Suzlon Energy Ltd v Bangad (No 3)

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Suzlon Energy Ltd v Bangad (No 3) [2012] FCA 123

Citation: Suzlon Energy Ltd v Bangad (No 3) [2012] FCA 123
Parties: SUZLON ENERGY LTD AND OTHERS NAMED IN THE SCHEDULE; SANJEEV BANGAD AND OTHERS NAMED IN THE SCHEDULE
File number: NSD 1670 of 2008
Judge: RARES J
Date of judgment: 24 February 2012
Corrigendum: 26 March 2012
Catchwords:

PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – SETTING ASIDE SERVICE OUT OF JURISDICTION – application by Swiss banks to set aside service of originating process, being a cross application, in a foreign country under r 13.01(b) of the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) – whether sufficient evidence of prima facie case for relief claimed against Swiss banks in cross application

PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW – STAY OF PART OF PROCEEDINGS – CLEARLY INAPPROPRIATE FORUM – whether local court is clearly inappropriate forum – claim against Swiss banks by Indian company for knowingly assisting its employees in committing breaches of fiduciary duty based on employees’ alleged frauds – Swiss banking secrecy laws prohibiting the respondent banks from pleading, giving discovery and calling evidence in forum (Australia)  – whether forum clearly inappropriate where all commercial dealings between the parties occurred outside forum and were governed by laws other than law of forum – no relevant conduct or dealings alleged to have occurred in forum– whether insufficient degree of connection between the proceedings and the forum to justify a stay – whether power to order stay of proceedings in respect of some but not all parties to proceedings 

Legislation:

Admiralty Act 1988 (Cth) s 12
Constitution s 76(iii)

Federal Act on Combating Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing in the Financial Sector (Switzerland) Arts 6, 7
Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) s 22
Federal Court Rules 1979 (Cth) O 8 r 3(2)(c)
Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) rr 10.43(4)(c), 13.01(1)(b)
Judicature Act 1873 (UK) 

Cases cited:

Aon Risk Services Australia Ltd v Australian National University (2009) 239 CLR 175 applied
Australian Securities Commission v Bank Leumi Le-Israel (Switzerland) (1996) 69 FCR 531 referred to
Baden v Société Générale pour Favouriser le Dévelopment du Commerce et de l′Industrie en France SA [1993] 1 WLR 509 referred to
Barnes v Addy (1874) LR 9 Ch App 244 applied
Batistatos v Roads and Traffic Authority (NSW) (2006) 226 CLR 256 applied
Beluga Shipping GmbH & Co v Headway Shipping Ltd [2008] FCA 1791 referred to
Beluga Shipping GmbH & Co v Suzlon Energy Ltd (No 5) (2011) 278 ALR 56 followed
Beluga Shipping GmbH v Suzlon Energy Ltd [2009] FCA 1020 referred to
Bray v Hoffmann-LaRoche Ltd (2003) 130 FCR 317 applied
Farah Constructions Pty Ltd v Say-Dee Pty Ltd (2007) 230 CLR 89 applied
Grimaldi v Chameleon Mining NL (No 2) [2012] FCAFC 6 referred to
Henry v Henry (1996) 185 CLR 571 applied
Ho v Akai Pty Ltd (in liq) (2006) 24 ACLR 1526 applied
Hunter v Chief Constable of West Midlands Police [1982] AC 529 followed
In the Goods of Tharp (1878) 3…

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Details
Case
[2012] FCA 123
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the Federal Court of Australia, Suzlon Energy Ltd brought a cross-claim against three Swiss banks, LB Swiss, Merrill Lynch, and Credit Suisse, seeking relief for alleged breaches of fiduciary duty by their employees. The central dispute revolved around whether Australia was a clearly inappropriate forum for the proceedings and whether service of the originating process on the Swiss banks should be set aside.

The court had to decide if Australia constituted a clearly inappropriate forum for the proceedings, given that all relevant transactions, evidence, and witnesses were located in Switzerland, and Swiss banking secrecy laws prevented the banks from providing evidence in Australia. Additionally, the court needed to consider if it was appropriate to stay the proceedings in respect of the Swiss banks while allowing them to continue against other defendants.

The court found that Australia was a clearly inappropriate forum for the proceedings concerning the Swiss banks. It held that the interests of justice favored staying the proceedings against the Swiss banks in Australia and allowing them to be pursued in Switzerland, where the banks would be subject to the effective control of Swiss courts. The court concluded that the Suzlon parties could obtain adequate relief in Switzerland and that staying the proceedings against the banks in Australia was manifestly unfair. The court ordered the proceedings to be stayed against the Swiss banks, subject to conditions to protect the Suzlon parties' rights, and directed the parties to prepare minutes of orders to reflect these reasons. The Suzlon parties were ordered to pay the costs of the Swiss banks' interlocutory applications.

