Doomadgee v Clements

Case [2005] QSC 357

SUPREME COURT OF QUEENSLAND

CITATION:  Doomadgee & Anor v Deputy State Coroner Clements & Ors
[2005] QSC 357
Hurley v Deputy State Coroner Clements & Ors [2005] QSC
357
PARTIES:  JANE DOOMADGEE and ELIZABETH DOOMADGEE
and VALMAI APLIN
(applicants)
v
DEPUTY STATE CORONER CLEMENTS
(first respondent)
COMMISSIONER OF THE POLICE SERVICE
(second respondent)
ERYKAH KYLE, CHAIR OF THE PALM ISLAND
ABORIGINAL COUNCIL
(third respondent)
CHRISTOPHER HURLEY
(fourth respondent)
MICHAEL LEAFE and LLOYD BENGAROO
(fifth respondent)
TRACEY LEE MARIA TWADDLE
(sixth respondent)
HUMAN RIGHTS AND EQUAL OPPORTUNITY
COMMISSION
(seventh respondent)
ATTORNEY-GENERAL OF QUEENSLAND
(eighth respondent)
CHRISTOPHER HURLEY
(applicant)
v
DEPUTY STATE CORONER CLEMENTS
(first respondent)
ERYKAH KYLE, CHAIR OF PALM ISLAND
ABORIGINAL COUNCIL
(second respondent)
TRACEY LEE MARIA TWADDLE
(third respondent)
HUMAN RIGHTS AND EQUAL OPPORTUNITY
COMMISSION
(fourth respondent)
JANE, ELIZABETH AND VALMAE DOOMADGEE
(fifth respondent)
COMMISSIONER OF THE QUEENSLAND POLICE
SERVICE
(sixth respondent)
ATTORNEY-GENERAL OF QUEENSLAND
(seventh respondent)
FILE NO:  BS9137 of 2005 BS9221 of 2005
DIVISION:  Trial Division
PROCEEDING:  Applications for statutory review
ORIGINATING 
COURT: 		 Supreme Court at Brisbane
DELIVERED ON:  22 December 2005
DELIVERED AT:  Brisbane
HEARING DATE:  7 December 2005
JUDGE:  Muir J
ORDER:  BS9137 of 2005 – Application is dismissed
CATCHWORDS:  ADMINISTRATIVE LAW – QUEENSLAND – GROUNDS FOR REVIEW – IMPROPER EXERCISE OF POWER – POWERS AND DISCRETION OF COURT – coronial inquest into death of an aboriginal man in police custody on Palm Island – coroner made preliminary ruling as to what evidence she would consider in making her findings under s 45 and s 46 of the Coroners Act 2003 (Qld) (“the Act”) – application made under Judicial Review Act 1991 (Qld) that coroner erred in accepting propensity evidence under s 46 of the Act – applicant contends such evidence not “connected with” a death under s 46(1) of the Act – scope of “connected with” – whether coroner exercised her discretion consistently with object of the Act – whether court should intervene in interlocutory decision of coroner – separate application made under Judicial Review Act 1991 (Qld) that coroner erred in excluding evidence of two complainants when making her findings under s 45 of the Act – applicant contends coroner erred in ruling such evidence was “impermissible” for her consideration and that she should “adopt a more restrictive view” with regards to it – whether coroner applied an erroneous principle of law in coming to her decision – whether coroner bound by legal principle to consider complainants’ evidence in her determination
Acts Interpretation Act 1954 (Qld), s 14A
Coroners Act 2003 (Qld) s 37, s 45, s 46
Judicial Review Act 1991 (Qld)
Atkinson v Morrow [2005] QSC 092
Briginshaw v Briginshaw (1938) 60 CLR 336
Cain v Glass (No 2) (1985) 3 NSWLR 230
Claremont Petroleum NL v Cummings (1992) 110 ALR 239
Coco v Shaw [1994] 1 Qd R 469
Harmsworth v The State Coroner [1989] VR 989
Harriman v The Queen (1981) 167 CLR 590
KRM v The Queen (2000) 206 CLR 221
Mills v Meeking (1990) 169 CLR 214

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AGLC
Doomadgee v Clements [2005] QSC 357
Case
[2005] QSC 357
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of Doomadgee v Clements, the central dispute involved the handling of a coronial inquest into the death of an Aboriginal man, Mulrunji, who died while in police custody on Palm Island. The coroner had made preliminary rulings on the admissibility of evidence, which were subsequently challenged by applicants under the Judicial Review Act 1991 (Qld). The primary legal issues were whether the coroner improperly exercised her discretion in accepting propensity evidence and whether she erred in excluding the evidence of two complainants. The applicants argued that the coroner should have adopted a stricter approach in determining the admissibility of evidence and that she was bound by legal principles to consider certain evidence in her determination.

The court examined the scope of the coroner's discretion under the Coroners Act 2003 (Qld) and the application of legal principles in the coroner's decision-making process. It was established that while the coroner was not bound by the rules of evidence, she was required to exercise her discretion in a manner consistent with the object of the Act. The court found that the coroner's decision to exclude certain evidence, particularly the propensity evidence, was erroneous as it was relevant and potentially available for use. However, the court also noted that the coroner was not obliged to admit all relevant evidence if its probative value was marginal or if it would unduly delay the proceedings.

Ultimately, the court determined that the coroner's exercise of discretion was not so flawed as to warrant judicial intervention. The court held that the coroner's reasons for excluding certain evidence were not erroneous and that the probative value of the excluded evidence was marginal. The applications were dismissed, and the coroner's preliminary rulings on evidence admissibility were upheld.

