FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Suzlon Energy Ltd v Bangad (No 5)
[2012] FCA 1505
Citation: Suzlon Energy Ltd v Bangad (No 5) [2012] FCA 1505 Parties: SUZLON ENERGY LTD AND OTHERS NAMED IN THE SCHEDULE; SANJEEV BANGAD AND OTHERS NAMED IN THE SCHEDULE File number: NSD 1670 of 2008 Judge: RARES J Date of judgment: 13 November 2012 Legislation: Admiralty Act 1988 (Cth) ss 12, 29
Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) s 22
Federal Court Rules 1979 (Cth)
Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) rr 10.42, 10.43(4)(c)Cases cited: Agar v Hyde (2000) 201 CLR 552 applied
Amin Rasheed Shipping Corporation v Kuwait Insurance Co [1984] AC 50 referred to
Beluga Shipping GmbH KS “Beluga Fantastic” v Headway Shipping Ltd (No 2) (2008) 251 ALR 620 applied
Beluga Shipping GmbH v Suzlon Energy Limited [2009] FCA 1020 referred to
Bray v F Hoffman-La Roche Ltd (2003) 130 FCR 317 applied
Ho v Akai Pty Limited (in liq) (2006) 24 ACLC 1526 applied
Siskina (Owners of the cargo on board) vDistos Compania Naviera SA [1979] AC 210 referred toSpiliada Maritime Corporation v Cansulex Ltd [1987] AC 460 applied
Suzlon Energy Ltd v Bangad (No 3) [2012] FCA 123 referred to
Voth v Manildra Flour Mills Pty Ltd (1990) 171 CLR 538 appliedDate of hearing: 13 November 2012 Place: Sydney Division: GENERAL DIVISION Category: No catchwords Number of paragraphs: 27 Counsel for the Second Cross-Claimant: Mr J Hogan-Doran Solicitor for the Second Cross-Claimant: HWL Ebsworth Counsel for the Third Second Cross-Defendant: Mr E Cox Solicitor for the Third Second Cross-Defendant: Norton White
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
IN ADMIRALTY
NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY
GENERAL DIVISION
NSD 1670 of 2008
SECOND CROSS CLAIM
BETWEEN: SUZLON ENERGY LTD AND OTHERS NAMED IN THE SCHEDULE
First Cross-ClaimantAND: SANJEEV BANGAD AND OTHERS NAMED IN THE SCHEDULE
Third Cross-Defendant
JUDGE:
RARES J
DATE OF ORDER:
13 NOVEMBER 2012
WHERE MADE:
SYDNEY
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The parties confer and provide short minutes of orders to give effect to the reasons given by Rares J on 13 November 2012, by 4 pm on 19 November 2012, and in the event of disagreement, the parties serve and provide a copy to the associate to Rares J the orders that each party proposes, together with brief written submissions outlining the areas of disagreement.
2.The interlocutory application stand over to 9:30 am on 21 November 2012 for the making of final orders.
3.The proceedings be stayed in so far as they concern the seventh, fifth, eighth, ninth, eleventh and twelveth second cross defendants (Mr Sridhar), SS Oceanwind Shipping Pte Limited (SS Oceanwind), Bluewind Enterprises (UK) Ltd (Bluewind), Sunshine Trade Services Limited (STS), BIP Holdings Limited (BIP) and Manning Limited (Manning) on the condition that:
(a)within 28 days SS Oceanwind, Bluewind, STS, BIP and Manning appear in these proceedings;
(b)within 28 days SS Oceanwind pays all monies currently held by or in the name of…
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- [2012] FCA 1505
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CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court's reasoning involved examining the terms of the Rules and the decisions of the Full Court in Bray v F Hoffman-La Roche Ltd and Ho v Akai Pty Limited. It concluded that the Rules provided for service out of the jurisdiction and that the Suzlon parties had made out a prima facie case, at least on one of the grounds they claimed. The court noted that the considerations of comity and restraint were relevant primarily in questions of forum non conveniens. The court also considered the impact of contemporary developments in communications and transport on the inconvenience and annoyance to which a foreign defendant might be subjected if brought into the courts of this jurisdiction. The court held that Mr Sridhar's objections to the jurisdiction and the conditions for a stay were not well-founded, and it granted a stay of proceedings under certain conditions, including that Mr Sridhar bring the other companies into the jurisdiction and secure the payment of moneys into court as security for the outcome of the proceedings.
