Goodwin v Commissioner of Police

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Goodwin v Commissioner of Police [2020] FCA 950

File number: VID 665 of 2019
Judge: BROMBERG  J
Date of judgment: 8 July 2020
Catchwords: ADMINISTRATIVE LAW – Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth), ss 5(1)(a), (1)(e), (1)(j), and (2)(g) – Australian Federal Police Act 1979 (Cth), s 28 – application for judicial review of decision to terminate applicant’s employment – whether applicant was denied natural justice – whether applicant was denied an opportunity to make submissions on sanctions alternative to termination – whether decision-maker failed to meaningfully consider relevant matters – whether absence of elucidation in circumstances where there is no obligation to provide reasons evinces lack of meaningful consideration – whether delegate took into account irrelevant considerations – whether decision-maker’s finding that applicant had engaged in serious misconduct was legally unreasonable – application dismissed
Legislation:

Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth)

Australian Federal Police Act 1979 (Cth)

Australian Federal Police Categories of Conduct Determination 2013 

Cases cited:

Aerocare Flight Support Pty Ltd v Transport Workers’ Union of Australia and Others (2018) 261 FCR 175

Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd v Wednesbury Corporation [1948] 1 KB 223

Coutts v Close [2014] FCA 19

Luck v Secretary, Department of Human Services (No 3) [2016] FCA 100

Minister for Aboriginal Affairs v Peko-Wallsend Limited (1986) 162 CLR 24

Minister for Home Affairs v Omar (2019) 373 ALR 569

Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v Stretton (2016) 237 FCR 1

Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v SZSSJ (2016) 259 CLR 180

Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v WZARH (2015) 256 CLR 326

Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v Li (2013) 249 CLR 332

North v Television Corporation Ltd (1976) 11 ALR 599 at 609

Plaintiff M64 of 2015 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2015) 258 CLR 173

Sunshine Coast Broadcasters Pty Ltd v Australian Communications and Media Authority (2012) 209 FCR 518

SZVCP v Cho (2017) 250 FCR 225

TTY 167 v Republic of Nauru (2000) 362 ALR 246

Date of hearing: 25 June 2020
Registry: Victoria
Division: General Division
National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 48
Counsel for the Applicant: Mr M McKenney
Solicitor for the Applicant: Dimitra Panagopoulos Lawyers
Counsel for the Respondent: Mr A Yuile
Solicitor for the Respondent: HWL Ebsworth Lawyers

ORDERS

VID 665 of 2019
BETWEEN:

TREVOR GOODWIN

Applicant

AND:

COMMISSIONER OF POLICE

Respondent

JUDGE:

BROMBERG  J

DATE OF ORDER:

8 JULY 2020

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The applicant’s application is dismissed.

2.Unless an application resisting an order for costs is made by the applicant within 7 days hereof, the applicant pay the respondent’s costs of the application.

Note:   Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.


REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

BROMBERG J:

  1. The applicant (“Mr Goodwin”) was appointed to the Australian Federal Police (“AFP”) in a policing role in January 2015.  Mr Goodwin initially served at…

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Details
Case
[2020] FCA 950
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of Goodwin v Commissioner of Police, Mr. Goodwin sought judicial review of the decision by the Commissioner of the Australian Federal Police (AFP) to terminate his employment. The application was brought under the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth), and Mr. Goodwin alleged multiple grounds of error, including breaches of natural justice, failure to take into account relevant considerations, consideration of irrelevant matters, unreasonable exercise of power, and contravention of law. The primary concern was whether the delegate had meaningfully considered relevant matters and whether the decision to terminate was legally sound.

The court considered whether Mr. Goodwin had been denied natural justice, specifically whether he had been denied an opportunity to make submissions regarding alternative sanctions to termination. Additionally, it examined whether the decision-maker had failed to meaningfully consider relevant matters and whether the absence of elucidation in the decision-making process, in circumstances where there was no obligation to provide reasons, indicated a lack of meaningful consideration. The court also assessed whether the delegate had taken into account irrelevant considerations and whether the decision-maker's finding that Mr. Goodwin had engaged in serious misconduct was legally unreasonable.

In its reasoning, the court found that the absence of an explanation for certain matters in the termination letter did not necessarily indicate a lack of meaningful consideration, as there was no obligation for the decision-maker to provide such explanations. The court further determined that the decision to terminate Mr. Goodwin's employment was not flawed on the grounds presented, and thus dismissed the application. The decision did not find any legal errors warranting the overturning of the Commissioner's decision.

The final orders of the court dismissed Mr. Goodwin's application and required him to pay the Commissioner's costs unless an application to resist the order for costs was made within seven days. This decision underscores the high threshold for successful judicial review applications concerning administrative decisions and the importance of demonstrating specific legal errors.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The applicant’s application is dismissed.

