Busa v South Eastern Sydney Local Health District Trading as Sydney Eye Hospital - [2025] NSWSC 130

Supreme Court

New South Wales

Medium Neutral Citation: Busa v South Eastern Sydney Local Health District Trading as Sydney Eye Hospital [2025] NSWSC 130
Hearing dates: 4-7 February 2025; 11-12 February 2025; 14 February 2025
Date of orders: 16 April 2025
Decision date: 16 April 2025
Jurisdiction: Common Law
Before: Davies J
Decision:
(1) Judgment for the defendant.
(2) The plaintiff is to pay the defendant’s costs.

Catchwords:
NEGLIGENCE – duty of care – particular relationships – medical practitioner and patient – proceedings for damages as a result of a procedure carried out on the plaintiff’s left eye by a doctor at the Sydney Eye Hospital – where the plaintiff claims to have lost vision in his left eye and suffered ongoing pain and psychiatric damage – whether the defendant breached its duty of care by performing an excessive number of attempts to tap vitreous fluid causing injury – where the plaintiff’s evidence was found to be unreliable – where the defendant’s evidence was borne out by contemporaneous notes and accepted – where it was accepted that no more than three injections were attempted – where the procedure was carried out to a standard widely accepted in Australia by peer professional opinion as competent professional practice – defendant did not breach its duty of care
OCCUPATIONS – medical practitioners – medical records – whether the defendant breached its duty of care by failing to document the procedure – where a number of notes about the procedure were absent – where it was uncertain if the notes were not made or lost subsequently – where the plaintiff claimed that the loss of notes contributed to his PTSD – where there is no requirement on a doctor to make notes – where there can be no breach of duty in omitting to make notes – where the failure to make out a s 5O defence does not impose a liability – defendant did not breach its duty of care
EVIDENCE – expert evidence – whether the evidence of the plaintiff’s overseas treating doctor can be used as expert evidence – where the doctor prepared five reports – where the Expert Witness Code was not acknowledged – where a treating doctor lacks the objectivity of other experts – where the doctor has never practised in Australia – where the reports were obtained without letters of instruction – where the doctor reversed his opinion on a significant matter – where the evidence of the plaintiff’s expert was rejected unless there was unanimity with the other experts

Legislation Cited:
Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW) ss 5D, 5O, 13

Cases Cited:
Campbell v Campbell [2015] NSWSC 784
Carangelo v State of New South Wales [2016] NSWCA 126
Castle Constructions Pty Limited v North Sydney Council & Anor [2008] NSWLEC 137
Elayoubi v Zipser [2008] NSWCA 335
Fussell v Hanrahan t/as Dignan Hanrahan Solicitors [2024] NSWSC 1388
In the matter of Kit Digital Australia Pty Ltd (In Liq) [2014] NSWSC 1547
Palios Meegan & Nicholson Holdings Pty Ltd v Shore (2010) 108 SASR 31; [2010] SASCFC 21
Strong v Woolworths Ltd (2012) 246 CLR 182; [2012] HCA 5
Tabet v Gett (2010) 240 CLR 537; [2010] HCA 12
Watson v Foxman (1995) 49 NSWLR 315
Willoughby City Council v Transport Infrastructure Development Corporation (No 2) [2008] NSWLEC 238
Zanner v Zanner (2010) 79 NSWLR 702; [2010] NSWCA 343

Texts Cited:
Nil

Category: Principal judgment
Parties: Giovanni Busa (Plaintiff)
South Eastern Sydney Local Health District t/as Sydney Eye Hospital (Defendant)
Representation:
Counsel:
A Campbell & M Causbrook (Plaintiff)
B Bradley (Defendant)
Solicitors:
Bellissimo Lawyers (Plaintiff)
Makinson d’Apice (Defendant)

File Number(s): 2020/7945
Publication restriction: Nil

Judgment

The plaintiff claims damages from the defendant as a result of a procedure carried out on his left eye by a doctor at the Sydney Eye Hospital (SEH) on 1 April 2015. The plaintiff claims to have lost vision in his left eye and suffered ongoing pain and psychiatric damage from the carrying out of the procedure and its consequences.

Background

The plaintiff was born in September 1961 in Plati, Reggio Calabria in Italy. He emigrated to Australia in 1964 with his family.
In 1997 he was diagnosed with diabetes, a condition which is prevalent in his family.
After leaving school he worked in a number of occupations. Relevantly, in 2008, he recommenced work as a heavy haulage truck driver for J D Transport, a company run by his two brothers, Dominic and Giosofatto.
From about 2008 he was diagnosed with hypertension and bilateral proliferative diabetic retinopathy. On 6 April 2012, he came under the care of the Sydney Eye Hospital. He was diagnosed with diabetic macular oedema (DMO) also called diabetic maculopathy. He was treated with retinal photocoagulation by Professor Mark Gillies and given Avastin injections.
Dr Gurmit Uppal, one of the expert ophthalmologists called by the defendant, explained that in DMO there is a leakage of fluid from blood vessels that lie in the macular area of the eye as a result of high blood glucose levels from the diabetes. Since 2012 the principal treatment for DMO has been the injection of a drug into the vitreous cavity (IVT injections) called anti-VEGF which blocks the signal that promotes the leakage of fluid from the macular blood vessels. These drugs last only eight weeks within an eye and patients with DMO may require regular and ongoing anti-VEGF IVT injections. The plaintiff was treated in that way since his diagnosis in April 2012.
Dr Uppal also explained diabetic retinopathy in this way. He said blood vessels within the human body narrow in their internal lumen with age. High blood glucose levels accelerate that internal narrowing, and the very small blood vessels that feed the retina are very susceptible to this process. They narrow to the extent that insufficient blood is supplied to the retina. This lack of sufficient blood is referred to as ischaemia. If the narrowing of the vessels is severe the retina responds by releasing a chemical signal (VEGF) that encourages the growth of new blood vessels into the retina. These pathological new blood vessels, a process termed proliferative diabetic retinopathy (PDR), grow in the wrong places, are weak and fragile, leak fluid, are prone to bleeding and can lead to scar formation on the delicate retina which can contract leading to very serious sight threatening complications such as retinal detachments.
The pathological new blood vessels in PDR can grow out of the plane of the retina and into the vitreous gel. When the vitreous gel moves with normal eye movements or separates, traction is placed on these pathological new blood vessels and this leads to bleeding in the vitreous cavity, termed a vitreous haemorrhage (VH). A VH reduces vision, often profoundly, and obscures the clinician’s view of the retina.
In severe PDR abnormal blood vessels can also grow in structures in the anterior chamber of the eye, specifically around the iris and drainage angles that allow outflow of aqueous. These vessels are referred to as rubeosis. If these blood vessels establish themselves then the pressure in the eye can remain elevated despite normal treatments to reduce and normalise the pressure. This is referred to as rubeotic glaucoma. These vessels can also lead to haemorrhage in the anterior chamber.
As PDR develops, pathological new blood vessels form on the retinal surface and can result in scar formation. As the scar tissue contracts it places traction on the retina and can detach the delicate retina away from the wall of the eye and its underlying supporting tissue. This is referred to as a tractional retinal detachment. Contraction of the scar tissue can also lead to haemorrhage within the eye if blood vessels are wrapped up in the scar tissue and the vitreous gel.
Visual acuity is assessed principally by the use of a Snellen Chart which has letters of decreasing size with the largest letters towards the top of the chart. An assessment, for example, of 6/9 means that the patient can see at 6 metres what a person with normal vision can see at 9 metres; 6/12 similarly means the person can see at 6 metres what a person with normal vision can see at 12 metres. A measurement might also add plus or minus 1,2 or 3 after the second number. That is an indication of being a little better or worse than the second number. When a patient’s vision is too poor to be measured by such a chart, visual acuity can be estimated by asking a patient to count the number of fingers the examiner is holding up at a particular distance. It will be recorded as “CF”. If the patient cannot count fingers a hand can be waved in front of the person. Their visual acuity is recorded as “hand movements” or “HM”.
Pinhole improvement in visual acuity refers to the temporary enhancement of vision when viewing through a small aperture (pinhole), which can help reveal potential refractive errors or other eye conditions. The pinhole effect works by limiting the amount of light entering the eye, effectively reducing the blur caused by minor irregularities in the eye's optics (like refractive errors). If a person's visual acuity improves when looking through a pinhole, it suggests that their poor vision is likely due to a refractive error (like near-sightedness or astigmatism) that can be corrected with glasses or contact lenses. If the vision does not improve with the pinhole, it could indicate other eye conditions, such as cataracts, macular degeneration, or other diseases that affect the retina.
On 8 May 2014 the plaintiff attended at the SEH where he saw Associate Professor Ho. The visual acuity in the left eye was said to be 6/24+3 with no improvement with pinhole. That reading of 6/24+3 indicates that the vision was somewhat worse than 6/24. Dr Ho diagnosed the plaintiff as having suffered from a localised tractional retinal detachment which needed to be monitored.
On 28 October 2014 the plaintiff saw Professor Mark Gillies at the SEH. Professor Gillies reported to the plaintiff’s general practitioner, Dr Susino, that he had seen the plaintiff on that day. He said the plaintiff had advanced diabetic retinopathy in each eye. His vison had been 6/9 in each eye following extensive laser treatment with intravitreal therapy. Professor Gillies said the plaintiff was much worse on that day with recurrent vitreous haemorrhages in both eyes, more marked on the left than the right, “and perhaps a tractional retinal detachment inferiorly in the left eye”. Professor Gillies said it appeared to be related to the recent exacerbation of his blood pressure. When tested that day, his visual acuity in the right eye was 6/12-2 with no pinhole improvement and the left eye was 6/15-1 with pinhole improvement only to 6/15.
On 21 November 2014 the plaintiff underwent repair of the left VH and a tractional retinal detachment by Dr Fernandez. Silicone oil was used to allow the retina to reattach. Dr Fernandez said that the likely cause of the detached retina was the plaintiff’s advanced PDR.
The clinical notes show that the plaintiff was seen by Dr Gorbatov on 27 November 2014. His visual acuity was assessed as CF at 1 metre. On 26 February 2015 his visual acuity remained poor, being assessed as CF at 20cm, improving with pinhole to 6/120.
On 27 March 2015 Dr Guillermo Fernandez performed left removal of silicone oil under peribulbar block and sedation. In this procedure the oil is slowly absorbed into the body and replaced with vitreous fluid. His visual assessment of the plaintiff was HM. Dr Fernandex said that the plaintiff’s prognosis for his left eye was very limited given that he had a severely ischaemic retina and had suffered the retinal detachment requiring silicone oil.
Subsequently, the plaintiff said that he noticed that his left eye was a bit sore and he presented again to the SEH on 1 April 2015.
It is the events of 1 April 2015 that form the basis of the plaintiff’s claim and, in particular, the procedure, known as a tap and inject procedure, carried out by Dr Marko Andric. A “tap and inject” is a procedure where a small amount (usually 0.2 mL) of fluid is taken from the eye by the insertion of a very fine needle after the eye is anaesthetised with a local anaesthetic. The fluid is then sent to pathology, and the removed fluid is replaced with 0.2 mL of antibiotics. The procedure is carried out when it is suspected that a patient might have endophthalmitis. Endophthalmitis is an inflammation of the ocular cavities and their adjacent structures resulting from intraocular colonisation of infectious agents with exudation within intraocular fluids (vitreous and aqueous). It is a potentially blinding condition.

The events of 1 April 2015

There is a considerable dispute about what happened on 1 April 2015.

The plaintiff’s account

The plaintiff said that he went with his sister Tommasina (sometime referred to as Tommasa) Antonelli, to the ground floor clinic of the SEH at approximately 1:00pm. He said he went to reception 2 at the clinic and had to wait to see a doctor. Because he was a diabetic he needed to eat, and at 3:00pm his sister bought him a sandwich and a drink.
The plaintiff said that at approximately 4:10pm a nurse who was aged approximately in her sixties called him into one of the rooms in reception 2. He went into the room which had a tap for washing hands and appeared to be an examination room. He was asked to sit on a recliner chair which was upright. He said he did not sign any hospital consent form on that day.
Approximately two minutes later he said a doctor came into the room and this doctor was Dr Andric whom he had not seen previously.
The plaintiff said to Dr Andric:

I had the oil removed four days ago. I noticed the eye was a bit watery today and a bit red. So I was concerned about the eye because I had surgery four days earlier and wanted to get it checked out to make sure everything is okay.

Dr Andric replied:

I need to take a sample out of your eye to get it tested for infection. It is going to involve a couple of needles into the eye.

