Rasla v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Rasla v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCA 1575

Appeal from: Application for extension of time: Rasla v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2016] FCCA 1830
File number: NSD 1378 of 2016
Judge: MCKERRACHER J
Date of judgment: 23 December 2016
Catchwords:

MIGRATION - carer visa – whether the Tribunal applied the wrong test when determining if the applicant was ‘willing and able’ to provide ‘substantial and continuing assistance’ under reg 1.15AA(1)(f) of the Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth) – whether reasoning of the Tribunal unreasonable, illogical and/or irrational

Held: Application dismissed

Legislation:

Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss 65(1)(b)

Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth) regs 1.15AA, 1.15AA(1)(f), cll 116.211, 116.221, 166.211

Cases cited:

Abebe v Commonwealth (1999) 197 CLR 510

Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v SZUXN [2016] FCA 516

Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZMDS (2010) 240 CLR 611

Narayan v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs [2001] FCA 1745

Nguyen v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCA 688

Perera v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2005] FCA 1120

WAHP v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2004] FCAFC 87

Xiang v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2004] FCAFC 64

Date of hearing: 22 November 2016
Date of last submissions: 15 November 2016
Registry: New South Wales
Division: General Division
National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 32
Counsel for the Applicant: Mr R Turner
Solicitor for the Applicant: Turner Coulson Immigration Lawyers
Counsel for the First Respondent: Ms R Francois
Solicitor for the First Respondent: DLA Piper Australia
Counsel for the Respondents: The Second Respondent submits to any order of the Court, save as to costs

ORDERS

NSD 1378 of 2016
BETWEEN:

MAGDA RASLA

Applicant

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION

First Respondent

ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL

Second Respondent

JUDGE:

MCKERRACHER J

DATE OF ORDER:

23 DECEMBER 2016

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The application for an extension of time within which to appeal from the specified orders will be refused.  

2.The applicant to pay the costs of the first respondent, to be assessed if not agreed. 

Note:    Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.


REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

MCKERRACHER J:

INTRODUCTION

  1. The applicant applies for an extension of time within which to appeal from orders made on 19 July 2016 (Rasla v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2016] FCCA 1830) (primary decision).  The primary judge dismissed the application for judicial review of a decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal made on 16 December 2014.  By that decision the Tribunal had affirmed a decision of a delegate of the Minister for Immigration and Border Protection to refuse to grant Other Family (Migrant) (Class BO) visas to Mr Barsom Girgis (the visa applicant) and to his wife and two minor children as secondary visa applicants.  The applicant is the mother of…

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Details
Case
[2016] FCA 1575
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In Rasla v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection, the applicant, a 57-year-old permanent resident with significant physical and mental health issues, sought a Subclass 116 Carer visa for her son. The delegate of the Minister initially refused the visa on 2 January 2013, but the Federal Circuit Court of Australia found a jurisdictional error and remitted the case to the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (AAT). The AAT reconsidered the application and again found against the visa applicant on 16 December 2014. The applicant now seeks an extension of time to appeal from the AAT's decision, arguing the AAT applied the wrong test and made illogical and irrational conclusions regarding the visa applicant's ability to provide 'substantial and continuing assistance'.

The primary legal issue was whether the AAT applied the correct test when determining if the visa applicant was willing and able to provide the required assistance under reg 1.15AA(1)(f) of the Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth). The applicant also argued the AAT's reasoning was unreasonable, illogical, and irrational. The court considered whether the Tribunal engaged in the correct reasoning process in assessing the visa applicant's ability to provide care and whether the Tribunal's findings were based on an evident and intelligible justification.

The court found the first proposed ground of appeal would not have sufficient prospects of success, as the Tribunal's adverse finding regarding the visa applicant's ability to provide care was open and not lacking an evident and intelligible justification. The court also dismissed the argument that the Tribunal's reasoning was illogical or irrational, stating the Tribunal was entitled to place limited weight on the evidence of family members about their willingness to financially support the visa applicant. The court concluded there was no jurisdictional error of the kind alleged in the second ground of appeal.

