Palios Meegan & Nicholson Holdings Pty Ltd v Shore

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SUPREME COURT OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA

(Full Court)

PALIOS MEEGAN & NICHOLSON HOLDINGS PTY LTD & ANOR v SHORE

[2010] SASCFC 21

Judgment of The Full Court

(The Honourable Justice Nyland, The Honourable Justice Gray and The Honourable Justice Vanstone)

12 August 2010

TORTS - NEGLIGENCE - ESSENTIALS OF ACTION FOR NEGLIGENCE - DUTY OF CARE - SPECIAL RELATIONSHIPS AND DUTIES - PROFESSIONAL PERSONS

CRIMINAL LAW - EVIDENCE - MATTERS RELATING TO PROOF - STANDARD OF PROOF - GENERALLY

EVIDENCE - BURDEN OF PROOF, PRESUMPTIONS, AND WEIGHT AND SUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE - GENERALLY - CREDIBILITY AND WEIGHT - PARTY'S FAILURE TO GIVE OR CALL EVIDENCE

Appeal against a finding in the District Court, of a breach of duty by solicitors and the damages there assessed - following a workplace injury which gave rise to workers compensation entitlements, the plaintiff and respondent engaged the defendants and appellants to act for her - claim was resolved in 1998 and future entitlements redeemed - following a later workplace injury, the respondent brought a claim against the appellants alleging breach of duty - whether fact finding process of trial Judge flawed - whether Judge erred in relation to the standard of proof - whether Judge erred in consideration of the Jones v Dunkel principle - whether Judge gave inadequate weight to evidence of established practice - whether Judge gave inadequate weight to the wording of the redemption agreements and annexures - whether Judge incorrectly concluded that the respondent "ill-advised" about settling her claims - whether Judge did not properly consider issue of reliability of evidence led by the appellants.

Held: appeal allowed - cross-appeal dismissed - judgment of trial Judge set aside - judgment entered in favour of the appellants - allegation of breach serious - on Judge's findings, no clear and cogent evidence to support a finding of breach - failure of the respondent to call witness who was present at the time the redemption agreements signed, gave rise to a Jones v Dunkel inference - Judge failed to give adequate weight to the evidence led by the appellants about established practice - when viewed in context of evidence of established practice, evidence should have been accepted - when considering adequacy of advice given, Judge failed to give adequate weight to the terms of the redemption agreements and annexures - agreement and annexures contained the advice mandated by statute - conclusion of Judge that respondent not adequately advised not to settle, flawed - review of evidence discloses that appellants obtained best settlement that could be obtained for the respondent, who had rejected advice to stay on the system - failure of Judge to give adequate consideration to issue of credibility flawed - Judge was required to address the direct conflict between the evidence of the two principal witnesses - no basis to reach conclusion that there had been any departure from standard of care expected of an expert professional legal advisor.

Workers Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 1986 (SA) s 22, s 35, s 42…

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Details
Case
[2010] SASCFC 21
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The appellants, solicitors Palios Meegan & Nicholson Holdings Pty Ltd, appealed to the Full Court of the Supreme Court of South Australia against a finding by the District Court that they had breached their duty of care to the respondent, Ms Shore. The dispute concerned advice provided by the appellants to Ms Shore regarding the settlement of her workers compensation claim following a workplace injury. The original proceedings involved allegations that the appellants failed to provide adequate advice concerning the redemption of Ms Shore's future entitlements, leading to a settlement that was not in her best interests.

The Full Court was required to determine several legal issues, including whether the trial judge's fact-finding process was flawed, particularly in relation to the standard of proof and the application of the *Jones v Dunkel* principle. The court also considered whether the trial judge erred in assessing the weight of evidence concerning established professional practice, the wording of the redemption agreements, and the reliability of the appellants' evidence. Specifically, the court had to decide if the trial judge correctly concluded that Ms Shore was ill-advised to settle her claims and if the judge adequately considered the credibility of the evidence presented by the appellants.