The plaintiff said that Dr Andric did not wear personal protective equipment and did not wear a face mask. He placed a hospital bib on the plaintiff’s chest, similar to what is used in a dental clinic. He then placed an eye clamp to his eye to keep the eye open.
Dr Andric next put numbing drops into his eye and then a local anaesthetic. Dr Andric then proceeded to attempt to take a sample from the eye. The plaintiff said the nurse was positioned on the plaintiff’s right-hand side, assisting the doctor in providing the needles.
The plaintiff said the first attempt was unsuccessful. He said Dr Andric told him he was having difficulties taking a specimen out of the eye. The plaintiff said he could see what the doctor was doing by looking from both of his eyes, and he observed that the time period between finishing the first and commencing the second attempt was approximately two minutes.
The plaintiff said Dr Andric proceeded with the second attempt; he threw away the first needle and put on a new needle. The plaintiff was counting the number of needles each time and the plaintiff recalled that each time after the failed attempt from removing the old needle and being passed a new needle from the nurse was approximately two minutes on each occasion.
Dr Andric said at the time he was up to the fourth needle, “I am still having problems getting a specimen out. I need to try again”. He said each time Dr Andric inserted the needle the pain was becoming more “aggressive” and he (the plaintiff) was starting to panic. He said he could see that Dr Andric was starting to get nervous. He said Dr Andric had long hair which was shoulder length at the time. He was brushing his hair back each time he was preparing his attempt to undertake each attempt to insert the needle. He observed that the nurse was looking nervous.
The plaintiff counted that Dr Andric had undertaken eight attempts. The plaintiff said when the last needle went into his eye, he felt excruciating pain and his left eye seemed to burst like a balloon. He said he could see blood inside the eye and he felt a lot of fluid gushing out of his eye. He started screaming and crying, and screamed for them to call his sister to come in. The nurse tried to clean him up.
Dr Andric put his arm around the plaintiff and said to him, “You’re a real trooper”. The plaintiff’s sister grabbed the plaintiff’s hand, and he said words to the effect, “Sina just kill me, kill me, I can’t bear the pain anymore”.
Dr Andric told the plaintiff that he had called for a specialist, and in about ten minutes Dr Fernandez arrived. He said that Dr Fernandez examined the plaintiff for about five minutes and then said to Dr Andric and the nurse, “Prepare him for emergency surgery”. At that point, the plaintiff said he knew that something was wrong.
At about 5:15pm, the plaintiff was wheeled in a wheelchair to an elevator and taken to level 1 and placed in a waiting room. He was subsequently put onto a hospital bed in front of an operating theatre where he was waiting for an anaesthetist.
An anaesthetist arrived and asked the plaintiff if he had had anything to eat. He said he had eaten at 3:00pm, to which the anaesthetist then said, “We can’t put you fully under. We need to put a local anaesthetic into the eye”. He was then given an anaesthetic into the left eye and at about 6:30pm he was taken into theatre. He then saw Dr Fernandez who said to him, “I’m going to stitch your eye”. The plaintiff felt uncomfortable and began to move. Dr Fernandez said, “Don’t move, I’m stitching your eye”. The plaintiff said this took about ten minutes. He was then taken to recovery and thereafter later to a ward. The plaintiff thereafter remained in hospital for some six days.

The account of the plaintiff’s sister

Ms Antonelli said that she went with the plaintiff to the SEH on 1 April 2015. She said:

I say categorically that we did not go to the Emergency Department of the Hospital.

She said at some time between 1:00pm to 1:30pm they went to the main entrance of the hospital and went to a reception desk. The plaintiff spoke to a woman saying that he had rung earlier. He provided his name to the lady at reception and she asked him to sit down in an area which the plaintiff’s sister says was identified with the sign “Reception 2”. They sat on chairs facing a door being the entrance to a room. Ms Antonelli attached two colour photographs to her statement (apparently taken by the plaintiff or his brother in 2024) showing the part of the hospital where they entered, sat and waited, and the room where the procedure was carried out. However, she said that a desk depicted in the photos did not exist at the time she and the plaintiff went to the hospital on 1 April 2015.
She said they waited for about three hours. She purchased a sandwich and drink for the plaintiff at about 3:00pm.
Ms Antonelli said that at about 4:00pm a doctor she now knows to be Dr Andric called the plaintiff to go into the room opposite which she and the plaintiff were sitting. She was aware that the doctor wanted to draw some liquid out of the plaintiff’s eye.
After about 15 minutes she heard the plaintiff scream in a howling voice in extreme pain and fear. Dr Andric opened the door and said to her words to the effect:

Can you come in please. I tried seven times with the needle and I still haven’t managed to get any fluid. He has to be taken into surgery to do it”.

She saw that the plaintiff was lying in a recliner chair, that he was extremely distressed and that he had bright red blood on his face and t-shirt. She said that the plaintiff screamed out to her saying, “Just kill me. I want to die. I want to die. My eye has been busted”.

The defendant’s account

The accounts given by the doctors and nurses at the Hospital who treated the plaintiff derive largely from their examination of the contemporaneous clinical records of the Hospital. Dr Andric has some limited independent recollection of the plaintiff because he had never experienced a patient who reacted the way the plaintiff did when he carried out a tap and inject procedure. Nurse Pratima Karki, the nurse who triaged the plaintiff and who was present in the room when Dr Andric performed the procedure, in her statement claimed to have a greater independent recollection of the plaintiff than was ultimately shown to be the case when she was cross-examined. However, she did have some actual recollection of the plaintiff. Dr Capucine Odouard who examined the plaintiff before Dr Andric saw him, had no independent recollection of the plaintiff or her dealings with him on that day. Dr Fernandez, who injected the antibiotics into the plaintiff’s eye after Dr Andric aborted the procedure, had some limited recollection of the plaintiff.

The fact that the doctors and nurses have limited or no recollection of the events of 1 April 2015 is not a matter of surprise or great significance. The events concerned happened almost ten years ago. It appears that the earliest any of these witnesses were required to recall what had occurred was some two and a half years after the events when it seems that the plaintiff first made a complaint to the Health Care Complaints Commission. Some of the defendant’s witnesses were only asked to recall the events after the present proceedings commenced in 2020.
The danger of courts relying on human memory has been referred to in many cases over the years, with three cases of significance being Watson v Foxman (1995) 49 NSWLR 315 at 319; Campbell v Campbell [2015] NSWSC 784 at [73]-[77]; and In the matter of Kit Digital Australia Pty Ltd (In Liq) [2014] NSWSC 1547 at [7]. I have recently set out the important passages from these judgments in Fussell v Hanrahan t/as Dignan Hanrahan Solicitors [2024] NSWSC 1388 at [45]-[46]. It is not necessary to set them out again, but I have taken account of what was said in those cases.
All of the cases which discuss human memory emphasise the greater importance of reliance on contemporaneous records. Those records tend to show in this case, in respect of a number of matters, that the plaintiff’s recollection of events is unreliable. That is not to say that the plaintiff was not endeavouring to tell the truth, and the same may be said of Ms Antonelli, but simply that the effects of time and recall have clouded for them what actually occurred.
The plaintiff was seen successively by Nurse Karki, Andrea Brisbane (possibly a nurse), Dr Odouard, Dr Andric and Dr Fernandez. Nurse Karki was involved again as the nurse present when Dr Andric was performing the impugned procedure. Bearing in mind the limits on the individual recollections of the doctors and Nurse Karki, the following are their accounts of what took place on that day, with principal reliance being placed on the contemporaneous hospital records.
The plaintiff presented to the emergency department at the hospital at 1:22pm on 1 April 2015. He was triaged by Nurse Karki. The triage window is located immediately to the left of the person taking the photographs of the emergency department that are annexed to the statement of Ms Antonelli. The following is recorded in relation to the findings on triage:

Triage Presenting Information: LE- Hx of silicon oil removal under Dr Ho 27/03/2015.C/O of pain, watery eye since 2/7 progressively worsening. IOP R-26, L-32. On G chlorsig, g PF, G HA, G iopidine. Hx of ret det in LE 09/2014.
Triage Additional Presenting Information: LE- Conj injected ++, LE mildly dilated

At 1:47pm Ms Andrea Brisbane conducted an eye examination of the plaintiff. The findings were recorded as follows:

Visual Correction Unaided
RVA Distance: 6m
RVA Number of Line: 12
RVA Pinhole: no imp
LVA Distance: hm 1/2 metre
LVA Pinhole: no imp

Subsequently, Dr Odouard conducted an examination of the plaintiff although she is unable to remember precisely what time that occurred. As her examination was followed immediately by Dr Andric examining the plaintiff and conducting the tap and inject directly afterwards, it is likely that the examination was later in the afternoon. Dr Odouard said that the examination took place in one of the rooms opposite the chairs where the plaintiff and his sister were sitting. That was not the room where Dr Andric subsequently carried out the impugned procedure.
At the time of her examination Dr Odouard said she had available to her the plaintiff’s online records of his previous admissions as well as the paper records created for the presentation on that day including his triage records and Ms Brisbane’s vision assessment. She explained Ms Brisbane’s findings as follows:

On assessment, Mr Busa had a right visual acuity with glasses of 6/12 with no pinhole improvement. His left visual acuity with glasses was hand movements only at 0.5 meters (sic), also with no improvement on pinhole. An improvement with pinhole vision suggests there is a refractive error where the vision can be improved or corrected with glasses or contact lenses and does not necessarily suggest pathology. No improvement in pinhole would suggest a pathological ocular finding resulting in reduced vision, not correctable with glasses.

Dr Odouard made handwritten notes of the history she obtained, of her examination of the plaintiff, and of what she did thereafter. The transcription of her notes is as follows:

- 53 y.o. M [Male]
- (L) RD [Detached Retina] repair (Dr Ho) with vitrectomy delamination, laser + oil.
- oil removed on 27/3/15-
- discharged on chlorsig QID, PF [Prednefrin forte] QID [4 daily].
HA [Homatropine] BD [twice daily]- compliant. VA [visual assessment]- CF [Count fingers] @ 20 cm- PH 6/120
- noted sticky discharge 2/7 post-op
- onset of pain yesterday- sharp, periorbital, not with EOM [Extra Ocular Movement]
- optometrist this morning said ↑IOP [Intraocular pressure]
- ᶲ nausea/vomiting.
- ᶲ headaches.
- ᶲ floaters- ? new
- vision- poor post op.
OHx
1. (L) RD repair.
2. T2DM PDR [Proliferative Diabetic Retinopathy]
→ laser PRP [Pan Retinal Photocoagulation] BE [Both Eyes]
3. DMO [Diabetic Macular Oedema]
- ® Avastin every month
- Due for one tomorrow with Dr Ho

MHx

Meds

1. Hernia repair

Novorapid 40u TDS

2. Appendectomy

Levemir 40u nocte

3. 2 x c-spine fusion

Tramadol 200mg

4. Septicaemia

Coversyl

5. ↑etoh

Lipitor

6. HTN

7. T2DM

Allergies- oxycontin

SHx – truck driver → not working for 12 mths.

