in February 2009 when the court dismissed the charges. During this period the applicant received two threatening phone calls. In 2009 the applicant’s daughter was approached by “some people” on her way to school who threatened the applicant’s life ([18] at CB 238).

8. The applicant continued his “religious activities” during this time. The applicant claimed that because of these activities, he was attacked on the street on 17 September 2010 by “five or seven men”. The attackers said they would not leave him alone until he stopped his activities and that they would kill him. The applicant claimed to have never seen these men before, and that he sustained injuries through beating to his shoulder, lip, cheeks and leg. The attack ended when “passers-by” came to help. A First Information Report (“FIR”) was issued by the police about the incident on the same day ([19] – [20] at CB 238).

9. The applicant further claimed that in October 2011 he was walking with two other people on the footpath after a religious gathering and some men approached on a motorcycle and fired shots at them. His two friends were hit in the legs causing all three to “collapse”. The applicant was taken to the hospital. Another FIR was made about this incident. Before, and after this incident, the applicant continued his religious activities ([21] – [22] at CB 238).

10. The applicant received another threatening phone call in December 2011 where he was told “his life would not be spared”. He reported this to the police but they were “unable to help him”. The applicant continued his religious activities until he came to Australia in June 2012 ([22] at CB 238). 

11. The applicant claimed that since his departure from Pakistan, his wife had received threatening telephone calls. The applicant was afraid to return to Pakistan as “Shi’as and their mosques are being attacked including in Rawalpindi and the police are not able to control this”. The applicant claimed that the police are present when these attacks happen. The applicant believes because of his religious activities, and the events occurring above, that he is at great risk of harm in Pakistan ([23] – [24] at CB 238).

12. The Tribunal affirmed the decision of the delegate on 4 February 2014 (CB 235 to CB 248). The Tribunal, in its decision record, set out the applicant’s claims ([8] at CB 237 to [24] at CB 238). The Tribunal had regard to various country information ([25] at CB 239 to [29] at CB 240).

13. Considering the cumulative concerns that it held in regard to the applicant’s credibility, the Tribunal found that the applicant was “not a witness of truth” and had not received “threats of any kind” ([73] at CB 245).

14. The Tribunal put to the applicant its concerns about his decision to remain in Pakistan and continue religious activities until June 2012 when he came to Australia, after alleged threats had occurred in Pakistan in September 2010 and October 2011 towards him, and his family. The Tribunal did not find his behaviour “consistent with someone claiming that his life was in danger in Pakistan” ([34] at CB 240).

15. The applicant stated that he needed to “make arrangements for his family” before he could leave Pakistan, that he wanted to travel to Saudi Arabia for “Umra” and that his family would be unable to live in Saudi Arabia. Further, that he would not have taken his family to Saudi Arabia if all the family had been granted visas to Australia. The Tribunal accepted that the applicant may not have been able to live in Saudi Arabia with his family, but had difficulty accepting that he would be willing to travel in and out of Pakistan when he considered his “life was in danger”, and when he had a visitor visa to Australia, and could have left Pakistan.

1. The Tribunal further found ([38] – [39] at CB 241):

   “[38] The Tribunal accepts that the applicant and his family would want to perform their religious obligation but, at the same time, the applicant said that from October 2011 he believed his life was in danger and he had taken the step of applying for a visitor visa to come to Australia leaving family behind in Pakistan to save his life.  The Tribunal does not believe the applicant would choose to remain in Pakistan and, rather than travel to Australia or some other country where he would have at least temporary sanctuary, he would instead travel to a another country for a brief period knowing that he was not going to settle there.

   [39] While he may have also wanted to make arrangements for a suitable place for his wife and children to live (if they were not to remain in the marital home) his willingness to remain in Pakistan after receiving the visitor visa for Australia and to not leave the country at the earliest opportunity given the danger he claimed he was facing was not credible.”

2. The Tribunal accepted that the applicant may have wanted to fulfil his religious obligations and continue his religious activities after October 2011. The applicant claimed it was his “responsibility”, due to his “position in the community”, to continue those activities “even if it meant losing his life”. However, the Tribunal found the applicant’s willingness to continue these religious activities, which had placed his life in danger, and his failure to leave Pakistan at the earliest opportunity once he had a visitor visa to come to Australia, were “inconsistent” with the claim that he had decided from October 2011 that he could no longer remain in Pakistan as he would be killed ([40] ‑ [42] at CB 241).