The court's decision was based on the principle that an Australian court must exercise its jurisdiction unless it is clearly inappropriate, considering factors such as the lack of connection between the proceedings and the forum, the governing law of the parties' relationship, and the availability of alternative forums. The court balanced these factors and found that the Swiss banks' arguments for a clearly inappropriate forum were compelling, leading to the conclusion that a stay was warranted.

Orders

Orders of the court

9. The parties provide to the associate to Rares J short minutes of order to give effect to the reasons for judgment on or before 1 March 2012.

10. The proceedings stand over to 2 March 2012 for the making of orders.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

Full text does not contain this section.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Almost all of the principal findings of fact that I made in the service out reasons, Beluga (No 5) 278 ALR at 59 [10]-[50], [52]-[61], have been accepted by the three banks as being supported by the present evidence for the purposes of determining the questions that must be decided on these applications. Similarly, the parties accepted my findings and reasoning on the content and effect of Swiss Law in my reasons in relation to the notices to produce served by the Suzlon parties on each of the banks in September 2011: Suzlon Energy Ltd v Bangad(No 2) (2011) 198 FCR 1 at [30]-[54]. Rather than repeating those findings in these reasons I will proceed on the basis that they form part of the factual matrix for determining these applications.FURTHER EVIDENCE The principal evidence on which the parties relied was tendered on the first day on which I began hearing the interlocutory applications by each of LB Swiss, Merrill Lynch, Credit Swisse to set aside notices to produce served on them by the Suzlon parties. I rejected certain evidence but granted leave to the parties affected to adduce further evidence. The parties adduced more evidence when the hearing resumed. Initially, I had rejected the expert report of Mr Martin as to banking practice when the Swiss banks objected to it at an interlocutory hearing. Previously, I had relied on his report in the service out reasons as providing an evidentiary basis for a reasonable prima facie case, that if proved at trial, would establish that each bank had sufficient knowledge of the facts to make it liable to the Suzlon parties as having assisted Mr Sridhar and his associates with knowledge of a dishonest and fraudulent design in breach of his fiduciary duties owed to a third party: Beluga (No 5) 278 ALR at 71-72 [73]-[78]. Mr Martin has now given additional evidence of his considerable specialised knowledge and experience of standards, practices and principles applicable to international payment systems including the “know your customer” or “KYC” principles, regulatory requirements to prevent money laundering and counter-terrorism financing, as well as the prevention and identification of fraud in relation to banks and financial institutions. Having regard to this further evidence, I admitted his evidence on the present applications because I was satisfied that, for the purposes of establishing a prima facie case under r 10.43(4)(c), Mr Martin was suitably qualified to express an expert opinion on the matters in his earlier affidavit on which I had made findings in the service out reasons: Beluga (No 5) 278 ALR at 66 [46]-[79]. In addition, the Suzlon parties relied on the report of Dr Alessandro Bizzozero, a Swiss expert in Swiss banking customs, regulations and practices. I accept his evidence for the purposes of the present application with the exception of his concluding observations about Credit Suisse, for the reasons I will give when dealing with its position. Dr Bizzozero had considered the same material as Mr Martin had for his report. Dr Bizzozero opined in respect of the following:·the Swiss regulatory requirements governing the commencement and subsequent conduct of a relationship between a banker and customer (referred to as a “client” in Swiss parlance) including the monitoring of transactions;·the appropriate conduct by a Swiss bank of the banker-customer relationship with a customer who is a senior employee of a listed company;·whether each of the three banks had conducted its relationship with Mr Sridhar in accordance with applicable Swiss banking customs, regulations and practices on the basis of the available material in evidence.