O/E

(R) VA

GAT

(L) VA

6/12

HM @ ½ m

Left 15 right 25

Suture X

[R EYE DIAG]

√ lids √

[L EYE DIAG] ←Soft rubeosis

√ cornea √

X suture mucous

√ conjunctiva SCH

D/Q [DEEP & QUIET] AC [ANTERIOR CHAMBERS] cell 2+

ᶲ hypopyon

√ ant [ANTERIOR] vit [VITREOUS] tender globe ++

Nil view

[VISION FIELD DIAG]

B-Scan- retina flat
D/W Dr Dagliesh/Guillermo/Dr Ghorbatrov [sic]
→for tap + inject
(bold italics added)

The transcription contains two errors about which Dr Odouard gave evidence. First, under the heading “MHx” what is transcribed alongside the number “5” should read “chol” with an upward pointing arrow. That is an abbreviation for high cholesterol. Secondly, under the heading “O/E” and in respect of the left eye, the reference to “soft rubeosis” should read “SCH rubeosis”. “SCH” stands for subconjunctival haemorrhage.
Dr Odouard said that in light of what the plaintiff informed her about what he had experienced since the procedure on 27 March for the removal of the oil, her index of suspicion for endophthalmitis was elevated. The significant matters were the recent surgery, intraocular inflammation with pain and possible new floaters, and a sticky discharge two days following the operation. Dr Odouard said that new symptoms of pain raised the suspicion of endophthalmitis which typically presents around three days following surgery.
Dr Odouard said that she performed a b-scan (bright scan ultrasonography) to check the status of the retina and to ensure it was still attached following the surgery. Her noting “retina flat” confirmed that the retina was attached and in the correct anatomical position.
Dr Odouard said that a clinical suspicion of endophthalmitis is a time-sensitive emergency that requires prompt intervention. She immediately escalated her concern to the more senior practitioner, Dr Andric, the ophthalmic registrar. She also discussed the plaintiff with Drs Dagliesh, Fernandez and Gorbatov who were members of the vitreoretinal surgical team. Dr Odouard received advice from the vitreoretinal surgical team to perform a tap and inject procedure in the emergency department. She communicated that advice to Dr Andric and handed the plaintiff over to him.
It should be noted that the plaintiff denies being seen or examined by Dr Odouard and there was a faint suggestion that Dr Odouard’s notes were fabricated because she did not sign them nor place a time recording on them.
Dr Andric’s evidence was that the two rooms opposite the chairs near the desk as shown in the photographs were examination rooms. One of those was used by Dr Odouard and the other was used by Dr Andric. There was a door between the two rooms and generally, he said, the door remained open. Dr Odouard thought it likely that the door would have been closed. Dr Andric said it was common for him to overhear Dr Odouard’s assessment of patients from his room, and he has some limited recollection of hearing her conduct an assessment of the plaintiff although he did not hear the details of the assessment.
After Dr Odouard had assessed the plaintiff, she spoke to Dr Andric about the plaintiff. He recalls briefly examining the plaintiff. He agreed with her concern that the plaintiff might have been suffering from post-operative endophthalmitis and he recommended that she promptly raise the plaintiff’s condition with the vitreoretinal team consisting of Drs Dagliesh, Fernandez and Gorbatov.
The team recommended that the plaintiff should undergo a “tap and inject” while waiting for a bed in a ward of the hospital.
Dr Andric said that he would carry out the procedure because Dr Odouard had not done it previously. Dr Andric said that by that time he would have carried out the procedure about half a dozen times in his three month rotation in the Emergency Department and a number of time before that, in his position as senior registrar at the hospital.
Dr Andric said that he would have explained the procedure to the plaintiff to get his consent to carry it out. Dr Andric does not remember what he said but, in his statement, he set out what in his usual practice he would have said. It is not necessary to set that out because none of the particulars of breach of duty assert that the plaintiff did not consent to the procedure.
Dr Andric said that the plaintiff signed a consent form which is in the hospital records. While the plaintiff denies that it is his signature on the consent form, he does not say that he did not agree to the procedure. The issue about whether it was the plaintiff’s signature was not pursued at the hearing. The only matter raised in the course of cross-examination was the fact that the consent originally was for “left tap and inject” and subsequently words were added (probably by Dr Andric) which said, “inject under anaesthesia”. Again, the plaintiff does not assert that he did not agree to the injection of the antibiotics being done under a form of anaesthesia; rather, his complaint is about what Dr Andric did.
Dr Andric said that obtaining a vitreous sample from an eye with endophthalmitis is difficult and is not always achieved. He said that he has a specific recollection of performing the tap on the plaintiff and that he successfully aspirated fluid from the eye. The pathology record shows that Dr Andric aspirated 0.1mL of fluid.
A significant issue in the case was whether Dr Andric inserted seven needles in order to aspirate the vitreous or whether he ceased the procedure after no more than three needles.
In this regard, a very unfortunate aspect of the matter is that there are no notes of the procedure carried out by Dr Andric. There were two possible explanations. One is that Dr Andric failed to make any notes. He said that if he did not make any notes he does not recall why he failed to do so. He said he has a recollection of Dr Fernandez reviewing the clinical notes in order to organise an operating theatre for the plaintiff. He said that it was possible he intended to document the procedure after Dr Fernandez had completed his review of the notes, but he overlooked doing so. He accepts that the omission should not have occurred, and he is apologetic about it.
The other possibility is that part of the file containing his notes has been lost. Some support for that derives from the evidence of Lesley McDowell, a Nurse Unit Manager at the SEH, who carried out a search of the records in response to a notice to produce. Not only were there apparently incomplete notes of Dr Odouard with her signature not appearing at the end of page 2 of the notes, there was the absence of a note of what is called the timeout procedure by Nurse Karki (conducted before the tap and inject) and the absence of a handover note by Nurse Karki after the tap and inject. I will return to the absence of notes by Dr Andric when discussing the negligence allegations.
Dr Andric’s evidence was that when performing tap and inject procedures he had never attempted more than three times (ie three taps) to extract fluid. He said that he is confident that he only attempted no more than three taps before abandoning the procedure and considering referral to theatre. Dr Andric said that clinical notes subsequently made by Dr Fernandez showing an absence of choroidal effusions or a detached retina identified on a b-scan were reassuring in that no structural trauma was identified as having occurred from the tap procedure.
Dr Fernandez’s evidence was that he saw the plaintiff in the room where Dr Andric had carried out the procedure at the end of that procedure. He can recall that the plaintiff was in considerable pain, and was distressed and agitated. He agreed with Dr Andric that it would be necessary to complete the procedure in theatre. Dr Fernandez does not actually recall speaking to the plaintiff about his consent to the procedure in theatre and to an anaesthetic, but he believes he would have done so as part of his usual practice.
The plaintiff was given a peribulbar block anaesthetic at 6:37pm, taken to theatre at 7:09pm and the 10 minute procedure injecting antibiotics commenced at 7:19pm. Since he had eaten at about 3.00pm the procedure could not be done under sedation or a general anaesthetic. Dr Fernandez’s notes of the procedure are as follows:

Type of anaesthetic
Peribulbar block
…
Procedure information
Left eye intravitreal injection of antibiotics and dexamethasone.
Operation description:
Povidone-iodine prep and drape
IVT antibiotics (Vancomycin 1mg/0.0Sml + Ceftazidime 2.25mg/0.05ml) and IVT dexa (0.4mg in 0.1ml). All given in inferotemporal quadrant at 4mm from limbus.
Jelonet and patch eye.
Wound class: clean.
…
Surgeon's note
Post procedure instructions and follow up
Comment
We need to unpatch the left eye to administer the drops and then repatch it:
g Maxidex every hour (24 hours out of 24) left eye
g Ocuflox 6 times day left eye
g Homatropine BO left eye
PO Ciprofloxacine 500mg BD

During that procedure Dr Fernandez injected antibiotics and anti-inflammatories into the plaintiff’s eye. Dr Fernandez also performed a b-scan. That allowed him to check the posterior segment of the eye to exclude choroidal haemorrhage and any retinal detachment. He said that neither was observed. At 7.50pm Dr Fernandez made the following notes:

'Fernandez
8-scan →    done in theatre
→    [Nil] choroidals
→   [Nil] RD [Retinal detachment]
[IVT antibiotics given (vancomycin 1mg/0.05ml
Ceftazidime 2.25mg/0.05mg)
+
IVT Dexamethasone (0.4mg/0.1ml)]
→ in infratemporal quadrant.
Plan: -please chart the above medication
On arrival to ward (call SRMO)
Rest as per indications on Sx report’

Subsequent events

Thereafter Dr Fernandez reviewed the plaintiff each day he remained in hospital. Dr Fernandez said it was his usual practice that after he had reviewed a patient he would discuss the patient and proposed treatment with a consultant ophthalmologist. The consultant on duty would also typically see the patient during the day.
On 2 April 2015, Dr Fernandez reviewed the plaintiff. He performed a vision assessment of his left eye and noted that the plaintiff could count fingers. On an examination of the plaintiff’s eye there was an absence of hypopyon (a whitish layer made from inflammatory cells in the anterior chamber of the eye), but there was a significant number of cells in the anterior chamber, measured as 3+. The intraocular pressure (IOP) of the left eye was 28mmHg (above normal IOP). A decision was made to add Timolol because of the high IOP.
Dr Fernandez made the following note on 2 April 2015:

'Post tap & inject #1 → less pain, feeling better
VA L [left] CF (Count Fingers]
[Left eye] 28 [eye diag] [Nil] hypopyon
Cells 3+

(*) Micro- pus cells [Nil] Hazy view
- [Nil] organisms seen Good red reflex
4q [Quadrants]

Imp: Improving
Plan → Continue on same treatment.
No need to patch eye anymore.
Timolol 0.5% BD (LE) [left eye]
(bold italics added)

On 3 April 2015, Dr Fernandez reviewed the plaintiff on the ward. Dr Fernandez noted that the plaintiff told him that his pain was significantly reduced. On a vision acuity assessment of his left eye the plaintiff was able to count fingers at 20cm, the amount of cells in the anterior chamber seemed to have decreased, there was no hypopyon, and the view of the fundus of the eye continued to be hazy, but Dr Fernandez could begin to perceive the optic nerve on examination. His eye pressure was still 28mmHg, so that a decision was made to add Iopidine to the treatment. Dr Fernandez made the following entry in the clinical notes:

'Fernandez
Post VT [lntravitreal Therapy] day #2 → ↓↓↓ pain
VA L CF @ 20cm
[Left eye] 28 [eye diag] Cells 1 +

[Nil] hypopyon
(*) no changes in micro histology. [Left eye diag] Hazy view
Nothing new seen. Just about seeing
the disc.
Imp: Improving
Plan: continue on same treatment.
Add lopidine TDS (L/E) [Left eye]'
(bold italics added)

On 4 April 2015 Dr Fernandez reviewed the plaintiff who informed him that he no longer had any pain in his left eye. On a vision assessment of the plaintiff’s left eye, the plaintiff could count fingers at 25cm. The eye pressure was 24mmHg and Dr Fernandez observed 3+ pigmented cells in the anterior chamber. He had a fundal view. On the basis of the increased number of cells and the fact that the doctor’s view of the fundus had worsened, Dr Fernandez decided to perform a b-scan.
The b-scan confirmed that the retina had not detached and there was no choroidal haemorrhage. However, the doctor could see some echoes in the vitreous cavity which he interpreted as a vitreous haemorrhage. In his view, the vitreous haemorrhage was likely residual neovascularisation secondary to his diabetic retinopathy. Since the plaintiff’s eye pressure was still slightly elevated, the doctor decided to substitute Cosopt for Timolol as it is a more potent therapy.
Dr Fernandez wrote the following in the clinical notes:

'Fernandez
Post IVT day # 3 → no pain.
VA L CF @ 25cm
[Left eye] 24 [eye diag] pigmented cells 3+

B-scan → (L) VH [vitreal haemorrhage]
Flat [Nil] coroidals. No view (VH)

Imp: VH
Plan: change Timolol 05% (stop it)
and start on Cosopt BD (LE)
rest continue the same'
(bold italics added)

On 5 April 2015, Dr Fernandez again reviewed the plaintiff. The plaintiff told him that he continued to have no pain. On a vision assessment, there was modest improvement to counting fingers at 30cm. There appeared to be fewer cells in the anterior chamber, and the fundal view seemed to have cleared a bit to enable the doctor to see the white of the disc. A decision was made to taper down steroids since there was no pain.
Both Dr Fernandez and the consultant considered discharging the plaintiff the following day since in the four days following the tap and inject his clinical evolution had been favourable. The pain had completely disappeared and subjectively, his vision appeared to be gradually improving. They concluded that the endophthalmitis had subsided. The only setback had been the appearance of a vitreous haemorrhage which was not unusual in diabetic patients.
Dr Fernandez made the following entry in the clinical notes for that day:

‘Fernandez
Post lVT #4 → [Nil] pain.
VA L CF @ 30cm
[Left eye] 23 [Eye diag] 2-3+ pigmented cells

[Nil] hyphema
[Nil] hypopyon

VH [Vitreal haemorrhage]
(Just see white of disc)
Imp: VH
Plan: ↓ Maxidex to 6 times a day.
Rest the same
DC probably tomorrow'
(bold italics added)

On 6 April 2015 Dr Fernandez conducted another review of the plaintiff. The plaintiff informed him that he had no pain and was feeling better. He informed him that he could see more clearly. Dr Fernandez performed a vision assessment and the plaintiff could count fingers at 50cm. Cells in the anterior chamber and the fundal view were similar to the previous day but his intraocular pressure and visual acuity was slightly better. There had been no organisms seen on microbiology or growth in culture. He considered the plaintiff was suitable for discharge.
Dr Fernandez made the following entry in the clinical notes for that day:

'Fernandez
Post IVT # 5 → [Nil] pain. Feeling better.
Feels he sees clearer.
VA L CF @ 50cm
[Left eye] 20 [eye diag] 2-3+ pigmented cells.
(*) no growth in microbiology
[Nil] hyphema
[Nil] hypopyon
VH (3-4+)
(Just see white of disc)
Imp: Stable/better
Plan: D/C today
F/U next week Thursday in VR clinic: if there is. If not Monday 13/4/15.
Rest as per discharge summary'.
(bold italics added)