2. Unless an application resisting an order for costs is made by the applicant within 7 days hereof, the applicant pay the respondent’s costs of the application.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

The delegate’s decision to terminate Mr Goodwin’s employment (“decision”) is the subject of this application for judicial review brought by Mr Goodwin under the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth) (“ADJR Act”). There are some eight grounds set out in Mr Goodwin’s application, however, not all of those grounds were pressed. Relying on s 5(1)(a) of the ADJR Act, Mr Goodwin alleged that a breach of the rules of natural justice had occurred in connection with the making of the decision. Relying on s 5(1)(e) of the ADJR Act, Mr Goodwin alleged that the delegate had failed to take relevant considerations into account. Relying on s 5(1)(e) of the ADJR Act, Mr Goodwin alleged that the delegate had had regard to irrelevant considerations. Relying on s 5(1)(e) and s 5(2)(g) of the ADJR Act, Mr Goodwin asserted that the decision was an unreasonable exercise of power and, lastly, relying on s 5(1)(j) of the ADJR Act that the decision was otherwise contrary to law. Mr Goodwin’s challenge to the decision is not made on the basis that the statutory processes required to have been followed in the making of the decision were not followed. It is necessary, however, in setting out a chronology of relevant events, to briefly refer to the scheme of the Australian Federal Police Act 1979 (Cth) (“AFP Act”) noting that a more detailed survey is provided by Griffiths J at [20]-[42] of Coutts v Close [2014] FCA 19. Part III of the AFP Act deals generally with the staffing of the AFP. On behalf of the Respondent (“Commonwealth”), the Commissioner has all the rights, duties and powers of an employer in respect of employees of the AFP: AFP Act, s 23. Pursuant to s 24 of the AFP Act, the Commissioner may engage persons as employees. Pursuant to s 28 of the AFP Act the Commissioner “may at any time, by notice in writing, terminate the employment of an AFP employee”. Part IV of the AFP Act deals with the Commissioner’s command powers. Under Part IV, the Commissioner may issue orders with respect to the general administration of, and control of the operations of, the AFP: s 38. Part V deals with professional standards and AFP conduct and practice issues. Pursuant to the scheme, a complaint may be made in relation to the conduct of an AFP appointee: s 40SA. Div 3 of Part V deals with the action that may be taken in response to misconduct by an AFP appointee. As earlier stated, five complaints were made against Mr Goodwin. The complainant was a female AFP appointee who worked with Mr Goodwin at Camp Mountain. Broadly stated, the complaints made fell into two categories. Four of the complaints asserted that Mr Goodwin had made inappropriate comments in the workplace. Numerous conversations were relied upon and the assertion that inappropriate remarks were made by Mr Goodwin were based on those remarks being offensive because of their sexist, sexualised or racist nature. The second category of complaint was labelled as an “unlawful traffic stop”. The complainant asserted that whilst on duty and in an unmarked patrol vehicle driven by Mr Goodwin, Mr Goodwin chased down another vehicle, required it to pull over and stop and pretended to conduct a license check of the driver. The “traffic stop” was asserted to have been done knowingly unlawfully – Mr Goodwin having no lawful authority to conduct a traffic stop in Queensland.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Mr Goodwin’s written submissions also contended that natural justice had been denied to him because redactions made on the copy of the PRS Report initially provided to him denied him “proper particulars”. The submission made was insufficiently specific and, faced with the need to demonstrate how the lack of each particular relied upon brought about a practical injustice (Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v WZARH (2015) 256 CLR 326 at [60] (Gageler and Gordon JJ)), the contention was not pressed.WERE RELEVANT CONSIDERATIONS MEANINGFULLY CONSIDERED? Mr Goodwin’s written submissions contended that certain relevant considerations, relevant in the Peko-Wallsend sense (Minister for Aboriginal Affairs v Peko-Wallsend Limited (1986) 162 CLR 24 at 39 (Mason J) as considerations which the AFP Act required be considered, were not considered by the delegate. However, as was revealed by the oral submissions made, properly understood, the contention was really a contention that particular relevant considerations had not been meaningfully considered (see Minister for Home Affairs v Omar (2019) 373 ALR 569 at [39]), rather than that those considerations had not been considered at all. The matters said to have been not meaningfully considered were identified by reference to the termination letter. There are four of them as follows:(i)that serious consideration had been given to “alternate sanctions” ([5] of the letter); (ii)Mr Goodwin’s prior work achievements, references provided by him and the impact of termination upon Mr Goodwin and his family ([6] of the letter);(iii)Mr Goodwin’s “unblemished service” ([9] of the letter); and(iv)that Mr Goodwin had failed to acknowledge any responsibility for his behaviour ([10] of the letter). That each of those matters raised a relevant consideration (in the Peko-Wallsend sense) was not conceded by the Commissioner. I will presume that each matter did raise a relevant consideration as, despite the making of that presumption in Mr Goodwin’s favour, his case is nevertheless not established. Mr Goodwin contended that I should accept, as a matter of fact, that no meaningful consideration was given by the delegate to the four matters detailed above. The fact contended for was said to be an available inference to be drawn from the absence of explanation or elucidation on each of those matters in the termination letter. The difficulty with Mr Goodwin’s contention is that the failure of a decision maker to record or explain how a particular matter was meaningfully considered, does not establish (without more) that, as a matter of fact, no meaningful consideration was given to those matters when they were considered. Where a decision maker is obliged to give reasons for a decision, the absence of elucidation in the reasons provided may point to the absence of meaningful consideration. However, where that is not the case, the absence of an explanation may be no more than a consequence of the absence of an obligation to provide such an explanation.