FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Simjanovska v Department of Human Services [2019] FCA 499
File number: NSD 416 of 2017 Judge: PERRY J Date of judgment: 11 April 2019 Catchwords: PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – where multiple applications for adjournment of summary dismissal applications dismissed
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – applications for summary dismissal under s 31A, Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth), and rule 26.01, Federal Court Rules2011 (Cth) – consideration of the nature of a summary dismissal application and applicable principles –where applicant alleged systematic and continuous handling of her complaints to the Department of Human Services and the creation and disclosure of an Employment Pathway Plan Agreement (EPP) by the Secretary in breach of the Privacy Act 1988 (Cth) (Privacy Act) – where applicant applied for judicial review of decision by the Australian Information Commissioner under s 41(1), Privacy Act, not to investigate her complaints – where entry into an EPP is a criterion for a Newstart allowance under the Social Security Act 1991 (Cth) – where applicant applied for and received the Newstart allowance – where no particulars of allegations of fraud and other misconduct – where no power to make orders for the executive to review current practices or for review of the respondents’ conduct under the Public Service Act 1999 (Cth) – where no power to award damages on judicial review – where power under s 41(1), Privacy Act, allegedly not validly delegated to the Assistant Commissioner – where correspondence from the Department responding to complaints cannot be the subject of judicial review – where extreme and unexplained delay – where no basis for “setting aside” EPP – application for judicial review summarily dismissed
HIGH COURT AND FEDERAL COURT – duties to unrepresented litigant – where orders necessary to preclude applicant from attending Registry subject to leave of the Court and for alternative arrangements for the physical filing of material
Legislation: Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth) ss 5(1), 16
Australian Information Commissioner Act 2010 (Cth)
Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) ss 31A, 37N, 37M
Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) s 39B
Privacy Act 1988 (Cth) s 41(1)(a)
Privacy Amendment (Enhancing Privacy Protection) Act 2012 (Cth)
Public Service Act 1999 (Cth)
Social Security (Administration) Act 1999 (Cth)
Social Security Act 1991 (Cth)
Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) r 26.01
Cases cited: AMF15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCAFC 68; (2016) 241 FCR 30
Banque Commerciale SA (en liq) v Akhil Holdings Ltd (1990) 169 CLR 279
Bhagat v Global Custodians Ltd [2002] FCAFC 331
Craig v South Australia (1995) 184 CLR 163
Davy v Garrett [1877] 7 Ch D 473
DC v Secretary, Department of Family and Community Services [2017] NSWCA 225
DOQ17 v Australian Financial Security Authority (No 2) [2018] FCA 1270
Federal Commissioner of Taxation v Primary Health Care Ltd [2017] FCAFC 131; (2017) 252 FCR 496
Forrest v Australian Securities and Investments Commission [2012] HCA 39; (2012) 247 CLR 486
Keep reading for free
Create a free CaseChat account to read Simjanovska v Department of Human Services and more:
- Read every judgment in full
- Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
- See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
- Download judgments as PDF or Word
One click creates your free account or signs you in.
By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.
- Case
- [2019] FCA 499
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court considered the nature of the summary dismissal applications and the applicable legal principles. It found that the applicant's allegations of fraud, bad faith, and other misconduct were conclusory and lacked basis. The court noted that the Assistant Commissioner's decision under the Privacy Act was lawful and that the court had no jurisdiction to order a review of current practices or award damages. The applicant's complaints revealed a misunderstanding of the Privacy Act and the evaluative judgment required by the Commissioner. The court held that the jurisdictional precondition for not investigating the applicant's complaints was met, and the discretion was properly exercised. The applicant's claims against the Department and the Secretary also lacked prospects of success.
The court concluded that the application for judicial review had no reasonable prospects of success and that certain claims for relief were misconceived in law. It found that the interlocutory applications were not frivolous or vexatious and that the applicant should not be afforded a further opportunity to re-plead her claims. The application for judicial review was summarily dismissed, and the applicant was ordered to pay the respondents' costs.
The court noted that the dismissal of the judicial review application meant that all claims against the respondents were dismissed, and the proceeding was at an end, subject to any appeal. The entry of orders was governed by Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The application for judicial review is summarily dismissed under s 31A of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) and rule 26.01 of the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth).
2. The applicant is to pay the respondents’ costs as agreed or assessed.
THE COURT NOTES THAT:
3. Order 1 means that all of the claims against the respondents have been dismissed and the proceeding is at an end, subject to any appeal.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Ms Simjanovska made multiple applications for adjournment of the respondents’ applications for summary dismissal, all of which were dismissed. The Department and the Secretary applied for summary judgment, and the Commissioner applied for an interlocutory injunction. The court heard the applications on 18 September 2017, and Ms Simjanovska opposed the applications. She argued that the affidavits of the respondents' solicitors should have been sworn by the clients, and she applied to cross-examine the solicitors. The court refused the application for cross-examination, stating that the affidavits were filed in accordance with the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) and deposed to non-contentious matters. Ms Simjanovska relied on her own affidavits in opposition to the applications for summary dismissal.
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
In this case, as I have already explained the delegate decided that he was satisfied that the acts complained of were not an interference with the privacy of Ms Simjanovska. As such, the jurisdictional precondition was ostensibly met and the discretion not to investigate, enlivened. 7. CONSIDERATION 7.1 Overview It is helpful briefly to outline the issues and the order in which they will be addressed, particularly given the confusing and prolix nature of the amended originating application upon which it has been necessary to endeavour to impose a comprehensible structure. First, I address certain misconceptions apparent from the applicant’s submissions as to the nature of the interlocutory applications and the Court’s task in determining those applications. Secondly, I explain why the allegations of fraud, bad faith and similar serious allegations made as against the three respondents must be summarily dismissed. Thirdly, I consider whether the application for judicial review of the Assistant Commissioner’s decision has any reasonable prospects of success. My conclusions in this regard are that certain claims for relief are misconceived in law, and the allegation that the power in s 41(1) of the Privacy Act was not lawfully delegated to the Assistant Commissioner and remaining grounds of judicial review also have no reasonable prospects of success. Fourthly, I hold that none of the claims against the Department and the Secretary, including the apparent challenge to the Department’s letter of 21 July 2014, have any prospects of success. Finally, for the reasons then given, I find that the applicant should not be afforded a further opportunity to re-plead her claims. 7.2 Preliminary issues raised by the applicant’s submissions as to the nature of the interlocutory applications for summary dismissal and task of the Court in determining such applications The applicant submitted that the respondents’ interlocutory applications for summary dismissal should be dismissed on a range of grounds. It is convenient to deal at the outset with a number of issues raised by the applicant relating to the nature of the interlocutory applications and the Court’s task in determining those applications. Relevantly in this regard the applicant submitted as follows.(1)The respondents’ interlocutory applications are unsubstantiated, have no reasonable prospects of success, are frivolous and vexatious, are intended to prevent a public hearing of her claims and her evidence, are unsupported by any proper grounds or reasons, and are not supported by any credible or “solid” evidence.(2)The interlocutory applications to dismiss her application “without a public hearing and without any evidence being tabled and determined at a public hearing before the Court [are] a gross and flagrant abuse of the judicial process and the judicial system of this country, it’s also unjust and unfair towards me as a self-represented applicant”.(3)There are still disputed issues about the evidence and, while the respondents produced some of the requested documents, they did not produce all of them, and the applicant reserves her rights to lodge an application for leave to issue subpoenas or notice to the respondents to produce.(4)Section 31A of the Federal Court Act and FCR rule 26.01(a) do not apply to her amended originating application.