FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Pharikan v Minister for Home Affairs [2019] FCA 49
Appeal from: Pharikan v Minister for Home Affairs & Anor [2018] FCCA 1453 File number: NSD 1163 of 2018 Judge: GLEESON J Date of judgment: 31 January 2019 Catchwords: MIGRATION – appeal from decision of Federal Circuit Court of Australia to affirm Administrative Appeals Tribunal’s decision to deny appellant partner visa – application for leave to rely on fresh grounds of appeal – whether Tribunal’s credibility finding based on illogical or irrational reasoning – appeal allowed Legislation: Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss 5CB(2), 104(1), 476
Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth) reg 1.15A, Sch 2 cl 801.221(2)(c)
Cases cited: Commissioner for ACT Revenue v Alphaone Pty Ltd (1994) 49 FCR 576
DAO16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCAFC 2
Gauci v Federal Commissioner of Taxation [1975] HCA 54; (1975) 135 CLR 81
Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs; Ex parte Applicant S154/2002 [2003] HCA 60; (2003) 201 ALR 437
SZBEL v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2006] HCA 63; (2006) 228 CLR 152
SZEJF v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2006] FCA 724
SZLGP v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2008] FCA 1198
SZLPH v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCAFC 145
Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZRKT [2013] FCA 317; (2013) 212 FCR 99
Tran v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2006] FCA 1229
W148/00A v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2001] FCA 679; (2001) 185 ALR 703
WAIJ v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2004] FCAFC 74; (2004) 80 ALD 568
Date of hearing: 20 November 2018 Registry: New South Wales Division: General Division National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights Category: Catchwords Number of paragraphs: 77 Counsel for the Appellant: Ms T Baw Solicitor for the Appellant: Turner Coulson Immigration Lawyers Counsel for the First Respondent: Ms N Laing Solicitor for the First Respondent: Minter Ellison ORDERS
NSD 1163 of 2018 BETWEEN: PHINIT PHARIKAN
Appellant
AND: MINISTER FOR HOME AFFAIRS
First Respondent
ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL
Second Respondent
JUDGE:
GLEESON J
DATE OF ORDER:
31 JANUARY 2019
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The appellant have leave to file an amended notice of appeal containing the following ground of appeal:
The Tribunal made a jurisdictional error by finding that the appellant deliberately withheld information from the Department which finding affected the Tribunal’s assessment of the appellant’s case that he was in a de facto relationship with his sponsor.
2.The appeal be allowed.
3.The orders made by the Federal Circuit Court of Australia dated 8 June 2018 be set aside, and in lieu of those orders it is ordered that:
(a)a writ of certiorari be issued quashing the decision of the second respondent dated 14 January 2016;
(b)the matter be remitted to the second respondent, differently constituted, for determination of the application for review dated 12 January 2015 according to law; and
(c)the first…
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- Case
- [2019] FCA 49
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The appellant have leave to file an amended notice of appeal containing the following ground of appeal:
The Tribunal made a jurisdictional error by finding that the appellant deliberately withheld information from the Department which finding affected the Tribunal’s assessment of the appellant’s case that he was in a de facto relationship with his sponsor.
2. The appeal be allowed.
3. The orders made by the Federal Circuit Court of Australia dated 8 June 2018 be set aside, and in lieu of those orders it is ordered that:
(a) a writ of certiorari be issued quashing the decision of the second respondent dated 14 January 2016;
(b) the matter be remitted to the second respondent, differently constituted, for determination of the application for review dated 12 January 2015 according to law; and
(c) the first respondent pay the appellant's costs of and incidental to the appeal and of the proceedings in the Federal Circuit Court of Australia as agreed or assessed.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Full text does not contain this section.
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
In determining whether procedural fairness has been denied, it may be relevant to note the distinction between an adverse assessment of a witness’s credit and a positive finding of fact on an issue about which the witness’s evidence is tested. Thus, for example, as Barwick CJ observed in Gauci v Federal Commissioner of Taxation [1975] HCA 54; (1975) 135 CLR 81 at 87, “[d]isbelief does not amount to positive evidence of the opposite of what is disbelieved”.ConsiderationParticulars (1) to (4) I am not satisfied that the Tribunal’s decision record reveals jurisdictional error of the kind identified in the first four of the five particulars to the first proposed ground of appeal. First, particular (1) implicitly acknowledges that the appellant had an obligation under s 104(1) of the Act “if his circumstances change[d]”. There is nothing illogical or irrational in an expectation that the appellant would be aware of his legal obligations. It is a separate question whether the appellant was, in fact, so aware. Second, the Tribunal’s finding that the appellant’s evidence was “unconvincing” was nothing more than an observation or side comment. Accepting, as was said in the passage from W148/00A set out above, that it is not sufficient to make passing comments where the issue is important or significant, the appellant’s evidence on this point was not such an issue. That is demonstrated by the fact that the Tribunal did not make findings as to the truthfulness of the evidence. Third, it was open to the Tribunal to form the view that the evidence was unconvincing. The appellant’s evidence was that he had paid a lawyer who had disappeared, rather than a migration agent. On its face, it is surprising that a lawyer or a migration agent might have disappeared given that both occupations are regulated and it is also surprising that the appellant claimed not to know what visa he held given the significance of the visa to his legal status in Australia. At the hearing of the appeal, it was submitted that the Tribunal had an obligation to quiz the appellant about his evidence, apparently in order to determine whether he might have been able to substantiate it with more detail. The Tribunal did not have such an obligation as a matter of procedural fairness. It was a matter for the appellant to put forward such evidence as he considered would support his application: see SZBEL at [40] and [48]; Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs; Ex parte Applicant S154/2002 [2003] HCA 60; (2003) 201 ALR 437 at [57]-[58] per Gummow and Heydon JJ (Gleeson CJ agreeing at [1]). Fourth, the Tribunal’s decision record does not reveal the evidentiary basis for its finding that the appellant “could have easily contacted Immigration himself” notwithstanding the appellant’s evidence that he did not know how to inform the Department of the breakdown of his previous relationship. However, the appellant did give evidence that, after the Department had initiated contact with him, his daughter assisted him to contact the Department. That evidence provides a basis (albeit thin) for the Tribunal’s finding. In my view, the Tribunal’s reasons should not be construed as meaning that the appellant could have contacted the Department without the assistance of his daughter but, rather, without the assistance of a migration agent. The other matters identified by the appellant, being his lack of English speaking skills and his statement that he did not know how to inform the Department, did not require the Tribunal to refrain from making the finding. Particular (5)