CITATION:The King v Gwynne (No 2) [2023] NTSC 22
PARTIES:THE KING
v
GWYNNE, Colleen Marie
TITLE OF COURT: SUPREME COURT OF THE NORTHERN TERRITORY
JURISDICTION: SUPREME COURT exercising Territory jurisdiction
FILE NO:21934234
DELIVERED: 6 March 2023
HEARING DATE: 3 March 2022
JUDGMENT OF: Burns J
Criminal Code Act 1983 s 75B, s 75C, s 81(3)
Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935 (SA) s 238, 251
Independent Commissioner Against Corruption (Consequential and Related Amendments) Bill 2017, Explanatory Statement
Interpretation Act 1978 (NT) s 62B(1) and (2)
Public Sector Employment and Management Act 1993 (NT) s 5DBoulanger v The Queen [2006] SCR 49; Charlie v The Queen (1999) 199 CLR 387 at 394 per Kirby J; Maitland v R; Macdonald v R [2019] NSWCCA 32; Maudsley v The Queen [2021] QCA 268; Nolan V MBF Investments Pty Ltd [2009] VSC 244; Obeid V The Queen (2015) 91 NSWLR 226; Pregelj v Manison (1987) 88 FLR 346; R v Carroll (2002) 213 CLR 635; R v J [2005] 1 AC 562; R v Quach (2010) 201 A Crim R 522; Soulemezie v Dudley (Holdings) Pty Ltd (1987) 10 NSWLR 247; Vallance v The Queen (1961) 108 CLR 56; Williams v Spautz (1992) 174 CLR 509, referred to.
REPRESENTATION:
Counsel:
Crown:G Wright SC with T Grealy
Accused:P Boulten SC with G O’Brien-Hartcher
Solicitors:
Crown:Office of the Director of Public Prosecutions
Accused:Bowden McCormack Lawyers
Judgment category classification: C
Judgment ID Number: Bur2306
Number of pages: 36
IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE NORTHERN TERRITORY
OF AUSTRALIA
AT DARWINThe King v Gwynne (No 2) [2023] NTSC 22
No. 21934234
BETWEEN:
THE KING
AND:
COLLEEN MARIE GWYNNE
CORAM: BURNS J
REASONS FOR RULING
(Delivered 6 March 2023)
Introduction
The accused, Colleen Gwynne, has entered a plea of not guilty to one Count alleging an offence in the following terms:
That between 1 December 2018 and 15 June 2019 at Darwin in the Northern Territory of Australia, [the accused] being a public officer, intentionally engaged in conduct, namely did take steps to secure the employment of Laura Dewson, which conduct was intentionally arbitrary or an abuse of process, and the said Colleen Gwynne was reckless as to the circumstance of the conduct being prejudicial to the rights of another person and the conduct was improper and engaged in with the intention of obtaining a benefit.
This Count charges an offence contrary to s 81(3) of the Criminal Code Act 1983 (‘the Code’). That section provides:
81 ABUSE OF OFFICE – ARBITRARY AND PREJUDICIAL CONDUCT
(1) A public officer commits an offence if:
(a)the officer intentionally engages in conduct; and
(b)the conduct is intentionally arbitrary or an abuse of process; and
(c)the conduct is prejudicial to the rights of another person and the officer is reckless in relation to that circumstance; and
(d)the conduct is improper.
Maximum penalty: Imprisonment for 2 years
(2) Absolute liability applies to subsection 1(d).
(3) A public officer commits an…
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- AGLC
- The King v Gwynne (No 2) [2023] NTSC 22
- Case
- [2023] NTSC 22
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court considered the relevant statutory provisions, including s 75C of the Code, which states that a person's conduct is improper if it warrants criminal sanction, and s 75B, which defines "benefit" within the context of the Code. The court also examined the meaning of "intention" as provided in s 43AI of the Code. Additionally, the court reviewed the Explanatory Statement to the Independent Commissioner Against Corruption (Consequential and Related Amendments) Bill 2017, which provided insight into the legislative intention behind s 81.
After considering the arguments from both the Crown and the accused, as well as relevant case law, the court concluded that the interpretation of s 81(3)(b) should include consideration of the accused's purpose in engaging in the alleged conduct. This interpretation is consistent with the apparent legislative intention that an offence under s 81 should be a serious criminal offence, and it provides clarity on when conduct may amount to an offence under s 81. The court proposed directing the jury to consider the accused's reason for engaging in the alleged conduct, as well as whether her conduct involved a deliberate departure from public sector requirements concerning the appointment of persons to positions in the Public Service.
This interpretation ensures that public officers are aware of the line that distinguishes administrative fault from criminal culpability, and it allows for a more comprehensive understanding of the elements required to prove an offence under s 81(3) of the Code.
Orders
Orders of the court
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Background
Background to the litigation
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Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
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Decision
Reasons for decision
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Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
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