3. The Tribunal also found that statements the applicant had made to the delegate as to his reason for returning to Pakistan from Saudi Arabia, such that he had a good job, income and that his family had remained there, were not matters that would explain, or excuse, his “willingness to continue his religious activities and his failure to leave Pakistan at the earliest opportunity for a country where he could actually seek sanctuary” ([43] at CB 241).

4. The Tribunal found a number of inconsistencies between his written statement and evidence given at the hearing. The Tribunal found that the applicant had mentioned a number of things in his written statement including carrying out religious activities for which he received threatening messages, a June 2007 bus attack, being detained, court proceedings, continuing to receive threats, his daughter being harassed, complaining to the police, having a FIR made in 2010 or 2011 and the October 2011 shooting incident.

5. However, the Tribunal found that the applicant did not mention in his written statement the “very significant incident” of the applicant being approached and attacked by a group of men on 17 September 2010 in which he was injured. The Tribunal found that the account the applicant had put forward to the Tribunal, regarding the FIRs, and the October 2010 incident, were “inconsistent” with the account given in his written statement ([44] – [50] at CB 242). The applicant provided “evidence” regarding who had attended “his court case” in 2009. Specifically, whether the alleged attackers and those who had reported the incident to the police had attended the hearing. The Tribunal found that the applicant’s evidence was inconsistent. The Tribunal specifically asked the applicant who was present on the day of the court case “concluded in February 2009” and he stated that “Sunni men with whom he had fought were not present” ([44] at CB 242 to [61] at CB 243).

6. The Tribunal found ([62] at CB 243 to [64] at CB 244):

   “[62] His attempt to retract that evidence after being reminded of the judgement issued by the court in February 2009 in which it was asserted that at least two of the Sunni men involved in the fight were present at the court on that day reflected poorly on his credibility.

   [63] The Tribunal acknowledges his claim that there were numerous court appearances during the life of the proceedings but the applicant can be reasonably expected to be able to consistently say whether or not any of the men with whom he and his associates had been fighting were present at court. 

   [64] The Tribunal rejects his belated claim that in fact two of those men were present on the final court day and no other because his initial evidence was that none of them were present on that final court day.”

7. The applicant’s representative submitted that, based on his own dealings with the applicant, he believed the applicant’s understanding of the Tribunal’s questions was poor and that the applicant replied “based on his own perceptions”. The Tribunal considered the representative’s submissions in relation to the applicant’s alleged “misperception” of questions put to him, but found that they did “not explain or excuse the concerns” about the applicant’s credibility as the “applicant impressed the Tribunal as an intelligent person who is tertiary educated”. The Tribunal stated that the credibility concerns did not arise from any claimed “misperception” on the applicant’s part of questions put to him, but arose from various inconsistencies in his evidence ([65] – [69] at CB 244).

8. Further, the Tribunal found ([72] at CB 244 to CB 245):

   “In submissions dated 20 November 2013 the representative submitted that in assessing credibility the Tribunal should consider that the applicant was nervous at his interview with the delegate; difficulties communicating through an interpreter and to allow for lapses of memory.  It was submitted that inconsistency in evidence might not necessarily mean an applicant is untruthful.  The Tribunal has made allowance for those matters but finds they do not excuse or explain the concerns the Tribunal holds about the applicant's credibility as discussed above.”

9. The Tribunal accepted that the applicant was a practicing “Shi’a male from Rawalpindi”. However, as he was not a “witness of truth”, the Tribunal did not believe that he was a member of the MSDZ and the MSO. The Tribunal found that there was “no credible evidence” that the applicant was ever harmed by anybody in Pakistan, or any evidence as to why the applicant left Pakistan and did not want to return there ([75] – [76] at CB 245).

10. Further, ([74] at CB 245):

    “The Tribunal finds to be false the applicant's account of his bus being attacked in June 2007; a fight ensuing; the applicant and others being detained and a court case taken out against them.  The Tribunal also disbelieves his claims that his daughter was approached by people threatening him; that he was attacked by a group of men in September 2010; that shots were fired at him in October 2011 and that the police (or anyone else) were approached and issued FIR's about those (or any other) incidents.”

11. The Tribunal had regard to the supporting documentation provided by the applicant to the Tribunal. This included certificates relating to the applicant’s education and employment in Pakistan, FIRs related to the claimed incidents of June 2007, September 2010 and October 2011, a court judgment in relation to the June 2007 incident, and a statement from a lawyer made in relation to that court case. These documents purport to corroborate the claims made by the applicant. However the Tribunal found that their contents did not “overcome or alleviate the concerns” the Tribunal held about the applicant’s credibility which led to the finding that the applicant was not a witness of truth. The Tribunal, for this reason, gave no weight to these documents ([73] at CB 245 to [79] at CB 246).