The clinical notes show that the plaintiff continued to see doctors at the Sydney Eye Hospital, usually Dr Ho or Dr Wong. The clinical notes disclose that on 23 April 2015 the plaintiff’s visual acuity in the left eye was 6/90 and the plaintiff told Dr Ho that he felt the vision was getting better in the left eye. On 28 April 2015 his visual acuity was recorded as being 6/60.
On 4 May 2015 the plaintiff saw his GP, Dr Susino. The visual acuity in his left eye was recorded 6/36.
On 7 May his visual acuity was recorded by the SEH at 6/36.
On 26 May 2015 the plaintiff’s visual acuity was recorded as hand movements at 1 metre only and it was recorded that the plaintiff had had a further vitreous haemorrhage in the left eye two days earlier. There was recoding of rubeotic glaucoma in the left eye.
On 28 May 2015 Dr Ho recorded hand movements at ½ a metre in the left eye and rubeosis in that eye.
On 4 June 2015, Dr Chua recorded in the clinical notes that the plaintiff had an increase in intraocular pressure which was measured at 50mmHg. The plaintiff’ underwent Cyclodiode laser surgery and the condition was medically managed by medications.
On 9 June 2015 he saw Dr Susino. He reported no vision in his left eye. He reported having been discharged from hospital after symptom management of glaucoma.
On 11 June 2015 Dr Higgins at the SEH noted in the clinical notes that the plaintiff presented in extreme pain in the left eye, saying that he had had that pain for the past two to three days. His vision in the left eye was said to be hand movements.
On 17 June 2015 he saw Dr Susino saying he needed to go back to the SEH and his left eye was painful.
On 18 June 2015 Dr Chua recorded that the visual acuity in the plaintiff’s left eye was recorded 6/120 and that he continued on drugs to treat his raised intraocular pressure.
On 7 July 2015 Dr Wong recorded that the plaintiff had received Cyclodiode laser treatment to treat the continued increase in intraocular pressure of 50mmHg.
On 16 July 2015 Dr Chua recorded that visual acuity in the plaintiff’s left eye was counting fingers at 1 metre,
On 18 August 2015 Dr Wong noted a decrease in intraocular pressure in the left eye to 18mmHg. The visual acuity in the left eye was counting fingers at ½ a metre.
On 15 September 2015 Dr Wong recorded that the visual acuity in the left eye was hand movements at 3 metres.
On 14 October 2015 the visual acuity in the plaintiff’s left eye was recorded as counting fingers at 1.5 metres. Dr Wong recorded on 20 October 2015 that he could count fingers at 1 metre.
On 5 May 2016 Dr Chua recorded that the plaintiff’s intraocular pressure in the left eye had increased again and Cyclodiode laser treatment was given to treat the pressure.
On 4 June 2016 the plaintiff underwent another left eye Cyclodiode laser procedure for increased intraocular pressure. The vision in the left eye was hand movements only.
On 5 July 2016 the plaintiff saw Dr Wong. Dr Wong recorded the following:

- long discussion w pt today
-pt asking questions about why LE has lost vision
-thinks LE tap and inject for endophthalmitis caused problems
- v. depressed that can’t see LE & can’t work as truck driver or graphic designer
-no current job
-v anxious when has R intravitreal injections as [??] that may lose vision

On 19 September 2016 the plaintiff underwent a left phacoemulsification with implantation of intraocular lens and insertion of Baerveldt implant with scleral patch graft.
On 17 October 2016 the plaintiff told Dr Susino that he had a sudden loss of vision in his right eye the previous week. On 18 November 2016 he told Dr Susino that he had photocoagulation to the right eye 10 days earlier and he lost vision in the right eye. He was found to have a vitreous haemorrhage. Dr Susino noted that he was visibly upset.
On 13 January 2017 Dr Susino recorded this:

Patient very upset about how he has been treated with the long history of eye issues
Sever diabetic retinopathy
Seen multiple time as Sydney Eye Hospital
Saw dr Chang (eye surgeon)_ yesterday, did further procedures to L eye but ultimately has told the patient that the eye needs to be removed – proliferation ++(with angiogenesis high)
Has been advised by Dr Chang that he can drive
currently struggling for income as he cannot get a job due to his eye condition
mood low
but denies any suicidal thoughts

By 19 January 2017 it was recorded that the plaintiff was blind in his left eye.
The above is a sample only of the consultations the plaintiff had with his doctors over that period to provide an overall picture of what happened with the plaintiff’s eye since the impugned procedure on 1 April 2015..

Assessment of witnesses

(a) The plaintiff

I do not accept the plaintiff’s evidence as reliable for what occurred on 1 April 2015 or otherwise as to his recollection for a number of reasons.
First, his recollection of the events of the day is poor, as the contemporaneous records demonstrate. He has no recollection of being triaged when he arrived at the hospital. The notes demonstrate that he was. He has no recollection of being seen by Dr Odouard. That is a significant lack of memory given the detail of the information recorded by Dr Odouard which could only have come from the plaintiff. It is also significant because when asked if he would accept that his memory might be a little unreliable because he could not remember seeing Dr Odouard, he replied:

Not on that day. I can never forget that day.

In a similar way, when it was suggested that he had been examined by Dr Odouard in one of the two rooms opposite the chairs, he said:

Never went into those rooms, ever, yeah. I know that hospital inside out.

That evidence was inconsistent with his sister’s evidence that Dr Andric saw the plaintiff in a room opposite to where they sat.

He denied that he had a sticky discharge two days after the operation to remove the oil from his eye and denied that he had sharp pain in his left eye when he went to the Hospital on that day. He claimed only to have watery eyes and a red eye. I prefer the contemporaneous medical record.
He said in his statement that Dr Andric had “long hair which was shoulder length at the time”. In oral evidence he said that was his “clear recollection”. A photograph of Dr Andric which had been posted online only 2 weeks prior to 1 April 2015 shows that Dr Andric had short dark hair. Dr Andric also denied that he had long shoulder-length hair. When taken to this photograph in cross-examination, the plaintiff said, “…that photograph; anybody can put a date on it, yeah. I’m a graphic designer, it’s very easy to change”. Dr Andric was not cross-examined to suggest that he had altered the date on the photograph. That assertion of the plaintiff reflected very poorly on him.
He asserted in his first statement that after the procedure was aborted Dr Andric called his sister, who was outside, and “then told my sister Tomassina “I attempted 7 times”. This was expressed very misleadingly because it emerged in cross-examination that he did not hear that said, rather, his sister told him the next day that Dr Andric said those words.
In his first statement he gave this evidence:

57.   In or about 6.30pm the bed was then wheeled into the theatre room. I then saw Dr Fernandez who said to me
“I’m going to stitch your eye”.
58.   As he was doing this I could feel everything and I felt uncomfortable. I started to move. Dr Fernandez said [to] me
“Don’t move, I am stitching your eye”.
…
61.   After Dr Fernandez stitched my eye, the bed was then wheeled into a Recovery room.

The plaintiff repeated in a somewhat unresponsive answer during cross-examination:

I could hear everything going in theatre, and he said, "Do not move, I'm stitching your eye", that's what he said in theatre to me.

He said further that he could not be mistaken about Dr Fernandez placing stitches in his eyes, and that he was not confusing the occasion with the procedure on 27 March 2015 where Dr Fernadez removed the silicone oil from the plaintiff’s eye, when stitches were placed.
In fact Dr Fernandez did not stitch the plaintiff’s eye. I accept Dr Fernandez’s evidence in that regard which is consistent with the notes made of the procedure. There was nothing to stitch; antibiotics were simply being injected into the eye. It may be understandable that the plaintiff might have thought Dr Fernandez was stitching his eye because he did not know exactly what was happening, but his evidence that Dr Fernandez twice said he was stitching the eye is clearly wrong, and is a further indication of the plaintiff’s unreliability about what occurred on that day.
In cross-examination the following exchanges occurred:

Q. What do you say to the suggestion that your vision acuity was better on 28 April 2015, after you were discharged from hospital, than what it was on presentation to the hospital on 1 April 2015.
A. No, I wasn't better at all because I lost my vision that day, yeah.
Q. I suggest the records disclose that on 7 May 2015 your vision acuity was 6/36, again better than when you presented to the hospital on 1 April 2015.
A. No, disagree.

The reference to losing his vision that day can only be an assertion that he had no vision in his left eye from 1 April 2015; it is not merely an assertion that on 1 April 2015 he had no vision – the question makes that clear. As is made clear above (at [72] to [104) he had vision as measured by various doctors until at least 2017.
Secondly, his evidence about the visual acuity of the left eye at various time both before and after 1 April 2015 also does not accord with what is recorded in contemporaneous medical records. In his first statement he said that after removal of the oil on 27 March 2015 his “eyesight had returned back to normal”. In cross-examination he modified that to saying “80% of normal”. However, the Discharge Summary addressed to the plaintiff’s GP, Dr Susino, indicates that visual acuity was hand movements. Further, as Dr Odouard’s notes ([51] above) and notes of the examination by Ms Brisbane ([48] above) make clear his visual acuity in the left eye on 1 April 2015 was hand movements at ½ a metre.
As to the position after 1 April 2015, the plaintiff said in his Further Supplementary Statement that on 6 April 2015 when he left hospital “I could only see vague hand movements”. What is recorded in the contemporaneous notes (above [72] to [82]) show that he could count fingers at various distances, the last being 50cm on 6 April 2015. He also said in that statement “As the weeks went by I never regained vision in my left eye”. He told Dr Peter Klug that he was discharged on 6 April 2015 and “to date his vision has not been restored”. The contemporaneous records ([83] to [104] show that his vision fluctuated but certainly improved at various times, including in May to 6/36.
Thirdly, on 8 May 2014 Dr Ho diagnosed the plaintiff with a localised tractional detachment. The plaintiff denied being informed of this and of being given advice about it. The clinical records show that Dr Ho recorded that the plaintiff was not a “good surgical candidate at this point in time. Pt [patient] agrees”. When taken to the notes the plaintiff gave this evidence:

Q. Is it possible that you're mistaken and that there was a discussion with Dr Ho on 8 May in relation to the fact that you had a localised tractional retinal detachment?
A. First of all, I've never seen these notes before.
Q. I'm not asking you to say you've seen them; I'm asking whether having seen those notes--
A. No, I don't recall any of this, yeah.
Q. You don't recall it, but is it possible as a fair man?
A. No. If I would have known I had a retinal detachment I would have asked for service straight away, yeah, as I was driving trucks.
Q. And then on 17 June 2014, again you don't need to look at the notes because you don't recall it.
A. Yeah.
Q. Professor Gillies has documented that you had a partial tractional retinal detached retina, and you received advice to "wait for now with further review in two to three months", you don't recall that?
A. No. In fact I don't even recall seeing Dr Gillies in 2014 at all, yeah. I saw Dr Gillies 2012, 2013, but 2014 I basically only saw Dr Ho and a few other intern doctors that were on duty at the time, yeah.
Q. Do you accept that if there is a clinical entry made by Professor Gillies in 2014 it is likely that Professor Gillies saw you in that year?
A. No.
Q. Do you reject the proposition that you may have forgotten that you were advised you had a localised tractional retinal detachment in May 2014?
A. No. I would remember something like that, yeah. My medical notes are all over the place, and missing, yeah.

The clinical notes record that he saw Professor Gillies a number of times during that period. For a patient not to remember that he was told he had a retinal detachment shows a poor memory but his refusal to admit of the possibility of it when shown the notes causes me to have considerable doubts about the reliability of his memory about past events associated with his eyes.
Fourthly, the plaintiff’s admitted falsehoods in his application to Linfox for employment indicates that the plaintiff is prepared to be untruthful to obtain an advantage, particularly, a financial advantage. When cross-examined about this application, the plaintiff became very emotional, explaining how desperate he was to obtain work to “get some money” so that he and his wife could survive. Whilst on one level his actions in that regard were understandable if not excusable, they still constituted false statements to obtain a financial advantage. The only difference in assessing his evidence (which is given, of course, to obtain damages) is that his evidence is given under oath, and I have some regard to that fact. Nevertheless, it affects his reliability at least.
Fifthly, the plaintiff said in his first statement:

5. Prior to the incident at Sydney Eye Hospital I worked as a prime mover truck driver regularly driving interstate.

Contrary to that evidence, the plaintiff lodged Permanent Incapacity Claims asserting that he “became incapable of being gainfully employed” on, variously, 29 June 2014 and 6 November 2014. He could not explain the difference in the two dates but his evidence of being incapacitated for work in June 2014 was inconsistent with his evidence that he took five months off from work up to October 2014 to look after his father. It is also inconsistent with his evidence of driving a vehicle for J D Transport, his employer for some years, from Townsville to Sydney in October 2014 until he had to stop driving because he had “floaties” in his eyes. He said:

I was travelling in and out of New South Wales and Queensland, all the time. Going back and forwards with my job in late – in 2014. Just back and forwards all the time, from Queensland. Yeah, basically Townsville I was working in.

