FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
SZTXS v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection
[2016] FCA 726
Appeal from: SZTXS v Minister for Immigration [2016] FCCA 311 File number: NSD 342 of 2016 Judge: RARES J Date of judgment: 23 May 2016 Legislation: Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss 36(2)(a), 36(2)(aa) Cases cited: Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZIAI (2009) 83 ALJR 1123
Re Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs; Ex parte Durairajasingham (2000) 168 ALR 407
Date of hearing: 23 May 2016 Registry: New South Wales Division: General Division National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights Category: No Catchwords Number of paragraphs: 52 Counsel for the Appellant: The Appellant appeared in person Counsel for the First Respondent: Ms C Hillary Solicitor for the First Respondent: DLA Piper Australia Counsel for the Second Respondent: The Second Respondent filed a submitting notice ORDERS
NSD 342 of 2016 BETWEEN: SZTXS
Appellant
AND: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION
First Respondent
ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL
Second Respondent
JUDGE:
RARES J
DATE OF ORDER:
23 MAY 2016
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The appeal be dismissed.
2.The appellant pay the first respondent’s costs.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
(REVISED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT)RARES J:
This is an appeal from the decision of the Federal Circuit Court refusing the appellant’s application for Constitutional writ relief in respect of the decision of the Refugee Review Tribunal given on 4 February 2014 that affirmed the Minister’s delegate’s decision not to give the appellant a protection visa: SZTXS v Minister for Immigration [2016] FCCA 311.
Background
The appellant is a citizen of Pakistan who arrived in Australia in June 2012 and applied to the Department for a protection visa on 4 July 2012. After interviewing the appellant, a delegate refused to grant the visa on 28 December 2012.
In his application for a protection visa the appellant included a detailed statement of his claims that he appears to have prepared with the assistance of a solicitor migration agent who represented him both before the delegate and the Tribunal. In essence, the appellant claimed to have been a member of the Shia minority Muslim sect in Pakistan and to have been a leader of his fellow worshipers in Rawalpindi where he lived. He worked for a large Pakistani government owned corporation. He claimed to have commenced participating in religious ceremonies and festivals of a particular Shia organisation from around 1996 and to have led his fellow worshipers in that organisation for religious activities. He claimed that his role required him also to protect the religious leader of their organisation. He claimed that the majority Sunni population of Pakistan was anti-Shia and that his problems had started when he became very active and vocal as a local leader of this organisation.
He claimed that, in June 2007, a procession of his organisation’s followers was attacked by unknown fundamentalist Sunnis but that he and his fellow…
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- Case
- [2016] FCA 726
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The central legal issues the court had to resolve were whether the Tribunal had erred in its consideration of the appellant's evidence, particularly in relation to the injuries his brother suffered in an attack, and whether there were translation difficulties during the Tribunal hearing. The appellant argued that the Tribunal had not properly considered certain documentary evidence and had misunderstood his reasons for delaying his departure from Pakistan. Furthermore, he claimed that the Tribunal had incorrectly assessed his credibility.
The court concluded that the Tribunal had indeed considered the material presented by the appellant and had provided detailed reasoning for its decision. It held that the Tribunal's assessment of the appellant's credibility and evidence was within its jurisdiction and that there was no jurisdictional error. The court also found that the Tribunal's reasoning regarding the appellant's delay in leaving Pakistan was sound and that the appellant's claims about his wife's pregnancy were not material that could have influenced the Tribunal's decision since they were not presented during the proceedings. Therefore, the appeal was dismissed with the appellant ordered to pay the respondent's costs.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The appeal be dismissed.
2. The appellant pay the first respondent’s costs.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
He contended that the Tribunal had not considered the material concerning the injuries his brother received in the attack of 17 December 2013 that had been submitted with his solicitor migration agent’s letter of 4 February 2014. He argued that there were difficulties with interpretation in the Tribunal hearing to which I have referred earlier. He claimed that there was no reason why he should have left his stable job with the government owned company for which he worked if he had not been threatened and that the Tribunal had clearly ignored his evidence when deciding that he was not credible. He sought orders that the Tribunal’s decision should be quashed.Consideration In my opinion, the trial judge correctly rejected each of the grounds before him for the reasons that he gave. The first ground of appeal is no more than an argument that the Tribunal ought to have acted on the documents which the appellant presented and should not have come to its own evaluation of him as a witness whom it positively disbelieved. The role of the Court in judicial review proceedings is to determine whether the administrative decision-maker has acted in accordance with the law in exercising the jurisdiction that the Parliament has conferred. The determination of the facts, including the assessment of evidence, are matters within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal. As McHugh J said in Re Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs; Ex parte Durairajasingham (2000) 168 ALR 407 at 423 [67]:… a finding on credibility is the function of the primary decision-maker par excellence. It was open to the Tribunal to come to its findings of credibility for the reasons that it explained. Having read the material in the appeal papers including, of course, the Tribunal’s decision, I am satisfied that there was evidence as to the facts before the Tribunal on which it was entitled to arrive at the conclusions that it did. I reject ground 1. Grounds 2, 5 and 6 in essence complained of the Tribunal’s use of the appellant’s delay in leaving Pakistan to assess whether he were truly in fear of his life. In essence, it reasoned that a person who was truly in fear of his life, who had the opportunity of coming to Australia shortly after his receipt of a visitor’s visa on 14 January 2012, would not have delayed for months so as to continue his religious activities that had generated the threats he claimed, go to Saudi Arabia, and then to return to the very place where he said his life was in danger, before coming to Australia. In my opinion, the Tribunal’s explanation as to how it arrived at its conclusions in that regard were open to it. I am unable to detect any jurisdictional error in the way it evaluated the evidence and arrived at those conclusions. The material which the appellant sought to rely on before me about his wife’s pregnancy was material of which he knew during the course of the whole administrative proceedings before the delegate and the Tribunal. However, he chose not to put those matters before the delegate or the Tribunal. As the appellant acknowledged, he had not put anything to the Tribunal concerning his wife’s condition. Accordingly, the Tribunal could not have made, and did not make, an error in failing to take that matter, of which it was not informed, into consideration. It follows that this was not material that could demonstrate that the Tribunal made a jurisdictional error or that the Court should interfere at this stage.