Pinnacle Runway Pty Ltd v Triangl Limited

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Pinnacle Runway Pty Ltd v Triangl Limited [2019] FCA 1662

File number: VID 794 of 2016
Judge: MURPHY J
Date of judgment: 10 October 2019
Catchwords:

TRADE MARKS – whether the second respondent infringed the applicant’s trade mark pursuant to s 120 of the Trade Marks Act 1995 (Cth) – whether the mark was used to distinguish its goods from the goods of other traders.

TRADE MARKS – cross-claim for cancellation of a trade mark pursuant to s 88 of the Trade Marks Act 1995 (Cth) – whether cross-respondent was the first to use the trade mark in Australia in relation to the goods for which that mark is registered – whether marks which were used earlier than the priority date are identical or substantially identical to registered trade mark – whether substantial identity between two marks where multiple differences exist – whether a total impression of similarity emerges from a comparison between the two marks.

EVIDENCE – hearsay evidence – whether screenshots of webpages advertising women’s fashion apparel and swimwear for sale under particular style names and at specified prices constitute business records under s 69 of the Evidence Act1995 (Cth) – finding that such evidence does fall within the business records exception – consideration of evidence that the “Wayback Machine” automatically archives and retrieves webpages, without relevant human intervention – whether screenshots of archived webpages obtained using the Wayback Machine constitute hearsay under s 59 of the Evidence Act – whether such evidence should be excluded under s 135 of the Evidence Act or their use limited under s 136 of the Evidence Act.

DAMAGES – claim for damages for lost sales – whether claim for damages for diminution of reputation established – whether conduct of the respondent is such as to justify an award of additional damages under s 126(2) of the Trade Marks Act 1995 (Cth).

Legislation:

Evidence Act 1995 (Cth)

Trade Marks Act 1995 (Cth)

Cases cited:

Accor Australia & New Zealand Hospitality Pty Ltd v Liv Pty Ltd [2017] FCAFC 56; (2017) 345 ALR 205

Accor Australia & New Zealand Hospitality Pty Ltd v Liv Pty Ltd [2015] FCA 554; (2015) 112 IPR 494

Anheuser-Busch Inc v Budejovicky Budvar, Narodni Podnik & Ors [2002] FCA 390; (2002) 56 IPR 182

Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Air New Zealand Limited (No 5) [2012] FCA 1479; (2012) 301 ALR 352

Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Meriton Property Services Pty Ltd [2017] FCA 1305; (2017) 350 ALR 494

Beecham Group plc v Colgate-Palmolive Pty Ltd [2005] FCA 838; (2005) 66 IPR 254

Bohemia Crystal Pty Ltd v Host Corporation Pty Ltd [2018] FCA 235; (2018) 354 ALR 353

Carnival Cruise Lines Inc v Sitmar Cruises Ltd [1994] FCA 68; (1994) 120 ALR 495

Conde Nast Publications Pty Ltd v Taylor [1998] FCA 864; (1998) 41 IPR 505

Dyno Nobel Inc v Orica Explosives Technology Pty Ltd (No 2) [2019] FCA 1552

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Details
Case
[2019] FCA 1662
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the Federal Court of Australia, Pinnacle Runway Pty Ltd initiated legal proceedings against Triangl Limited, asserting infringement of its trade mark under section 120 of the Trade Marks Act 1995 (Cth). Pinnacle contended that Triangl's use of the word "DELPHINE" for a bikini style infringed its registered trade mark "DELFINA SPORT." The dispute also involved a cross-claim by Triangl for the cancellation of the trade mark under section 88 of the same Act. The central legal issues were whether Triangl's use of "DELPHINE" constituted an infringement of Pinnacle's trade mark and whether Triangl was the first to use the mark in Australia in relation to the relevant goods. The court further examined whether the marks were substantially identical and if substantial identity existed despite multiple differences.

The court's analysis focused on the comparison between the marks "DELPHINE" and "DELFINA SPORT." The court noted the similarities, such as both starting with "DEL" and having a homophonic second syllable. However, the differences were deemed significant enough to prevent a total impression of similarity from emerging. The court found that the overall appearance and certain design elements of the marks were markedly different. The court concluded that while "SPORT" might be descriptive to some extent, it served to distinguish the mark to a meaningful degree, impacting the overall impression of the marks. Consequently, the court ruled that the marks were not substantially identical.