Elsewhere in cross-examination he said that he ceased work in November 2014. Again, in Dr Delaney’s report of 18 August 2017 Dr Delaney said:

Mr Busa told me he had worked as a truck driver until the end of June 2014 but he had not worked since.

That was consistent with what appears in Dr Klug’s report:

I understand Mr Busa has not been able to return to work as a heavy freight truck driver since June 2014 due to loss of vision in his left eye.

The plaintiff agreed that what appeared in Dr Klug’s report was consistent with his TPD application asserting 29 June 2014 as the date he had to cease work.

Some of the evidence concerning when he ceased work and why was open to the conclusion that a measure of dishonesty was involved in relation to the TPD claims. I am not, however, prepared to say that the plaintiff was dishonest in that regard. What is certainly clear is that this area of his evidence is entirely unreliable, and that reflects on his reliability in relation to the remainder of his evidence.
Finally, Dr Klug noted in his report:

There is no past psychiatric history or family psychiatric history.

The plaintiff said in his evidence that that statement was accurate. Yet, as he also agreed, he was diagnosed in 2010 with PTSD and major depression as a result of his mother’s traumatic death, and he made a claim for psychiatric injury consequent on her death. Nor did he report to Dr Klug stress and depression for which he was prescribed antidepressants in December 2013.

(b) Tomassa Antonelli

Nor do I consider that the plaintiff’s sister was a reliable witness. First, she did not recall the plaintiff being triaged nor seen by anyone who conducted an eye examination. Secondly, she denied that the plaintiff was seen by Dr Odouard. Thirdly, she said in her statement:

I say categorically that we did not go to the Emergency Department of the hospital,

despite that being exactly where the plaintiff was treated. She was also wrong about the existence of the desk shown in the photographs of the Emergency Department, but that is an understandable mistake of recollection.

Fourthly, in her statement she said:

16. I am aware that the doctor wanted to draw some liquid out of John’s eye.

In cross-examination she gave this evidence:

Q. At 16 you say that you're aware that Dr Andric wanted to draw some liquid out of John's eye?
A. That's right.
Q. Are you said (sic) you didn't go into the procedure room with Mr Busa before his procedure.
A. No, I didn't.
Q. When you say you were aware that Dr Andric wanted to draw some fluid, is that something that Mr Busa told you as you were sitting in the waiting area before the procedure?
A. No. He was told that they were going to try and draw out some fluid from his eye to see if there was an infection.
Q. When were you told that?
A. Before he went in.
Q. You tell his Honour that before he'd seen a member of the nursing staff, before he'd seen a doctor, before Dr Marko Andric called him into the room, he knew he was having a tap, some fluid taken out of his eye?
A. That's right.
Q. Isn't it more probable as a reasonable person that before he went into the room to have that tap and inject procedure, he had seen a doctor who had recommended?
A. No.
Q. How did you know before he was called into the room that he was to have the procedure?
A. He was told.

In fact, the evidence is overwhelming that it was not until Dr Andric examined the plaintiff after Dr Odouard’s assessment, and he had been directed by the vitreoretinal team to perform the tap and inject, that the plaintiff or his sister could have known that was what was to happen.
Fifthly, Ms Antonelli claimed that when she first spoke to Dr Andric after the procedure he said, “I still haven’t managed to get any fluid”. The plaintiff pointed to evidence Dr Andric gave from which the plaintiff submitted Dr Andric thought it was plausible that he told Ms Antonelli he was unable to manage getting fluid. However, the question and answer was this:

Q. Would you perhaps have said something about, "But I'm unable to manage getting fluid" whether it be any fluid or enough fluid?
A. That's plausible. And I would've said - because the point is, obviously, looking back in hindsight, I wasn't able to finish the procedure that needed to be done so I would have said, "Look, I can't do it here. He's in pain. We can do it upstairs where we can give pain relief and you can do it safely."
(emphasis added)

It may be observed that the question asked “any fluid or enough fluid”. Dr Andric had been aiming for 0.2mL which was said to be the norm, but he had only extracted 0.1L as the pathology records attest. It is highly improbable that Dr Andric said what Ms Antonelli asserts because he had in fact extracted 0.1mL of fluid.
Nor did it reflect well on Ms Antonelli that she asserted Dr Andric was lying when he said he did not make seven attempts to extract fluid. Again, it was not put to Dr Andric that he was lying when he denied making seven attempts. That statement, like the plaintiff’s assertion that Dr Andric might have digitally altered the date of his photograph, suggests two people with a fixed view of wrongdoing by Dr Andric, doing what they could to besmirch his evidence, and with no ability or desire to consider alternative possibilities.

(c) Dr Andric

The plaintiff challenged Dr Andric’s credibility relying on four matters; first, his evidence that the door between his room and Dr Odouard’s room was usually open was inconsistent with Dr Odouard’s evidence that it was normally shut; secondly, he had limited recollection of the plaintiff; thirdly, he made no notes of the procedure he carried out; fourthly, a challenge was made on the basis of things said in his statement dated 18 December 2017 which transpired to be incorrect.
The first of these matters was trivial and I disregard it. The second is, as I have noted, scarcely surprising. It can be accepted that Dr Andric has limited recollection of what occurred on that day, although he can remember Mr Busa because he had never had a patient who reacted in such a way to the procedure.
The statement of Dr Andric of 18 December 2017 came about in this way. The plaintiff wrote to the SEH making a complaint about what happened to him on 1 April 2015. Dr Andric must have been approached by the SEH for a response to the plaintiff’s letter. At the time he wrote the letter Dr Andric had only a redacted copy of Dr Odouard’s notes and nothing more. He accepted that the notes assisted to some extent to help him reconstruct what he believed had happened, coupled with his actual recollection of the way Mr Busa reacted.
His letter relevantly said:

As the events occurred in April 2015, my recollection of the events is limited but I will try to describe what I can.
[He then gave evidence of his usual practice when confronted with someone with suspected endophthalmitis, and went on to say:]
Obtaining a vitreous sample from an eye with endophthalmitis is difficult and not always achieved. To obtain a vitreous sample, I am always prepared to try another 2 times to a total of 3 injections or “taps”. …
In cases such as this one, where the patient was already known to the vitreoretinal team which was available for urgent surgery, I would have tried a maximum number of 3 times and if still unable to obtain a sample, referred Mr Busa to VR Fellow Dr Guillermo Fernandez for surgical management.
…
Patients with endophthalmitis would receive urgent surgery after an initial tap and inject and this would have been the case with Mr Busa. The subsequent surgery took place because of the infection, not because of the tap and inject.
…
I also regret that I myself did not ensure more documentation of the procedure. Dr Odouard had initially assessed the patient in her room and written in the notes and I likely took the file into the treatment room for the procedure. It is possible that while trying to reassure Mr Busa and talk to his sister at the end of the procedure, I did not immediately write in the notes as I usually would. At this point, it is possible that the notes went to theatre with the patient and Dr Fernandez without me realising my oversight.

There were two criticisms of Dr Andric in respect of this statement. First, it was said that Dr Andric considered he had completed the tap and inject procedure, and, secondly, he said that the reason the plaintiff went to theatre afterwards was because he had endophthalmitis. Dr Andric’s recollection in that regard was wrong, but he gave this evidence about what he had written:

Q. I want to suggest to you that when you were writing this statement, your recollection was that you had completed the tap and inject procedure; that you'd done a tap and then you'd done an inject procedure, and then the patient had been sent off to theatre; is that right?
A. I was under the impression that I did something. I wouldn't have been able to really recall, but from my point of view, I would have - like, I knew that Dr Fernandez was involved. I knew that the plan was to take him upstairs for something, and I didn't know whether that was to finish the tap, to finish the injection, or whether it was to do another vitrectomy, because the issue is that, if you're worried there's an infection in there, your priority is to give the antibiotics, so I don't know whether I was going to do or whether they were going to do it. I just knew that he was going out for something.
Q. Because just on the second page, you said this; fourth paragraph: "Patients with endophthalmitis would receive urgent surgery after an initial tap and inject, and this would have been the case with Mr Busa". Just breaking that down. Are you saying in this - would your Honour want a copy of the document?
HIS HONOUR: If you've got one, that would help.
CAMPBELL
Q. You see that, "Patients would receive urgent surgery after an initial tap and inject". Is that right?
A. It can be. So when I wrote this, it was with - again, with limited notes. I knew that he had something done, but it's quite common that patients do undergo another vitrectomy to remove the debris - to remove the source of the infection - and have that surgery. So that's not unreasonable, and depending on surgeon preference, some people go in early; some people wait a day or two for the original antibiotics to kick in. I'd assume that if I hadn't done it, they would have taken him to theatre to finish it. If I had done it, they would have taken him to go and clear it out.
Q. But you didn't say that, Doctor. You said, "The subsequent surgery took place because of the infection, not because of the tap and inject". What did you mean by that?
A. So I think in the original letter that Mr Busa wrote, I think he was under the impression that they rushed him off to emergency surgery that evening because of something that I had done; because of some trauma or damage that I had caused, and that's why he was rushed off. The reality is that that's not the case. He was rushed off to either administer the antibiotics or get the tap or clear out the infection, but there was no sort of urgency because of anything that I had done, it was just that's what we normally would do.

While he was wrong at the time in his recollection of completing the procedure and the reason for the plaintiff going to theatre, his statement is otherwise consistent with his evidence in court that he performed a maximum of three attempts to withdraw fluid. He said in the statement that if he had not been able to complete the procedure he would have called for Dr Fernandez. That is also consistent with what happened.
In my opinion, Dr Andric’s mistaken recollection of those two matters does not cause me to doubt the reliability of his evidence now. December 2017 was the first time he was asked to recall this event, and he had only a copy of Dr Odouard’s notes which simply recorded her history and examination of the plaintiff. They did not assist Dr Andric to recall what he did or how and why that came to an end, and why the plaintiff was taken to theatre. In preparation for this case he has seen all of the relevant records of the hospital.
I have already commented on the failure (if it was such) of Dr Andric to make notes. Even if he did fail to record what he had done and what occurred, it does not cause me to doubt his credibility.
No other evidence was adduced to suggest that he otherwise did not carry out his duties responsibly on that or any other occasion. I consider that he was a very impressive witness. He impressed me as a careful and competent doctor. He did not try to pretend that he remembered more than he actually did. He was clearly very empathetic towards the plaintiff and the very unpleasant experience he had on 1 April 2015. His explanations for why the plaintiff may have believed things about what he remembered and experienced were entirely reasonable including the number of needles he initially laid out, and the pain and blood during the procedure.

(d) Dr Odouard

Dr Odouard’s evidence was based almost entirely on what she had written in her notes on the day and/or on the basis of her regular practice. The plaintiff submitted that the reliability of her notes was in issue, seemingly because they were not signed, nor was there any time written against the entry. However, in cross-examination the only faint challenge was on the issue of whether she had written up her notes after the events of 1 April or as she was examining the plaintiff and taking a history. I am entirely satisfied that the notes were made as she went, as she said was the case. An examination of those notes makes it quite clear that it is extremely unlikely that anyone could have retained as much detail as appears in those notes and to have written it up at a later time.

(e) Dr Fernandez

It is fair to say that there was no real challenge to the factual evidence given by Dr Fernandez. To the extent that he was challenged in cross-examination it was chiefly about his opinion, which was essentially expert opinion, that it was likely the plaintiff did have endophthalmitis on 1 April 2015. The defendant did not lead Dr Fernandez as an expert witness but counsel for the plaintiff cross-examined him as such, although I drew counsel’s attention to the fact that he was so doing during that cross-examination. I found Dr Fernandez to be an impressive witness whose evidence, both factual and expert, I accept. With regard to such of his evidence as can be considered to be expert evidence, it accords with the evidence of Dr Uppal and Dr Geoffrey Cohn whose evidence I also accept. It should be mentioned that English was not Dr Fernandez’s first language although he did not apparently have any difficulty understanding questions put to him. I mention this only because of the way some of his answers read in passages I shall set out from his evidence.

