Papoutsakis v Australian Information Commissioner

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Papoutsakis v Australian Information Commissioner [2025] FCAFC 10  

Appeal from: Papoutsakis v Australian Information Commissioner [2024] FCA 75
File number(s): NSD 229 of 2024
Judgment of: O'SULLIVAN, KENNETT AND NEEDHAM JJ
Date of judgment: 13 February 2025 
Catchwords: HUMAN RIGHTS – Privacy – appeal from decision of primary judge to dismiss application for judicial review of a decision of a delegate of the Australian Information Commissioner not to investigate a breach of privacy complaint under s 41(1)(da) of the Privacy Act 1988 (Cth) – whether primary judge erred and denied procedural fairness in admitting file note – whether primary judge erred by failing to consider legal and procedural requirements for consent to release information and for a valid loan application – whether decision was legally unreasonable
Legislation:

Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth) ss 5, 16

Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) s 56

Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) s 39B

Privacy Act 1988 (Cth) ss 36, 40, 41

Cases cited:

Jones v Office of the Australian Information Commissioner [2014] FCA 285

Minister for Aboriginal Affairs v Peko-Wallsend Ltd (1986) 162 CLR 24

Papoutsakis v Australian Information Commissioner [2024] FCA 75

Simjanovska v Department of Human Services [2019] FCA 499

Division: General Division
Registry: New South Wales
National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights
Number of paragraphs: 44
Date of hearing: 4 November 2024
Counsel for the Appellant: The appellant appeared in person
Counsel for the Respondent: Ms N Gollan
Solicitor for the Respondent: Mills Oakley

ORDERS

NSD 229 of 2024
BETWEEN:

ANTONIO PAPOUTSAKIS

Appellant

AND:

AUSTRALIAN INFORMATION COMMISSIONER

Respondent

ORDER MADE BY:

O'SULLIVAN, KENNETT AND NEEDHAM JJ

DATE OF ORDER:

13 FEBRUARY 2025

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The appeal be dismissed with costs, as agreed or taxed.

Note:   Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.


REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

THE COURT:

  1. This is an appeal from the decision of the primary judge in Papoutsakis v Australian Information Commissioner [2024] FCA 75 (primary judgment).

  2. At the opening of the hearing, the Court granted the appellant, with the consent of the respondent, leave to file an Amended Notice of Appeal to reflect the matters raised in his submissions under the heading “Grounds of Appeal”. He filed the Amended Notice of Appeal in accordance with directions on 8 November 2024.

  3. The appeal arises out of a privacy complaint made by the appellant against Motor Trades Association of Australia Superannuation Fund Pty Ltd, as trustee for Spirit Super. The appellant and his company Papou Properties Pty Ltd were clients of QT Investment Management Pty Ltd (QTIM) trading as Taplan Commercial Lending (a mortgage loans business operated by QTIM). In 2021, QTIM became wholly owned by Spirit Super. Spirit Super was the active respondent to the complaint. The facts are not generally in contest, and are set out by the primary judge at [2] and [3] of the primary judgment:-

    Mr Papoutsakis complains that, without his consent,…

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Details
Case
[2025] FCAFC 10
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The appeal in Papoutsakis v Australian Information Commissioner was brought by the appellant against the Australian Information Commissioner, challenging the decision of a delegate of the Commissioner not to investigate a privacy complaint. The appellant, Mr Papoutsakis, had lodged a complaint with the Commissioner regarding the handling of his personal financial information by QTIM, a mortgage loans business. The central issue was whether the Commissioner's delegate had erred in deciding not to investigate the privacy complaint under section 41(1)(da) of the Privacy Act 1988 (Cth). Specifically, the appellant argued that the decision-making process lacked procedural fairness, failed to consider the legal and procedural requirements for consent to release information, and was legally unreasonable.

The Court examined whether the primary judge had erred in admitting a redacted file note into evidence and whether this affected the outcome of the case. The file note, dated several years after the events in question, suggested that Mr Papoutsakis had consented to the release of information. The Court found that the admission of the file note did not constitute an error warranting a re-trial, as the primary judge did not rely on the substance of the file note in reaching his conclusion. The Court further noted that the appellant did not object to the file note being part of the Court Book or challenge its inclusion during the hearing. The Court concluded that the admission of the file note did not result in a failure to take into account a relevant consideration or an error of law, and the issue of whether the file note was compliant with financial regulatory requirements was beyond the scope of the judicial review.

