Narbey v Commissioner of Taxation

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Narbey v Commissioner of Taxation [2008] FCA 1699

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW – appeal on question of law – adequacy of Tribunal’s reasons – ambit of duty on Tribunal to state its findings of fact – whether duty complied with – simple adoption of all of the Commissioner’s submissions – whether reasoning clear – whether ground for judicial review points to any specific deficiency in the reasoning – whether Court should attempt to identify deficiency in that circumstance

INCOME TAXATION – deductions – management fees and interest claimed as deductions – whether outgoings incurred in gaining or producing assessable income – whether outgoings necessarily incurred in carrying on a business for the purpose of gaining or producing assessable income – whether outgoings of capital nature – whether eligible mining deduction – tax avoidance scheme – whether scheme entered into or carried out for dominant purpose of obtaining tax benefit – subjective or objective purpose – penalty tax - failure to consider subjective purpose in relation to penalty

Held:  application allowed in part.

Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth) ss 43(2B), 44, 44(1)
Income Tax Assessment Act 1936 (Cth) ss 79D, 177D, 177D(D), 177F(1)
Income Tax Assessment Act 1997 (Cth) ss 8-1, 8-1(2), 330, 330A, 330-15, 330-20, 330-595

Federal Court Rules O 53 r 3

Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Saxby Bridge Financial Planning Pty Ltd (2003) 133 FCR 290
Calder v Commissioner of Taxation (2005) 61 ATR 267
Calder v Commissioner of Taxation (2005) 59 ATR 655
Cliffs International Inc v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1979) 142 CLR 140
Clowes v Commissioner of Taxation (1954) 91 CLR 209
Commissioner of Taxation v Brand (1995) 31 ATR 326
Commissioner of Taxation v Cooke (2004) 55 ATR 183
Commissioner of Taxation v Emmakell Pty Ltd (1990) 22 FCR 157
Commissioner of Taxation v Hart (2004) 217 CLR 216
Commissioner of Taxation v Lau (1984) 6 FCR 202
Commissioner of Taxation v Starr (2007) 164 FCR 436
Commissioner of Taxation v Walker (1984) 2 FCR 283
Commissioner of Taxation v Zoffanies Pty Ltd (2003) 132 FCR 523
Cooke v Commissioner of Taxation (2002) 51 ATR 223
Copperart Pty Ltd v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1993) 93 ATC 4779
De Domenico v Marshall (1999) 94 FCR 97
Federal Commissioner of Taxation v Consolidated Press Holdings Ltd (2001) 207 CLR 235
Federal Commissioner of Taxation v McCabe (1990) 26 FCR 431
Federal Commissioner of Taxation v Spotless Services Ltd (1996) 186 CLR 404
Hallstroms Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Taxation (Cth) (1946) 72 CLR 634
HJ Heinz Company Ltd v Chief Executive Officer of Customs (2006) 61 ATR 711
Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Yusuf (2001) 206 CLR 323
Peabody v Commissioner of Taxation (1993) 40 FCR 531
Puzey v Commissioner of Taxation (2002) 50 ATR 595
Rana v Military Rehabilitation and Compensation Commission [2005] FCA 6
Roncevich v Repatriation Commission (2005) 222 CLR 115
Sleight v Commissioner of Taxation (2004) 136 FCR 211
Starr v Commissioner of Taxation of…

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Details
Case
[2008] FCA 1699
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of Narbey v Commissioner of Taxation involved the applicants challenging the imposition of penalties under the taxation laws. The dispute primarily concerned the application of sections 226 and 226L of the ITAA 1997, which pertain to the assessment of penalties for tax avoidance schemes. The applicants argued that the Tribunal had erred in failing to consider their subjective purposes in entering into the scheme when imposing the penalties. They contended that the Tribunal should have made specific findings regarding their actual intentions, relying on the decision in Starr v Commissioner of Taxation. The applicants submitted that their purpose was to obtain a commercial return rather than solely to avoid tax, and that this was not contested in the evidence presented.

The court was required to determine whether the Tribunal had properly considered the applicants' subjective purposes when imposing the penalties. The applicants argued that the Tribunal's failure to acknowledge and consider their actual purposes amounted to an error in law. The court had to examine whether the Tribunal's decision was influenced by the uncontented evidence of the applicants' actual intentions and whether this omission affected the imposition of the penalties.

The court found that the Tribunal had indeed erred in not considering the applicants' subjective purposes when imposing the penalties. The court held that the Tribunal should have taken into account the unchallenged evidence of the applicants' actual purposes, as this was a critical factor in determining the applicability of the penalty provisions. The court referenced the decision in Starr v Commissioner of Taxation, where the judge had emphasised the importance of the taxpayers' actual purposes in assessing penalties. The court concluded that the Tribunal's failure to address the actual purposes of the applicants in their decision-making process constituted an error in law.

The court ordered that the application be allowed only in relation to the issue of the penalty ruling. The applicants' application was dismissed on other grounds. The parties were directed to file consequential consent orders or, alternatively, written submissions within 21 days, not exceeding 10 pages, on the making of appropriate consequential orders including costs.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The application be allowed only as to the limited issue of the ruling on penalty.

2. The application otherwise be dismissed.

3. The parties are to:

(a) file consequential consent orders, alternatively

(b) file written submissions within 21 days, not exceeding 10 pages, on the making of appropriate consequential orders including costs.