The Full Court allowed the appeal, setting aside the judgment of the trial judge and entering judgment in favour of the appellants. The court reasoned that there was no clear and cogent evidence to support the finding of a breach of duty. The failure of the respondent to call a witness present at the signing of the redemption agreements, who could have provided relevant evidence, gave rise to a *Jones v Dunkel* inference against the respondent. Furthermore, the trial judge failed to give adequate weight to the appellants' evidence regarding established professional practice and the terms of the redemption agreements and their annexures, which contained the statutorily mandated advice. The court found that the trial judge's conclusion that Ms Shore was not adequately advised was flawed, as the evidence indicated the appellants obtained the best possible settlement for her, especially given her rejection of advice to remain on the workers compensation system. The court also found that the trial judge failed to properly consider the credibility of the evidence and address the direct conflict between key witnesses, ultimately concluding there was no departure from the standard of care expected of expert legal advisors.

Background

Background to the litigation

The appellants challenged the findings of the Judge concerning the extent of advices given to Ms Shore. It was submitted that the Judge’s approach to the making of factual findings was materially flawed. It was said that this Court was in a position to not only find that the Judge’s approach was flawed but was in a position to make its own findings and to dismiss the claim. It was argued that this was a matter in which the evidence in support of the dismissal of the claim, when properly understood, was overwhelming.Background Facts Ms Shore was born in South Australia in January 1946. She left school when aged 14 years to find employment. She first worked for a hairdresser, and later as a waitress. When aged 19 years she took employment as a carer – a nurse’s assistant – for the elderly in suburban Adelaide. Thereafter, she worked continuously in that occupation taking employment at Resthaven Inc in the mid 1970’s. While at Resthaven, she held a second job working as a carer at nursing homes through placements arranged by an agency. On 7 July 1996, Ms Shore sustained an injury in the course of her employment with Resthaven. As a consequence of the injury, she suffered compensable disability within the meaning of the Workers Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 1986 (SA). She became entitled to statutory benefits, of which three are of relevance to the within appeal: an entitlement to lump sum compensation for non-economic loss in respect of a permanent disability;[3] an ongoing entitlement to weekly payments of income maintenance until aged 65 years;[4] and, an ongoing right to the recovery of medical expenses.[5] [3] Workers Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 1986 (SA), section 43.[4] Workers Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 1986 (SA), section 35.[5] Workers Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 1986 (SA), section 22. In September 1997 Ms Shore instructed Palios Meegan and Nicholson to act. At this time, she was in receipt of weekly income maintenance payments and the reimbursement of medical expenses. On 31 October 1997, the compensation authority made a determination of a lump sum entitlement to non-economic loss under section 43 of the Workers Rehabilitation and Compensation Act, of $33,550.20. Ms Shore was paid this amount in December 1997. On 28 January 1998, Ms Shore exercised her statutory right to review the section 43 determination. Palios Meegan and Nicholson lodged a notice of dispute on her behalf. In May 1998, in the course of compulsory conciliation, WorkCover raised the possibility of an all-up settlement. This included a possible redemption of Ms Shore’s ongoing entitlement to weekly income maintenance payments, pursuant to section 42 of the Workers Rehabilitation and Compensation Act. This led to Ms Shore seeking advice from Ms Palios, with respect to an all-up settlement. It was common ground that Palios Meegan and Nicholson were experts in workers compensation. Ms Palios had an extensive practice, and at the time of advising Ms Shore, was conducting in the order of 250 workers compensation claims. Ms Palios maintained files with respect to her clients. Ms Shore’s file included court documents, correspondence and typed and handwritten file notes. An examination of the file reveals the type of file expected to be maintained by a busy solicitor working within a well-familiar area of practice. Unsurprisingly, many of the notes were brief, even to the point of being cryptic.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

