FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Jaworski v Australian Information Commissioner [2022] FCA 1400
File number(s): VID 603 of 2021 Judgment of: ROFE J Date of judgment: 23 November 2022 Catchwords: ADMINISTRATIVE LAW – consideration of an application for an order of review under the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth) concerning a decision of the delegate of the Commissioner in exercising a statutory discretion to cease further investigation of a complaint made by the applicant under the provisions of the Privacy Act 1988 (Cth) Legislation: Administrative Decision (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth)
Australian Information Commissioner Act 2010 (Cth)
Privacy Act 1988 (Cth)
Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth)
Cases cited: Goodwin v Commissioner of Police [2020] FCA 950
Jones v Office of the Australian Information Commissioner [2014] FCA 285
Love v State of Victoria [2009] VSC 215
Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Eshetu (1999) 197 CLR 611
Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Yusuf (2001) 206 CLR 323
Ranav Australian Information Commissioner [2022] FCA 817
Simjanovska v Department of Human Services [2019] FCA 499
Sunshine Coast Broadcasters Pty Ltd v The Australian Communications and Media Authority [2012] FCA 1205
Division: General Division Registry: Victoria National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights Number of paragraphs: 126 Date of hearing: Determined on the papers Counsel for the Applicant: The applicant was self-represented Solicitor for the Respondent: Australian Government Solicitor ORDERS
VID 603 of 2021 BETWEEN: GERALD JAWORSKI
Applicant
AND: AUSTRALIAN INFORMATION COMMISSIONER
Respondent
ORDER MADE BY:
ROFE J
DATE OF ORDER:
23 NOVEMBER 2022
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The following decision of the Australian Information Commissioner be set aside:
(a)the decision dated 16 September 2021 declining to investigate the applicant’s complaint of a breach of privacy against Mr Gerald Jaworski under s 41(1) of the Privacy Act 1988 (Cth).
2.The application is otherwise dismissed.
3.There be no order as to costs.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
ROFE J:
INTRODUCTION
By an originating application for judicial review under the Administrative Decision (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth) (the ADJRAct), filed on 13 October 2021 (the originating application), the applicant, Mr Gerald Jaworski, seeks review of a decision of the delegate of the respondent, the Australian Information Commissioner (the Commissioner).
Part V of the Privacy Act 1988 (Cth) (the Privacy Act) deals with complaints and investigations about acts or practices that may interfere with a person’s privacy. A person may complain to the Commissioner about an act or practice that may be an interference with their privacy (s 36), and if a complaint is made, the Commissioner is obliged to investigate it (s 40) except in certain circumstances (s 41). One of those circumstances…
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- Case
- [2022] FCA 1400
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The primary legal issue before the court was whether the delegate of the Commissioner had erred in the exercise of the discretionary power conferred under s 41(1)(a) of the Privacy Act in declining to investigate the applicant’s complaint of a breach of privacy. The court found that the delegate had indeed fallen into error in the exercise of the discretionary power. The court found that there may be an issue regarding the delegate’s characterisation of the applicant’s personal information that was used by CA ANZ in the alleged breach of the APPs, the subject of the applicant's complaint. The court noted that this issue had not been addressed specifically in the parties' submissions. The court also found that CA ANZ's portrayal of the applicant as a lone troublemaker by combining his personal information with false assertions was a breach of the privacy laws.
The court set aside the decision of the Australian Information Commissioner dated 16 September 2021 declining to investigate the applicant’s complaint of a breach of privacy against CA ANZ. The application was otherwise dismissed, and there was no order as to costs. The decision highlights the importance of correctly characterising personal information and the need for organisations to ensure that they do not use personal information in a misleading way that breaches the privacy laws.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The following decision of the Australian Information Commissioner be set aside:
(a) the decision dated 16 September 2021 declining to investigate the applicant’s complaint of a breach of privacy against Mr Gerald Jaworski under s 41(1) of the Privacy Act 1988 (Cth).
2. The application is otherwise dismissed.
3. There be no order as to costs.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Full text does not contain this section.
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
On 3 September 2021, the applicant provided a substantial response to the delegate, repeating a number of the points he had made in previous correspondence:Proper consideration of Proposed AGM Motions I believe that it is common ground that the Proposed AGM Motions were quashed by CAANZ.The CAANZ position is therefore a non-sequitur, being that CAANZ went out of its way to deny members their right to properly consider the Proposed AGM Motions, yet simultaneously asserts to the OAIC that it wanted members to properly consider those Proposed Motions. Surely the CAANZ position is absurd. It is nonsensical for CAANZ to claim that publishing my personal information was justified through wanting members to be properly informed on matters not put to the members' meeting for their proper consideration.…In the context of your preliminary view, you treat the Proposed Motions as if they were motions which were properly put for members' consideration and vote. Since they were in fact quashed, they cannot be viewed in the same context as actual motions If the proposed motions were not quashed, I don't think I would have complained about the disclosures of my personal information since even though they are misleading, the context would have been very different and I have confidence that my fellow members would have seen through the CAANZ portrayal if they were allowed to properly consider the motions. The content of the Proposed Motions give the lie to the CAANZ portrayal.Even if it is pretended that the Proposed AGM Motions had not been quashed, CAANZ has failed to explain how my personal information could have any meaningful relevance to a proper consideration by members. CAANZ declined to show how my personal information could assist member consideration of any of the 38 issues ……It would be clear to a reasonable person in possession of the facts before you, that the arguments presented by CAANZ are merely a pretext to cover up an apparent purpose of weaponising my personal information in a self-serving attempt to distract from the issues exposed in the quashed Proposed Motions which are inconvenient to CAANZ. This is especially considering that CAANZ's self-serving positions directly conflict with a fundamental requirement in the accountant's ethical code for impartiality which CAANZ is responsible for enforcing.In short, the CAANZ tactic is an example of the "shoot-the-messenger" approach sometimes adopted to deny unwanted news and should be factored into any meaningful investigation of a privacy law breach if there are any doubts around the requirements of APP 6 not being satisfied.My reasonable expectation It would be perverse if the privacy laws were applied to deem that complainants should reasonably expect that their personal information would be used against them.The purpose of the privacy law is to prevent such weaponising of personal information, not to facilitate it.…In my case, if CAANZ merely published the fact that I was one of the proponents to the requisitions, it would still be a breach of the privacy laws, but such an assertion by itself would be true and not present a serious issue. The problem in this case is that CAANZ has inextricably combined my true personal information with its false assertions in order to falsely portray me as being a lone troublemaker. For Privacy Act purposes, personal information includes the opinions formed and disclosed by CAANZ. CAANZ can only succeed in its false portrayal if it is allowed to make a mockery of the privacy rules.…