The court also addressed the admissibility of certain evidence, particularly screenshots of webpages and archived web content, ruling that they constituted business records under the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth). The decision rejected Pinnacle's objections regarding the use of such evidence, finding that it was admissible under the business records exception. The court dismissed both the application for trade mark infringement and the cross-claim for cancellation, concluding that Triangl's use of "DELPHINE" did not infringe Pinnacle's trade mark and that Triangl was not the first to use the mark in relation to the relevant goods in Australia. The court further ordered that the parties submit their submissions on the question of costs within a specified timeframe.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The application be dismissed.

2. The cross-claim be dismissed.

3. The parties file and serve submissions on the question of costs within 21 days, and file and serve any submissions in reply within seven days thereafter.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

Full text does not contain this section.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Pinnacle objected to the admissibility of the screenshots and tables on the basis that this evidence was inadmissible hearsay under s 59 of the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) (the Evidence Act). Pinnacle argued, in the alternative, that they should be excluded under the general discretion pursuant to s 135 or their use limited under s 136 to use which does not include establishing that prior to the relevant period traders in Australia actually used the names listed in the course of trade. Triangl contended that the screenshots were not hearsay as it did not seek to adduce them to prove the truth of their contents. I do not accept that. Triangl relied upon the screenshots to make out its assertion that, up to and including the relevant period, consumers in Australia were used to seeing women’s names used as style names in relation to women’s fashion, including women’s swimwear. Each screenshot only assists to establish that asserted fact if its content is accepted as showing that the website of the relevant fashion brand or online retailer marketed items of women’s fashion or swimwear in Australia and used women’s names as a style names in relation to those goods. In my view Triangl sought to use the screenshots to prove the truth of their contents. They are evidence of a previous out of court representation by the relevant fashion house or online retailer to prove the fact asserted by the representation, which is inadmissible unless it falls within one of the exceptions to the hearsay rule. There are authorities which provide that such documents do not fall within the business records exception in s 69 of the Evidence Act but, for the reasons I explain, I consider that they do. In Roach v Page (No 27) [2003] NSWSC 1046 (Roach v Page (No 27)), Sperling J held that extracts from websites operated by Irish and Dutch peat exporters, which described the quality control procedures undertaken by those businesses, constituted inadmissible hearsay. His Honour referred to his earlier ruling in Roach v Page (No 15) [2003] NSWSC 939 in which he had observed that not every publication by a business is a “record of the business” within the meaning of s 69. In the earlier ruling (at [5] and [6]), Sperling J said: The records of a business are the documents (or other means of holding information) by which activities of the business are recorded. Business activities so recorded will typically include business operations so recorded, internal communications, and communications between the business and third parties. On the other hand, where it is a function of a business to publish books, newspapers, magazines, journals (including specialised professional, trade or industry journals), such publications are not records of the business. They are the product of the business, not a record of its business activities. Similarly, publications kept by a business such as journals or manuals (say, for reference purposes) are not records of the business. In Roach v Page (No 27) Sperling J said (at [9]-[12]): So far as is presently relevant, it is the recording of business activities in the course of carrying on the business which is critical. The publication of a book by a business providing a history of the business may record details of the business carried on but it is not a “record of business” within the meaning of s 69. Similarly, a flyer or a media advertisement or a website publication, extolling the virtues of the business in the way such publications do, is not a record of a business merely because it purportedly records activities of the business. It is necessary to place such a restrictive construction on s 69 because it cannot have been intended that publications of this kind would qualify, any more than it would have been intended that – in the ordinary course – books, magazines or newspapers published by the business would be covered by that section. The thinking behind the section is clear enough. Things recorded or communicated in the course of the business and constituting or concerning business activities are likely to be correct. There is good reason for the courts to afford to such records the same kind of reliability as those engaged in business operations customarily do. The same is not true of publications made for wider dissemination, for entertainment, for advertising or for public relations purposes. Such publications are justifiably received with healthy scepticism. The publications now tendered are not business records within the meaning of s 69. (Emphasis added.)