The court dismissed the application for an extension of time, stating the delay of about 10 days, with some explanation and lack of specific prejudice, did not warrant granting an extension if the grounds of appeal had sufficient prospects of success. The applicant was ordered to pay the costs of the first respondent, to be assessed if not agreed.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The application for an extension of time within which to appeal from the specified orders will be refused.

2. The applicant to pay the costs of the first respondent, to be assessed if not agreed.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

In the argument before me, the focus concentrated on the merits of any proposed appeal. I was satisfied in the absence of any substantial argument to the contrary that the delay of about 10 days, taken with some explanation and lack of specific prejudice, was such that if the grounds of appeal had sufficient prospects of success, the delay should not preclude the appeal being considered.BACKGROUND The visa applicant applied to the Department on 19 November 2012 for a Subclass 116 Carer visa. The applicant herself is a 57 year old permanent resident who suffers from extensive physical and mental health problems, including carpal tunnel syndrome, reduced vision, osteoarthritis, psychotic depression, post-traumatic stress disorder and anxiety. It was common ground that the applicant needed ‘24/7’ care, which I take as meaning constant care. A delegate of the Minister refused to grant the visa applicant, on 2 January 2013, as well as to the secondary visa applicants. On 16 January 2014, a differently constituted Tribunal affirmed the decision under review, but by consent the Federal Circuit Court of Australia accepted that there was jurisdictional error in arriving at that decision. The decision was remitted to the Tribunal for further consideration according to law. The Tribunal wrote to the applicant on 6 August 2014 confirming that her application was to be reconsidered. On 22 August 2014, the applicant, the visa applicant and the secondary visa applicants were invited by the Tribunal to appear before it to give evidence and to present arguments. A hearing occurred on 27 October 2014. On 3 November 2014, the Tribunal wrote to the applicant pursuant to s 359A of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth). As noted by the primary judge (at [4]-[5] of the primary decision), the letter stated:4. The review applicant and visa applicants were also represented by their registered migration agent at that hearing. Following the hearing on 3 November 2014 the Tribunal sent a letter to the review applicant and visa applicants consistent with s.359A of the Migration Act 1958 raising the following information:At the hearing on 27 October 2014, the visa applicant told the Tribunal that if the visa was granted and he came to Australia he would be able to support his family by running his business by working from home on his computer for 30 minutes to one hour per day. If this did not prove to be possible he stated he would look for part-time work to support his family.5. The Tribunal identified in the letter how the information was relevant. The Tribunal expressly referred to the legislative requirement that the visa applicant must be willing and able to provide to the review applicant substantial and continuing assistance of the kind needed. Through her representative, and by letter 6 November 2014, the applicant responded. By letters of 17 and 19 November 2014, the applicant again through her representative, provided further statements from her Australian relatives in relation to the preparedness of each relative to give financial support to the visa applicant in Australia, if that was required.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

