FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Pinnacle Runway Pty Ltd v Triangl Limited (No 3) [2020] FCA 1379
ORDERS
VID 794 of 2016 BETWEEN: PINNACLE RUNWAY PTY LTD
Applicant
AND: TRIANGL LIMITED
First Respondent
TRIANGL GROUP LIMITED
Second Respondent
AND BETWEEN: TRIANGL GROUP LIMITED
Cross-Claimant
AND: PINNACLE RUNWAY PTY LTD
Cross-Respondent
ORDER MADE BY:
MURPHY J
DATE OF ORDER:
25 SEPTEMBER 2020
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The Applicant pay the Second Respondent’s costs of and associated with the application alleging trade mark infringement (the infringement claim):
(a)for the period from the commencement of the infringement claim against the Second Respondent until 12…
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- Case
- [2020] FCA 1379
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The central legal issues involved determining the principles applicable to indemnity costs in the context of unsuccessful claims and cross-claims, and whether the rejection of settlement offers was unreasonable or imprudent. The court examined whether the settlement offers placed the offeree in a substantially better position than they achieved at trial, and the appropriate discretion to be exercised in ordering costs. The court considered the extensive submissions and affidavits provided by both parties, which highlighted the substantial legal costs incurred relative to the potential damages.
The court concluded that Triangl should be awarded its costs in relation to the infringement claim on an indemnity basis from 13 February 2018 onwards. This decision was based on the unreasonableness of Pinnacle's refusal to accept Triangl's settlement offer, which would have placed Pinnacle in a substantially better position than it achieved at trial. For the period up to 12 February 2018, Triangl's costs were to be paid on a party-party basis. Regarding the cross-claim, Pinnacle was awarded its costs up to 12 February 2018 on a party-party basis, with each party bearing their own costs thereafter. The court found that the conduct of the parties did not justify awarding costs for the failure to sue the correct entity.
The final orders were that Pinnacle pay Triangl's costs of the infringement claim on an indemnity basis from 13 February 2018 and on a party-party basis up to that date. Triangl was ordered to pay Pinnacle's costs of the cross-claim on a party-party basis up to 12 February 2018, with each party bearing their own costs thereafter.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The Applicant pay the Second Respondent’s costs of and associated with the application alleging trade mark infringement (the infringement claim):
(a) for the period from the commencement of the infringement claim against the Second Respondent until 12 February 2018, on a party-party basis; and
(b) for the period from 13 February 2018, on an indemnity basis;
as agreed or assessed.
2. The Second Respondent pay the Applicant’s costs of and associated with the cross-claim for the period up to 12 February 2018 on a party and party basis, as agreed or assessed. Thereafter each party bear their own costs.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Full text does not contain this section.
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Pinnacle also notes that, despite seeking the proposed orders, it made a Calderbank offer on 25 October 2019 in which it offered not to appeal the liability judgment and to settle the issue of costs on the basis that each party bear their own costs. The offer was not accepted and Pinnacle subsequently filed an appeal.Consideration Some of Pinnacle’s contentions relate to the infringement claim alone, and others involve rolling up consideration of the costs of the infringement claim with consideration of the costs of the cross-claim. In the circumstances of the present case I am not persuaded that it is appropriate to roll up consideration of the costs in that way. The facts and circumstances relevant to which party should have the benefit of a costs order are different as between the infringement claim and the cross-claim and it is appropriate to consider them separately, at least largely. Having said that, and as I explain, my view that it was unreasonable for Pinnacle not to have accepted Triangl’s second Calderbank offer made in relation to the whole proceeding (both infringement claim and cross-claim) has an effect on my view as to the appropriate order in relation to costs in the cross-claim. Once the issues in relation to the costs of the infringement claim are considered largely separately from those in relation to the costs of the cross-claim I can see little merit in Pinnacle’s proposed orders. First, I do not accept Pinnacle’s contention that it should have its costs thrown away because it was misdirected or misled by Triangl and its director, Mr Ellis, which resulted in it commencing the proceeding against the wrong Triangl entity. The evidence does not establish that Mr Ellis, Triangl Ltd or Triangl deliberately misdirected or misled Pinnacle’s lawyers in relation to the correct Triangl entity such that it might be appropriate that Triangl bear the costs thrown away. It was put to Mr Ellis in cross examination that he did not alert Pinnacle to the fact that it had commenced the proceeding against the wrong Triangl entity because he wanted to make the case as difficult and expensive as possible for Pinnacle. Essentially Mr Ellis said that he did not inform Pinnacle of its mistake because he had a lot to do and he had to prioritise his work. He said, and I accepted (at LJ [86]), that the “last thing” he was thinking about in response to Pinnacle’s demands was whether it had sued the right entity. It was the task of Pinnacle’s lawyers, Actuate IP, to commence the proceeding against the correct Triangl entity. I have no difficulty in accepting that it was reasonable for Mr Petale to commence the case against Triangl Ltd given the information that he had, but there were further available methods open for him to satisfy himself as to the correct Triangle entity, including by making a “trap” purchase so as to obtain an invoice, by making an application for preliminary discovery, or undertaking a search of entities within the Triangle group of companies. In the absence of evidence that Mr Ellis, Triangl Ltd or Triangl deliberately sought to misdirect or mislead Pinnacle or its solicitors, Pinnacle draws a long bow in arguing that the successful respondent to the proceeding should pay the costs of its failure to sue the correct party. I am not persuaded that the conduct of Mr Ellis, Triangl Ltd or Triangl rises to the level of justifying such an order.