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

MCKERRACHER J
Subject to what is said below on penalty, as to s 226 and s 226L, the Tribunal’s statements on this topic (at [259]-[261]) were certainly succinct. However once the Tribunal has agreed with, recorded and accepted all that has been submitted for the Commissioner, the process of reasoning requires little more to be said to justify the conclusion in these paragraphs. CONCLUSION ON SUBJECTIVE PURPOSE AND PENALTY On the second limb of the ‘appeal’, the applicants argue that within the context of the imposition of a penalty, the Tribunal erred in law in failing to make the critical material finding as to the applicants’ subjective or actual purposes. The applicants submit that the Tribunal was required to record its conclusion in relation to that evidence. It is argued that it failed to refer to the evidence it relied upon in deciding that the Commissioner was entitled to impose additional tax by way of a penalty. The applicants rely on the decision of Starr v Commissioner of Taxation of the Commonwealth of Australia (2007) 65 ATR 86. At the time of arguing the matter before the Tribunal the decision in Starr had not been delivered. By the time the Tribunal published its reasons in April 2007, however, the decision had been delivered. It appears to be common ground that no submission was made to the Tribunal that the decision should be taken into account. (The first instance decision in Starr was appealed by the Commissioner). In Starr at first instance French J said at [50], [52] and [53]:50The text of the definition of “tax avoidance scheme” in s 224(2) had the following inter-related features:1.It used the relevant purpose to define the subclass of schemes which are “tax avoidance schemes” for the purpose of s 224.2.The relevant sole and dominant purpose was that for which the scheme “was entered into or carried out”.3.The use of the words “entered into” or “carried out” suggest that the provision was formulated on the apparent assumption that the relevant inquiry was into the existence of an actual rather than attributed purpose.The definition is used for the purpose of imposing liability to a penalty by way of additional tax. In my opinion the word “purpose” in the definition of “tax avoidance” in s 224(2) should be taken, like “purpose” in s 4D of the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth), to have referred to the purpose of those who entered into the relevant scheme. In this case the purpose is that of the taxpayers, Messrs Starr and Hopkins, and possibly also those of their advisors. The uncontested evidence of all of them was that their purpose in entering into the scheme was to obtain a commercial return. While tax benefits were relevant, they were not the sole or dominant purpose.…52It is to be recalled that s 226L was a penalty provision. The fact of entry into a tax avoidance scheme was a necessary condition of the imposition of the penalty for which it provided. If the purpose of penalties is to secure compliance with the tax laws, they may ordinarily be expected to be concerned with the conduct and purposes of defaulting taxpayers. That is to say their actual conduct and actual purposes. It is difficult to see why if 2 constructions of s 224(2) be available that construction should be adopted which would permit the imposition of a penalty by reference to a purpose which the taxpayer never had. Of course, purpose could be assessed even under s 224(2) by reference to objective factors. It may also be that the statements of individual taxpayers about their purposes relevant to the imposition of penalty would be given little weight. But the relative weight and extent of subjective and objective evidence relevant to that determination will be an accident of the particular proceedings in which the question arises. In this case the evidence of the taxpayers and the advisors was unchallenged.53In my opinion, the tribunal erred in law in excluding consideration of the stated purposes of Messrs Starr and Hopkins. Their statements were not contested. They were not inherently improbable. The tribunal came to a contrary conclusion evidently based upon that reached by the Federal Court in Vincent v FCT (2002) 124 FCR 350; 51 ATR 18; 2002 ATC 4742; 193 ALR 686 about the application of Pt IVA.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: MCKERRACHER J

At the relevant date, s 330-15 and s 330-20 of the ITAA 1997 provided:SECT 330-15 Deduction for exploration or prospecting expenditure(1)Expenditure (whether of a capital nature or not) you incur in the 1997-98 income year or a later income year on *exploration or prospecting for *minerals, or *quarry materials, obtainable by *eligible mining or quarrying operations is deductible for that income year. Note 1: The amount you can deduct for an income year is subject to the excess deduction rules: see Subdivision 330-F.Note 2: Your deductions under this Subdivision may be reduced if any of your commercial debts have been forgiven in the income year: see Subdivision 245-E of Schedule 2C to the Income Tax Assessment Act 1936.Note 3: If an amount of the expenditure is recouped, the amount may be included in your assessable income: see Subdivision 20-A. (2)However, you can deduct it only if during that income year you satisfy one or more of the tests set out in the following table: Part IVA of the ITAA 1936 operates in effect by voiding transactions where they are found to give rise to a tax benefit in connection with a scheme. Under s 177F(1) of the ITAA 1936 the Commissioner has the discretion to apply Pt IVA to a transaction. Section 177D is the key provision which identifies the criteria for Pt IVA to apply. There must be: ·a scheme (s 177A);·a tax benefit (or the taxpayer would but for s 177F obtain a tax benefit) (s 177C); and ·having regard to eight matters stated in s 177D(b), it is to be concluded that a person associated with the scheme entered into the scheme for the purpose of enabling the taxpayer or other taxpayers to obtain a tax benefit in connection with the scheme. Section 79D of the ITAA 1936 (now superseded) also arises for consideration in these appeals. Relevantly, that section provides as follows:Limitation on deductions for foreign income(1) Where:(a)apart from this section, there are one or more foreign income deductions of a taxpayer in relation to a class of assessable foreign income in relation to a year of income; and(b)either:(i)the taxpayer did not derive any assessable foreign income of that class in the year of income; or(ii)the taxpayer derived assessable foreign income of that class in the year of income and its amount is exceeded by the sum of the foreign income deductions;then, for the purposes of this Act, those deductions are reduced respectively:(c)where subparagraph (b)(i) applies—to nil; or(d)where subparagraph (b)(ii) applies—by amounts proportionate to those deductions and equal in total to the amount of the excess referred to in that subparagraph. Section 6AB(1) of the ITAA 1936 provides:(1)A reference in this Act to foreign income is a reference to income (including eligible termination payments as defined in subsection 27A(1)) derived from sources in a foreign country or foreign countries, and includes a reference to an amount included in assessable income under section 26D, 27CAA, 102AAZD, 456, 457, 458, 459, 459A or 529.