Nguyen v Minister for Home Affairs

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Nguyen v Minister for Home Affairs [2021] FCA 155

Appeal from: Application for review of a migration decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal made on 20 December 2018
File number: VID 120 of 2019
Judgment of: SNADEN J
Date of judgment: 3 March 2021
Catchwords:

MIGRATION –application for review of a decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (AAT) – cancellation of visa on character grounds – AAT affirmed decision of the first respondent’s delegate to refuse to revoke the cancellation of the applicant’s visa – whether the AAT’s decision was a product of jurisdictional error – whether AAT’s decision not to revoke the cancellation of the visa bespoke legal unreasonableness – whether the AAT otherwise failed to exercise its jurisdiction properly – application dismissed

Legislation: Migration Act 1958 (Cth) – ss 476A, 496, 499, 500, 501 and 501CA
Cases cited:

Abebe v The Commonwealth (1999) 197 CLR 510

Applicant WAEE v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2003) 236 FCR 593

BSJ16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2017) 252 FCR 82

CAR15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2019) 272 FCR 131

Carrascalao v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2017) 252 FCR 352

CTB19 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2020] FCAFC 166

DQM18 v Minister for Home Affairs [2020] FCAFC 110

GBV18 v Minister for Home Affairs (2020) 274 FCR 202

Minister for Home Affairs v Buadromo (2018) 267 FCR 320

Minister for Home Affairs v Omar (2019) 272 FCR 589

Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v Eden (2016) 240 FCR 158

Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v Sabharwal [2018] FCAFC 160

Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v Li (2013) 249 CLR 332

Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZJSS (2010) 243 CLR 164

Navoto v Minister for Home Affairs [2019] FCAFC 135

Division: General Division
Registry: Victoria
National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights
Number of paragraphs: 46
Date of hearing: 14 December 2020
Counsel for the Applicant: The applicant appeared in person with the assistance of an interpreter
Counsel for the First Respondent: Mr N Wood
Solicitor for the First Respondent: Clayton Utz
Counsel for the Second Respondent: The second respondent filed a submitting notice in this proceeding, save as to costs

ORDERS

VID 120 of 2019
BETWEEN:

MINH TRIET NGUYEN

Applicant

AND:

MINISTER FOR HOME AFFAIRS

First Respondent

ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL

Second Respondent

ORDER MADE BY:

SNADEN J

DATE OF ORDER:

3 MARCH 2021

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The application be dismissed.

2.The applicant pay the first respondent’s costs of the application, to be assessed in default of agreement in accordance with the court’s Costs Practice Note (GPN-COSTS).

Note:   Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.


REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

SNADEN J:

  1. The applicant is Vietnamese.  He came to Australia in 2011 and, in 2013, was granted a partner (class BS, subclass 801) visa, which was conferred…

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Details
Case
[2021] FCA 155
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

Nguyen sought judicial review of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal's (AAT) decision to affirm the Minister's delegate's decision to refuse to revoke the cancellation of his visa on character grounds. The AAT had considered the applicant's arguments for revocation, including his remorse, the best interests of his children, and the potential for reprisal and ridicule upon his return to Vietnam. The AAT, however, concluded that there remained a risk of reoffending and that the potential harm to the community outweighed the applicant's arguments for revocation.

The primary legal issues before the court were whether the AAT's decision was a product of jurisdictional error, whether the AAT's decision not to revoke the cancellation of the visa bespoke legal unreasonableness, and whether the AAT otherwise failed to exercise its jurisdiction properly. The applicant argued that the AAT ignored critical evidence, specifically a psychological assessment by Luke Armstrong, which highlighted the applicant's Dependent Personality Disorder and his compulsion to "rescue" his then-girlfriend, Uyen Thai, as key factors contributing to his offending. The applicant contended that the AAT misunderstood these submissions and failed to properly consider the evidence in its decision-making process.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the AAT had not erred in its decision. The court held that the AAT had engaged in an active, intellectual process and had given proper, genuine, and realistic consideration to the applicant's arguments and the Armstrong Report. The court found no basis to conclude that the AAT's decision was legally unreasonable or that it had failed to properly exercise its jurisdiction. The court further held that the AAT's conclusion that there remained a risk of reoffending and that the potential harm to the community outweighed the applicant's arguments for revocation was a reasonable one, given the seriousness of the applicant's offending.

The court made the following orders: (1) the application be dismissed; and (2) the applicant pay the first respondent's costs of the application, to be assessed in default of agreement in accordance with the court's Costs Practice Note (GPN-COSTS).

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The application be dismissed.

2. The applicant pay the first respondent’s costs of the application, to be assessed in default of agreement in accordance with the court’s Costs Practice Note (GPN-COSTS).