12. Further, the Tribunal stated (footnote [15] at CB 246):

    “The Tribunal had a recollection that, at the hearing, a suggestion was made that a witness could be called to talk about the procurement of these documents and their delivery to Australia.  No witness was called and no formal request was made about that.  The Tribunal has already found that assertions by the representative that the documents are genuine as well as the contents of the documents themselves do not overcome the concerns the Tribunal holds about the applicant's credibility.  Assertions by a witness that the documents are genuine similarly would not overcome the Tribunal’s concerns as to the applicant’s own evidence about his experiences in Pakistan.”

13. The submissions to the Tribunal of 20 November 2013 complained that the delegate did not seek advice about the authenticity of documents provided by the applicant, and that the documents were certified and originals available. The Tribunal found that, as it had already found the applicant to be discredited as a witness, there was “no need” for the Tribunal to make enquires as to these documents. The fact that they were certified, and originals were available, did “not demonstrate to the Tribunal that their contents and the applicant’s claims” were true

    
    

    ([80] – [81] at CB 246).

14. The Tribunal accepted that the applicant had previously travelled out of Pakistan, but was not satisfied that these journeys related to any fear of harm on the applicant’s part, as his evidence was not credible ([82] at CB 246). The Tribunal accepted that the applicant’s wife and children may have relocated within Pakistan, but found that this was not due to any fear of harm on the applicant’s part ([83] at CB 246).

15. The Tribunal had regard to the letter from the Muhammadi Welfare Association Incorporated but held that the “contents of the letter do not persuade the Tribunal that the applicant will be anything other than a practicing Shi’a on return” to Pakistan ([84] – [85] at CB 246).

16. The Tribunal also had regard to the documents provided by the applicant, country information and submissions made, in regard to the harm that the applicant would face on return to Pakistan as a practicing Shi’a. The Tribunal acknowledged the country information provided by the  representative regarding attacks in Rawalpindi in November 2013, but held that, overall, reported attacks on Shi’as in Rawalpindi were “few and isolated”  and that the risk of harm to the applicant was “remote” ([86] at CB 246 to [94] at CB 247).

17. The Tribunal found that the applicant did not have a well-founded fear of persecution ([95] at CB 247 to CB 248). Further, that based on its finding that the applicant was not a witness of truth, the Tribunal held that there were not “substantial grounds” for believing that as a necessary and foreseeable consequence of the applicant’s removal from Australia to Pakistan, that there was a “real risk” that the applicant would suffer significant harm ([96] – [99] at CB 248).

Consideration

1. Before the Court, the applicant emphasised his grievance that the Tribunal did not accept his claims to fear harm if he were to return to Pakistan. To the extent that the applicant took issue with factual findings made by the Tribunal, including its disbelief of these claims, this can only be understood, in the circumstances, as a request for the Court to engage in impermissible merits review (Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Wu Shan Liang & Ors [1996] HCA 6; (1996) 185 CLR 259). On what is before the Court, the Tribunal’s findings of fact were reasonably open to it on what was before it. The applicant’s oral submissions did not reveal jurisdictional error on the part of the Tribunal.

2. The first ground of the application as stated, appears to raise two related complaints. One, that the Tribunal fell into jurisdictional error by finding that the applicant was not a credible witness. Two, that the applicant found it difficult to understand the interpreter. If this is a reference to the interpreter at the hearing with the Tribunal, then, although not pleaded, this may be an assertion of jurisdictional error on the basis of a denial of procedural fairness pursuant to s.425 of the Act.

3. The particular to the ground seeks to explain that complaint by referring to the applicant’s representative’s submissions to the Tribunal. These are said to have been to the effect that the applicant’s understanding of questions put to him was poor, and he responded according to his own perceptions.

4. There is an inconsistency or misdirection between the allegation in the ground and the applicant’s representative’s submissions to the Tribunal. The applicant does not say now when, or where, those submissions were made. However, the transcript of the Tribunal hearing that he has provided to the Court reveals that while the representative raised the matter of the applicant’s claimed perceptions at the hearing, these were not said to be because of any error or difficulties in interpretation at the hearing. Rather, these were said by the applicant’s representative to be because of some unidentified characteristic of the applicant.

