FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Suzlon Energy Ltd v Bangad (No 4)
[2012] FCA 350
Citation: Suzlon Energy Ltd v Bangad (No 4) [2012] FCA 350 Parties: SUZLON ENERGY LTD AND OTHERS NAMED IN THE SCHEDULE; SANJEEV BANGAD AND OTHERS NAMED IN THE SCHEDULE File number: NSD 1670 of 2008 Judge: RARES J Date of judgment: 22 March 2012 Legislation: Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) rr 35.13, 39.04, 39.05 Cases cited: Burrell v The Queen (2008) 238 CLR 218 referred to
Suzlon Energy Ltd v Bangad (No 3) [2012] FCA 123 referred to
Date of hearing: 22 March 2012 Place: Sydney Division: GENERAL DIVISION Category: No catchwords Number of paragraphs: 15 Counsel for the Second Cross-Claimant: Mr A W Street SC with Ms C O Gleeson Solicitor for the Second Cross-Claimant: HWL Ebsworth Counsel for the Thirteenth and Fifteenth Second-Cross-Defendant: Ms K C Morgan Solicitor for the Thirteenth and Fifteenth Second Cross-Defendant: Mallesons Stephen Jaques Counsel for the Fourteenth Second Cross-Defendant: Mr B McClintock SC with Mr J Hutton Solicitor for the Fourteenth Second Cross-Defendant: Ashurst Australia
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY
GENERAL DIVISION
NSD 1670 of 2008
SECOND CROSS CLAIM
BETWEEN: SUZLON ENERGY LTD AND OTHERS NAMED IN THE SCHEDULE
First Cross-ClaimantAND: SANJEEV BANGAD AND OTHERS NAMED IN THE SCHEDULE
Third Cross-Defendant
JUDGE:
RARES J
DATE OF ORDER:
22 MARCH 2012
WHERE MADE:
SYDNEY
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The order made by Rares J on 2 March 2012 be varied pursuant to Rule 39.04 of the Federal Court Rules 2011 by adding:
1A.Prayer 1 in the notice of motion of the fourteenth second cross-defendant filed on 21 June 2011 be dismissed.
1BPrayer 1(a) and (b)(i) in the interlocutory application of the thirteenth second cross-defendant filed on 9 September 2011 be dismissed .
2.The costs of the second cross-claimants of today be paid by the fourteenth second cross-defendant. Those costs may be set off against the costs ordered on 2 March 2012.
Note:Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY
GENERAL DIVISION
NSD 1670 of 2008
SECOND CROSS CLAIM
BETWEEN: SUZLON ENERGY LTD AND OTHERS NAMED IN THE SCHEDULE
Cross-ClaimantAND: SANJEEV BANGAD AND OTHERS NAMED IN THE SCHEDULE
Cross-Defendant
JUDGE:
RARES J
DATE:
22 MARCH 2012
PLACE:
SYDNEY
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
(REVISED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT)
On 24 February 2012 I published reasons for judgment in which I concluded that the applications by Frankfurter Bankgesellschaft (Schweiz) AG, known as LB Swiss at the relevant times, Merrill Lynch Bank (Suisse) SA and Credit Suisse Group for, among other things, a stay of the proceedings against them should be granted: Suzlon Energy Ltd v Bangad (No 3) [2012] FCA 123. In the course of those reasons I rejected the applications of Merrill Lynch and LB Swiss to set aside service of the proceedings on them in Switzerland and the order authorising that to be done that I…
Keep reading for free
Create a free CaseChat account to read Suzlon Energy Ltd v Bangad (No 4) and more:
- Read every judgment in full
- Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
- See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
- Download judgments as PDF or Word
One click creates your free account or signs you in.
By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.
- Case
- [2012] FCA 350
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court found that the orders made on 2 March 2012 had inadvertently omitted to address Merrill Lynch's application to set aside the service. However, the court was satisfied that this did not require a reconsideration of the substantive decision reached on 2 March. Instead, the court determined that the appropriate remedy was to vary the orders to include the necessary orders dismissing the relevant prayers of Merrill Lynch's interlocutory application. The court also considered Merrill Lynch's request for the additional order to take effect immediately, but decided against it, reasoning that it would create unnecessary complications and procedural difficulties.