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

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Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

For those reasons, I do not accept that the Tribunal’s Decision was legally unreasonable in any of the respects to which the applicant adverts. I therefore reject the first ground upon which he invites the court to set the Tribunal’s Decision aside.FAILURE TO CONSIDER CRITICAL EVIDENCE By his second ground of review, the applicant charges the Tribunal with having ignored evidence that he advanced in support of his Review Application. Principally, the evidence in question was that of Mr Armstrong (or, more particularly, specific aspects of his evidence). It is convenient to set out the terms of the applicant’s second ground in full:2.The Second Respondent constructively failed to exercise its jurisdiction, denied the Applicant procedural fairness, or otherwise failed to carry out its statutory review task by ignoring critical and relevant evidence provided by the Applicant in support of a claim, and thereby fell into jurisdictional error.Particulars(a)The Applicant submitted that his offending was due to his relationship with his then girlfriend and co-offender, Uyen Thai (Thai).(b)The Applicant filed the Armstrong Report in support of his submission that he was of an acceptably low risk of his re-offending and to his mental health.(c)By the Armstrong Report Mr Armstrong gave evidence that:(i)the Applicant had a severe and chronic personality disorder known as Dependent Personality Disorder;(ii)the Dependant Personality Disorder was pre-existing and contributed in a major way to his arrest;(iii)the Applicant felt compelled to Thai and this compulsion clouded any pre-existing notion of the wrongfulness of the circumstances he found himself in;(iv)the offending resulted from the Applicant losing complete perspective in the context of a toxic, exploitative and groomed relationship;(v)access to the kind of psychological treatment necessary for his full rehabilitation from the Dependant Personality Disorder is unlikely to be available to him in Vietnam;(d)The Armstrong Report was critical evidence relied on by the Applicant.(e)The Second Respondent misunderstood the Applicant's submissions made in reliance on the Armstrong Report, as to the nature of his relationship with Thai.(f)The Applicant's Dependant Personality Disorder adversely affects his mental health.(g)The Second Respondent ignored or overlooked the factors described in paragraph 2(c) into account, or did not give them proper, conscious consideration in taking into account:(i)the cause of the Applicant's offending insofar as they related to the Applicant's risk; and(ii)the impediments the Applicant would face if returned to Vietnam.(h)The Second Respondent's failure to properly consider the Applicant's submissions and the Armstrong Report materially affected the Second Respondent's decision. By his written submissions, the applicant observed that:…a Tribunal charged with a review fails to exercise its review jurisdiction if it does not engage in an active, intellectual process, or give proper, genuine and realistic consideration to a substantive, clearly articulated argument relying upon established facts.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Section 496 of the Act permits the Minister to delegate his or her powers under the Act, including the power for which s 501CA(4) of the Act provides. Section 500(1) of the Act confers jurisdiction on the Tribunal to hear applications for the review of decisions made by delegates of the Minister under s 501CA(4). This court has jurisdiction to hear applications for judicial review of such decisions: the Act, s 476A(1)(b).THE CASE FOR REVOCATION AND THE TRIBUNAL’S DECISION In support of his quest to have the Cancellation revoked, the applicant identified a number of factors that he felt should incline the Tribunal toward that end. Amongst them were the fact that he is the father of two children, both of whom reside in Australia with their respective mothers. In his Revocation Submissions, he spoke of his shame and remorse at having been involved in the criminal enterprise that was the focus of his conviction, which he described as a “one-off experience that will never occur again”. By way of very brief summary, the applicant contended before the Tribunal that:(1)he had learnt from his mistakes and did not pose a threat to the Australian community;(2)the best interests of his two children (and three other children of his former partner who he described as his step-children) were that he be able to remain in Australia;(3)the Australian community would not expect, in the circumstances, that he should be denied an opportunity to continue his life in Australia;(4)he would, because of his offending, be made the subject of reprisal and ridicule upon return to Vietnam; and(5)despite his one-off offending, he was of essentially good character. In support of his Review Application, the applicant submitted a written psychological assessment prepared by a psychologist, Luke Armstrong. Mr Armstrong also gave oral evidence before the Tribunal. He noted in his written assessment (hereafter, the “Armstrong Report”) that the applicant suffered from what he diagnosed as Dependent Personality Disorder, key symptoms of which are “confusing and abusive developmental experiences” that, in the case of the applicant, have led to an inability to tolerate the suffering of others and a loss of perspective in relationship settings. Mr Armstrong, after noting that the applicant had “a highly developed sense of what is right and wrong”, attributed his offending to his compulsion to “…rescue [his partner], ultimately to secure her support, approval and to a lesser degree love…” The Tribunal approached the Review Application cognisant of the requirements of what was then known as Direction No. 65: a direction issued by the Minister in accordance with s 499(2A) of the Act. As it was required to, it had regard to each of the considerations to which that instrument required that it have regard. After setting out the nature of the applicant’s offending and the circumstances that led to it—and after referring to the “comparatively lengthy” term of imprisonment to which he was sentenced in respect of it—the Tribunal concluded that there remained a risk of the applicant reoffending and that the harm that would befall the community if he did so was such that the risk should weigh against the revocation of the Cancellation. It noted that the applicant “…is an intelligent and educated man who without any doubt clearly understood the nature and effect of what he got himself into [and] fully appreciated not only that he was committing a serious criminal offence but also what the effects of heroin has on its users [sic], not to mention society as a whole”. It went on to observe:Other factors that also weigh heavily against the revocation decision in the context of the seriousness of his offending is the fact that the Applicant committed the offence concerned when he was not a gambler, nor under financial pressure, nor a drug user. It is puzzling in the extreme.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

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