5. The representative’s relevant submissions are (T32, l.15 to T33, l.50):

   “[UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER]: There is not much for me to say, Honourable Member, other than a couple of things regarding his understanding and his personality. What I have been encountering with him, personally, his understanding of the questions is really poor and that he answers according to his own implication, his own perception. Such as you asked him, ‘What - was there someone present in the court on that day?’, and of course he mentioned that there was no one. What I feel and what I perceive that he would've perceived that ‘Any time when you are going to the court was there any person present’, and right now, he's answering to you again and again the same thing because he's perceiving the question that way again, that ‘Whenever I went to there, there was no one, but yes, at the time of the decision there were two people. There were two witnesses there.’

   Another thing was, for example, you repeatedly ask him, I think, the question,  two or three times regarding something and he's - say like for example, you ask him the question, ‘At what time you made the decision?’ Maybe that was a little bit not the gentleman who is interpreting, but I could understand because I - my background is from court or speaking, and the way he was putting it him, the word he was using, the word he was using they were not meaning too very close what you were asking him. You know what I mean?  You were asking him that ‘At what time did you make the decision to leave the country?’ And I believe the way the question was asked from him was that ‘At what occasion do you make the decision to leave the country?’

   [MEMBER]: At what, sorry?

   [UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER]: ‘At what occasion.’

   [MEMBER]: ‘At what occasion’.

   [MEMBER] [The reference to “Member” is in error. In context, it was plainly the applicant’s representative who made the following statement.] Yes, ‘occasion you make the decision to leave the country?’ Now there was a little bit difference in that, but I understood. But also, having his background in my mind, I can understand that at some time when they're asking him the question, he will be keep looking at my face just like, he will take, say, like maybe a minute before answering, to mean, very - with a very shallow mind or something, looking at me just like I ask him something very strange. It is his lack of understanding. As I said, it's not the fault of the interpreter or yours or any other interpreter, it's the lack - in his personality, it's a lack of understanding of the questions. That how should he understand, and that's what I've been asking him. ‘Look, your answers could be pertaining to what your story is, but the problem is when the question is asked to you, you don't understand that question properly, and you go back to the story, again and again.’ ‘Oh yeah, that's why I did it and that's why I didn't - didn't do it.’

   That's where it could be the problem as well. I know that not much today, but his story at the first time, there was reality lost in translations, which I actually mentioned to the honourable Interviewer at that day. I said, ‘look, he has the problem with his understanding and then when he is mentioning and he is uttering the word to his understanding they are not translated properly to the gentleman, to the interviewer.’ But not so much so today. I mean I am satisfied that other than a couple of things, which I already cleared, that you got - the Kachari thing.

   [MEMBER]: Yes

   [UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER]: Because I heard him saying today again, you might come across with interview, at the time of your question, he uttered the word of Kachari which wasn't translated to you. The reason was I believe that he uttered the word but in the low tone, and the gentleman told – translated that he went to see his friend. But he uttered the word ‘He went to Kachari.’ which is very close to his friends' residence.

   [MEMBER]: Right, okay.

   [UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER]: So that is a court. Kachari mean usually court. In my language ‘Kachari’ mean court.

   [Tribunal]: Yes.

   [UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER]: But when we say ‘towards Kachari’ it does not mean that he is going towards the court, attending some matter or something—

   [MEMBER]: He’s going to an area.

   [UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER]: He means toward the direction.

   [MEMBER]: Yes

   [UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER]: So that was actually I was (indistinct) for him. But again, the problem is with his understanding of the question, not I mean I'm getting on anyone's—

   [MEMBER]: Yes.

   [UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER]: I'm not pointing or raising the question, you know, but all in all, I think it was very well done, Honourable Member.”

6. Two elements emerge. The first is that the applicant’s claimed lack of understanding was said to be because of his “personality” and that the representative encountered this difficulty in his own dealings with the applicant. The representative said he spoke the same language as the applicant. This claimed “difficulty”, therefore, did not arise because of any lack of interpretation.

7. The Tribunal considered these submissions (see [65] – [71] at CB 244). The Tribunal found that these submissions did not satisfactorily “excuse” the concerns it had with the applicant’s evidence as had been put to him at the hearing. The Tribunal found that its concerns about the applicant’s evidence did not arise because of any lack of perception on the part of the applicant arising from the questions put to him by the Tribunal at the hearing (see in particular [68] at CB 244). The Tribunal found that, in the circumstances, the applicant had understood the questions put to him ([69] at CB 244).

8. I agree with the Minister that this complaint does not rise above a disagreement with the Tribunal’s findings of fact. No legal error is revealed in these circumstances.

