Re State Coroner; Ex parte Minister for Health

Link copied
Case Copied 60 min read

JURISDICTION     :   SUPREME COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA

TITLE OF COURT :   THE COURT OF APPEAL (WA)

CITATION:   RE THE STATE CORONER; EX PARTE THE MINISTER FOR HEALTH [2009] WASCA 165

CORAM:   MARTIN CJ

BUSS JA
MILLER JA

HEARD:   19 AUGUST 2009

DELIVERED          :   18 SEPTEMBER 2009

FILE NO/S:   CACV 116 of 2008

MATTER                :An application pursuant to s 52 of the Coroners Act 1996 in respect of an inquest into the death of Daniel Paul Rolph by the State Coroner

EX PARTE

THE MINISTER FOR HEALTH
Appellant
 

ON APPEAL FROM:

Jurisdiction              :  SUPREME COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA

Coram  :TEMPLEMAN J

Citation  :RE THE STATE CORONER; EX PARTE THE MINISTER FOR HEALTH [2008] WASC 250

File No  :GDA 9 of 2008

Catchwords:

Coroners - Inquest - Application to review - The character of an inquest under the Coroners Act 1996 (WA) - The nature of a 'finding' within s 25(1) - The nature and ambit of the 'findings' which a Coroner must make, if possible, under s 25(1) - The character of an application to the Supreme Court under s 52(1) - Whether a 'finding' within s 25(1) is different from a 'finding' within s 52 - What an applicant under s 52(1) must establish in order to satisfy the Supreme Court that the Coroner's 'findings' are against the evidence or the weight of the evidence

Coroners - Inquest - Application to review - Whether impugned statements in a Coroner's Report were 'findings' within s 25(1) of the Coroners Act 1996 (WA) - Whether the impugned statements were critical of a psychiatrist who had treated the deceased - Whether the impugned statements were against the evidence, or the weight of the evidence, adduced at the inquest - Whether it was open to the Coroner to conclude that the criteria in s 26 of the Mental Health Act 1996 (WA) were satisfied in relation to the deceased when he last consulted with a psychiatrist - Whether the Coroner failed to accord the appellant procedural fairness before making the impugned statements

Legislation:

Coroners Act 1996 (WA), s 4, s 19(1), s 22(1), s 25, s 44, s 52
Mental Health Act 1996 (WA), s 5, s 26, s 43(2), s 67(1)

Result:

Appeal dismissed

Category:    A

Representation:

Counsel:

Appellant:     Mr G T W Tannin SC & Ms K A T Pedersen

Non-party:     Mr D H Mulligan

Solicitors:

Appellant:     State Solicitor for Western Australia

Non-party:     Not applicable

Case(s) referred to in judgment(s):

Annetts v McCann [1990] HCA 57; (1990) 170 CLR 596

Atkinson v Morrow [2005] QCA 353; [2006] 1 Qd R 397

Atkinson v Morrow [2005] QSC 92

Briginshaw v Briginshaw [1938] HCA 34; (1938) 60 CLR 336

Domaszewicz v The State Coroner [2004] VSC 528; (2004) 11 VR 237

Doomadgee v Clements [2005] QSC 357; [2006] 2 Qd R 352

Hurley v Clements [2009] QCA 167

Keown v Khan [1999] 1 VR 69

Khan v Keown [2001] VSCA 137

March v E &…

CaseChat AU logo

Keep reading for free

Create a free CaseChat account to read Re State Coroner; Ex parte Minister for Health and more:

  • Read every judgment in full
  • Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
  • See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
  • Download judgments as PDF or Word
Continue with Google

One click creates your free account or signs you in.

By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.

Details
Case
[2009] WASCA 165
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case before the court was an appeal by the Minister for Health against a decision of the Supreme Court of Western Australia, which had reviewed a Coroner's findings under the Coroners Act 1996 (WA). The Minister sought to challenge certain statements made by the Coroner during an inquest into the death of a patient who had been under the care of a psychiatrist employed by the Minister. The central issue before the court was whether the Coroner's findings were against the evidence or the weight of the evidence, and whether the Minister was denied procedural fairness during the inquest.

