FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Sydney Sunny Glass Pty Ltd v McParland [2020] FCA 1017
Appeal from: McParland v Origin Oz Holdings t/a Nuline Glass [2019] FCCA 1534
McParland v Origin Oz Holdings t/a Nuline Glass (No 2) [2019] FCCA 1674
File number(s): NSD 1066 of 2019 Judge(s): RARES J Date of judgment: 24 July 2020 Catchwords: CONTRACTS – contractual interpretation – contracts of employment – where employee entered into a contract of employment with first employer as well as a collateral contract to obtain shares after a period of escrow during which time he would continue working for that employer – where employee transitioned prior to the conclusion of escrow period to working for second employer with “current entitlements” and first employer paid all “entitlements owing” at date of termination –– whether “current entitlements” due by second employer included obligations under collateral contract to deliver shares at end of escrow – where trial judge entered judgment jointly and severally against both employers in respect of the failure to deliver shares under collateral contract – trial judge erred in finding second employer liable under collateral contract – appeal allowed
INDUSTRIAL LAW – where second employer, through actions of its principal, dismissed employee for exercising workplace right to seek compliance with workplace safety laws from a regulator in contravention of ss 340(1)(ii) and 341(1)(c) of the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) – consideration of whether to order both second employer and its principal to pay separate civil penalties – appropriate to impose penalty on both for contravention of s 340 – where employee’s dismissal also contravened s 44(1) of the Act by reason of failures to comply with the requirements of s 117(1) and 117(2) – where contraventions part of course of conduct – consideration of civil penalties – application of principles and totality – penalties imposed by trial judge set aside
Legislation: Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth), ss 44, 61, 117, 323, 340, 341, 539, 546, 550, 557 Cases cited: Australian Building and Construction Commissioner v Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union (2017) 249 FCR 458
Cohen v iSoft Group Pty Limited (2013) 298 ALR 516
Commercial Union Assurance Co of Australia Ltd v Ferrcom Pty Ltd (1991) 22 NSWLR 389
Commonwealth v Director of Fair Work Building Industry Inspectorate (2015) 258 CLR 482
Ermogenous v Greek Orthodox Community of SA Inc (2002) 209 CLR 95
Hull v Thompson [2001] NSWCA 359
Kuhl v Zurich Financial Services Australia Ltd (2011) 243 CLR 361
Mayburyv Atlantic Union Oil Co Ltd (1953) 89 CLR 507
Parker v Australian Building and Construction Commissioner (2019) 270 FCR 39
Treasury Wine Estates Vintners Limited v Pearson (2019) 268 FCR 12
Date of hearing: 20 February 2020 Registry: New South Wales Division: Fair Work Division National Practice Area: Employment & Industrial Relations Category: Catchwords Number of…
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- Case
- [2020] FCA 1017
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The legal issues before the court involved determining the scope of "current entitlements" owed to Mr. McParland by Viridian and assessing whether Sunny Glass breached its contract by not delivering the shares. Additionally, the court needed to address the dismissal of Mr. McParland by Viridian for exercising his workplace rights to seek compliance with safety laws, and whether this dismissal contravened the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth).
The court found that Mr. McParland was only entitled to compensation for a notice period due to his unlawful termination and rejected his other claims for compensation. The court examined the terms of the contracts and the surrounding circumstances to determine the obligations of the employers. It held that the term "current entitlements" did not include the obligations under the collateral contract for share delivery. Consequently, the trial judge's finding that Viridian was liable under the collateral contract was erroneous. The court also determined that both Viridian and its principal were liable for separate civil penalties for contravening sections 340 and 44 of the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth), though the penalties imposed by the trial judge were set aside.
In summary, the appeal was allowed, and the cross-appeal was partly allowed. The orders of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia were varied to exclude Viridian from liability for the share transfer and to adjust certain compensation amounts owed to Mr. McParland.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The appeal be allowed.