(f) Nurse Karki

Nurse Karki was not an entirely satisfactory witness. Whilst I accept that she had some actual recollection of the plaintiff for the reason she gave, namely, that she had never seen a patient react in the way the plaintiff did to the tap and inject procedure, the main problem with her evidence was that she appeared to try to reconstruct what she thought had happened in some respects based on the reading of the hospital records, but when confronted with other evidence she was forced to admit that her recollection was not accurate.
A significant example of this was her repeated assertion in her first statement that she administered Endone to the plaintiff before the tap and inject procedure because he had a painful eye and was anxious. When records were made available showing the time she administered the Endone and the time shown on the pathology records of what had been withdrawn from the plaintiff’s eye by Dr Andric, it was apparent that she gave the Endone to the plaintiff at the end of the procedure. While the question of when the Endone was administered was not in itself of any importance, the certainty with which she included that material in her first statement causes me to scrutinise carefully the remainder of her evidence.
In some cases her evidence should be accepted. The hospital notes confirm that she triaged the plaintiff at 1:26pm as she asserted, although the plaintiff has no recollection of such a triage. Further, in many respects, her evidence of what took place during the tap and inject procedure accords with the evidence of Dr Andric, whose evidence I accept. I will refer to that evidence in due course when making findings about what occurred on 1 April 2015.

Findings regarding the events of 1 April 2015

I have set out earlier the doctors’ accounts of what occurred on that day. Up to the time that Dr Andric actually carried out the first half of the tap and inject procedure, those accounts are entirely borne out by the contemporaneous notes which were made.
Despite the absence of notes concerning the tap and inject procedure, I accept the evidence of Dr Andric that he did not attempt more than three injections to withdraw fluid from the plaintiff’s eye. I do so for a number of reasons. First, the plaintiff’s evidence generally was unreliable in a number of respects, and in particular as to the events of 1 April 2015, for the reasons I have earlier given. In the same way, the evidence of Ms Antonelli is unreliable concerning the events of that day for the reasons I have earlier given. I am, in the first place, unpersuaded by their evidence about what happened and what was allegedly said about the number of injections.
Secondly, I accept Dr Andric’s evidence that he had been taught that he should not attempt more than three taps to withdraw fluid. That evidence was consistent with the evidence of Dr Uppal and Dr Cohn. I accept the evidence that he had never done so whenever he had carried out the tap and inject procedure. He said also that there was no point in trying to get a tap after three attempts where he had access to the VR team. This was, in effect, evidence of his usual practice.
The plaintiff pointed to what was said in Elayoubi v Zipser [2008] NSWCA 335 at [86]:

In respect of the first contention, the challenge is unpersuasive because it relies upon a purported acceptance of “usual practice”. Evidence of usual practice may be of assistance in circumstances where mechanical steps or routine tasks are in issue and the witness who supposedly undertook the task on a particular occasion has no recollection of the occasion. The weight to be given to such evidence will depend upon the possibility or likelihood of departure from such practice. However, the present case was not concerned with a mechanical step or routine task: it was concerned with a quite unusual procedure in professional practice. Nor was the task itself in any sense mechanical: rather, it involved conveying important medical information to a patient in a hospital ward.

The plaintiff submitted that the tap and inject procedure was not a routine task involving mechanical steps. That was because the expert evidence showed that in the plaintiff’s case the tap would have been unusually difficult because the plaintiff had oil removed and gas inserted into his eye.

However, the fact that the task was difficult does not mean that it is performed in a relevantly different manner to other tap and inject procedures. It involved some anaesthetic, the taps (up to three) to withdraw vitreous fluid and the injection of antibiotic into the eye. Dr Andric had performed this about six times in approximately a three-month rotation period in the Emergency Department and many more before and after that time.
The significant point about usual practice was the number of taps. A statement that someone never did a particular thing is a stronger statement of usual practice than a statement that the person always did something in a particular way. It has greater force when there is a plausible reason for never doing the thing. Dr Andric gave two plausible reasons for never having tapped more than three times; he had been taught not to, and there was little or no point in doing more than three because nothing is achieved and the patient is likely to be distressed.
Dr Andric is supported by Nurse Karki who gave this evidence in cross-examination:

I do not recall the actual vitreous fluid being taken out of the eye. I do not remember him making seven attempts for the tap and inject. If that would have happened, then I would clear (sic) remember, because that's not correct. I mean, no one can go in the eye with seven attempts with a needle.

That evidence has the ring of truth about it, and I accept it.

I accept that Dr Andric did not attempt more than three taps.
Thirdly, other details of the procedure given by the plaintiff were contradicted by Nurse Karki. She was not passing needles to Dr Andric because that is a sterile procedure and she was not sterile. The plaintiff gave evidence that Nurse Karki cleaned him up after the procedure. She denied that, and was not challenged about it in cross-examination. The plaintiff alleged Dr Andric was not wearing any personal protective equipment when he carried out the procedure. Dr Andric said he was not wearing any such equipment when he first examined the plaintiff but said that he was wearing a face mask and sterile gloves when carrying out the procedure. Nurse Karki also gave evidence that Dr Andric wore a mask and sterile gloves. These parts of Nurse Karki’s evidence accorded very much with what was likely to be true.
Fourthly, the plaintiff only heard that Dr Andric had attempted seven times to withdraw fluid from Ms Antonelli the day after the events, although the way that evidence was given in the plaintiff’s statement suggested that he heard Dr Andric say it. Nor does the plaintiff’s evidence that he counted the seven needles that Dr Andric used, plus the one to inject the anaesthetic, withstand scrutiny when both Dr Andric’s and Nurse Karki’s evidence about the handling of the needles is considered. The plaintiff said that the nurse opened a drawer in a stainless steel table and removed a packet containing a needle. He said that she handed needles to Dr Andric when he needed them. Nurse Karki denied that needles were kept in that drawer; it contained post-operative dressings. She denied handing needles to Dr Andric because she was not sterile. I prefer Nurse Karki’s evidence about those matters.
What seems to me likely in relation to Ms Antonelli’s evidence of what Dr Andric said is that Dr Andric told her he had made several attempts rather than seven attempts. Whilst I accept that that proposition was not put to Ms Antonelli, it seems to me the most likely explanation to resolve the factual dispute between them. I note in that regard that the plaintiff uses the term “several” in his original complaint letter to the SEH on 1 December 2017, and that Dr Morelli uses the term twice in his original report where he sets out his understanding of what occurred. However, I do not base my finding that Dr Andric did not attempt more than three taps on that explanation, because I accept Dr Andric’s evidence in that regard. It does, however, add support to Dr Andric’s evidence.
I accept that the tap procedure was a painful and unpleasant for the plaintiff. All of the doctors say that it is painful, not the least reason for which is that, if the patient is suffering from endophthalmitis, the eye is infected and inflamed. Even if it is only inflamed, and there is no dispute the plaintiff’s eye was inflamed, that adds to the pain. While I accept that the plaintiff said he felt that his left eye seemed to have burst like a balloon, the only medical explanation for that, according to Dr Andric, was that the removal of the small amount of fluid would have lowered the pressure in the eye, and that might be the sensation the plaintiff felt. I accept that there may have been some blood resulting from the procedure as Dr Andric acknowledged.

On the other hand, he said this to Dr Virgona about that matter:

He stated that he went back to the Eye Hospital and complained. He applied for all his records and went through them. He stated that there was no mention of what happened to the left eye and no mention of the doctor's name or any history of it. He stated that they also had done 1,192 lasers on his eye without his permission. He stated that he was in shock when he read this. He organised a meeting. He stated that the first one was he and his wife with Dr Playfair and Kate Stewart, the complaint nurse. Dr Playfair said they went through the notes twice and couldn't find evidence of what had happened but they would do an investigation. At a second meeting with his sister, they said they found out that the doctor who did the procedure that afternoon said he forgot to write in the notes. They then had a third meeting with the CEO who said they'd already notified the insurance company and it would be taken care of. He stated that he saw a solicitor because he doesn't want anyone else to go through this.

Dr Virgona recorded this:

He gets very disturbed about the medical notes having been missing and having been lied to, "not only once."

It is not clear in what way the plaintiff had been lied to.

In his oral evidence Dr Virgona said this about the cause or causes of his PTSD:

CAMPBELL: The trigger for the PTSD was that procedure; correct?
WITNESS VIRGONA: I concluded that there were multiple events that Mr Busa had experienced over the course of the treatment with his eyes, plural, and it was he was distressed during the course of the examination on several occasions, talking about different events, and so I concluded that it was a combination of traumatic incidents occurring in the treatment of his eyes that led to the development of the PTSD.

In relation to the absence of the notes of the procedure, he gave this evidence:

CAMPBELL: It was as a result of those investigations that he found out, amongst other things, that there were no notes taken of the procedure on 1 April?
WITNESS VIRGONA: Yes.
CAMPBELL: You knew that, yes. That was of some distress to him when he found that out?
WITNESS VIRGONA: Yes.
CAMPBELL: He believes that something happened on 1 April 2015 which caused the pain in his eye and ongoing loss of vision to his left eye?
WITNESS VIRGONA: Yes.
CAMPBELL: Is it those other features, that is finding out about the no notes, thinking that something happened at the time that caused injury to him, that's what's caused his PTSD?
WITNESS VIRGONA: I think there were other instances as well that I referred to in the record, and certainly there was distress with the hospital, with the doctor, with the lack of notes and the meetings that he had with the hospital, that he recounted. I'm just sort of going back to my report. But he also had instances of sudden blindness which had occurred which were extremely distressing for him subsequently when he had the right eye problems as well, so it became difficult, during the course of the examination, to tease out the relative contributions of these events, and so I formed the view that PTSD was likely to be the result of a combination of those instances.

Dr Klug was then asked about the matter and gave this evidence:

CAMPBELL: Dr Klug, do you have any comments in respect to the diagnosis, which I think you also have of PTSD; correct, and it's (sic) cause, having regard to what was just discussed with Dr Virgona?
WITNESS KLUG: On the whole I agree but I would just elaborate in the sense that I think the seminal event, the seminal traumatic event, was the 1 April 15 - is that the correct date - when he suddenly felt excruciating pain and was bleeding and lost vision in that eye. I think that that was the traumatic event that gave rise to his PTSD. I think subsequent events, which Dr Virgona has mentioned, have really been exacerbating and perpetuating events, but that the prime traumatic experience was the one on 1 April 15.

The psychiatrists made clear that what was relevant was the plaintiff’s perception of what happened to him. Dr Klug gave this evidence:

HIS HONOUR: Dr Klug, can I just ask this, is the focus here on the patient's perception of what happened, rather than the objectivity of it? In other words, if he perceives something terrible has happened to him, even if by objective standards it isn't terrible, PTSD could still result from that; could it not?
WITNESS KLUG: Yes, your Honour.
HIS HONOUR: And it wouldn't matter, from assessment by you, whether the event was in fact a terrible event that would be likely to produce PTSD. If he perceived it like that, that would be sufficient?
WITNESS VIRGONA: Yes, your Honour.
HIS HONOUR: Do you agree?
WITNESS KLUG: I agree; yep.
(The answer recorded as having been given by Dr Virgona was in fact given by Dr Klug and the subsequent answer attributed to Dr Klug was in fact given by Dr Virgona.)

Although Dr Susino’s note of 13 January 2017 ([103] above) is the first contemporaneous note of a complaint concerning psychological symptoms that are said to be related to the plaintiff’s treatment (the note of Dr Wong of 5 July 2016 at [100] above refers to the plaintiff being depressed about his vision not his treatment), both psychiatrists considered that what the plaintiff experienced on 1 April 2015 was significant for the development of his PTSD.
I did not find the psychiatric evidence very satisfactory in relation to the diagnosis of PTSD. The psychiatrists gave this evidence about the diagnosis of PTSD:

HIS HONOUR: Dr Virgona and Dr Klug, can I just ask you, I thought that for PTSD to be diagnosed there needed at least to be one specific traumatic type of event; is that right? Or can PTSD arise from just an accumulation of bad things?
WITNESS VIRGONA: There has to be an event which is threat to life or health, so in his case my argument was that there is a series of events that impacted on his health that were sufficient for the criterion A for the PTSD diagnosis, yeah.
HIS HONOUR: So there would have to be a series of events, each of which would be sufficient to bring about PTSD?
WITNESS VIRGONA: Sudden loss of vision in both eyes would be sufficient to bring about PTSD. I mean, people would find that shocking, yes, as an example.
HIS HONOUR: Did you want to say anything about that, Dr Klug?
WITNESS KLUG: I think there has to be a specific traumatic event, from which the trauma related condition starts, and then there can be exacerbating and perpetuating events subsequently, which can be both internal and external, so in his case, for instance, continued problems with his eyesight or recurrent pain would be an internal stressor or an external stressor; finding out about the loss of - that there was file note at the time or other adverse events with the eye hospital, but from my point of view, it dates - his trauma related condition dates from 1 April 15.