The Judge concluded that Ms Shore, although honest, was an unreliable witness. The Judge considered that her memory was “severely compromised by a combination of the passage of time, the complexity of the subject matter, the effect of age and recent invasive medical treatment” and as a consequence:[6]It is not possible to accept the evidence of the plaintiff that she was given no substantial advice at all. In the first place that stance is inconsistent with the defendants’ letters of advice, some of them confirming the terms of oral advice previously rendered. Secondly, her recall was shown to be quite imperfect when she claimed to have kept all her solicitor’s correspondence, when clearly she had not. Thirdly, when it came to signing the agreements, her evidence of having received no legal or financial advice is quite inconsistent with the evidence of the financial planner Mr Field, who deposed to having a substantial conversation with her on that day. This is supported by the notes he made at the time. Parts of the contents of those could only have emanated from Mrs Shore herself. It is further supported by the letter he wrote afterwards. Finally, her evidence cannot stand against the file notes of conferences with Ms Palios on 22 January, 25 June and 22 July. The general terms of these are detailed above. In the end these clearly demonstrate detailed legal advice must have been rendered, in terms recorded therein. …[Emphasis added – footnotes omitted][6] Shore v Palios Meegan & Nicholson Holdings P/L & Palios [2009] SADC 5 at [57]. Ms Shore claimed that she signed the redemption agreements to give effect to the settlement without receiving advice and without reading the documentation. As set out in the above extract, the Judge rejected her evidence in this respect as unreliable. That rejection was not challenged on appeal. The Judge found Ms Palios to be an honest witness. This finding was not challenged on appeal. The Judge reached the conclusion that Ms Palios had not retained any independent recollection of particular events or specific discussions. As a consequence, the Judge gave little or no weight to significant parts of her evidence as in his view, it was no more than reconstruction. The Judge went so far as to describe Ms Palios’ process of giving evidence as being “no more than abject reconstruction”. The Judge was unimpressed by the evidence of Ms Palios that detailed oral advice was allegedly given to Ms Shore when there was no matching or related file note. The Judge observed:[7]An astonishing feature of this case is that there is nowhere to be found, any reference whatsoever in any of the contemporary records, reflecting the fact that advice along these lines was ever given. It is inconceivable that of all the advice proffered and opinions expressed over the period of twelve months or so, some of it quite detailed in relation to other topics of lesser importance, that some record would not have been made, had the advice along the claimed lines been given. It is difficult to appreciate why it was not confirmed or referred to in any of the many letters sent to Mrs Shore, still less in any file note, or why there is no reference to the settlement being affected against that advice.[7] Shore v Palios Meegan & Nicholson Holdings P/L & Palios [2009] SADC 5 at [62].

Decision

Reasons for decision

I make clear that I have not given any weight to the appellants’ submission that adverse inferences should be drawn against the plaintiff’s case on account of her failure to call her companion, Mr Stuart, who attended various conferences with the defendants. The appellants’ argued, both to the judge and to this Court, that since Mr Stuart was apparently present at a number of conferences during which the plaintiff was given important advice, the failure to call him allowed an inference against the plaintiff’s case that the relevant advice was in fact given. Like the judge, I would have been very slow to draw such a conclusion. The advice in question was of a technical nature and was of concern primarily to the plaintiff, not to Mr Stuart. There is no reason to think that he would have understood the advice to such an extent that he would have retained it in his memory. Nor was there any reason to think he would have read the correspondence passing between the parties, so as to give him a better understanding of the various conversations he heard. There is no evidence that Mr Stuart had any role in supporting the plaintiff through these proceedings, other than driving her to and from appointments.Conclusion It is plain that all witnesses in the trial laboured under difficulties consequent upon the passage of over ten years between the events the subject of the action and the trial. This led to the plaintiff’s evidence being rejected, after being shown to be unreliable on the key conversations and events. That rejection was inevitable, in my view, having regard to the discrediting of the plaintiff in cross-examination. The result was that her evidence became valueless in terms of proving key aspects of her case. The judge was unpersuaded by much of Ms Palios’s evidence, including her assertion that she roughly quantified the total value of the plaintiff’s weekly benefits in the event that they extended to retirement age. He expressed himself as being forced to resort to such objective facts as were found to be proved in order to determine the probabilities of what advice was, and was not, furnished to the plaintiff. In this way, rather than being a contest between the evidence of plaintiff and defendant, the determination of the issues devolved to a situation where Ms Palios’s evidence as to what she advised, or believed she would have advised, was discredited by perceived deficits or inadequacies in the solicitors’ file. I consider that there are profound difficulties in this approach. As I have observed, it takes as its starting point an assumption that the solicitors’ file contains a record of all relevant advices and instructions. Strictly, there is no obligation upon solicitors to keep a file in that manner. The file in question is patchy, rather than even, in the way interactions are recorded. Such a collection of documents is an inadequate means of discrediting sworn evidence given by a practitioner. I do not consider it was open to the judge in this case to make positive findings as to the absence of relevant advice based solely on deficiencies in the file.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The Court of Appeal undertook a comprehensive examination of the fact-finding process of the trial Judge, ultimately concluding that it was materially flawed. The Judge's reliance on the absence of file notes to discredit the solicitors' evidence was deemed an inadequate basis for making findings on the extent of advice provided. The Court held that there is no obligation for solicitors to maintain a comprehensive file, and the patchy nature of the file in question rendered it an inadequate means of discrediting sworn evidence. The Court found that the Judge should not have made positive findings on the absence of relevant advice based solely on deficiencies in the file.