9. The second element arising from the ground is the assertion that the applicant found it difficult to understand the interpreter. The particular to the ground, with its reference to the representative’s submissions, does not appear to support this contention. The focus of the particulars referred to above is on the applicant’s lack of perception.

10. The representative’s submissions to the Tribunal made clear (as set out above – T33, ll.1-3):

    “[Representative]: …It is his lack of understanding. As I said, it's not the fault of the interpreter or yours or any other interpreter, it's the lack - in his personality, it's a lack of understanding of the questions.”

11. It is the case, as the Minister submits, that to substantiate any allegation of an error in interpretation, the applicant must provide evidence to support this claim.

12. It is also the case that a breach of the obligation pursuant to s.425 of the Act would lead to jurisdictional error being revealed. In issuing the invitation to the hearing, the Tribunal is obliged to provide a meaningful opportunity to the applicant to give his evidence and address the issues in the review. Error in interpretation may frustrate this process.

13. A set out above, in his submissions, the Minister initially relied on P119, especially at [17], as to the relevant standard required to establish jurisdictional error.

1. As stated above, some care must be taken here. In SZRMQ, Allsop CJ, questioned the correctness of P119. In the same case, Robertson J agreed. As stated above, it is important to note, however, that in SZRMQ the Full Court was concerned with procedural fairness at general law and not a breach of s.425 of the Act. Robertson J said (SZRMQ at [74] – [75]):

   “[74] I have had the advantage of reading in draft the reasons of the Chief Justice. I agree with his Honour’s general comments and his analysis of the authorities. It is significant that the errors of translation in the present case are to be tested against procedural fairness under the general law rather than by reference to the blunter question of whether the Tribunal has given the applicant an opportunity to appear before it to give evidence: s 425(1)(a) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) as considered by Kenny J in Perera v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [1999] FCA 507; (1999) 92 FCR 6.

   [75] I should add however that what is in my view the correct approach under the general law was, with respect, stated too narrowly by Logan J in SZQLS v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2012] FCA 1274; (2012) 134 ALD 267 at [33] with reference to the decision of the Full Court in WALN v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2006] FCAFC 131 at [29], which concerned the terms of the Act, that either or each of the following needed to be established:

   (a)     that the standard of interpretation at the interview by the reviewer was so inadequate that the appellant was effectively prevented from giving evidence at the hearing; or

   (b) that errors were made by the interpreter at the reviewer interview, which were material to the conclusions which the reviewer made adversely to the appellant.

   This is significant because that was the test which the primary judge, it seems, applied in the present case, see at [30] and [103] and [109]. That test is in substance the same as the test stated in Appellant P119/2002 v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2003] FCAFC 230 at [17]- [18] which Allsop CJ has considered and questioned. In my opinion this test should not be applied to cases, such as the present, which involve the general law. It follows that I do not agree with the reasoning of the primary judge in various instances although I do agree with his Honour’s conclusion.”

2. Ultimately as set out above, I respectfully understood the application of what was said in SZRMQ to the current case to be as explained by Griffiths J in SZSEI.  In particular, (SZSEI at [72]):

   “In my view, subject to some important observations which I will make shortly, the approach to be taken in a case such as this which raises the application of s 425 of the Act is essentially that which was applied in cases such as Perera, SZOYU, Appellant P119 and WALN. In WALN, Ryan J (with whom Tamberlin and Middleton JJ agreed) set out the relevant approach relating to alleged errors in translation in a s 425 context in the following terms at [29]:

   To succeed on this ground the appellant must establish that he was effectively prevented from giving his evidence; see Perera (supra) at [38]-[41]. Alternatively, he must establish that errors had occurred in translation which were so material as to cause the decision-making process to miscarry...”

3. In the current case, the difficulty for the applicant is that he has not pointed to any errors in interpretation at the Tribunal hearing. The applicant’s ground asserts, but does not identify, any such errors. As set out above, the reference to the representative’s submissions directs attention to the applicant’s perceptions, not errors in interpretation. Ultimately, the representative stated he was an Urdu speaker (the relevant language at the hearing) and that there were no errors of significance in interpretation. The reference above to “Kachari” was explained by the representative, and understood by the Tribunal. Ultimately, the representative made clear that the “problem” was with the applicant and that the interpretation was “very well done”.

4. In essence, the transcript of the Tribunal hearing provided to the Court, by the applicant, confirms that the Tribunal accurately reflected, in its account of the hearing, what had occurred there.

5. In any event, the applicant’s complaints at the Tribunal hearing, about interpretation errors, were directed to the interpretation at the interview with the delegate. Even in that context, the complaint lacks specificity.