The applicant draws attention to [33] of the Tribunal’s decision, which was in these terms:The Tribunal further considered that if the visa applicant sought part time work while he was in Australia he would not also be able to offer substantial and continuing assistance as his mother requires. In determining this, the Tribunal does not take into account whether the visa applicant's sister, Heba would be sharing the assistance required with him. This visa application is on the basis of whether [the visa applicant] is willing and able to provide to [the applicant] substantial and continuing assistance of the kind needed under subparagraph (b)(iv). The visa applicant has given evidence, there is documentary evidence on the Department file and the Tribunal accepts, that [the applicant] needs 24/7 care. The visa applicant has said that his mother’s risk of falling is a major consideration to be taken into account in assessing the nature of the continuous care she requires. His evidence is that she requires someone to be with her at all times to assist her if she should fall. The Tribunal considers that if the visa was granted and the visa applicant was not able to run his part of the family business on the part time basis of 30 minutes to 1 hour per day he would need to obtain part time work. The Tribunal considers that if he was to work part time he would not be able to provide substantial and continuing assistance as required by his mother.(emphasis added) The Tribunal at this point found that if the visa applicant sought part time work whilst in Australia, he would not be able to offer substantial and continuing assistance as his mother required. The applicant argues that necessarily such a conclusion requires some assessment of the nature of and duration of the assistance required by the applicant, as well as an assessment of the number of hours the visa applicant would have to be able to commit (having regard to his potential part time work commitments), and the nature of assistance the visa applicant would be able to provide. This would be necessary, it is argued, to discern whether the assistance the visa applicant was able to provide met the threshold of ‘substantial’ under the Regulations. Having made no attempt to engage in any reasoning of this kind, it is argued that the Tribunal’s findings at [33], and [36] in particular, are flawed and based fundamentally on an incorrect approach to the test in reg 1.15AA. This, it is said, is illustrated in [36] of the Tribunal’s findings which was in these terms:The Tribunal does not accept that the visa applicant would be able to run what he described at the hearing, as a full time business, for which he attended the office 4 days of the previous week as well as working from home, in 30-60 minutes per day, from his computer at home. It does not find this to be credible. The Tribunal does not accept that the applicant would be able to find other work 'of the same kind' if he was not able to support his family in this way. It notes the visa applicant is involved in a family tourism business run together with his uncle in Egypt in which he can work flexible hours. It does not find his claim that he would be able to find work 'of the same kind' to be credible. The Tribunal notes the visa applicant said he would work to support his family. The Tribunal notes that when asked about how he would support himself and his family the visa applicant said he would look for a part time position in some sort of computer work or possibly working for the Church. The Tribunal is not satisfied the visa applicant will be able to secure work of the flexible/home-based kind claimed. Accordingly, the Tribunal is not satisfied he will be ab1e to provide substantial and continuing assistance of the kind needed.(emphasis added)

Decision

Reasons for decision

The applicant applies for an extension of time within which to appeal from orders made on 19 July 2016 (Rasla v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2016] FCCA 1830) (primary decision). The primary judge dismissed the application for judicial review of a decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal made on 16 December 2014. By that decision the Tribunal had affirmed a decision of a delegate of the Minister for Immigration and Border Protection to refuse to grant Other Family (Migrant) (Class BO) visas to Mr Barsom Girgis (the visa applicant) and to his wife and two minor children as secondary visa applicants. The applicant is the mother of the visa applicant and the sponsor for the visa. The principles in relation to applications for extension of time of this nature are well established. Relevant considerations are the length of the delay, the explanation for the delay, any prejudice to the other party or parties, noting the absence of prejudice alone is not sufficient to grant leave, and the merits of the proposed appeal. In the argument before me, the focus concentrated on the merits of any proposed appeal. I was satisfied in the absence of any substantial argument to the contrary that the delay of about 10 days, taken with some explanation and lack of specific prejudice, was such that if the grounds of appeal had sufficient prospects of success, the delay should not preclude the appeal being considered.BACKGROUND The visa applicant applied to the Department on 19 November 2012 for a Subclass 116 Carer visa. The applicant herself is a 57 year old permanent resident who suffers from extensive physical and mental health problems, including carpal tunnel syndrome, reduced vision, osteoarthritis, psychotic depression, post-traumatic stress disorder and anxiety. It was common ground that the applicant needed ‘24/7’ care, which I take as meaning constant care. A delegate of the Minister refused to grant the visa applicant, on 2 January 2013, as well as to the secondary visa applicants. On 16 January 2014, a differently constituted Tribunal affirmed the decision under review, but by consent the Federal Circuit Court of Australia accepted that there was jurisdictional error in arriving at that decision. The decision was remitted to the Tribunal for further consideration according to law. The Tribunal wrote to the applicant on 6 August 2014 confirming that her application was to be reconsidered. On 22 August 2014, the applicant, the visa applicant and the secondary visa applicants were invited by the Tribunal to appear before it to give evidence and to present arguments. A hearing occurred on 27 October 2014. On 3 November 2014, the Tribunal wrote to the applicant pursuant to s 359A of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth). As noted by the primary judge (at [4]-[5] of the primary decision), the letter stated:4. The review applicant and visa applicants were also represented by their registered migration agent at that hearing. Following the hearing on 3 November 2014 the Tribunal sent a letter to the review applicant and visa applicants consistent with s.359A of the Migration Act 1958 raising the following information:At the hearing on 27 October 2014, the visa applicant told the Tribunal that if the visa was granted and he came to Australia he would be able to support his family by running his business by working from home on his computer for 30 minutes to one hour per day. If this did not prove to be possible he stated he would look for part-time work to support his family.5. The Tribunal identified in the letter how the information was relevant. The Tribunal expressly referred to the legislative requirement that the visa applicant must be willing and able to provide to the review applicant substantial and continuing assistance of the kind needed.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