2. The cross appeal be allowed in part.
3. The orders made by the Federal Circuit Court of Australia on 13 June 2019 be varied by:
(a) deleting “and the Third Respondent are jointly and severally liable to” from order 1;
(b) setting aside orders 2, 3, 5 and 6; and
(c) adding the following order:
“2. The Third Respondent pay the Applicant the sum of $12,866.36 inclusive of interest up to 13 June 2019.”
4. The orders made by the Federal Circuit Court of Australia on 14 June 2019 be varied by:
(a) deleting from declaration 2c. all words and figures after “applicant’s” and substituting in their place “car allowance in relation to the period 15 March 2017 to 5 June 2017 in the amount of $4,229.59”.
(b) deleting from order 2 “$81,000” and substituting in its place “$56,000”; and
(c) deleting from order 3 “$7,560” and substituting in its place “$9,000”.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
This case came before the court as an appeal from the decision of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia. The original proceedings involved claims by Mr McParland against Sunny Glass and Viridian for various employment-related entitlements and breaches of contract. The trial judge found in favour of Mr McParland on several points, including that Sunny Glass had breached its contract of employment and was jointly and severally liable with Viridian for the failure to deliver shares under the collateral contract. Sunny Glass appealed against the decision, arguing that it was not liable under the collateral contract. Viridian and Mr McParland were also involved in the appeal but to a lesser extent. The court considered the appeal and varied the orders of the Federal Circuit Court.
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Mr McParland argued that his Honour correctly made his findings about the terms of his contract with Sunny Glass. He contended that where the letters of 9 and 14 March 2017 promised that his employment with Sunny Glass would continue with “current entitlements” that expression necessarily included, first, the express terms of the Nuline contract and, secondly, his rights under the collateral share contract. He submitted that Sunny Glass had promised that if he worked for it, it would reward him with the same payments and rights as he had when he worked for Nuline. He argued that the collateral share contract was in the nature of a “golden handcuff” that had the purpose of retaining him as an employee of “the business” for the two years of the escrow, which had not expired when he accepted Sunny Glass’ offer of 14 March 2017. Thus, he contended, Sunny Glass benefited from his working for it and became liable to fulfil Nuline’s obligation to transfer the Baumart shares to him once the escrow ended.Consideration – principles The principles for the construction of a contract of employment are not in doubt. First, it is necessary to determine what the terms of each of the Nuline contract, the collateral share contract and the Sunny Glass contract were. Employment relationships are not purely contractual, as Rares, Cowdroy and Kerr JJ held in Cohen v iSoft Group Pty Limited (2013) 298 ALR 516 at 526–527 [35]–[38], namely: The meaning of a commercial document and of a contract is determined objectively: Toll (FGCT) Pty Limited v Alphapharm Pty Limited (2004) 219 CLR 165 at 178-180 [38]-[41] per Gleeson CJ, Gummow, Hayne, Callinan and Heydon JJ; Pacific Carriers Ltd v BNP Paribas (2004) 218 CLR 451 at 461-462 [22] per Gleeson CJ, Gummow, Hayne, Callinan and Heydon JJ. The construction of such a document or contract must be determined by what a reasonable person in the position of the parties would have understood its terms to mean. That process involves consideration not only of the text of the documents, but also of the surrounding circumstances known to all the parties, as well as the purpose and object of the transaction. As Lord Wilberforce explained, in a frequently cited passage from his speech in Reardon Smith Line Ltd v Hansen-Tangen [1976] 1 WLR 989 at 995-996 (that was approved in Pacific Carriers 218 CLR at 462 [22] and Royal Botanic Gardens and Domain Trust v South Sydney City Council (2002) 240 CLR 45 at 52-53 [10] per Gleeson CJ, Gaudron, McHugh, Gummow and Hayne JJ):In a commercial contract it is certainly right that the court should know the commercial purpose of the contract and this, in turn, presupposes knowledge of the genesis of the transaction, the background, the context, the market in which the parties are operating.The objective theory of