Puric v State of South Australia

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SUPREME COURT OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA

(Full Court)

PURIC v STATE OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA

[2009] SASC 107

Judgment of The Full Court

(The Honourable Justice Gray, The Honourable Justice Sulan and The Honourable Justice Kourakis)

24 April 2009

EVIDENCE - BURDEN OF PROOF, PRESUMPTIONS, AND WEIGHT AND SUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE - GENERALLY - CREDIBILITY AND WEIGHT

Appeal against dismissal of application for statutory compensation pursuant to section 18(5) of the Victims of Crime Act - appellant claimed assaulted on 31 October 2005 and for compensation for physical and mental injuries sustained in addition to resultant economic loss - trial Judge dismissed the application on basis that commission of the offence to which the application related had not been proved beyond reasonable doubt - whether proof of offence beyond reasonable doubt required by section 22 of the Victims of Crime Act 2001 (SA) - whether section 22(2)(a)(i) applicable to criminal proceedings - whether claims under the Act and the commission of the offence the subject of the claim require proof on the balance of probabilities - whether trial Judge erred in failing to accept appellant's own evidence - whether trial Judge erred in failing to draw Jones v Dunkel inference in favour of appellant.

Held: appeal dismissed - offence subject of claim for compensation pursuant to section 22 of the Victims of Crime Act 2001 (SA) require proof beyond reasonable doubt - Jones v Dunkel inference of little assistance in cases where credibility as opposed to reliability in issue - rarely appropriate to interfere with trial Judge’s assessment of witnesses.

Victims of Crime Act 2001 (SA) s 18, s 22 and s 24; Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935 (SA) s 15, referred to.
Devries v Australian National Railways Commission (1993) 177 CLR 472; Rosenberg v Percival (2001) 205 CLR 434; Jones v Dunkel (1958) 101 CLR 298; R v Buckland [1977] 2 NSWLR 452; Fox v Percy (2003) 214 CLR 118; R v Lahides (1983) 34 SASR 355; Hobbs v Tinling (CT) & Co Ltd [1929] 2 KB 1; O'Donnell v Reichard [1975] VR 916; Beaumont v South Australia (1990) 156 LSJS 479; Bartsch v McIlroy (1980) 24 SASR 506; Edmunds v Edmunds [1935] VLR 177; Weissensteiner v The Queen (1993) 178 CLR 217; Evans v Sparrow (1973) 6 SASR 519; Dyers v The Queen (2002) 210 CLR 285, considered.

PURIC v STATE OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA
[2009] SASC 107

Full Court        Gray, Sulan and Kourakis JJ

GRAY and SULAN JJ.

  1. This is an appeal pursuant to section 24(1) of the Victims of Crime Act 2001 (SA). The appellant has appealed against the dismissal of his application for statutory compensation.

  2. The appellant made a claim for statutory compensation pursuant to section 18(5) of the Victims of Crime Act.  The appellant claimed that he was assaulted outside the Serbian Club, 1 Mary Street, Hindmarsh at approximately 1.00am on 31 October 2005.  The appellant claimed compensation for the physical and mental injuries he…

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Details
Case
[2009] SASC 107
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of Puric v State of South Australia, the appellant sought statutory compensation under the Victims of Crime Act 2001 (SA) for injuries he sustained in an alleged assault on 31 October 2005. The appeal was against the dismissal of his application for compensation, which the trial judge had rejected on the basis that the appellant had not proven the commission of the offence beyond reasonable doubt. The main legal issues revolved around the burden of proof required under section 22 of the Act, the applicability of the Jones v Dunkel inference in the context of credibility, and whether the trial judge erred in assessing the appellant's evidence.

The court held that the commission of the offence, which was the subject of the compensation claim under the Act, required proof beyond reasonable doubt. The court found that the Jones v Dunkel inference was of limited utility when credibility, rather than reliability, was at issue. It was also noted that it was rarely appropriate to interfere with a trial judge's assessment of witness credibility. The evidence presented by the appellant and the respondents was heavily disputed, with the trial judge concluding that none of the witnesses were truthful. Despite the appellant's arguments that certain admissions by the respondents could not have constituted self-defence, and that the Jones v Dunkel inference should have been drawn due to the failure to call a relevant witness, the appeal was dismissed. The court found that the appellant had indeed carried the criminal onus of proof, but the trial judge's findings on credibility and the weight of the evidence were upheld.

In conclusion, the appeal was dismissed, and the trial judge's decision was affirmed. The court held that the appellant had carried the burden of proving the offence beyond reasonable doubt, but the judge's assessment of the evidence and the credibility of the witnesses was upheld. No new orders were made beyond the dismissal of the appeal.