Decision

Reasons for decision

Mr Ellis also said that style names did not matter to Triangl, that it did not “care that much” about style names, and that in the context of the international market in which Triangl operated the names it used as style names were not unusual, although it might be said they were so in an Australian context. In his view there was no value, benefit or reputation to be attributed to Triangl in the style names that it applied to its bikini styles. I accept Mr Ellis’ evidence in this regard but the question as to whether Triangl’s use of DELPHINE constituted use as a trade mark does not turn on Triangl’s intent and it is a matter for the Court to decide. Triangl’s decision to use DELPHINE Mr Ellis deposed that he was unable to recall specifically who chose the name DELPHINE for one of the four new bikini styles Triangl was planning to launch as part of its Spring/Summer 2016 campaign. Then, in cross-examination, he said that a designer Triangl employed at the time came up with the names PALOMA, LOTTE, BIBI and DELPHINE for the four styles in the new collection. He said that the designer had an Italian background and she was trying to give the collection a more Mediterranean slant “just to vary it up - to step away from what we had done previously”. He said that Triangl chose the name DELPHINE along with PALOMA, LOTTE and BIBI as the new style names in line with the informal naming practice outlined above, and the four style names chosen were then arbitrarily assigned to the four new bikini styles. I accept his evidence in this regard. I also accept Mr Ellis' evidence that he was unaware of the existence of Pinnacle and of the DELPHINE Trade Mark at the time Triangl decided to use the name DELPHINE. Triangl’s use of DELPHINE It is uncontentious that during the relevant period (24 April 2016 to 2 June 2016) Triangl marketed and sold in Australia a bikini style in three colours and floral designs under the name DELPHINE, naming the three different designs as DELPHINE – FIORE, DELPHINE – FIORE ROSA and DELPHINE – FIORE NERO (the Triangl DELPHINE bikinis). It is also uncontentious that Triangl only used the name DELPHINE in Australia in that short period and that its use was restricted to:(a)the TRIANGL website;(b)three electronic direct mail (EDM) communications with customers and prospective customers who had set up an account through the TRIANGL website; and(c)12 posts on the TRIANGL Instagram page, 7 posts on the TRIANGL Facebook page, and in a press pack sent to Elise Garland Public Relations in June 2016 (the press pack).Pinnacle relied upon Triangl’s use of DELPHINE on the TRIANGL website and in the EDMs for the claim of trade mark infringement. It only relied on Triangl’s use of DELPHINE on the TRIANGL Instagram and Facebook pages as part of the context in which a consumer would perceive the use of DELPHINE on the TRIANGL website and in the EDMs. It did not rely on the use of DELPHINE in the press pack. I proceed upon that basis.The use of DELPHINE on the TRIANGL website

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Triangl submitted that the word SPORT is not an essential element or dominant cognitive cue in the DELFINA SPORT mark. It argued that SPORT is descriptive of the goods in question and not apt to perform a distinguishing role in respect of the goods. On its argument SPORT does not substantially affect the identity of DELFINA SPORT and on the test enunciated in Accor and Pham Global the DELPHINE and DELFINA SPORT marks should be found to be substantially identical.Consideration For convenience I again set out the two marks, side-by-side. The question as to whether these marks are substantially identical is a question of fact to be determined by a side-by-side comparison, noting the similarities and differences, and assessing the importance of these having regard to the essential features of the registered mark. If a total impression of similarity emerges from a comparison between the two marks then they are substantially identical: Shell at 414; Carnival Cruise Lines at 513. There are some similarities between the two marks and I accept that the overall idea of DELPHINE and DELFINA is similar. Both commence with the letters “DEL”, the “f” phenome in both sounds the same, and they have a homophonic second syllable. Having said this, the differences are such that a total impression of similarity does not emerge. First, the DELPHINE mark and the DELFINA SPORT mark are different in overall appearance in a way which is apt to distinguish them. The DELPHINE mark is not stylised. It is uppercase and there is nothing about the font style, size, colour or shape which distinguishes it. The DELFINA SPORT mark is in a stylised font with DELFINA in title case and italicised, and SPORT in uppercase, italicised, and set below and to the right. The DELFINA SPORT mark is sea blue in colour on a white background, and it has a lighter blue wave running through DELFINA. The evidence also shows a variant in which the text is in white on a sea blue background. That variant appears, for example, on the documents produced on subpoena which purport to be posts on Delfina Sport’s Facebook page. The overall appearance is markedly different. Second, the DELFINA element of the DELFINA SPORT mark is different to DELPHINE. The letters “F” and “PH” look different when the marks are viewed, and (putting to one side the fact that there are two elements to the DELFINA SPORT mark) DELFINA has a distinctly different sound to DELPHINE because it ends with “a”. Third, the DELFINA SPORT mark includes the SPORT element, and that element is given some prominence by being stylised, capitalised, italicised and offset. The fact that the name is double-barrelled, with both elements being given some prominence, is significant to the overall impression of difference that emerges. SPORT is descriptive to an extent which reduces its capacity to perform a distinguishing role, but SPORT may be a reference to an almost endless array of goods and the level of its descriptiveness is therefore low. In my view it serves to distinguish to an extent.