FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Pembroke School Incorporated v Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission
[2002] FCA 1020
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – application to re-open proceedings after judgment and orders formally entered - ground of new evidence – whether jurisdiction exists to do so – grounds upon which jurisdiction (if it exists) might be exercised – whether grounds made out - jurisdiction to re-open application for review of Commission’s decision in circumstances where the Commission’s decision is alleged to have been effected by fraud – whether exceptional circumstances – whether ground made out.
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW – ostensible bias – waiver.
Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth), ss 5, 5(1)(a), 5(1)(b), 5(1)(e), 5(1)(g), 5(2)(b)
Disability Discrimination Act 1992 (Cth), ss 5, 6, 22, 22(2), 22(2)(a), 23, 23(1)(c), 24, 37, 79(1), 83, 98
Federal Court Rules, O 35 r 7(2), O 36
Human Rights & Equal Opportunity Commission Act 1986 (Cth), s 42School v Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission [1998] FCA 1455
Munroe Schneider Associates (Inc.) v No.1 Raberem Pty Ltd (No.2) (1992) 37 FCR 234 - discussed
Darling Downs Investments Pty Ltd v Elwood (1988) 18 FCR 510 – referred to
Elna Australia Pty Ltd v International Computers (Aust.) Pty Ltd (1987) 14 FCR 461 – referred to
Wentworth v Rogers (No.5) (1986) 6 NSWLR 534 - discussed
Donkin v AGC (Advances) Ltd [1995] FCA 696 - discussed
Autodesk Inc. v Dyason (No.2) (1993) 176 CLR 300 - discussed
Autodesk Inc. v Dyason (1992) 173 CLR 330 – referred to
State Rail Authority of New South Wales v Codelfa Constructions Pty Ltd (1982) 150 CLR 29 – referred to
Jovanovic v The Queen (1999) 92 FCR 580 - discussed
McDonald v McDonald (1965) 113 CLR 529 – referred to
Spies v Commonwealth Bank of Australia (1991) 24 NSWLR 691 – referred to
Smith v NSW Bar Association (1992) 176 CLR 256 - cited
Commonwealth Bank of Australia v Quade (1991) 178 CLR 134 - discussed
Orr v Holmes (1948) 76 CLR 632 – referred to
Greater Woollongong Corporation v Cowan (1995) 93 CLR 435 – referred to
Minister for Aboriginal Affairs v Peko-Wallsend Ltd (1980) 162 CLR 24 – referred to
Borkovic v Minister for Immigration & Ethnic Affairs (1981) 39 ALR 186 - cited
Ebner v Official Trustee in Bankruptcy (2000) 176 ALR 644; [2000] HCA 64 – referred to
R v Watson; Ex parte Armstrong (1976) 136 CLR 248 – referred to
Dickason v Edwards (1910) 10 CLR 243 – referred to
Maloney v New South Wales National Coursing Association Ltd (1978) 1 NSWLR 161 – referred to
Vakauta v Kelly (1989) 167 CLR 568 – referred to
Preston v Carmody (1993) 44 FCR 1 – referred to
Najjar v Haines (1999) 25 NSWLR 224 – referred toPEMBROKE SCHOOL INCORPORATED v HUMAN RIGHTS AND EQUAL OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION and MERELYN COWELL (on behalf of herself and FLEUR COWELL)
SG.45 of 1998
MANSFIELD J
19 AUGUST 2002
ADELAIDE
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
SOUTH AUSTRALIA…
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- Case
- [2002] FCA 1020
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The legal issues before the Court included whether the Court had the power to re-open or set aside a decision of the Commission under the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act (ADJR Act), particularly if the decision was procured by fraud. The Court also had to determine if the new evidence presented, namely the diary of Ms F Cowell, was sufficient to justify setting aside the Commission’s decision or the Court’s judgment. The Court considered whether the delay in presenting this new evidence could be excused and if the interests of justice required a re-opening of the case.
The Court found that the Cowells had not demonstrated any grounds upon which the Court should permit a re-opening of their application under the ADJR Act. The Court held that the new evidence did not substantiate claims of fraud sufficient to justify setting aside the Commission’s decision. The Court also concluded that the motion did not constitute a rare and exceptional case where the interests of justice required re-opening the case. Consequently, the application to re-open the case was dismissed, and the Court upheld the Commission’s decision and its own judgment.
The final orders of the Court were that the application of the Cowells made by notice of motion dated 16 August 2001 was dismissed.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The application of the second respondent by notice of motion dated 16 August 2001 is dismissed.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Established by:
I do not think the explanation for the delay is entirely satisfactory. However, I am conscious of the difficulties the Cowells have experienced in getting to the present point. I do not propose to refuse the present motion by reason of any delay, or apparent delay, on their part in making the application.CONSIDERATION OF GROUNDS In the document entitled “Amended Proposed Grounds to Seek Further Review of Decision of 23 March 1998” of HREOC, there are seven grounds. I shall deal with them in sequence as they are listed. The first is “indirect discrimination”. It is expressed in the following terms:“The findings of the Tribunal were not dealt with in the cross review of this matter. Despite the fact that irrelevant considerations had been taken into account. The second respondents were prevented from presenting these facts. French classes in 1995 were upstairs but not affected by a change of house. A computer was available in the library in 1995 not in 1994 when the second respondent was actually taking compulsory computer lessons. The inside stairs were as difficult access as the outside stairs.” In very brief terms, the allegation which the Commission was required to address was whether the School had imposed a condition that Ms F Cowell regularly attend classes which were located upstairs. She had been first allocated a home house which was located upstairs, before any question as to her capacity to use the stairs at the School to access the upstairs home rooms had been raised. In March 1994, the Commission found, her home group teacher had been alerted to the fact that she was having difficulties with the stairs. The Commission accepted that her home group teacher had then suggested that Ms F Cowell be transferred to another of the six home houses with home rooms on a ground floor section of the School campus, but that offer was rejected by Ms M Cowell. A similar offer was made in April 1994 but again rejected. The Commission did not accept the evidence given by Ms M Cowell about those conversations. At a formal meeting between the head of the middle School and Ms M Cowell early in term two of 1994, a further suggestion of a change of house was put but rejected, and later that year the acting head of that house (whilst the house master was on leave) again put that proposal but it was rejected. The head of the middle School put that proposal further in early 1995. The Commission further found that the subject of computing was taught only upstairs during 1994, and that normal access to the computing class was by external stairs which were not suitable to be used by Ms F Cowell whilst she was on crutches during that year. The School offered her the use of an internal stairway, which it found could be used by her even when on crutches. I noted in the reasons for judgment of 11 November 1998:“[Ms F Cowell’s] evidence was (as the Commission found) that she was not worried about computing, and that a computer was available to her in the library [downstairs]. The Commission declined to make any discrete finding adverse to the School in relation to computing classes. No issue based on that particular aspect is raised on this application.”