The appeal was dismissed with costs, as agreed or taxed. The Court ruled that the decision of the primary judge was correct and did not contain any procedural errors or legal flaws that would warrant a re-trial. The Court found no basis to interfere with the decision of the Commissioner's delegate not to investigate the privacy complaint further.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appeal be dismissed with costs, as agreed or taxed.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

Full text does not contain this section.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

This is an appeal from the decision of the primary judge in Papoutsakis v Australian Information Commissioner [2024] FCA 75 (primary judgment). At the opening of the hearing, the Court granted the appellant, with the consent of the respondent, leave to file an Amended Notice of Appeal to reflect the matters raised in his submissions under the heading “Grounds of Appeal”. He filed the Amended Notice of Appeal in accordance with directions on 8 November 2024. The appeal arises out of a privacy complaint made by the appellant against Motor Trades Association of Australia Superannuation Fund Pty Ltd, as trustee for Spirit Super. The appellant and his company Papou Properties Pty Ltd were clients of QT Investment Management Pty Ltd (QTIM) trading as Taplan Commercial Lending (a mortgage loans business operated by QTIM). In 2021, QTIM became wholly owned by Spirit Super. Spirit Super was the active respondent to the complaint. The facts are not generally in contest, and are set out by the primary judge at [2] and [3] of the primary judgment:-Mr Papoutsakis complains that, without his consent, QTIM provided details of three loans he had from QTIM, including the details of three properties over which the loans were secured, the terms of the loans and the amounts outstanding, to a different prospective lender, Prime Capital. Against Mr Papoutsakis’s instructions, Prime Capital then sought to include those properties as securities by way of second mortgages in the documents for the new loan whereas Mr Papoutsakis says that his instructions had always been that the new loan would be secured only by a mortgage on a fourth property. The inclusion of the other properties in the documents caused Mr Papoutsakis to withdraw from the new loan before there had been any drawdown. When Prime Capital invoiced him $26,606 for its wasted expenses and liquidated damages, Mr Papoutsakis refused to pay. That refusal in turn led to a bankruptcy notice followed by a creditor’s petition, the sequestration of his estate and the loss to him of all four properties. He claims an entitlement to compensation of $15 million. Mr Papoutsakis made his complaint of breach of privacy to the Australian Information Commissioner, the respondent, in November 2021. After limited investigation, to which I will return, on 9 June 2023 a delegate of the Commissioner published a preliminary intention to close the complaint without (further) investigation under s 41(1)(a) of the Privacy Act 1988 (Cth). Mr Papoutsakis was given the opportunity to comment on the preliminary decision. After he did so, the delegate published a final decision on 19 July 2023. That decision was that, in reliance on s 41(1)(da) of the Privacy Act, the complaint should not be (further) investigated. A summary of the appellant’s complaint to the Commissioner is provided in the Commissioner’s decision on 19 July 2023:Ÿ[QTIM trading as Tasplan], Spirit Super, the Motor Trades Association of Australia Superannuation Fund and Tasplan fall under “one roof” and played an active role in your loan agreement Ÿyou did not consent to QTIM releasing information about your properties for the purposes of registering a second mortgage Ÿyou did not authorise QTIM to engage with Mr Tsiakis [the appellant’s broker]ŸQTIM disclosed details of your three properties to Prime Capital prior to 1 August 2016, which is evidenced by the fact that details of those properties were included on the initial loan documents prepared for your signature.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The respondent filed a Notice of Contention. Essentially the respondent contended that if the primary judge erred in admitting the file note into evidence, then that error does not constitute an appealable error warranting the grant of a re-trial, essentially on the basis that the exclusion of the file note would not “realistically have resulted” in the primary judge reaching a different decision.Submissions and considerationThe admission of the redacted file note As provided in Ground 3 of the Amended Notice of Appeal above, the appellant sought that the matter be re-heard without the file note being part of the evidence. The file note is dated 30 August 2022 and was provided by Spirit Super to the investigations officer at the Office of the Commissioner. The author is Mr Ford, who was QTIM’s Commercial Lending Manager at the time. There is one sentence redacted in the copy which was part of the Court Book before the primary judge and before the Full Court. The appellant took issue with that part of the file note which suggests that he consented to the release of information, and the fact that the file note is dated some six years after the relevant events, and some time after the complaint was made to the Commissioner. The respondent noted that the document was provided to the respondent by Spirit Super in its redacted form. The respondent submitted that the file note was before the delegate of the Commissioner at the time of his decision and would therefore be admissible as a relevant document under s 56 of the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth). Further, the appellant did not raise any objection to the Court Book being tendered ([J61]), and did not challenge the inclusion of the file note in the Court Book. In fact, the file note was discussed during the hearing and the appellant raised his issues with its contents and the use to be made of it during the hearing before the primary judge. The respondent submitted that even if the document were admitted in error, this would not have produced a different outcome as the primary judge did not rely on the substance of the file note in reaching his conclusion, but merely noted that the document demonstrated that a conflict of evidence existed between the appellant and the file note, which was not relevant to the issues to be considered by the primary judge. We accept the respondent's submissions. The admission of the file note was relevant because it was part of the material before the delegate of the respondent, who, like the primary judge, did not make a finding of fact based on the two competing accounts of the question of consent. Given that the appellant did not object to the admission of the file note even after being taken to it by the primary judge, it is difficult to see how the redaction of the file note was an irrelevant consideration taken into account, a failure to take account of a relevant consideration, or otherwise an error of law. Likewise, the issue of whether the file note was compliant with financial regulatory requirements was not a matter within the scope of the judicial review.The use of the redacted file note