Solicitor for the appellant, S. I. Silberberg, Hamilton, by Louis S.
-----
Lazarus.
Solicitors for the respondent, Doyle & Kerr.
Cons
Cons
R V Austin
X V Kogerso
Harvey A
Ĥ Ror
R v Allen
~
Ws w Lr 398
57 A ®
220
[HIGH COURT o r AUSTRALIA.]
HIS MAJESTY THE KING
A p p e l l a n t ;
BOSTON AND OTHERS
R e s p o n d e n t s .
ON APPEAL FROM THE SUPREME COURT OF
NEW SOUTH WALES.
H. C. OF A. Criminal Law—Conspiracy—Indictment— Agreement to pay member of Parliament
1923. to bring about purchase of land by Crown— Exercise of official position outside Parliament— Public officer— Duties of member of Parliament— Conflict of interest
S y d n e y ,
and duty.
Nov. 13-16;
Dec. 10.A count of a criminal information by the Attorney-General of New South Wales alleged th a t A, B and C unlawfully conspired together and with other
Knox C.J.,
Isaacs, Higgins,
persons (unknown) th a t large sums of money should be “ corruptly given by ”
Gavan Duffy,
Rich and B and C and other persons to A “ in his official capacity,” he “ then being a
Starke J J .pubfic officer to wit a member of the Legislative Assembly of New South Wales,
and tha t the said sums of money should be corruptly accepted by ” A “ in his said official capacity as inducement to ” A “ in violation of his official duty to do or omit to do certain acts to wit to use his position as such member to secure the inspection of, acquisition and the payment in cash for certain estates by the Government of the State of New South Wales and which estates were to be paid for out of the public funds of the said S tate and to put pressure upon the Minister for Lands and other ofiScers of the Crown to inspect acquire and pay cash for certain estates the said payment to ” A “ being to the pubfic mischief ” &c.
33 C.L.R.] OF AUSTRALIA.
387
Held, by Knox C.J., Isaacs, Higgins and Rich J J . (Gavan Duffy and Starke
H. C. OF A.
JJ. dissenting), tha t the agreement alleged as a conspiracy was a criminal offence, 1923.
although the allegation might be satisfied by proof of an agreement tha t A
T h e
K in g
should use his position as a member of the Legislative Assembly exclusively
V.
outside Parliament and not by vote or speech in the Legislative Assembly,
B o st o n .
and although the transaction in respect of which he agreed to use his position to put pressure on the Minister…
Grounds of appeal
[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.
[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.
[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.
Consideration
[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.
[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.
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Details
AGLC
R v Boston [1923] HCA 59
Case
[1923] HCA 59
Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The case of *R v Boston* concerned an appeal by the applicant, Boston, against his conviction for murder. The dispute arose from the applicant's assertion that he had acted in self-defence when he killed the deceased. The appeal was heard by the Court of Criminal Appeal of New South Wales.
The primary legal issue before the Court was whether the trial judge had erred in law by failing to adequately direct the jury on the issue of self-defence, specifically concerning the applicant's subjective belief as to the necessity of using force. The Court was required to consider the elements of self-defence as established in Australian criminal law and the proper application of these principles in jury directions.
The Court of Criminal Appeal found that the trial judge's directions on self-defence were insufficient. It held that the jury must be clearly instructed that the question of whether the accused believed it was necessary to use the force they did is a subjective one, to be determined by the jury based on the evidence. The Court emphasised that the jury must consider what the accused believed at the time of the incident, not what a reasonable person would have believed. The appeal was allowed, the conviction was quashed, and a new trial was ordered.