In my view, the first proposed ground of appeal would not have sufficient prospects to be of success if an extension of time were granted.Ground 2 – illogical and irrational conclusions The argument on this ground pertains to three sub-grounds and is slightly more complex. The applicant contends, as she did in the Federal Circuit Court, that the reasoning of the Tribunal was irrational and/or illogical in three respects:(a)the reasoning regarding the visa applicant’s ability to provide substantial and continuing assistance;(b)the reasoning regarding evidence of financial support of the visa applicant; and(c)the Tribunal’s findings as to the visa applicant’s ability to provide assistance. The primary judge gave consideration to this ground (at [16]-[22]) of his Honour’s reasons where he said:16. In relation to ground 2, counsel for the applicant sought to attack the last sentence of para.36 as being an irrational, illogical and unreasonable finding. Given the identification of the needs of the review applicant, it cannot be said that no reasonable Tribunal could make the finding found in the last sentence of para.33, namely “the Tribunal considers that if the visa applicant was to work part-time, he would not be able to provide substantial or any assistance as required by his mother.” The adverse finding made by the Tribunal was open and cannot be said to lack an evident and intelligible justification. 17. Counsel for the applicant also sought to attack the finding of the Tribunal placing little weight on the evidence of family members, that they would provide financial support to the first visa applicant if it was needed. The specific finding attack was that the Tribunal places limited weight on this evidence. 18. The criticism was advanced that the Tribunal’s reference to the circumstances in which that evidence was put forward as a result of a s.359A letter was said to undermine the rational and logical basis upon which the Tribunal could come to an adverse conclusion in relation to that evidence. 19. It was open to the Tribunal to make the adverse finding made in relation to the evidence proffered belatedly as to the financial support being provided to the first visa applicant by his family. It was also open to the Tribunal to take into account that no evidence had been given to that effect by the first visa applicant at the hearing. There was no irrational, illogical or unreasonable finding by the Tribunal by reason of the decision to place limited weight on the evidence of the family members about the ability to financially support the first visa applicant. 20. The further grounds upon which it was argued that there was irrationality, unreasonable or illogicality was based on the reference in para.26 to the physical objective fitness of the first visa applicant to provide substantial and continuing care. On the further analysis engaged in by the Tribunal as to the ability of the applicant to provide that care, there was no inconsistency, illogicality, or unreasonableness in relation to those findings. 21. Insofar as it was argued in support of ground 2 that the Tribunal had to make a finding about the level of care that the first visa applicant could provide, the relevant consideration under reg.1.15AA(1)(f) referred to the applicant being willing and able to provide the resident substantial and continuing assistance of the kind needed that was identified by reference to reg.1.15AA(1)(iv). It was common ground in the material before the Tribunal that the nature of that care was 24/7 and the Tribunal so found.22. There was no requirement of the Tribunal to make a finding about the level of care that the first visa applicant was able to offer in the context of his part-time employment. There was no jurisdictional error of the kind alleged in ground 2.