6. As set out above, the applicant did not make any direct allegation of any substantial or significant error by the interpreter at the Tribunal hearing. The substantial concerns expressed were about the interview with the delegate and the applicant’s own understanding of some of the questions put to him. Any errors in interpretation at the interview with the delegate do not provide a basis to impugn the interpretation at the Tribunal hearing. As to the latter point, the applicant’s understanding was not said to arise from interpretation errors.

7. In his submissions of 10 December 2015 to the Court, the applicant made specific references to both the Tribunal’s account of the hearing (“item 1”), the transcript of the hearing (“item 2”), and to references to other material in the Court Book (“item 3’).

8. In relation to the second and third items, the submission is simply that the Tribunal ignored his evidence and comments. For example, the submissions made by the representative to the Tribunal (CB 177 to CB 180). This is not an allegation of interpreter error. It simply seeks to take issue with the Tribunal’s subsequent findings.

9. Nor do the references to the transcript assist the applicant in establishing that he was effectively prevented from giving his evidence or that errors had occurred, which were so material as to cause the Tribunal’s process to miscarry. In all, ground one is not made out.

10. Ground two asserts that the Tribunal failed to understand that the applicant had to conclude his religious work in Pakistan before leaving. This was said to be an attempt by the Tribunal to “undermine” his religion.

11. It is difficult to understand exactly what jurisdictional error is alleged here. On its face, this complaint appears to be that the Tribunal should have accepted the applicant’s explanation as to why he did not leave Pakistan once a visa for Australia had been granted to him.

12. The applicant had claimed before the Tribunal that in October 2011 he was approached by a number of armed men while walking on a footpath after a religious gathering. Shots were fired and two people walking with the applicant were hit and hospitalised ([21] at CB 238).

13. The applicant was granted a visa to come to Australia on 14 January 2012 ([34] at CB 240). The applicant had given evidence to the Tribunal that after the incident of October 2011 he had decided to leave Pakistan as soon as possible, and had begun to prepare to depart in December 2011 after realising that the police would not be able to protect him ([33] at CB 240).

14. Notwithstanding this, after obtaining the visa in January 2012, the applicant did not travel to Australia until June 2012 ([34] at CB 240). In all, the applicant’s evidence about remaining in Pakistan for this period was that he had religious work to conclude before he could depart.

15. The Tribunal accepted that the applicant may have wished to perform his religious activities, but found that in the circumstances presented, his failure to leave Pakistan at the earliest opportunity was inconsistent with his claim that he feared for his life.

16. This finding was reasonably open to the Tribunal on what was before it. A different decision maker may have come to a different conclusion. However, there is no legal error where the finding of fact was reasonably open to the Tribunal. Ground two does not reveal jurisdictional error.

17. Ground three asserts that the Tribunal fell into jurisdictional error because it failed to make further inquiries before concluding that documents presented by the applicant contained false information. The particulars to the ground make reference to the Tribunal’s finding but are not helpful in explaining the legal error alleged.

18. In any event, the documents in question appear to be documents provided after he made his application for a protection visa. These appear to be, variously, police and court documents, education and employment documents and a letter from a lawyer (see [78] at CB 245 and CB 83 to CB 110)

19. As the Minister submits, with reference to Minister for Immigration v SZIAI [2009] HCA 39; (2009) 83 ALJR 1123 (“SZIAI”) (and see further Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs v SGLB [2004] HCA 32; (2004) 207 ALR 12), the circumstances where the Tribunal can fall into jurisdictional error if it fails to conduct an inquiry are rare. The applicant has been unable to establish (and for that matter, no real attempt to do so has been made) that the Tribunal failed to conduct an inquiry involving a critical fact, the existence of which was easily ascertained, and which might have affected the decision (SZIAI at [25]).

20. The Tribunal noted the applicant’s representative’s submissions on the matter of making further inquiries on the question of the authenticity of the documents. The Tribunal found that there was no need to make such inquiries given that it had found that the applicant had been significantly discredited as a witness of truth (see [80] – [81] at CB 240). No legal error is revealed here.

21. Ground four appears to assert three different errors of law said to arise from the Tribunal’s conclusion that the applicant did not have a

    
    

    well-founded fear of persecution in Pakistan.

22. First, the applicant asserts that the Tribunal’s conclusion in this regard was illogical or irrational. Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v  SZMDS [2010] HCA 16; (2010) 144 CLR 1 (“SZMDS”) at [78] per Heydon J and [130] – [131] per Crennan and Bell JJ, is relevant authority for the proposition that if reasonable minds could differ about the Tribunal’s reasoning, it could not be said to be illogical (see also SZOOR v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2012] FCAFC 58; (2012) 202 FCR 1 at [15] and [85]).

