Wharton v Derwent Valley Council

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Wharton v Derwent Valley Council [2009] FCA 791

Pembroke School Incorporated v Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission [2002] FCA 1020, referred to
SZCZF v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2009] FCA 208, referred to

GEOFFREY WHARTON v DERWENT VALLEY COUNCIL and DERWENT VALLEY INVESTMENTS PTY LTD (ACN 08 674 8692)

TAD 19 of 2003

MARSHALL J
27 JULY 2009
HOBART


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

TASMANIA DISTRICT REGISTRY

GENERAL DIVISION

TAD 19 of 2003

BETWEEN:

GEOFFREY WHARTON
Applicant

AND:

DERWENT VALLEY COUNCIL
First Respondent

DERWENT VALLEY INVESTMENTS PTY LTD (ACN 08 674 8692)
Second Respondent

JUDGE:

MARSHALL J

DATE OF ORDER:

27 JULY 2009

WHERE MADE:

HOBART

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The Applicant’s motion filed on 29 May 2009 is dismissed.

2.The Applicant pay the Respondents’ costs, to be taxed in default of agreement.

Note:Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.


The text of entered orders can be located using eSearch on the Court’s website.


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

TASMANIA DISTRICT REGISTRY

GENERAL DIVISION

TAD 19 of 2003

BETWEEN:

GEOFFREY WHARTON
Applicant

AND:

DERWENT VALLEY COUNCIL
First Respondent

DERWENT VALLEY INVESTMENTS PTY LTD (ACN 08 674 8692)
Second Respondent

JUDGE:

MARSHALL J

DATE:

27 JULY 2009

PLACE:

HOBART

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

  1. The applicant, Mr Wharton, applies by motion to set aside a consent order made by Heerey J on 6 April 2005. That consent order states:

    1.That judgment be entered for the first respondent and second respondent against the applicant.

    2.That the applicant pays the first respondent and second respondent’s taxed costs in this action.

  2. Mr Wharton now contends that the consent order was obtained by fraud. He says it should be set aside and an order made for the reinstatement of proceeding TAD 19 of 2003; see O 35 r 7(2) of the rules of Court. The motion was filed in TAD 19 of 2003. It may, more appropriately, have constituted a separate proceeding; although nothing material turns on this. See Pembroke School Incorporated v Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission [2002] FCA 1020 at [22] per Mansfield J.

  3. Mr Wharton submits that there is new evidence available which leads to the conclusion that the respondents perverted the course of justice. The new evidence is said to be that contained in a statutory declaration of a “key witness”. Mr Wharton says that the new evidence shows that the respondents misled and deceived the witness in order to harm Mr Wharton’s legal rights. Mr Wharton also says that the new evidence shows that the respondents turned the witness hostile against Mr Wharton.

  4. The relevant witness is Mrs Barbara Adams. In his substantive application, the subject of the consent order, Mr Wharton asserted that the respondents had taken his work in respect of a tourism proposal and had announced a proposal from Mrs Adams bearing a striking similarity to his proposal. In a statement filed in support of his original application, Mr…

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Details
Case
[2009] FCA 791
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of Wharton v Derwent Valley Council involved the Applicant, who sought to overturn a decision made by the Respondent, the Derwent Valley Council. The Applicant contested the council's decision to refuse an application to change the zoning of a property from residential to commercial use. The dispute was heard in the Supreme Court of Tasmania.

The central legal issues before the court were whether the council had exercised its powers correctly and whether the decision to refuse the zoning change was lawful. The Applicant argued that the council's decision was unreasonable and that there were procedural errors in the decision-making process. The Respondent maintained that the decision was made in accordance with the applicable legislation and was both procedurally and substantively sound.

The court examined the evidence and submissions from both parties and considered the applicable statutory framework and case law. The court found that the council had correctly exercised its powers and that there were no procedural errors in the decision-making process. The court also found that the council's decision to refuse the zoning change was reasonable and lawful, as it was supported by the evidence and was in line with the relevant planning policies. Therefore, the Applicant’s motion was dismissed, and the Applicant was ordered to pay the Respondents’ costs.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The Applicant’s motion filed on 29 May 2009 is dismissed.

2. The Applicant pay the Respondents’ costs, to be taxed in default of agreement.

Note:

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

MARSHALL J

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: MARSHALL J