The final orders of the court were that a stay of proceedings would be granted if Mr Sridhar complied with the conditions outlined, including bringing the other companies into the jurisdiction and securing the payment of moneys into court. If Mr Sridhar failed to comply with these conditions, the stay would not be granted, and the proceedings would continue. The court also noted that Mr Sridhar would not be precluded from bringing a subsequent interlocutory application to vary the orders and conditions of the stay but would carry the onus of establishing that any such variation was appropriate.
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Background to the litigation
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Evidence Before The Court
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Decision
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Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Mr Sridhar argued that the Rules relating to service should be construed strictly in favour of the foreigner where there is any ambiguity. He relied on Lord Diplock’s remarks in Siskina (Owners of the cargo on board) vDistos Compania Naviera SA [1979] AC 210 at 254H-255B, namely, that rules providing for the long arm jurisdiction of the court are to be strictly construed in favour of the foreigner. However, in Agar v Hyde (2000) 201 CLR 552 at 570-571 [42]-[43], Gaudron, McHugh, Gummow and Hayne JJ, after referring to another of his Lordship’s speeches to similar effect, in Amin Rasheed Shipping Corporation v Kuwait Insurance Co [1984] AC 50 at 65-66, observed that considerations of comity and consequent restraint have informed many of the reported decisions about service out of the jurisdiction. But their Honours said that it was important to have regard to the fact that rules of court or local statutes that provided for service out were now a commonplace, at least in jurisdictions whose legal systems had been informed or influenced by common law traditions. They continued (201 CLR 571 [42]-[43]):“… contemporary developments in communications and transport make the degree of ‘inconvenience and annoyance’ to which a foreign defendant would be put, if brought into the courts of this jurisdiction, ‘of a qualitatively different order to that which existed in 1885’.The considerations of comity and restraint, to which reference has so often been made in cases concerning service out of the jurisdiction, will often be of greatest relevance in considering questions of forum non conveniens. The starting point for the present inquiry, however, must be the terms of the Rules, not any general considerations of the kind just mentioned.” (footnotes omitted) (emphasis added) Mr Sridhar formally argued that the decisions of the Full Court in Bray v F Hoffman-La Roche Ltd (2003) 130 FCR 317 and Ho v Akai Pty Limited (in liq) (2006) 24 ACLC 1526, were incorrectly decided, insofar as they held that there need only be a prima facie case for the relief sought by a party on one of any number of the bases pleaded or contended to exist by that party. In Ho 24 ACLC 1535 [44]-[47] Finn, Weinberg JJ and myself refused to entertain the argument that Bray 130 FCR 317 was wrongly decided and we followed it. As a single judge I am, of course, bound by those decisions, and, in any event, I consider them to be correct. Moreover, the Rules have been remade by the judges of the Court since each of those decisions and repeat the same provisions as previously existed in O 8 r 3 to govern the issue of service out of the jurisdiction. For those reasons it seems to me that Mr Sridhar’s objection to the jurisdiction of the Court fails, he having accepted that each of the Suzlon parties has made out a prima facie case, at least on one of the grounds it claimed. It is not necessary for the Suzlon parties to do more. Mr Sridhar also argued that the only evidence of loss or damage suffered in the jurisdiction that could possibly have been incurred by a Suzlon party, related to Suzlon Energy Australia Pty Limited when it paid or expended money in connection with the release of cargo. That occurred because the shipowner interpleaded in respect of the cargo when the initial dispute between Headway, as charterers, and the Suzlon parties developed in late October and early November 2008.