Pembroke School Incorporated v Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Pembroke School Incorporated v Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission

[2002] FCA 1020

PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – application to re-open proceedings after judgment and orders formally entered - ground of new evidence – whether jurisdiction exists to do so – grounds upon which jurisdiction (if it exists) might be exercised – whether grounds made out - jurisdiction to re-open application for review of Commission’s decision in circumstances where the Commission’s decision is alleged to have been effected by fraud – whether exceptional circumstances – whether ground made out.

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW – ostensible bias – waiver.

Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth), ss 5, 5(1)(a), 5(1)(b), 5(1)(e), 5(1)(g), 5(2)(b)
Disability Discrimination Act 1992 (Cth), ss 5, 6, 22, 22(2), 22(2)(a), 23, 23(1)(c), 24, 37, 79(1), 83, 98
Federal Court Rules, O 35 r 7(2), O 36
Human Rights & Equal Opportunity Commission Act 1986 (Cth), s 42

School v Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission [1998] FCA 1455
Munroe Schneider Associates (Inc.) v No.1 Raberem Pty Ltd (No.2) (1992) 37 FCR 234 - discussed
Darling Downs Investments Pty Ltd v Elwood (1988) 18 FCR 510 – referred to
Elna Australia Pty Ltd v International Computers (Aust.) Pty Ltd (1987) 14 FCR 461 – referred to
Wentworth v Rogers (No.5) (1986) 6 NSWLR 534 - discussed
Donkin v AGC (Advances) Ltd [1995] FCA 696 - discussed
Autodesk Inc. v Dyason (No.2) (1993) 176 CLR 300 - discussed
Autodesk Inc. v Dyason (1992) 173 CLR 330 – referred to
State Rail Authority of New South Wales v Codelfa Constructions Pty Ltd (1982) 150 CLR 29 – referred to
Jovanovic v The Queen (1999) 92 FCR 580 - discussed
McDonald v McDonald (1965) 113 CLR 529 – referred to
Spies v Commonwealth Bank of Australia (1991) 24 NSWLR 691 – referred to
Smith v NSW Bar Association (1992) 176 CLR 256 - cited
Commonwealth Bank of Australia v Quade (1991) 178 CLR 134 - discussed
Orr v Holmes (1948) 76 CLR 632 – referred to
Greater Woollongong Corporation v Cowan (1995) 93 CLR 435 – referred to
Minister for Aboriginal Affairs v Peko-Wallsend Ltd (1980) 162 CLR 24 – referred to
Borkovic v Minister for Immigration & Ethnic Affairs (1981) 39 ALR 186 - cited
Ebner v Official Trustee in Bankruptcy (2000) 176 ALR 644; [2000] HCA 64 – referred to
R v Watson; Ex parte Armstrong (1976) 136 CLR 248 – referred to
Dickason v Edwards (1910) 10 CLR 243 – referred to
Maloney v New South Wales National Coursing Association Ltd (1978) 1 NSWLR 161 – referred to
Vakauta v Kelly (1989) 167 CLR 568 – referred to
Preston v Carmody (1993) 44 FCR 1 – referred to
Najjar v Haines (1999) 25 NSWLR 224 – referred to

PEMBROKE SCHOOL INCORPORATED v HUMAN RIGHTS AND EQUAL OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION and MERELYN COWELL (on behalf of herself and FLEUR COWELL)

SG.45 of 1998

MANSFIELD J
19 AUGUST 2002
ADELAIDE


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

SOUTH AUSTRALIA…

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Details
Case
[2002] FCA 1020
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of Pembroke School Incorporated v Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission involved the Pembroke School Incorporated (the School) and the Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission (HREOC). The dispute centered around the School’s alleged indirect discrimination against a student, Ms F Cowell, who used crutches and found the stairs at the School difficult to navigate. The School was found to have imposed a condition that Ms F Cowell regularly attend classes located upstairs, despite her difficulties. The Court was tasked with deciding whether the decision of the Commission, which found the School had indirectly discriminated against Ms F Cowell, could be re-opened or set aside due to new evidence or alleged fraud by the School.

The legal issues before the Court included whether the Court had the power to re-open or set aside a decision of the Commission under the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act (ADJR Act), particularly if the decision was procured by fraud. The Court also had to determine if the new evidence presented, namely the diary of Ms F Cowell, was sufficient to justify setting aside the Commission’s decision or the Court’s judgment. The Court considered whether the delay in presenting this new evidence could be excused and if the interests of justice required a re-opening of the case.