Orders

Orders of the court

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

For the reasons that follow I have concluded that the appellant carried the criminal onus of proof. I would also hold that the Judge did not err in finding that the admissions, such as they were, did not discharge that onus, and that the failure of the respondent to call the witness was an immaterial consideration in the circumstances of this case.The evidence The appellant and his friend Nikolic were at the Serbian Club in Hindmarsh from about 8:00pm on 30 October 2005. The appellant did not call Nikolic as a witness, but the evidence showed that he had unsuccessfully attempted to serve a subpoena on him. The appellant drank enough alcohol on the night to be at least a little drunk by the time of the fight. His blood alcohol concentration was .101 per cent when a sample of his blood was taken at the Royal Adelaide Hospital, where he went for treatment after the fight. The fight started just outside the Serbian Club at about 1:00am. The appellant and Nikolic were on one side. Opposing them were Radinovic, Vjestica, and possibly others. In the course of the fight the appellant’s cheekbone was fractured and he suffered some form of injury to his ribs, although it was not clear from the evidence whether any ribs were in fact broken. The appellant’s general practitioner gave evidence that a very large degree of force would have been required to fracture the appellant’s cheekbone, and that a single fall was unlikely to have caused all of his injuries. The evidence I have summarised so far was largely common ground and was accepted by the Judge. Just about everything else about the fighting and the cause of the appellant’s injuries was much disputed. The appellant testified that the attack on him was unprovoked. He gave evidence that his first involvement in any trouble outside the hall was when he attempted to diffuse a dispute between his friend Nikolic on the one hand and Radinovic and Vjestica on the other. He testified that when he attempted to do so, Radinovic and Vjestica abused him, and then set upon him and punched and kicked him. He claimed that they were part of a larger group of men who attacked him. Radinovic and Vjestica, on the other hand, testified that they were waiting outside the Serbian Club for Vjestica’s girlfriend, Gorana Sinikovic, to arrive. They saw the appellant and Nikolic approach her and heard them speak very crudely to her. They remonstrated with the appellant, who abused Radinovic and then swung punches at him. Radinovic testified that two of his teeth were broken in the fight that ensued. Even though the appellant had insisted in his evidence that there was no incident involving a young woman, the Judge found that at least that part of the evidence of Radinovic and Vjestica had the ring of truth about it. The Judge said:I am also satisfied, and I find, that the fight began because Puric and Nikolic behaved improperly towards the young woman. That part, at least, of the evidence of Radinovic and Vjestica has the ring of truth to it. That latter finding makes one aspect of Puric’s evidence especially telling. He insisted that there was no incident involving a young woman. I am satisfied that he was being deliberately untruthful about that. His repeated denials of the incident cause me to be very wary indeed of the rest of his evidence about the events outside the Club.[11][11] Puric v State of South Australia [2008] SADC 82 at [14].

Decision

Reasons for decision

In this case drawing an inference adverse to the respondent due to the failure to call Ms Sinikovic would not advance the appellant’s case. The inference that Ms Sinikovic’s evidence would not assist the respondent, which is not the same as inferring that such evidence would be contrary to the respondent’s case, could not alter the fact that the appellant was not truthful and made no attempt to tell the whole truth. The Jones v Dunkel inference has very little work to do, if any, in cases where credibility as opposed to reliability is in issue.Conclusion In our view there is no substance to the grounds of appeal advanced by the appellant. The appeal should be dismissed. KOURAKIS J: This is an appeal against the dismissal of the appellant’s claim for compensation pursuant to the Victims of Crime Act 2001 (the Act). By his statement of claim, the appellant alleged that he was the victim of an assault committed by a person or persons unknown outside the Serbian Club in Mary Street, Hindmarsh on 31 October 2005. The trial of the appellant’s claim was conducted on the basis that he carried the onus of proving the commission of the offence with respect to which he claimed compensation beyond reasonable doubt. Only three persons who were present outside the Serbian Club on that night were called to give evidence. They were the appellant, Djuro Radinovic and Miodrag Vjestica. The last two mentioned men admitted in their evidence that they had fought with the appellant on the night in question. They testified that they fought back in self defence after the appellant attacked them. The Judge who presided over the trial found that none of the witnesses gave evidence truthfully. Indeed, he found that they did not even try to honour their oaths. The Judge described all three men as singularly unimpressive witnesses who were often reluctant to answer questions and who were evasive and argumentative. Given those credibility findings, it is not surprising that the Judge was not satisfied that the appellant had discharged the high onus of proof which he had accepted. Notwithstanding those findings, the appellant complains on this appeal that the Judge failed to take proper account of certain admissions made by Radinovic and Vjestica of striking him, in circumstances that the appellant contends could not possibly have amounted to self defence. The appellant also complains that the Judge erred in failing to draw an inference adverse to the respondent by reason of its failure to call a relevant witness. Finally, the appellant submits that, notwithstanding his concession at trial, he did not as a matter of law carry the onus to prove the commission of the offence beyond reasonable doubt. For the reasons that follow I have concluded that the appellant carried the criminal onus of proof. I would also hold that the Judge did not err in finding that the admissions, such as they were, did not discharge that onus, and that the failure of the respondent to call the witness was an immaterial consideration in the circumstances of this case.The evidence

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established