Simjanovska v Department of Human Services

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Simjanovska v Department of Human Services [2019] FCA 499

File number: NSD 416 of 2017
Judge: PERRY J
Date of judgment: 11 April 2019
Catchwords:

PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – where multiple applications for adjournment of summary dismissal applications dismissed

PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – applications for summary dismissal under s 31A, Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth), and rule 26.01, Federal Court Rules2011 (Cth) – consideration of the nature of a summary dismissal application and applicable principles –where applicant alleged systematic and continuous handling of her complaints to the Department of Human Services and the creation and disclosure of an Employment Pathway Plan Agreement (EPP) by the Secretary in breach of the Privacy Act 1988 (Cth) (Privacy Act) – where applicant applied for judicial review of decision by the Australian Information Commissioner under s 41(1), Privacy Act, not to investigate her complaints – where entry into an EPP is a criterion for a Newstart allowance under the Social Security Act 1991 (Cth) – where applicant applied for and received the Newstart allowance – where no particulars of allegations of fraud and other misconduct – where no power to make orders for the executive to review current practices or for review of the respondents’ conduct under the Public Service Act 1999 (Cth) – where no power to award damages on judicial review – where power under s 41(1), Privacy Act, allegedly not validly delegated to the Assistant Commissioner – where correspondence from the Department responding to complaints cannot be the subject of judicial review – where extreme and unexplained delay – where no basis for “setting aside” EPP – application for judicial review summarily dismissed

HIGH COURT AND FEDERAL COURT – duties to unrepresented litigant – where orders necessary to preclude applicant from attending Registry subject to leave of the Court and for alternative arrangements for the physical filing of material

Legislation:

Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth) ss 5(1), 16

Australian Information Commissioner Act 2010 (Cth)

Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) ss 31A, 37N, 37M

Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) s 39B

Privacy Act 1988 (Cth) s 41(1)(a)

Privacy Amendment (Enhancing Privacy Protection) Act 2012 (Cth)

Public Service Act 1999 (Cth)

Social Security (Administration) Act 1999 (Cth)

Social Security Act 1991 (Cth)

Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) r 26.01

Cases cited:

AMF15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCAFC 68; (2016) 241 FCR 30

Banque Commerciale SA (en liq) v Akhil Holdings Ltd (1990) 169 CLR 279

Bhagat v Global Custodians Ltd [2002] FCAFC 331

Craig v South Australia (1995) 184 CLR 163

Davy v Garrett [1877] 7 Ch D 473

DC v Secretary, Department of Family and Community Services [2017] NSWCA 225

DOQ17 v Australian Financial Security Authority (No 2) [2018] FCA 1270

Federal Commissioner of Taxation v Primary Health Care Ltd [2017] FCAFC 131; (2017) 252 FCR 496

Forrest v Australian Securities and Investments Commission [2012] HCA 39; (2012) 247 CLR 486

Hamod v New South…

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Details
Case
[2019] FCA 499
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

Simjanovska v Department of Human Services involved the dismissal of multiple applications for adjournment of summary dismissal applications brought by the applicant against the Department of Human Services and others. The applicant alleged various forms of misconduct and breaches of privacy laws by the Department and sought judicial review of decisions by the Australian Information Commissioner not to investigate her complaints. The court was required to determine whether the application for judicial review had reasonable prospects of success, whether certain claims for relief were misconceived, and whether the applicant should be afforded an opportunity to re-plead her claims.

The court considered the nature of the summary dismissal applications and the applicable legal principles. It found that the applicant's allegations of fraud, bad faith, and other misconduct were conclusory and lacked basis. The court noted that the Assistant Commissioner's decision under the Privacy Act was lawful and that the court had no jurisdiction to order a review of current practices or award damages. The applicant's complaints revealed a misunderstanding of the Privacy Act and the evaluative judgment required by the Commissioner. The court held that the jurisdictional precondition for not investigating the applicant's complaints was met, and the discretion was properly exercised. The applicant's claims against the Department and the Secretary also lacked prospects of success.

The court concluded that the application for judicial review had no reasonable prospects of success and that certain claims for relief were misconceived in law. It found that the interlocutory applications were not frivolous or vexatious and that the applicant should not be afforded a further opportunity to re-plead her claims. The application for judicial review was summarily dismissed, and the applicant was ordered to pay the respondents' costs.