The court considered the nature and scope of a Coroner's findings under section 25(1) of the Coroners Act 1996 (WA), and the requirements of procedural fairness under the common law. The court held that the impugned statements made by the Coroner did not constitute findings that were against the evidence or the weight of the evidence. The court further held that the Minister was not denied procedural fairness during the inquest, as the legal representative for the Minister had been adequately informed of the potential for adverse findings, and had not sought to call additional evidence that may have changed the outcome.

The court emphasised that procedural fairness is a flexible concept, and that the requirements of procedural fairness must be tailored to the specific circumstances of the case. The court noted that the legal representative for the Minister had assumed the responsibility of protecting the interests of both the Minister and the treating psychiatrist, and that there was no relevant conflict between their interests. The court also noted that even if additional evidence had been called, it was not clear that it would have changed the outcome of the inquest.

The court dismissed the appeal, holding that the Coroner's findings were not against the evidence or the weight of the evidence, and that the Minister was not denied procedural fairness during the inquest. The court made no orders as to costs.

Orders

Orders of the court

Appeal dismissed

Background

Background to the litigation

Full text does not contain this section.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Full text does not contain this section.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Fairness is essentially a practical concept. It is not abstract in nature. The law of procedural fairness is concerned to avoid practical injustice. See Re Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs; Ex parte Lam [2003] HCA 6; (2003) 214 CLR 1 [37] (Gleeson CJ). The requirements of procedural fairness are flexible. Proceedings where procedural fairness must be accorded may be organised to ensure fairness having regard to the nature and circumstances of the particular proceeding, including the relevant facts, the statutory context, the matters in dispute, the circumstances of the particular parties whose interests may be affected, and the legal representation of parties before the relevant body or tribunal. See Mijatovic v Legal Practitioners Complaints Committee [2008] WASCA 115; (2008) 37 WAR 149 [56] (Buss JA). As I have mentioned, the appellant was the only party to the proceedings before the learned primary judge and to this appeal. In particular, neither Dr Shalala nor any of the other treating psychiatrists was or is a party. The issue, therefore, in the context of ground 5, is whether the appellant was denied procedural fairness. In my opinion, on the assumption (favourable to the appellant in relation to ground 5) that the impugned statements reflected adversely on the appellant either directly or indirectly as Dr Shalala's employer, the appellant was not denied procedural fairness. My reasons for that opinion are as follows. First, Mr Egan, in appearing for the Department of Health at the inquest, was, at least in part, representing the interests of the appellant as the Minister of State responsible for administering the Department. Mr Egan assumed the responsibility of protecting the appellant's interests. Secondly, the Coroner, in the exchange with Mr Egan that I have set out at [107] above, adequately raised with Mr Egan the substance of the adverse finding which was ultimately recorded in the impugned statements. Thirdly, it is apparent from Mr Egan's letter dated 20 June 2008 and his supplementary written submissions to the Coroner that he understood the potential for an adverse finding being made in the terms ultimately recorded in the impugned statements. Fourthly, Mr Egan did not at any time apply to the Coroner for the chief psychiatrist, Dr Davidson, to be called to give evidence. He merely made a 'suggestion'. Fifthly, in any event, there is no evidence before this court from Dr Davidson as to the evidence he would have given at the inquest if he had been called as a witness. Sixthly, in any event, I am not persuaded that if Dr Davidson had given evidence there was any reasonable prospect that it would not have remained open to the Coroner to make the impugned statements. I should note, for completeness, that even though Dr Shalala was not a party to the proceedings before the learned primary judge or to this appeal, I am satisfied that she was not denied procedural fairness in relation to the impugned statements. My examination of that part of the transcript of the inquest which is before this court, and of Mr Egan's supplementary written submissions to the Coroner, indicates that Mr Egan assumed the responsibility of protecting the interests of Dr Shalala in addition to those of the appellant and the Department of Health. Counsel for the appellant accepted, before this court, that there was no relevant conflict between the appellant's interests and Dr Shalala's interests in the manner in which the inquest was conducted (appeal ts 50). Further, the other reasons I have advanced for rejecting counsel for the appellant's submissions that the appellant was denied procedural fairness apply, with necessary modifications, to Dr Shalala.