FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Wharton v Derwent Valley Council [2009] FCA 791
Pembroke School Incorporated v Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission [2002] FCA 1020, referred to
SZCZF v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2009] FCA 208, referred toGEOFFREY WHARTON v DERWENT VALLEY COUNCIL and DERWENT VALLEY INVESTMENTS PTY LTD (ACN 08 674 8692)
TAD 19 of 2003
MARSHALL J
27 JULY 2009
HOBART
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
TASMANIA DISTRICT REGISTRY
GENERAL DIVISION
TAD 19 of 2003
BETWEEN: GEOFFREY WHARTON
Applicant
AND: DERWENT VALLEY COUNCIL
First RespondentDERWENT VALLEY INVESTMENTS PTY LTD (ACN 08 674 8692)
Second Respondent
JUDGE:
MARSHALL J
DATE OF ORDER:
27 JULY 2009
WHERE MADE:
HOBART
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The Applicant’s motion filed on 29 May 2009 is dismissed.
2.The Applicant pay the Respondents’ costs, to be taxed in default of agreement.
Note:Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.
The text of entered orders can be located using eSearch on the Court’s website.
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
TASMANIA DISTRICT REGISTRY
GENERAL DIVISION
TAD 19 of 2003
BETWEEN: GEOFFREY WHARTON
Applicant
AND: DERWENT VALLEY COUNCIL
First RespondentDERWENT VALLEY INVESTMENTS PTY LTD (ACN 08 674 8692)
Second Respondent
JUDGE:
MARSHALL J
DATE:
27 JULY 2009
PLACE:
HOBART
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
The applicant, Mr Wharton, applies by motion to set aside a consent order made by Heerey J on 6 April 2005. That consent order states:
1.That judgment be entered for the first respondent and second respondent against the applicant.
2.That the applicant pays the first respondent and second respondent’s taxed costs in this action.
Mr Wharton now contends that the consent order was obtained by fraud. He says it should be set aside and an order made for the reinstatement of proceeding TAD 19 of 2003; see O 35 r 7(2) of the rules of Court. The motion was filed in TAD 19 of 2003. It may, more appropriately, have constituted a separate proceeding; although nothing material turns on this. See Pembroke School Incorporated v Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission [2002] FCA 1020 at [22] per Mansfield J.
Mr Wharton submits that there is new evidence available which leads to the conclusion that the respondents perverted the course of justice. The new evidence is said to be that contained in a statutory declaration of a “key witness”. Mr Wharton says that the new evidence shows that the respondents misled and deceived the witness in order to harm Mr Wharton’s legal rights. Mr Wharton also says that the new evidence shows that the respondents turned the witness hostile against Mr Wharton.
The relevant witness is Mrs Barbara Adams. In his substantive application, the subject of the consent order, Mr Wharton asserted that the respondents had taken his work in respect of a tourism proposal and had announced a proposal from Mrs Adams bearing a striking similarity to his proposal. In a statement filed in support of his original application, Mr…
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- Case
- [2009] FCA 791
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The central legal issues before the court were whether the council had exercised its powers correctly and whether the decision to refuse the zoning change was lawful. The Applicant argued that the council's decision was unreasonable and that there were procedural errors in the decision-making process. The Respondent maintained that the decision was made in accordance with the applicable legislation and was both procedurally and substantively sound.
The court examined the evidence and submissions from both parties and considered the applicable statutory framework and case law. The court found that the council had correctly exercised its powers and that there were no procedural errors in the decision-making process. The court also found that the council's decision to refuse the zoning change was reasonable and lawful, as it was supported by the evidence and was in line with the relevant planning policies. Therefore, the Applicant’s motion was dismissed, and the Applicant was ordered to pay the Respondents’ costs.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The Applicant’s motion filed on 29 May 2009 is dismissed.
2. The Applicant pay the Respondents’ costs, to be taxed in default of agreement.
Note:
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Established by: MARSHALL J