Decision

Reasons for decision

I am also satisfied that, if sued in Switzerland, while the banks would be able to avail themselves of such defences as Swiss law affords them, they would be subject to the effective control of the Courts of that nation in relation to the furnishing and giving of evidence, unlike here. Since the Suzlon parties could obtain adequate and appropriate relief if they sue the banks in Switzerland in respect of the essential subject matter of their claims in these proceedings, the interests of justice as between the Suzlon parties and the banks dictate that this is a clearly inappropriate forum. Provided that appropriate conditions on the grant of a stay will protect the legitimate rights of the Suzlon parties it would be manifestly unfair to require the banks to remain active parties in these proceedings in those circumstances.CONCLUSION I am of opinion that on the evidence and balancing the competing interests and arguments of the parties there is a substantial, if not overwhelming, preponderance of factors in favour of granting a stay, provided that the Suzlon parties’ rights against the banks can be protected by appropriate conditions. The following conditions should be enforceable as undertakings given to the Court by each bank. First, each bank should not invoke any limitation defence in Switzerland that it would not have been able to invoke here had the proceedings not been stayed. Secondly, each bank should not invoke any objection to the exercise of jurisdiction by the Courts of Switzerland in respect of relief available to the Suzlon parties arising out of the material facts alleged in the cross claim brought against the bank here. Thirdly, the banks should not object or seek to prevent the Suzlon parties from seeking, if they choose, to pursue in the Swiss proceedings their other claims against Mr Sridhar, Mr Bangad and their associates and companies. I will direct the parties to bring in short minutes of orders to reflect these reasons. These should also provide that the Suzlon parties pay the costs of the banks’ interlocutory applications, since the banks have succeeded in obtaining a stay. In light of these conclusions it is not necessary to decide whether any paragraphs in the cross claim should be struck out.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Each of the banks argued that Australia was a clearly inappropriate forum within the test identified in Voth v Manildra Flour Mills Pty Ltd (1990) 171 CLR 538. This was because, they contended:(1)none of the transactions, potential witnesses or events now the subject of the proceedings had anything to do with this jurisdiction;(2)Swiss law governed the relationship between each of the banks and its customers, being Mr Sridhar and his associated companies;(3)the events involving each bank occurred in Switzerland and all documentary and electronic evidence was located there together with most of the current and former employees of the banks who could give evidence as to the transactions;(4)the effect of Swiss banking secrecy laws was to prevent the banks and their current and former employees leading any evidence at all here, or even pleading a defence;(5)if proceedings were brought against the banks in Switzerland, a Swiss Court will have power to require, first, the banks to produce documents and, secondly, their current and former employees present in that country to give evidence;(6)Australian law was not the proper law of any part of the controversy, since it was likely that any breaches of duty by Mr Sridhar and other ex-Suzlon employees would be governed by Indian law and the liability of the banks was likely to be governed by Swiss law;(7)the Suzlon parties had not pleaded that they had suffered any loss in Australia. The only connection that Suzlon Australia had was, as Mr Vagadia had explained, to be a local marketing subsidiary that took delivery of products shipped here that another Suzlon group company had manufactured and then Suzlon Australia supplied those products to a local customer.CONSIDERATION In Voth 171 CLR at 565 Mason CJ, Deane, Dawson and Gaudron JJ suggested that, in “the ordinary case” of a stay application on the ground of clearly inappropriate forum, counsel should be able to furnish the primary judge with any necessary assistance by a short, written and preferably agreed summary identification of relevant connecting factors “and by oral submissions measured in minutes rather than hours”. Their Honours had described earlier approaches dealing with this difficult area as involving “a war of affidavits” (171 CLR at 558). That encouragement seems to have bypassed these applications. However, complexity of stay applications now appears to be an accepted consequence of the exercise of “long arm” jurisdiction by superior courts in Australia, as recognised in Regie Nationale des Usiness Renault SA v Zhang (2002) 210 CLR 491 at 519 [73] per Gleeson CJ, Gaudron, McHugh, Gummow and Hayne JJ. These applications have involved one day’s hearing on preliminary issues culminating in my judgment and orders of 7 October 2011 (Suzlon (No 2) 198 FCR 1), two days of hearing, about 100 pages of submissions and over 2,000 pages of evidence about which I must now decide.CLEARLY INAPPROPRIATE FORUM – THE PRINCIPLES The following propositions emerge from the majority reasons in Voth 171 CLR 538, with which Brennan J agreed at 572:1.An Australian court must exercise jurisdiction that is conferred on it, except where it is established to be a clearly inappropriate forum (171 CLR at 559).2.In cases where the Court has a discretion to grant leave to serve outside the jurisdiction, it is relevant to consider the appropriateness of the forum in exercising that discretion (171 CLR at 560).3.The applicant for either that leave, or confirmation of service effected (here, the Suzlon parties), must satisfy the Court positively that the proceedings would not, or ought not, be stayed as having been brought in a clearly inappropriate forum or as being an abuse of process (171 CLR at 564).4.The power to stay (or refuse leave to serve outside the jurisdiction), based on the Court being a clearly inappropriate forum is discretionary, and involves a subjective balancing process, in which various factors and matters of impression, in all the circumstances, are weighed as had been explained by Deane J in Oceanic Sun Line Special Shipping Co Inc v Fay (1988) 165 CLR 197 at 247-248 (whose judgment was substantially approved in Voth 171 CLR at 564).5.Ordinarily, the local court will not be a clearly inappropriate forum if there is no foreign tribunal that has jurisdiction over the respondent (here the banks) and would entertain the particular proceedings that the applicant wishes to bring (Oceanic 165 CLR at 248). However, where there is no real connection between the subject matter of, or parties to, the litigation, the local court may be clearly inappropriate if the law of the place where the alleged wrong occurred did not allow proceedings to be brought for its redress (e.g. in a jurisdiction where a traffic accident occurred and that had an exclusive statutory compensation scheme, a suit brought in this jurisdiction would be in a clearly inappropriate forum) (Voth 171 CLR 558-559).6.The rationale for the exercise of the power to stay is the avoidance of injustice between parties in the particular case (Voth 171 CLR at 554).