23. In the circumstances presented, the applicant’s complaint can only be understood as an expression of disagreement with the Tribunal’s ultimate conclusion, and the findings of fact which informed it. The Tribunal’s relevant findings, and the conclusion, were all reasonably open to it on what was before it. The Tribunal gave reasons for its findings probative of the material before it. Illogicality and irrationality are not made out in circumstances where reasonable minds may differ. No legal error is revealed here.

24. Second, the applicant asserts that the Tribunal misapplied the Refugees Convention test. Again, that is not explained. On what is before the Court, the Tribunal set out the relevant test in unexceptional terms

    
    

    ([4] – [7] at CB 236). I cannot see that it erred in its application of the test in its analysis and findings. Again, this complaint, in the circumstances, does not rise above a disagreement with the Tribunal’s findings. No legal error is revealed.

25. Third, the ground complains that the Tribunal failed to take into account relevant information. No particulars are provided. However, in his affidavit of 3 July 2014, the applicant identifies certain documentary information which he says he gave to the Tribunal and oral evidence that he gave in support.

26. Some care must be taken here by the applicant’s use of the words “failure to take certain information into account”.  If this is meant to be an assertion that the Tribunal failed to consider a matter it was legally obliged to consider, then jurisdictional error would result (Minister for Aboriginal Affairs v Peko-Wallsend Ltd [1986] HCA 40; (1986) 162 CLR 24 (“Peko-Wallsend”), Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZRKT [2013] FCA 317; (2013) 212 FCR 99 at [111] and Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v SZSRS [2014] FCAFC 16 at [29]).

27. If, however, the phrase is meant to convey a complaint that the Tribunal should have been persuaded by the applicant’s documentary and oral evidence, and find in his favour, then in circumstances where the Tribunal’s relevant findings were reasonably open to it, the complaint is nothing more than a disagreement with the Tribunal’s findings.

28. I am satisfied, on a fair reading of the Tribunal’s decision record, that the Tribunal did consider the applicant’s evidence as identified in his affidavit of 3 July 2014.

29. First, the applicant’s affidavit refers to various FIRs, a lawyer’s letter, and a court judgment submitted to the Tribunal by him to support his claims of having suffered past harm in Pakistan. The Tribunal’s decision record reveals that the Tribunal did turn its mind to these documents (see [78] at CB 245 to [81] at CB 246).

30. It found that, in light of its significant concerns about the applicant’s credibility, which led to its finding that he was not a witness of truth, it gave no weight to these documents. Such a finding is not a failure to take into account relevant considerations. Rather, it is, with explanation, an assignment of weight to evidence before it. This was within the Tribunal’s exercise of jurisdiction (Peko-Wallsend and Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZJSS & Ors [2010] HCA 48; (2010) 243 CLR 164).

31. Second, the applicant’s affidavit refers to a letter from the General Secretary of the Muhammadi Welfare Association Incorporated, Guildford, NSW. The applicant says he provided this to the Tribunal to show he was a “devout Muslim”. The affidavit asserts that the Tribunal did not give it “due consideration”.

32. Contrary to the applicant’s assertion, the Tribunal did consider this letter. It found that even though the applicant may be involved with this group in Australia, that did not, of itself, demonstrate the “truth” of his claim of past harm in Pakistan. Further, the Tribunal found that the contents of the letter did not persuade it that on return to Pakistan, the applicant would “be anything other than a practicing Shi’a”

    
    

    ([84] – [85] at CB 246). No legal error is revealed here.

33. Third, the applicant’s affidavit complains that the Tribunal did not give “due consideration” to his evidence and submissions demonstrating the “continuing hardship” he would face on return. This claim was considered by the Tribunal ([86] at CB 246 to [95] at CB 247). It specifically referred to reports provided by the applicant concerning various incidents in Pakistan, and the medical records concerning the applicant’s brother.

34. The Tribunal concluded ([94] at CB 247):

    “In response, both the applicant and the representative repeated their claims about Shi'as being killed and the government failing to provide protection.  The Tribunal acknowledges those claims but still considers the risk of the applicant suffering serious harm in the part of Pakistan where he comes from is remote.   The Tribunal remains of that view given there is no credible evidence that the applicant was harmed in Pakistan and that, while there have been recent attacks on Shi'as in Rawalpindi as mentioned above, overall, the Tribunal considers the pattern of those attacks to be random and isolated.”