The court noted that the dismissal of the judicial review application meant that all claims against the respondents were dismissed, and the proceeding was at an end, subject to any appeal. The entry of orders was governed by Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The application for judicial review is summarily dismissed under s 31A of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) and rule 26.01 of the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth).

2. The applicant is to pay the respondents’ costs as agreed or assessed.

THE COURT NOTES THAT:

3. Order 1 means that all of the claims against the respondents have been dismissed and the proceeding is at an end, subject to any appeal.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

Ms Simjanovska lodged an amended originating application seeking judicial review of a decision by the Australian Information Commissioner under s 41(1) of the Privacy Act 1988 (Cth) not to investigate her complaints about the Department of Human Services and the Secretary. The entry into an Employment Pathway Plan Agreement (EPP) is a criterion for a Newstart allowance under the Social Security Act 1991 (Cth). Ms Simjanovska had applied for and received the Newstart allowance. Ms Simjanovska alleged systematic and continuous handling of her complaints to the Department and the creation and disclosure of an EPP by the Secretary in breach of the Privacy Act. Ms Simjanovska claimed that there were no particulars of allegations of fraud and other misconduct, and that there was no power to make orders for the executive to review current practices or for review of the respondents’ conduct under the Public Service Act 1999 (Cth). She also claimed that there was no power to award damages on judicial review and that the power under s 41(1) of the Privacy Act was not validly delegated to the Assistant Commissioner. Ms Simjanovska further argued that correspondence from the Department responding to complaints could be the subject of judicial review.

Ms Simjanovska made multiple applications for adjournment of the respondents’ applications for summary dismissal, all of which were dismissed. The Department and the Secretary applied for summary judgment, and the Commissioner applied for an interlocutory injunction. The court heard the applications on 18 September 2017, and Ms Simjanovska opposed the applications. She argued that the affidavits of the respondents' solicitors should have been sworn by the clients, and she applied to cross-examine the solicitors. The court refused the application for cross-examination, stating that the affidavits were filed in accordance with the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) and deposed to non-contentious matters. Ms Simjanovska relied on her own affidavits in opposition to the applications for summary dismissal.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Accordingly, I refused the applicant’s applications for an adjournment.3. EVIDENCE In support of their application for summary judgment, the Department and the Secretary relied upon the affidavit of Ashley Tsacalos, solicitor, sworn on 17 August 2017. In support of the Commissioner’s interlocutory application, the Commissioner relied upon the affidavit of Kim Thanh Nguyen affirmed on 17 August 2017. At the hearing, the applicant objected to the affidavits of the respondents’ solicitors being read, and without prior notice, applied to cross-examine the solicitors who had deposed in affidavits as to the basis for the applications by the respondents for summary dismissal. The applicant argued that the affidavits should have been sworn by the clients and not the solicitors. I refused that application. As I explained at the hearing, affidavit evidence on information and belief, as opposed to direct or personal knowledge, can be relied upon in support of interlocutory relief and is admissible under s 172 of the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth). The affidavits in question were filed in accordance with FCR rule 17.01(1) which requires an interlocutory application to be accompanied by an affidavit in support “if appropriate”. Furthermore, no