Ultimately, the court made an order varying the previous orders by dismissing the relevant prayers in Merrill Lynch's and LB Swiss' applications to set aside the service. The costs of this application were to be paid by Merrill Lynch and could be set off against the costs previously ordered. This decision aimed to correct the omission in the initial orders while maintaining the procedural integrity of the case.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The order made by Rares J on 2 March 2012 be varied pursuant to Rule 39.04 of the Federal Court Rules 2011 by adding:
1A. Prayer 1 in the notice of motion of the fourteenth second cross-defendant filed on 21 June 2011 be dismissed.
1B Prayer 1(a) and (b)(i) in the interlocutory application of the thirteenth second cross-defendant filed on 9 September 2011 be dismissed .
2. The costs of the second cross-claimants of today be paid by the fourteenth second cross-defendant. Those costs may be set off against the costs ordered on 2 March 2012.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Full text does not contain this section.
Decision
Reasons for decision
Full text does not contain this section.
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
At about 5 pm on 16 March 2012, the Suzlon parties’ solicitors wrote back, saying that they were of the view that the orders as made on 2 March were sufficient to dispose of Merrill Lynch’s application to set aside service and the Suzlon parties did not consent to the proposed additional order.CONSIDERATION The principal order made on 2 March 2012 provided that the proceedings be stayed insofar as they concerned each of the banks on conditions that they gave the undertakings set out in the balance of the orders. The present position, therefore, is that these proceedings have been stayed, so far as they concern Merrill Lynch and LB Swiss. Although the orders of 2 March 2012 have not yet been entered, the considerations applicable in respect of those orders are, in the circumstance of this case, in my opinion, akin to, those that would obtain had an application been made under the Court’s inherent or implied jurisdiction to correct accidental errors in or omissions from orders that it has made, under what is known as the slip rule or its equivalent in r 39.05. This is notwithstanding that the power that I am exercising arises under r 39.04, being a power to vary or set aside a judgment or order before it has been entered. The order made on 24 February 2012 required the parties to bring in short minutes of order to give effect to my reasons for judgment. The order that Merrill Lynch seeks to have made is an order that has precisely that effect, namely, to give effect to my reasons for judgment so far as it deals with one aspect of its interlocutory application. It follows that the power of the Court that Merrill Lynch seeks to invoke is, in substance, the power to correct an error arising from an accidental slip or omission, so as to have the court record corrected as at 2 March 2012 to give effect to the reasons for judgment I had pronounced and the order I made on 24 February 2012: cf Burrell v The Queen (2008) 238 CLR 218 at 224-225 [18]-[21] per Gummow ACJ, Hayne, Heydon, Crennan and Kiefel JJ. I am satisfied that the orders I made on 2 March 2012 accidently omitted orders giving effect to my dismissal of the applications by Merrill Lynch and LB Swiss to set aside the order for service out made on 4 March 2011 and the service consequently effected on each of them in Switzerland. However, that does not involve reconsidering or altering the substance of the result that I reached, and that ought to have been recorded, on 2 March in consequence of the order I made on 24 February. In my opinion, the appropriate order that should be made is an order varying the orders made on 2 March 2012 to add a further order to that effect.THE DATE FOR MAKING THE ADDITIONAL ORDER Merrill Lynch asked that I make that order with effect from today by reason of what it says is an apparent oversight in failing to apply earlier than it did. It asserts that it was lulled into a false sense of security by the Suzlon parties’ solicitors’ email sent in the afternoon of 15 March 2012 into not filing an application seeking to vary the order earlier and then seeking leave to appeal from it. It intends to seek leave to appeal and says that I should not vary the order I made on 2 March 2012 so as to truly reflect my reasons, but make a new order today. Merrill Lynch contends that this can be achieved by a partial lifting of the stay and by making the new order effective today. It asserts that this will create less difficulty for it because it will not need to seek an extension of time in which to seek leave to appeal. Rather, it will be able to file an application for leave to appeal within the time limited by r 35.13 directly from an order only made today.