35. In all, therefore, the applicant’s ground cannot be seen as rising higher than a disagreement with factual findings made by the Tribunal. No jurisdictional error is revealed.

36. Ground five asserts that the applicant was not afforded “natural justice”. The particulars assert bias on the part of the Tribunal member. This is a very serious allegation to make against an administrative decision-maker. Therefore, the law requires that such claims be clearly made and distinctly proven (Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs v Jia Legeng [2001] HCA 17 (2001) 205 CLR 507 at [69] and [127]).

37. The test for bias is well settled (SBBS v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2002] FCAFC 361; (2002) 194 ALR 749, VFAB v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2003] FCA 872; (2003) 131 FCR 102 and Re Refugee Review Tribunal; Ex parte H [2001] HCA 28; (2001) 179 ALR 425).

38. While the applicant’s ground asserts bias, no clear particulars are provided. In the circumstances, it cannot be said that a claim of bias is clearly made, let alone distinctly proven. The particulars do make specific reference to a FIR which he says the Tribunal found as “not credible” without first verifying its authenticity. This is dealt with above at ground three. To the extent that this is some attempt to assert a failure to afford the applicant procedural fairness generally, this is a case to which Division 4 of Part 7 of the Act applies as the exhaustive statement of the natural justice hearing rule, in relation to matters dealt with in that Division. I note that the applicant was invited to a hearing pursuant to s.425 of the Act. That is dealt with at ground one above. Section 424A was not engaged. Ground five is not made out.

Conclusion

1. In all, the applicant’s grounds, as amended, do not reveal jurisdictional error on the part of the Tribunal. The application to the Court should be dismissed. I will make an order accordingly.

I certify that the preceding one hundred and two (102) paragraphs are a true copy of the reasons for judgment of Judge Nicholls

Date: 18 February 2016

Schedule 1

1. The following documents are in evidence before the Court:

   i.A copy of the applicant’s identity card.

   ii.A copy of the applicant’s driver’s licence.

   iii.A copy of a student’s identification card.

   iv.An article titled “Three Dead in Suicide Blast bear Rawalpindi Imambargah” said to be annexure “A” to the applicant’s affidavit of 11 June 2014.

   v.An article titled “Suicide blast kills 3, injures 13outside Imam Bargah in Pindi”.

   vi.A copy of a document titled “Discharge Summary” from Benazir Bhutto Hospital Rawalpindi.

   vii.An article titled “Rawalpindi residents appealed to stay at home” said to be annexure “F” to the applicant’s affidavit of 11 June 2014.

   viii.An article titled “LHC CJ forms Judicial Commission to probe Rawalpindi mayhem”.

   ix.An article titled “Rawalpindi incident to be thoroughly probed: Nisar”.

   x.A copy of a judgment from a judicial magistrate in the manner of “The State VS. Manza Abbas etc”.

   xi.A letter with the heading “Rajput Law Associates”.

   xii.Copies of documents titled “First Information of a cognizable crime”, “Police Choki Kacheri Police Station”, “First Information of a cognizable crime” (with the date 21.10.2011 at the end of the document), in Urdu and translated copies in English.

   xiii.A document titled “Muhammadi Welfare Association Incorporated”, said to be said to be annexure “G” to the applicant’s affidavit of 11 June 2014.

   xiv.A copy of the transcript of the hearing before the Tribunal said to be prepared by “Legal Transcripts Pty Ltd”.

Schedule 2

1. The following documents were not in evidence before the Court

   i.An article titled “Three killed in suicide attack on Imambargah”.

   ii.An article titled “Three killed in Rawalpindi suicide blast”.

   iii.A copy of photographs with the words “Brother”, “Injured”, “Cousin” and “Dead”.

   iv.A copy of a document in a foreign language with URL “ copy of a document in a foreign language with URL “e.jang.com.pk/12-18-2013/pindi/page1.asp”.

   vi.A copy of a document in a foreign language with URL “e.dunya.com.pk/detail/php?date=2013-12-18&edition=ISL&id=781016_84298107”.

   vii.A copy of a document in a foreign language with URL “ article titled “Situation remains volatile post Rawalpindi clashes, 8 arrested”.

   ix.An article titled “Cops killed in attack near imambargah in Rawalpindi”.

   x.An article titled “Cops killed in attack near imambargah in Rawalpindi” by “Dawn.com”.

   xi.An article titled “Shia Pilgrims Martyred in Bomb Attacks Near Pak-Iran Border”.