The Court also addressed the issue of the standard of proof required in the case. The Court held that the Judge did not err in relation to the standard of proof. The Court emphasised that the allegation of breach was serious and that the Judge correctly applied the standard of proof required in negligence cases, which is the balance of probabilities. The Court concluded that, on the Judge's findings, there was no clear and cogent evidence to support a finding of breach of duty.

The Court further examined the Judge's consideration of the Jones v Dunkel principle in relation to the respondent's failure to call a particular witness. The Court held that the Judge correctly drew an inference against the respondent's case due to the failure to call a witness who was present at the time the redemption agreements were signed. The Court held that the advice in question was of a technical nature and was of concern primarily to the respondent, not to the absent witness, and there was no reason to think that the witness would have understood or retained the advice.

The Court also found that the Judge gave inadequate weight to the evidence of established practice presented by the appellants. The Court held that when viewed in the context of the evidence of established practice, the evidence should have been accepted. The Court held that the Judge's failure to give adequate weight to the evidence of established practice was a material error.

The Court further held that the Judge gave inadequate weight to the wording of the redemption agreements and annexures. The Court held that the agreements and annexures contained the advice mandated by statute, and the Judge's conclusion that the respondent was not adequately advised not to settle was flawed. The Court held that the review of the evidence disclosed that the appellants obtained the best settlement that could be obtained for the respondent, who had rejected advice to stay on the system.

The Court also found that the Judge incorrectly concluded that the respondent was "ill-advised" about settling her claims. The Court held that the Judge failed to give adequate consideration to the issue of the reliability of evidence led by the appellants. The Court held that the Judge was required to address the direct conflict between the evidence of the two principal witnesses and was not entitled to dismiss the evidence of one party without proper consideration.

Finally, the Court held that the Judge did not properly consider the issue of the reliability of evidence led by the appellants. The Court held that the Judge was required to address the direct conflict between the evidence of the two principal witnesses and was not entitled to dismiss the evidence of one party without proper consideration. The Court held that there was no basis to reach the conclusion that there had been any departure from the standard of care expected of an expert professional legal advisor.

In conclusion, the Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, set aside the judgment of the trial Judge, and entered judgment in favour of the appellants. The Court held that the Judge's fact-finding process was materially flawed, and the Judge erred in giving inadequate weight to the evidence of established practice, the wording of the redemption agreements and annexures, and the reliability of evidence led by the appellants. The Court also held that the Judge incorrectly concluded that the respondent was "ill-advised" about settling her claims and failed to properly consider the issue of the reliability of evidence led by the appellants. The ratio decidendi of this case is that the Court of Appeal will not uphold findings of fact based solely on deficiencies in a solicitor's file, and the Judge must properly consider the direct conflict between the evidence of the parties and the reliability of the evidence led by each party.