notice had been given of any intention to cross-examine: cf FCR rule 29.09. More fundamentally, no proper basis was identified for permitting the exceptional step to be taken of allowing a party’s solicitor to be cross-examined and, as the respondents submitted, the affidavits in question deposed only as to non-contentious matters being the historical background to the proceedings and the interlocutory applications, and identifying the grounds on which the interlocutory allocations were made. The applicant relied in opposition to the applications for summary dismissal upon her affidavit sworn on 2 August 2017 in support of her amended originating application and her affidavit sworn on 13 October 2017. As I have mentioned, there were voluminous annexures annexed to both of her affidavits and cumulatively the affidavits and their annexures run to over 650 pages. 4. RELEVANT PRINCIPLES 4.1 Preliminary observations regarding the duties to unrepresented litigants It is helpful at the outset to explain the duties owed to an unrepresented litigant. These duties are only to ensure that the unrepresented litigant is aware of her or his rights in respect of court procedure and evidence. The judicial officer is not required to endeavour to place the unrepresented litigant in a better position than a represented litigant; indeed, such an approach would be inappropriate because all parties are entitled to procedural fairness. As the New South Wales Court of Appeal held in Hamod v New South Wales [2011] NSWCA 375 (Hamod):309 Courts have an overriding duty to ensure that a trial is fair: Dietrich v R [1992] HCA 57; 177 CLR 292. This entails ensuring that the trial is conducted fairly and in accordance with law: MacPherson v The Queen [1981] HCA 46; 147 CLR 512 per Gibbs CJ and Wilson J at [16] 525. The duty reposes in the individual judicial officer hearing a case. In the context of an unrepresented litigant, the duty requires that a person does not suffer a disadvantage from exercising the recognised right of a litigant to be self-represented: R v Zorad (1990) 19 NSWLR 91 at 94-95. In MacPherson Mason J, at [31] 534, noted that: “A trial in which a judge allows an accused to remain in ignorance of a fundamental procedure which, if invoked, may prove to be advantageous to him, can hardly be labelled as ‘fair’.”310 However, the court’s duty is not solely to the unrepresented litigant. The obligation is to ensure a fair trial for all parties. For this reason, the duty is usually stated in terms that require that the impartial function of the judge is preserved, whilst also requiring the judge to intervene where necessary to ensure the trial is fair and just: Tomasevic v Travaglini [2007] VSC 337; 17 VR 100 at [95]; Barghouthi v Transfield Pty Ltd [2002] FCA 666; 122 FCR 19, 23; NAGA v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2002] FCA 944, [11]; Nagy v Ryan [2003] SASC 37, [52]-[53].311 Insofar as the duty relates specifically to an unrepresented party, it has been said that a trial judge has an obligation to take appropriate steps to ensure that the unrepresented litigant has sufficient information about the practice and procedure of the court, so far as is reasonably practicable for the purpose of ensuring a fair trial. …312 Although the duty of a trial judge to assist an unrepresented litigant is cast in active terms, it does not extend to advising the accused as to how his or her rights should be exercised: R v Gidley (1984) 3 NSWLR 168. Rather, the judge has to put the unrepresented litigant in the position of being able to make an effective choice, a duty which applies notwithstanding the adversarial character of a criminal trial: McPherson per Mason J at 534. The duty is the same in a civil proceeding, with such modifications as are called for to take account of civil procedures. However, it is not the function of the court to give judicial advice to, or conduct the case on behalf of, the unrepresented litigant: Bhagwanani v Martin (1999) 204 LSJS 449; [1999] SASC 406; Clark v State of New South Wales (No 2) [2006] NSWSC 914.313 The touchstone at all times remains that of fairness. …(emphasis added)