As noted earlier, in his report Dr Virgona said that the symptoms of PTSD relate to “various specific distressing experiences at the hospital”, which included the events of 1 April 2015, his answer above was that there had to be an event which is threat to life or health, and he gives the example of a sudden loss of vision in both the plaintiff’s eyes, but seems to say in this case that there was a series of events that ultimately led to the PTSD. Dr Klug said there had to be a specific traumatic event and he points to the plaintiff’s experience on 1 April 2015 as that event. Dr Klug’s opinion made more sense to me, having regard to what he said at [269] above that the subsequent events “have really been exacerbating and perpetuating events”.
The further difficulty is, as noted earlier, that the first notation of the plaintiff being upset because of his visual problems is in Dr Wong’s note of 5 July 2016 and thereafter in Dr Susino’s note of 18 November 2016, as result of problems with vision in his right eye, and the first note relating his mood and his being upset to his treatment at the SEH is on 13 January 2017. None of the contemporaneous notes at the SEH or at his GP’s practice suggested mood, psychological or mental health issues prior to those occasions. It was not explored with the psychiatrists in their concurrent evidence why they believed the plaintiff had suffered PTSD in the absence of any contemporaneous record noting psychological or psychiatric matters until 2016 or early 2017. Nor was it explored why his mental health problems were related to his treatment by the SEH, not only because of the time lapse, but also because there was no linking of the two until early 2017, almost two years after the impugned treatment.
Nevertheless, I must accept the evidence of the psychiatrists, because there is no evidence to the contrary, that the plaintiff suffers from PTSD and that it is related to his treatment, or at least his beliefs about that treatment, on 1 April 2015. However, in the light of my earlier findings of no breach of duty, the psychiatric conditions from which the plaintiff suffers, whilst they may have been related to his treatment on 1 April 2015, cannot mean that the defendant is legally liable for those conditions.

(b) Absence of notes

I set out earlier some of the symptoms that Dr Klug listed from having been told them by the plaintiff. None of those matters mentioned concern, upset or distress from having ascertained at some point that no notes had been made of the procedure. Further, the plaintiff gave no evidence himself of the matters that caused him concern, upset or distress apart from the events of 1 April 2015. The highest that his evidence went in that regard was that he said what he had told the psychiatrists was true. In that regard, it may be noted that it was not all true because he told Dr Klug that there was no past psychiatric history although he had made a claim for mental harm arising out of his mother’s death and had been on antidepressants for a period of time.
He did mention, as I have noted earlier, to Dr Virgona that at a second meeting with representatives from the defendant, the plaintiff found out “that the doctor who did the procedure that afternoon said he forgot to write in the notes”. He also told Dr Virgona that he “gets very disturbed about the medical notes having been missing”. As I have also noted earlier, it was Dr Virgona’s opinion that the plaintiff’s symptoms of PTSD related to various specific distressing experiences, one of which it may be accepted, was the loss of the notes.
In Strong v Woolworths Ltd (2012) 246 CLR 182; [2012] HCA 5 the majority judgment said:

[18] The determination of factual causation under s 5D(1)(a) is a statutory statement of the "but for" test of causation: the plaintiff would not have suffered the particular harm but for the defendant's negligence. While the value of that test as a negative criterion of causation has long been recognised, two kinds of limitations have been identified. First, it produces anomalous results in particular cases, exemplified by those in which there is more than one sufficient condition of the plaintiff's harm. Secondly, it does not address the policy considerations that are bound up in the attribution of legal responsibility for harm.
…
[26] Section 5D(2) makes special provision for cases in which factual causation cannot be established on a "but for" analysis. The provision permits a finding of causation in exceptional cases, notwithstanding that the defendant's negligence cannot be established as a necessary condition of the occurrence of the harm. Whether negligent conduct resulting in a material increase in risk may be said to admit of proof of causation in accordance with established principles under the common law of Australia has not been considered by this Court. Negligent conduct that materially contributes to the plaintiff's harm but which cannot be shown to have been a necessary condition of its occurrence may, in accordance with established principles, be accepted as establishing factual causation, subject to the normative considerations to which s 5D(2) requires that attention be directed.

In my opinion, the absence of the notes cannot be held to be a necessary condition of the occurrence of the harm. If the plaintiff had not believed he suffered injury from the procedure on 1 April 2015, the loss of the notes of that procedure would not have been important. Accepting Dr Klug’s assessment of the cause of the plaintiff’s PTSD, it was the plaintiff’s belief about what happened on that day. At best, the discovery about the loss of the notes merely exacerbated that injury in a somewhat minor way. The decline in vision of his left eye to blindness and the issues with his right eye were of much greater significance in terms of exacerbation.
However, in circumstances where Dr Virgona at least thinks that it contributed to the symptoms of PTSD, consideration must then be given to s 5D(2). The evidence is not sufficient to show that the absence of notes materially contributed to the plaintiff's harm but, even if it did, if the only negligence of the defendant was the failure to take notes or the loss of them, and not the carrying out of the procedure on 1 April 2015, this would not constitute an exceptional case such that the absence of the notes would establish factual causation.
The judgment in Strong endorsed what Allsop P had said in Zanner v Zanner (2010) 79 NSWLR 702; [2010] NSWCA 343 at [11]:

The requirement to follow s 5D is clear. What its statutory content is and the extent of any continuity with developing common law concepts awaits judicial elucidation. In Woolworths Limited v Strong [2010] NSWCA 282 at [48] Campbell JA (with whom Handley AJA and Harrison J agreed) said that s 5D(1) excluded notions of “material contribution” and increase in risk. To the extent that his Honour was referring only to factors or circumstances from which a negative “but for” answer was given, so much is clear. However, the notion of cause at common law can incorporate “materially contributed to” in a way which would satisfy the “but for” test. Some factors which are only contributing factors can give a positive “but for” answer. Both the driver who goes through the red light and the driver with whom he collides who is not paying attention contribute to the accident. If either episode of neglect had not occurred the accident would not have occurred. The facts of Henville v Walker [2001] HCA 52; 206 CLR 459 provide another example. However, material contributions that have been taken to be causes in the past (notwithstanding failure to pass the ”but for” test) such as in Bonnington Castings Ltd v Wardlaw [1956] AC 613 are taken up by s 5D(2) which, though referring to “an exceptional case”, is to be assessed “in accordance with established principle”.

The loss of the notes of the tap and inject procedure (if they were made) or the failure of Dr Andric to make those notes was not a necessary condition of the occurrence of the harm. The absence of those notes (to use a neutral term) cannot be divorced from the determination that there was no breach in the carrying out of the procedure by Dr Andric or the defendant generally. The perpetuation of the plaintiff’s PTSD, as the plaintiff’s counsel describes it, was not contributed to by the loss of the notes but by the plaintiff’s mistaken belief about the wrongdoing of Dr Andric and the defendant.
Although the plaintiff undoubtedly suffers from PTSD, that condition has arisen, not as a result of acts and omissions on the part of the defendant, but from the problems the plaintiff has had with both of his eyes and his belief, mistaken as it is, about failures of the defendant.
The absence of the notes is not causative of any loss.

Damages

Judges at first instance are encouraged, where they find judgment for a defendant, to embark, nevertheless, on a hypothetical calculation of damages, in the event that they are found to be in error on liability. In the present case, that involves making a number of assumptions in relation to liability. I must assume that in one way or another, the tap and inject procedure was not carried out properly. I assume also that that ultimately led to the plaintiff going blind in the left eye although account must be taken of the evidence that there was the likelihood of at least diminished vision in that eye in any event from the PDR and the possibility that, notwithstanding what occurred at the tap and inject procedure, he might have gone blind in that eye.
I also assume that in relation to the absence of the notes, s 5D of the Civil Liability Act is satisfied in relation to the mental health issues suffered by the plaintiff from the absence of the notes. However, there can be no doubt that the plaintiff’s psychiatric problems were only exacerbated by the absence of the notes and that, more significantly, his loss of vision in the left eye, and the problems with his right eye, in respect of which there is no liability on the defendant’s part, materially contributed to those mental health issues.

(a) Non-economic loss

The plaintiff claims non-economic loss at 50% of the most extreme case, being $381,000.00. That is put on the basis of what is said to be the significant nature and extent of the plaintiff's physical and psychological injuries.
The defendant submitted that the plaintiff would be entitled to be assessed at between 0% and 27% of the most extreme case. This was for two reasons. First, the plaintiff’s life was significantly compromised before 1 April 2015. He had poorly controlled diabetes, he underwent a cervical spine fusion in 2001 with subsequent degenerative disease, lower back pain from 2003, depression, neuropathic pain, diabetic neuropathy, hypertension together with all his eye problems. Secondly, his eye problems were worsening unrelated to any breach of duty on the defendant’s part.
There can be no doubt that the plaintiff had significant left eye disease, and right eye disease for that matter as a result of his diabetic condition. If, as I have found, the plaintiff had endophthalmitis when he presented on 1 April 2015, the expert opinion was that the deteriorating condition of his left eye would be partly related to that. If, contrary to what I found, the plaintiff did not have endophthalmitis, the history of his left eye points to a significant deterioration over time even absent any trauma caused on 1 April 2015 or even from the endophthalmitis. Dr Uppal said:

This was already a very sick eye prior to 1 April 2015. The eye may have recovered better vision [absent any trauma caused on 1 April 2015] but the records prior to this event and the progress of the fellow eye from ongoing diabetic eye complications strongly indicate ongoing poor diabetic control and a very poor visual prognosis for the left eye.

Dr Cohn said:

The rubeotic glaucoma would have occurred irrespective. The course of the right eye is indicative. … On balance of probabilities, the left vision could not have improved and would likely have deteriorated further. There are several indications of unsatisfactory blood sugar control …, Professor Gilles notes that blood pressure was out of control. This also impacts retinopathy.

It also clear from the evidence of the psychiatrists that the PTSD was brought about by a combination of factors which not only included any trauma on 1 April 2015, ongoing pain and deteriorating vision and the absence of notes, but also from the ultimate outcome with his left eye which more likely than not was going to happen in any event, and the ongoing problems with the right eye including the period of time during which the plaintiff was blind in both eyes. Further, Dr Virgona related the plaintiff’s depressive disorder to the consequences on his life of his loss of vision and said he was likely to suffer a depressive disorder with vision loss and its consequences whatever the cause.
In all the circumstances, I would assess the plaintiff at 30% of the most extreme case entitling him to damages for non-economic loss of $175,000.00

(b) Past out of pocket expenses

The plaintiff claims invoices from Dr Andrew Chang from 2017 to January 2025 totalling $12,969.75. He claims past benefits paid by Medicare of $20,786.85. He claims travel to Italy and London to see Dr Morelli of $6,641.08.
None of these amounts is agreed and no primary documents have been provided. Given that the plaintiff had a serious pre-existing condition in both eyes for which he has been and is being treated, the plaintiff fails to prove what expenses were incurred as a result of any negligence committed on 1 April 2015. I would be prepared to allow the sum of $5,000.00 for past treatment arising out of any negligence.
I do not consider it was reasonable of the plaintiff to engage a surgeon in Italy and to claim the cost of travel as a result. It is one thing to use an expert medico-legal witness and another thing to choose to engage a treating doctor in a foreign country with concomitant travel expenses. I would disallow the claims for travel.

(c) Future out of pocket expenses

The plaintiff claims a buffer of $50,000.00 for ongoing physical and psychological therapies.
In terms of future psychiatric and related care, Dr Klug provided for psychiatric and psychological sessions for an 18 month’ period and for antidepressants. The psychiatric care totalled $5,625.00, the psychologist totalled $4,500.00 and antidepressants for two years were estimated at $1,800.00. The total of these amounts is $11,925.00.
Dr Virgona provided a more modest assessment of psychiatric care for six months at a cost of $1,800.00, 15 sessions of psychological therapy totalling $4,050.00 and antidepressants for two years totalling $720.00. The total of these amounts is $6,570.00.
There can be no doubt from the evidence of the psychiatrists that any breach of duty by the defendant was not the only cause of the plaintiff’s mental health conditions.
I have taken the midway point between the two totals by the psychiatrists and applied a 40% discount for matters not related to any breach of duty on the defendant’s part. I would allow an amount of $4,700.00 for future psychiatric and psychological care, including medication.
The plaintiff did not lead evidence of the cost of future care for his eye problems. The figure of $50,000.00 put forward by the plaintiff for future out of pocket expenses seems to me to be a figure that has been pulled out of the air. In the absence of any evidence, I would not allow any further amount. What is also clear is that ongoing costs in relation to his eyes would have been incurred despite any breach of duty on the part of the defendant.

