FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Goodwin v Commissioner of Police [2020] FCA 950
File number: VID 665 of 2019 Judge: BROMBERG J Date of judgment: 8 July 2020 Catchwords: ADMINISTRATIVE LAW – Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth), ss 5(1)(a), (1)(e), (1)(j), and (2)(g) – Australian Federal Police Act 1979 (Cth), s 28 – application for judicial review of decision to terminate applicant’s employment – whether applicant was denied natural justice – whether applicant was denied an opportunity to make submissions on sanctions alternative to termination – whether decision-maker failed to meaningfully consider relevant matters – whether absence of elucidation in circumstances where there is no obligation to provide reasons evinces lack of meaningful consideration – whether delegate took into account irrelevant considerations – whether decision-maker’s finding that applicant had engaged in serious misconduct was legally unreasonable – application dismissed Legislation: Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth)
Australian Federal Police Act 1979 (Cth)
Australian Federal Police Categories of Conduct Determination 2013
Cases cited: Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd v Wednesbury Corporation [1948] 1 KB 223
Luck v Secretary, Department of Human Services (No 3) [2016] FCA 100
Minister for Aboriginal Affairs v Peko-Wallsend Limited (1986) 162 CLR 24
Minister for Home Affairs v Omar (2019) 373 ALR 569
Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v Stretton (2016) 237 FCR 1
Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v SZSSJ (2016) 259 CLR 180
Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v WZARH (2015) 256 CLR 326
Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v Li (2013) 249 CLR 332
North v Television Corporation Ltd (1976) 11 ALR 599 at 609
Plaintiff M64 of 2015 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2015) 258 CLR 173
Date of hearing: 25 June 2020 Registry: Victoria Division: General Division National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights Category: Catchwords Number of paragraphs: 48 Counsel for the Applicant: Mr M McKenney Solicitor for the Applicant: Dimitra Panagopoulos Lawyers Counsel for the Respondent: Mr A Yuile Solicitor for the Respondent: HWL Ebsworth Lawyers ORDERS
VID 665 of 2019 BETWEEN: TREVOR GOODWIN
Applicant
AND: COMMISSIONER OF POLICE
Respondent
JUDGE:
BROMBERG J
DATE OF ORDER:
8 JULY 2020
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The applicant’s application is dismissed.
2.Unless an application resisting an order for costs is made by the applicant within 7 days hereof, the applicant pay the respondent’s costs of the application.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
BROMBERG J:
The applicant (“Mr Goodwin”) was appointed to the Australian Federal Police (“AFP”) in a policing role in January 2015. Mr Goodwin initially served at…
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- Case
- [2020] FCA 950
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court considered whether Mr. Goodwin had been denied natural justice, specifically whether he had been denied an opportunity to make submissions regarding alternative sanctions to termination. Additionally, it examined whether the decision-maker had failed to meaningfully consider relevant matters and whether the absence of elucidation in the decision-making process, in circumstances where there was no obligation to provide reasons, indicated a lack of meaningful consideration. The court also assessed whether the delegate had taken into account irrelevant considerations and whether the decision-maker's finding that Mr. Goodwin had engaged in serious misconduct was legally unreasonable.
In its reasoning, the court found that the absence of an explanation for certain matters in the termination letter did not necessarily indicate a lack of meaningful consideration, as there was no obligation for the decision-maker to provide such explanations. The court further determined that the decision to terminate Mr. Goodwin's employment was not flawed on the grounds presented, and thus dismissed the application. The decision did not find any legal errors warranting the overturning of the Commissioner's decision.
The final orders of the court dismissed Mr. Goodwin's application and required him to pay the Commissioner's costs unless an application to resist the order for costs was made within seven days. This decision underscores the high threshold for successful judicial review applications concerning administrative decisions and the importance of demonstrating specific legal errors.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The applicant’s application is dismissed.
2. Unless an application resisting an order for costs is made by the applicant within 7 days hereof, the applicant pay the respondent’s costs of the application.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Mr Goodwin’s written submissions also contended that natural justice had been denied to him because redactions made on the copy of the PRS Report initially provided to him denied him “proper particulars”. The submission made was insufficiently specific and, faced with the need to demonstrate how the lack of each particular relied upon brought about a practical injustice (Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v WZARH (2015) 256 CLR 326 at [60] (Gageler and Gordon JJ)), the contention was not pressed.WERE RELEVANT CONSIDERATIONS MEANINGFULLY CONSIDERED? Mr Goodwin’s written submissions contended that certain relevant considerations, relevant in the Peko-Wallsend sense (Minister for Aboriginal Affairs v Peko-Wallsend Limited (1986) 162 CLR 24 at 39 (Mason J) as considerations which the AFP Act required be considered, were not considered by the delegate. However, as was revealed by the oral submissions made, properly understood, the contention was really a contention that particular relevant considerations had not been meaningfully considered (see Minister for Home Affairs v Omar (2019) 373 ALR 569 at [39]), rather than that those considerations had not been considered at all. The matters said to have been not meaningfully considered were identified by reference to the termination letter. There are four of them as follows:(i)that serious consideration had been given to “alternate sanctions” ([5] of the letter); (ii)Mr Goodwin’s prior work achievements, references provided by him and the impact of termination upon Mr Goodwin and his family ([6] of the letter);(iii)Mr Goodwin’s “unblemished service” ([9] of the letter); and(iv)that Mr Goodwin had failed to acknowledge any responsibility for his behaviour ([10] of the letter). That each of those matters raised a relevant consideration (in the Peko-Wallsend sense) was not conceded by the Commissioner. I will presume that each matter did raise a relevant consideration as, despite the making of that presumption in Mr Goodwin’s favour, his case is nevertheless not established. Mr Goodwin contended that I should accept, as a matter of fact, that no meaningful consideration was given by the delegate to the four matters detailed above. The fact contended for was said to be an available inference to be drawn from the absence of explanation or elucidation on each of those matters in the termination letter. The difficulty with Mr Goodwin’s contention is that the failure of a decision maker to record or explain how a particular matter was meaningfully considered, does not establish (without more) that, as a matter of fact, no meaningful consideration was given to those matters when they were considered. Where a decision maker is obliged to give reasons for a decision, the absence of elucidation in the reasons provided may point to the absence of meaningful consideration. However, where that is not the case, the absence of an explanation may be no more than a consequence of the absence of an obligation to provide such an explanation.