The Court found that the Cowells had not demonstrated any grounds upon which the Court should permit a re-opening of their application under the ADJR Act. The Court held that the new evidence did not substantiate claims of fraud sufficient to justify setting aside the Commission’s decision. The Court also concluded that the motion did not constitute a rare and exceptional case where the interests of justice required re-opening the case. Consequently, the application to re-open the case was dismissed, and the Court upheld the Commission’s decision and its own judgment.

The final orders of the Court were that the application of the Cowells made by notice of motion dated 16 August 2001 was dismissed.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The application of the second respondent by notice of motion dated 16 August 2001 is dismissed.

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

MANSFIELD J (dissent)
I have dealt with the claims about those three documents on the assumption that, if the Cowells could demonstrate by the re-acquisition of the diary of Ms F Cowell or in some other way that the Commission’s decision was procured by fraud on the part of the School, and that the case fell within the principles discussed above, it would be within the power of the Court on this motion to re-open the ADJR application or to set aside the Court’s judgment for the purpose somehow of re-enlivening the Court’s power to hear the ADJR application, presumably invoking s 5(1)(g) of the ADJR Act. It is not self-evident that the Court could do so if the basis of the claim were the ascertaining of fresh evidence which did not go so far as to demonstrate the Commission’s decision was affected by fraud. I also do not need to address whether s 5(1)(g) refers only to fraud on the part of the administrative decision maker.CONCLUSION In my judgment, the Cowells have not made out any basis upon which the Court should permit them to reopen their application under the ADJR Act in respect of the decision of the Commission given on 23 March 1998, assuming in the circumstances that the Court has jurisdiction to do so. The case is not one of rare and exceptional cases where the interests of justice require that course of action in respect of a judgment which has been entered in accordance with the Rules. I also consider that, if the motion be treated as a fresh action to set aside the decision of the Commission on the ground that it was procured by fraud, the Cowells have not made out grounds upon which any such order may be made. I did not understand them to be alleging that the decision of the Court given on 11 November 1998 was itself procured by fraud on the part of the School. There is no material upon which they could make that out. Their motion might also be taken as a fresh action to set aside the judgment of the Court of 11 November 1998 for the purpose of arguing on the application then before the Court that the decision of the Commission given on 23 March 1998 should be generally set aside. The basis of that application is the discovery in March 2000 of the diary of Ms F Cowell. For the reasons given, I do not consider that grounds have been made out upon which that application could succeed. I accordingly dismiss the application of the Cowells made by notice of motion dated 16 August 2001.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by:

I do not think the explanation for the delay is entirely satisfactory. However, I am conscious of the difficulties the Cowells have experienced in getting to the present point. I do not propose to refuse the present motion by reason of any delay, or apparent delay, on their part in making the application.CONSIDERATION OF GROUNDS In the document entitled “Amended Proposed Grounds to Seek Further Review of Decision of 23 March 1998” of HREOC, there are seven grounds. I shall deal with them in sequence as they are listed. The first is “indirect discrimination”. It is expressed in the following terms:“The findings of the Tribunal were not dealt with in the cross review of this matter. Despite the fact that irrelevant considerations had been taken into account. The second respondents were prevented from presenting these facts. French classes in 1995 were upstairs but not affected by a change of house. A computer was available in the library in 1995 not in 1994 when the second respondent was actually taking compulsory computer lessons. The inside stairs were as difficult access as the outside stairs.” In very brief terms, the allegation which the Commission was required to address was whether the School had imposed a condition that Ms F Cowell regularly attend classes which were located upstairs. She had been first allocated a home house which was located upstairs, before any question as to her capacity to use the stairs at the School to access the upstairs home rooms had been raised. In March 1994, the Commission found, her home group teacher had been alerted to the fact that she was having difficulties with the stairs. The Commission accepted that her home group teacher had then suggested that Ms F Cowell be transferred to another of the six home houses with home rooms on a ground floor section of the School campus, but that offer was rejected by Ms M Cowell. A similar offer was made in April 1994 but again rejected. The Commission did not accept the evidence given by Ms M Cowell about those conversations. At a formal meeting between the head of the middle School and Ms M Cowell early in term two of 1994, a further suggestion of a change of house was put but rejected, and later that year the acting head of that house (whilst the house master was on leave) again put that proposal but it was rejected. The head of the middle School put that proposal further in early 1995. The Commission further found that the subject of computing was taught only upstairs during 1994, and that normal access to the computing class was by external stairs which were not suitable to be used by Ms F Cowell whilst she was on crutches during that year. The School offered her the use of an internal stairway, which it found could be used by her even when on crutches. I noted in the reasons for judgment of 11 November 1998:“[Ms F Cowell’s] evidence was (as the Commission found) that she was not worried about computing, and that a computer was available to her in the library [downstairs]. The Commission declined to make any discrete finding adverse to the School in relation to computing classes. No issue based on that particular aspect is raised on this application.”