(d) Economic loss

Despite all of the evidence led in relation to the plaintiff’s ability to continue driving trucks, and from what date he was able to do that, the plaintiff ultimately accepted that it would have been unlikely that he would have returned to heavy vehicle driving regardless of what happened on 1 April 2015. The claim for economic loss is, therefore, based on his contract at Linfox where he was to earn a net figure of $1,322.00 per week.
The plaintiff, therefore, claimed past economic loss for 471 weeks from 1 July 2015 to 14 February 2025 totalling $473,276.00. He then claimed future economic loss until the plaintiff turned 70 using a multiplier of 309.4 and deducting 15% for contingencies, totalling $347,672.78.
The evidence concerning the plaintiff’s earning capacity was left in a very unsatisfactory state. It is true that the plaintiff gave evidence that he had to cease working at Linfox because he was not able to carry out properly the tasks he was required to do because of his visual problems. However, the evidence suggested that, regardless of any breach of duty on 1 April 2015, and in the circumstances where the plaintiff contracted endophthalmitis following the surgery on 27 March 2015 there was always going to be serious deterioration of the vision in his left eye. The evidence also demonstrated that there had been a number of problems, some serious, in relation to the right eye and there had been a deterioration in that regard also.
Further, the claim by the plaintiff makes no allowance for the fact that, in my opinion, he had some residual earning capacity even despite the issues with his left eye. As he accepted, he was able to concentrate in the witness box and read documents that were put before him on a number of occasions. He gave this evidence:

Q. Finally, Mr Busa, you've sat there since 10.30 this morning and you have answered lots of questions. I've taken you to many documents some with very small print and you have read them. You would agree.
A. Yes.
Q. And you have been able to concentrate apart from one moment where you were distressed throughout the course of the day. You would agree.
A. Yes.
Q. And you were able to read those documents without assistance from anyone else.
A. Well, I can read it, yes. But like I said, sometimes you're telling me where I'm looking and I find it sometimes hard to see little print like that, but I manage to read them, yes.

In my opinion, the plaintiff should be entitled to no more than 50% of the claim for past economic loss on the basis that he had some residual earning capacity and on the basis that, regardless of any breach by the defendant, he would have had such visual difficulties that at some point he would not be able to work.
As far as future economic loss is concerned, s 13 of the CLA provides:

13 Future economic loss - claimant’s prospects and adjustments
(1) A court cannot make an award of damages for future economic loss unless the claimant first satisfies the court that the assumptions about future earning capacity or other events on which the award is to be based accord with the claimant’s most likely future circumstances but for the injury.
(2) When a court determines the amount of any such award of damages for future economic loss it is required to adjust the amount of damages for future economic loss that would have been sustained on those assumptions by reference to the percentage possibility that the events might have occurred but for the injury.
(3) If the court makes an award for future economic loss, it is required to state the assumptions on which the award was based and the relevant percentage by which damages were adjusted.

In my opinion, the plaintiff’s most likely future circumstances are that he would have been able to work for a period of time, at least up to the date of trial and perhaps for a 12 month’ period beyond that, based on his ability to read documents as I have noted, but thereafter problems from both his eyes, unrelated to any breach of duty, would have prevented him from working.
The evidence was left in such an unsatisfactory state about these matters that the best I can do is to indicate that a buffer for future economic loss should be provided. Having regard to the matters I have referred to, I would have provided a buffer of $200,000.00.
The plaintiff would be entitled to superannuation of 11% on the past economic loss and in respect of the buffer for the future.

(e) Care

The plaintiff claims past care costs on the basis of 18 hours per week for 516 weeks at $34.00 per hour. Future care is claimed for 14 hours per week using a multiplier of 753.6 (presumably assessed until the plaintiff turns 81) less 15% for contingencies at the rate of $65.00 per hour, totalling $582,909.00.
The plaintiff did not give evidence of assistance he needed nor the care he received. His wife, Alona Danilishyna gave some evidence of it in an affidavit. Ms Danilishyna was not cross-examined, but counsel for the defendant submitted that “it’s a matter of weight on various issues”.
Ms Danilishyna gave evidence that the plaintiff received some assistance from his family as they would bring food to the plaintiff’s home and provide some driving assistance when they were available. Ms Danilishyna also gave evidence that she assists him to take his eye drops and his tablets and she prepares meals. She reports that he bumps into things and on one occasion he had a fall.
An occupational therapist, Natala Cogger, retained by the plaintiff noted that the plaintiff has relied on his wife for assistance with domestic and personal care tasks.
Ms Cogger reported that from 1 April 2015 to 24 November 2016 the plaintiff required 18.36 hours per week which was provided initially by his sister and her husband and then by his now wife. She assessed that he needed 20.11 hours per week from 25 November 2016 to 16 February 2022 which was after the plaintiff had had surgery to his right eye. This comprised 1.75 hours per week for personal care tasks for 15 minutes daily, transport for three hours per week to access the community and medical appointments, and domestic assistance for 15.36 hours per week. The breakdown of domestic assistance consists of all manner of housework including meal preparation and tidying up, vacuuming, sweeping and mopping floors, cleaning the bathroom, dusting, polishing and tidying living areas, cleaning the bedroom, making the bed and changing linen weekly, four loads of washing, two hours of shopping as well as spring cleaning. This does not appear to take into account the reasonable contribution that would be in the ordinary course provided by his wife. The plaintiff’s claim somewhat reduces the hours and cost set out in Ms Cogger’s report.
The defendant engaged Susan Dinley as an occupational therapist. She estimated his care needs as follows, following a very thorough assessment in her report:

(a)   6/4/15 to 30/6/16:   8.5 hours care per week;
(b)   1/7/16 to 30/11/16:   9 hours care per week;
(c)   1/12/16 to date:   9 hours care per week for 26 weeks, reducing to 6. 5 hours per week for a further 26 weeks and then falling below the statutory threshold.

Ms Dinley would allow 7.5 hours per week for future care.
These estimates are all based on the plaintiff's disability being entirely caused by what occurred on 1 April 2015. In the light of the medical evidence that is not sustainable.
I found Ms Cogger’s report and her evidence unsatisfactory in that she accepted what the plaintiff told her without question although she had reference to the clinical notes of SEH concerning his visual problems that predated 1 April 2015.
Under the heading in her report, “Previous work, personal and domestic situation”, she said this:

4.1 Mr Busa lived at his father’s home at Fairfield. He was independent in personal care tasks. He was responsible for domestic, gardening and home maintenance tasks for the household.
4.2 Mr Busa had worked as a truck driver, driving up to 60 hours a week for his brothers’ transport company. … At the time of the subject incident, he had “taken a break” from his work, in order to care for his father. …
…
4.4 Mr Busa enjoyed being physically active. He did martial arts, for which he trained 3 nights a week. He also enjoyed going snow skiing every year, and he water skied with friends who had a boat. He also played tennis socially with friends.
4.5 Mr Busa used to travel regularly to Europe, in particular spending time in Italy.
…
4.7 He had a history of diabetes type II and this was managed with insulin, diet and exercise. At the time of the incident, he denied any previous medical history that impacted on his capacity to work, engage in ADLs or lead an active lifestyle.

Ms Cogger agreed in cross-examination that she did not mention any of the limitations on the plaintiff that appeared in the hospital records including neck pain, cellulitis, paraesthesia across the upper chest into the right arm, right shoulder arm pain radiating from the neck, neuropathic pain and matters related to his vision. Ms Cogger said that she did not feel that the information in those records was sufficient to determine the impact they had on his capacity to manage domestic AVLs and she did not ask him about them. It must be said, that anyone reading that portion of her report that I have set out above, would not conclude that the plaintiff had any limitations on his abilities prior to the events of 1 April 2015.
By contrast, Ms Dinley set out in her report all the details of the plaintiff’s condition prior to 1 April 2015. I prefer the evidence of Ms Dinley in terms of the plaintiff's care needs noting, however, as I have earlier, that all of those care needs do not derive from any breach of duty on the defendant’s part on the assumption that such breach occurred.
Doing the best I can, I assess the hours of care for the three periods specified by Ms Dinley for the past and for the future care at 50% of those hours on the basis that the plaintiff would have needed such care regardless of any breach by the defendant on 1 April 2015. Ms Dinley does not offer the costs of care for the past but specifies personal care at $55.00 per hour, domestic care at $48.00 per hour, and maintenance care (lawns and gardens) at $62.00 per hour. I would accept those hourly rates rather than $65.00 per hour claimed by the plaintiff for the future.

Conclusion

Accordingly, I make the following orders:

Judgment for the defendant.

The plaintiff is to pay the defendant’s costs.

**********

Decision last updated: 16 April 2025

Medium Neutral Citation:	Busa v South Eastern Sydney Local Health District Trading as Sydney Eye Hospital [2025] NSWSC 130
Hearing dates:	4-7 February 2025; 11-12 February 2025; 14 February 2025
Date of orders:	16 April 2025
Decision date:	16 April 2025
Jurisdiction:	Common Law
Before:	Davies J
Decision:	(1) Judgment for the defendant. (2) The plaintiff is to pay the defendant’s costs.
Catchwords:	NEGLIGENCE – duty of care – particular relationships – medical practitioner and patient – proceedings for damages as a result of a procedure carried out on the plaintiff’s left eye by a doctor at the Sydney Eye Hospital – where the plaintiff claims to have lost vision in his left eye and suffered ongoing pain and psychiatric damage – whether the defendant breached its duty of care by performing an excessive number of attempts to tap vitreous fluid causing injury – where the plaintiff’s evidence was found to be unreliable – where the defendant’s evidence was borne out by contemporaneous notes and accepted – where it was accepted that no more than three injections were attempted – where the procedure was carried out to a standard widely accepted in Australia by peer professional opinion as competent professional practice – defendant did not breach its duty of care OCCUPATIONS – medical practitioners – medical records – whether the defendant breached its duty of care by failing to document the procedure – where a number of notes about the procedure were absent – where it was uncertain if the notes were not made or lost subsequently – where the plaintiff claimed that the loss of notes contributed to his PTSD – where there is no requirement on a doctor to make notes – where there can be no breach of duty in omitting to make notes – where the failure to make out a s 5O defence does not impose a liability – defendant did not breach its duty of care EVIDENCE – expert evidence – whether the evidence of the plaintiff’s overseas treating doctor can be used as expert evidence – where the doctor prepared five reports – where the Expert Witness Code was not acknowledged – where a treating doctor lacks the objectivity of other experts – where the doctor has never practised in Australia – where the reports were obtained without letters of instruction – where the doctor reversed his opinion on a significant matter – where the evidence of the plaintiff’s expert was rejected unless there was unanimity with the other experts
Legislation Cited:	Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW) ss 5D, 5O, 13
Cases Cited:	Campbell v Campbell [2015] NSWSC 784 Carangelo v State of New South Wales [2016] NSWCA 126 Castle Constructions Pty Limited v North Sydney Council & Anor [2008] NSWLEC 137 Elayoubi v Zipser [2008] NSWCA 335 Fussell v Hanrahan t/as Dignan Hanrahan Solicitors [2024] NSWSC 1388 In the matter of Kit Digital Australia Pty Ltd (In Liq) [2014] NSWSC 1547 Palios Meegan & Nicholson Holdings Pty Ltd v Shore (2010) 108 SASR 31; [2010] SASCFC 21 Strong v Woolworths Ltd (2012) 246 CLR 182; [2012] HCA 5 Tabet v Gett (2010) 240 CLR 537; [2010] HCA 12 Watson v Foxman (1995) 49 NSWLR 315 Willoughby City Council v Transport Infrastructure Development Corporation (No 2) [2008] NSWLEC 238 Zanner v Zanner (2010) 79 NSWLR 702; [2010] NSWCA 343
Texts Cited:	Nil
Category:	Principal judgment
Parties:	Giovanni Busa (Plaintiff) South Eastern Sydney Local Health District t/as Sydney Eye Hospital (Defendant)
Representation:	Counsel: A Campbell & M Causbrook (Plaintiff) B Bradley (Defendant) Solicitors: Bellissimo Lawyers (Plaintiff) Makinson d’Apice (Defendant)
File Number(s):	2020/7945
Publication restriction:	Nil

MHx	Meds
1. Hernia repair	Novorapid 40u TDS
2. Appendectomy	Levemir 40u nocte
3. 2 x c-spine fusion	Tramadol 200mg
4. Septicaemia	Coversyl
5. ↑*etoh*	Lipitor
6. HTN
7. T2DM	Allergies- oxycontin

O/E	(R) VA	GAT	(L) VA
6/12	HM @ ½ m
Left 15 right 25
Suture X
[R EYE DIAG]	√ lids √	[L EYE DIAG] ←*Soft rubeosis*
√ cornea √	X suture mucous
√ conjunctiva SCH
D/Q [DEEP & QUIET] AC [ANTERIOR CHAMBERS] cell 2+
ᶲ hypopyon
√ ant [ANTERIOR] vit [VITREOUS] tender globe ++
Nil view
[VISION FIELD DIAG]