contract must also apply to ascertaining who were the parties to the contract. Additionally, the contract must be construed as a whole with a view to reconciling and harmonising, if possible, apparent inconsistencies in expression. If words or expressions are used that are repugnant or have been transposed or omitted, the [Court] can construe the contract to give it the effect that, objectively, can be seen as what the parties intended: Fitzgerald v Masters (1956) 95 CLR 420 at 436-438 per McTiernan, Webb and Taylor JJ. Dixon CJ and Fullagar J expressed the principle there with typical lucidity there by rejecting a construction that (95 CLR at 427):… the parties did not intend to contract otherwise than by reference to the terms of a document which they mistakenly believed to exist. … It seems indeed almost absurd to say that the parties, having agreed on everything essential, intended that the agreement should be nullified if effect could not be given to cl. 8.Employment relationships are not purely contractual and can be affected by statutory provisions and the incidents of a fiduciary relationship: Concut Pty Ltd v Worrell (2000) 176 ALR 693 at 697-698 [17] per Gleeson CJ, Gaudron and Gummow JJ. In that case, an employment relationship had existed over a lengthy period. Initially, the employee had worked for a related company of the employer. However, in 1980 he began working for the employer with which he signed a service agreement in 1986 that was the subject of the dispute. The High Court held that the service agreement was not properly characterised as a new and discrete contract that had replaced and terminated the earlier oral agreement. Gleeson CJ, Gaudron and Gummow JJ said (176 ALR at 698 [19]):The relevant principles are well settled. In FCT v Sara Lee Household & Body Care (Aust) Pty Ltd [(2000) 172 ALR 346 at 350-1 [22]; 74 ALJR 1094 at 1098], Gleeson CJ, Gaudron, McHugh and Hayne JJ said: When the parties to an existing contract enter into a further contract by which they vary the original contract, then, by hypothesis, they have made two contracts. For one reason or another, it may be material to determine whether the effect of the second contract is to bring an end to the first contract and replace it with the second, or whether the effect is to leave the first contract standing, subject to the alteration. For example, something may turn upon the place, or the time, or the form, of the contract, and it may therefore be necessary to decide whether the original contract subsists.Their Honours went on [(2000) 172 ALR 346 at 351 [23]; 74 ALJR 1094 at 1098. See also (2000) 172 ALR 346 at 360 [81], 362 [95], 363 [100]; 74 ALJR 1094 at 1105, 1106, 1107 per Callinan J.] to refer to the judgment of Taylor J in Tallerman & Co Pty Ltd v Nathan's Merchandise (Victoria) Pty Ltd [(1957) 98 CLR 93 at 143-4]. Taylor J had rejected submissions that (a) "it is impossible by a subsequent agreement, merely, to vary or modify an existing contract” and (b) "[an] agreement which purports to vary an existing contract operates … first of all to abrogate entirely the existing contractual relationship and, then, to reinstate the terms of the old contract as varied or modified by the new agreement” [compare Meek v Port of London Authority [1918] 2 Ch 96]. His Honour, to the contrary, accepted the propositions that (a) the earlier contract might be rescinded altogether, the determining factor being the intention of the parties disclosed by the later agreement; (b) partial rescission is a variation, not the destruction, of the contractual relationship between the parties; and (c) the earlier contract may be varied by way of (i) partial rescission with or without the substitution of new terms for those rescinded and (ii) the addition of new terms with or without any partial rescission at all [(1957) 98 CLR 93 at 144]. In Tallerman, Kitto J [(1957 98 CLR 93 at 135. See also at 122-3 per Williams J.] spoke in terms which involved acceptance of propositions (a) and (b) as identified above, adding that while “in strict logic” a variation may be a new contract, “the discharge of an old contract is a matter of intention”. [Emphasis added.]In applying those principles, their Honours concluded that the service agreement did not entirely supplant the earlier agreement, but, rather, supplemented it, finding (176 ALR at 699 [20], [22]):… the text of the service agreement itself, as well as the surrounding circumstances, indicate that such a conclusion would not be in accord with the manifest intention of the parties.