Orders

Orders of the court

BS9137 of 2005 – Application is dismissed

Background

Background to the litigation

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Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

The submissions of Ms Erykah Kyle, Chair of the Palm Island Aboriginal Council adopted and supplemented the Doomadgee/Aplin submissions. There was no appearance on behalf of the third and fourth respondents to the Hurley application. The evidence at the Inquest concerning the cause and circumstances of death In order to understand the parties’ claims, it is necessary to know something of the subject matter of the inquiry and of the course of action taken by the Coroner. Paragraphs 3, 4 and 5 of the Ruling contain a useful description of the events surrounding the death and cause of death: “The evidence to this stage of the inquest is that Mulrunji died on 19 November 2004 in the watch-house cell at the Palm Island Police Station whilst in custody. There is no evidence to suggest that Mulrunji was suffering from any illness or injury when he was taken into custody by Senior Sergeant Hurley. There is no dispute in the medical evidence that he died as a result of blood loss due to his liver being torn. The injury required severe blunt force that could have occurred as a result of the application of a compressive force when Mulrunji was against a hard surface. Senior Sergeant Hurley has given evidence in chief as required by this court No cross examination or questions from his counsel has occurred yet. The evidence in chief from Senior Sergeant Hurley is that when he removed Mulrunji from the police vehicle at the back of the watch house cells, Mulrunji punched him to the face. That evidence was confirmed by Penny Sibley who was standing at the back of the police van at the rear of the police garage area. Senior Sergeant Hurley’s evidence was that then a “tussle” occurred between the two men while Hurley was trying to get him to the police station door and Mulrunji was resisting. This resulted in the two of them falling through the back door of the police station onto the lino covered cement floor. Hurley’s statement to investigating officers is that they fell apart from each other and landed separately on the floor. However, after he became aware of the medical evidence he considered that the only explanation of Mulrunji’s injuries was that he must have fallen onto Mulrunji in the course of the fall. He rejected the alternative possibility raised by counsel insisting that he had deliberately struck some blow of very forceful nature that has caused the injury and death.” The cause of death was a badly ruptured liver. The most likely cause of the rupture was a compression injury caused by severe force being applied over a confined area whilst the body was supported by a hard flat surface. The deceased had four broken ribs and the evidence of the pathologist who conducted an autopsy of the deceased’s body was to the effect that the force necessary to cause the injury could only have been conveyed by some part of the applicant’s body, such as a knee or elbow, being applied to a confined space over the ribs whilst the deceased’s body was immobilised by the fall.[1] [1] Transcript 625, lines 1-30.

Decision

Reasons for decision

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Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The use of the word “impermissible” is explained as, “understandable in the context that the … Coroner was dealing with a similar fact or propensity evidence which is evidence is ordinarily led by the Prosecution to prove the guilt of an accused. The … Coroner was not conducting a criminal trial and was not concerned with, and was indeed specifically prohibited from, making any [such] finding …”. Consideration of the Doomadgee/Aplin application In considering the challenge to the Reasons I am mindful that they “are not to be scrutinised upon over-zealous judicial review by seeking to discern whether some inadequacy may be gleaned from the way in which the reasons are expressed.[14] [14] Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Wu Shan Lung [1996] 185 CR 259 at 272. In paragraph 1 of the Reasons, the Coroner identifies her task as being “to consider the admissibility and if so, for what purpose of certain material”. In paragraph 2 of the Reasons she acknowledges that “the Coroners Court is not bound by the rules of evidence”. The same acknowledgement is made in paragraph 17 immediately before it is concluded that “it would be impermissible … to admit the evidence of some other alleged assault for the purposes of drawing an inference about what occurred”. In the preceding sentence she had said “I do not see how I could draw on that conclusion to determine what happened when Mulrinji was arrested and placed into custody. It may well be the case that when the totality of the evidence available to the Coroner is considered she will find the Propensity Evidence of little or no weight in comparison with the eyewitness accounts and other more direct evidence. But that does not produce the result that it would be “impermissible” to admit the Propensity Evidence. The rules of evidence do not apply and the discussion in the authorities concerning the admissibility of propensity evidence in criminal trial is thus of little benefit except insofar as it identifies the probative limitations of such evidence and the care which must be employed in its use. The Propensity Evidence, if accepted, is “logically probative” of the fact or one of the facts in issue.[15] It is thus relevant and potentially available for use by the Coroner together with all the other evidence before her. Consequently, the conclusion that it is “impermissible” to receive that evidence for the purpose of s 45 is erroneous. The Coroner proposes to receive the evidence anyway for s 46 purposes. [15] See Harriman v The Queen (1981) 167 CLR 590 at 597; Pfennig v The Queen (1995) 182 CLR 461 at 487-488 and 531, 532; KRM v The Queen (2000) 206 CLR 221 at 228-232 and R v O’Keefe [2000] 1 Qd R 564 at 571. It does not follow from this conclusion that the Coroner is obliged to admit the Propensity Evidence and rule on its merits in order to make her determination under s 45. “A coroner’s court may inform itself in any way it considers appropriate”.[16] A coroner’s discretion as to what evidence ought be obtained and by what means requires the exercise of commonsense and judgment. Even though some potential evidence might be regarded by a coroner as relevant, he or she is not bound to attempt to procure it regardless of its probative value or of the cost of or time spent in obtaining it. The resources of all tribunals are finite and the public interest often will be better served by the expeditious and economical dispatch of business than by the undiscriminating pursuit of evidence which the tribunal regards as having no reasonable likelihood of influencing the outcome of the hearing. The Reasons reveal that the Coroner has concluded that, in view of the direct evidence available to her of the events at the watch house, and what is described in paragraph 19 of the Reasons as the “additional evidence”, the probative value of the Propensity Evidence is marginal, at best. Nothing drawn to my attention casts doubt on the correctness of that view. [16] Coroners Act 2003 (Qld), s 37.