Decision

Reasons for decision

In short, the bald and conclusory allegations in the amended originating application of fraud, bias, and other misconduct are made without any apparent basis, are vexatious, and do not disclose any reasonable cause of action. 7.4 Does the application for judicial review of the Assistant Commissioner’s decision have any reasonable prospects of success? 7.4.1Jurisdiction to grant the relief sought against the Commissioner Insofar as the amended originating application for judicial review of the Assistant Commissioner’s decision under the Privacy Act seeks orders setting aside that decision and requiring it to be re-made according to law, this Court plainly has jurisdiction to entertain the application under s 39B of the Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) and s 16 of the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth) (the ADJR Act). That said, the Court is limited on judicial review to considering only the legality of the Assistant Commissioner’s decision based upon the material before him: see further below at [108]. However, as the Commissioner submits, the Court has no jurisdiction under those provisions or the Privacy Act to make orders also sought as against the Commissioner to require him to undertake a review of current practices for the assessment and investigation of complaints under the Privacy Act and to establish practices reflecting the objects and requirements of the Privacy Act. This Court is vested only with jurisdiction with respect to “matters” and therefore in which there is some “immediate right, duty or liability to be established and determined by the court”: Re Judiciary and Navigation Acts (1921) 29 CLR 257 at 265 (Knox CJ, Gavan Duffy, Powers, Rich and Starke JJ). Equally, an application for judicial review, even if successful in establishing a jurisdictional error or error of law, does not of itself entitle the person affected to damages as against the administrative decision-maker. Relief will lie under s 39B(1) against a Commonwealth officer, where a jurisdictional error is made, in the form of a writ of mandamus or prohibition or an injunction and associated orders in the nature of certiorari to quash the decision and declaratory relief. Nor do the ADJR Act or the Privacy Act confer power on the Court to make orders awarding damages in the event that a decision of an officer of the Commonwealth, such as the Assistant Commissioner, is set aside. Otherwise, the applicant’s complaints, as best they can be discerned, disclose a misunderstanding of s 41(1) of the Privacy Act and, in particular, the evaluative judgment required to be undertaken by the Commissioner or his delegate in determining whether she or he is satisfied that there has been no interference with the applicant’s privacy as a precondition to the exercise of the discretion. As explained above, the question for the Commissioner is not whether, objectively speaking, there has been an interference with the applicant’s privacy. Rather, bearing in mind that the Act does not afford absolute protection to the privacy of individuals but “carves out” significant exceptions, the question was whether he was satisfied that there was no such interference for the purposes of the Privacy Act. It is clear from the explanation of the steps taken by the Assistant Commissioner which I summarised earlier at [41] above that he found that he was not so satisfied for rational, logical reasons based upon the information before him, applying the statutory framework under the Social Security Act pursuant to which the information was collected, used and disclosed by the Department. Those findings included, with respect to the applicant’s central complaints, that:(1)the Department had collected the information contained in the EPP for a lawful purpose because, in order for the applicant to qualify for the Newstart allowance for which she had applied, it was required to create an EPP under s 605 of the Social Security Act deemed suitable for her needs; and(2)despite the applicant having not consented to the disclosure, her personal information was lawfully disclosed by the Department under s 202 of the Social Security (Administration) Act 1999 (Cth) for the purpose of delivering effective work-related services.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

In this case, as I have already explained the delegate decided that he was satisfied that the acts complained of were not an interference with the privacy of Ms Simjanovska. As such, the jurisdictional precondition was ostensibly met and the discretion not to investigate, enlivened. 7. CONSIDERATION 7.1 Overview It is helpful briefly to outline the issues and the order in which they will be addressed, particularly given the confusing and prolix nature of the amended originating application upon which it has been necessary to endeavour to impose a comprehensible structure. First, I address certain misconceptions apparent from the applicant’s submissions as to the nature of the interlocutory applications and the Court’s task in determining those applications. Secondly, I explain why the allegations of fraud, bad faith and similar serious allegations made as against the three respondents must be summarily dismissed. Thirdly, I consider whether the application for judicial review of the Assistant Commissioner’s decision has any reasonable prospects of success. My conclusions in this regard are that certain claims for relief are misconceived in law, and the allegation that the power in s 41(1) of the Privacy Act was not lawfully delegated to the Assistant Commissioner and remaining grounds of judicial review also have no reasonable prospects of success. Fourthly, I hold that none of the claims against the Department and the Secretary, including the apparent challenge to the Department’s letter of 21 July 2014, have any prospects of success. Finally, for the reasons then given, I find that the applicant should not be afforded a further opportunity to re-plead her claims. 7.2 Preliminary issues raised by the applicant’s submissions as to the nature of the interlocutory applications for summary dismissal and task of the Court in determining such applications The applicant submitted that the respondents’ interlocutory applications for summary dismissal should be dismissed on a range of grounds. It is convenient to deal at the outset with a number of issues raised by the applicant relating to the nature of the interlocutory applications and the Court’s task in determining those applications. Relevantly in this regard the applicant submitted as follows.(1)The respondents’ interlocutory applications are unsubstantiated, have no reasonable prospects of success, are frivolous and vexatious, are intended to prevent a public hearing of her claims and her evidence, are unsupported by any proper grounds or reasons, and are not supported by any credible or “solid” evidence.(2)The interlocutory applications to dismiss her application “without a public hearing and without any evidence being tabled and determined at a public hearing before the Court [are] a gross and flagrant abuse of the judicial process and the judicial system of this country, it’s also unjust and unfair towards me as a self-represented applicant”.(3)There are still disputed issues about the evidence and, while the respondents produced some of the requested documents, they did not produce all of them, and the applicant reserves her rights to lodge an application for leave to issue subpoenas or notice to the respondents to produce.(4)Section 31A of the Federal Court Act and FCR rule 26.01(a) do not apply to her amended originating application.