FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Starr v Commissioner of Taxation of the Commonwealth of Australia
[2007] FCA 23TAXATION – income tax – penalty – tax shortfall – derived from treating income tax law as applying in relation to a tax avoidance scheme – tax avoidance scheme – whether entered into or carried out for the sole or dominant purpose of enabling a person to pay no or less tax – subjective or objective determination – subjective inquiry – appeal allowed
“purpose”
Income Tax Assessment Act 1936 (Cth) s 226L, s 222A(1), s 177A, s 177D
Taxation Administration Act 1953 (Cth)Vincent v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (2002) 124 FCR 350; 193 ALR 686 cited
Edgington v Fitzmaurice [1885] 29 Ch D 459
Ermogenous v Greek Orthodox Community of SA Inc (2002) 209 CLR 95 cited
News Ltd v South Sydney District Rugby League Football Club Ltd (2003) 215 CLR 563 cited
Chandler v Director of Public Prosecutions [1964] AC 763 cited
Dowling v Dalgety Australia Ltd (1992) 34 FCR 109 cited
ASX Operations Pty Ltd v Pont Data Australia Pty Ltd (No 1) (1990) 27 FCR 460 cited
Eastern Express Pty Ltd v General Newspapers Pty Ltd (1992) 35 FCR 43; 106 ALR 297 cited
Universal Music Australia Pty Ltd v Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (2003) 131 FCR 529 cited
Krampel Newman v Commissioner of Taxation (2003) 126 FCR 561 cited
Newton v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1958) 98 CLR 1 citedCheshire and Fifoot, Law of Contract (8th Australian Edition, LexisNexis, Butterworths 2002)
Parsons, Income Taxation in Australia (Law Book Co, 1985)DONALD ST CLAIR STARR AND GARY KEVIN HOPKINS v COMMISSIONER OF TAXATION OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA
WAD262 OF 2005FRENCH J
23 JANUARY 2007
PERTH
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
WESTERN AUSTRALIA DISTRICT REGISTRY
WAD262 OF 2005
ON APPEAL FROM THE ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL
BETWEEN:
DONALD ST CLAIR STARR AND GARY KEVIN HOPKINS
ApplicantAND:
COMMISSIONER OF TAXATION OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA
Respondent
JUDGE:
FRENCH J
DATE OF ORDER:
23 JANUARY 2007
WHERE MADE:
PERTH
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The decisions of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal given on 19 August 2005 dismissing the applicants’ applications for review are set aside.
2.The decisions of the respondent on 6 March 2005 disallowing the objections lodged by the applicants to their amended assessments for the year ended 30 June 1996 are set aside.
3.The objections of the applicants against their amended assessments for the year ended 30 June 1996 are allowed.
4.The parties have liberty to apply for any consequential orders within seven (7) days.
Note: Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
WESTERN AUSTRALIA DISTRICT REGISTRY
WAD262 OF 2005
ON APPEAL FROM THE ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL
BETWEEN:
DONALD ST CLAIR STARR AND GARY KEVIN HOPKINS
ApplicantAND:
COMMISSIONER OF TAXATION OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA
Respondent
JUDGE:
FRENCH J
DATE:
23 JANUARY 2007
PLACE:
PERTH
REASONS FOR…
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- Case
- [2007] FCA 23
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The primary legal issue in this case was the interpretation of the term "scheme" as it appears in section 226L of the Income Tax Assessment Act 1936 (Cth) and its application to the taxpayers' actions. The court had to determine whether the tax shortfall arose from the taxpayers treating the income tax law as applying in relation to a scheme in a particular way, and if the scheme was entered into for the sole or dominant purpose of avoiding tax. Additionally, the court had to consider the implications of the tax shortfall being caused by the taxpayers' treatment of capital expenditure as deductible, which was not permissible under the ordinary provisions of the Income Tax Assessment Act 1936 (Cth).
The Federal Court of Australia, in delivering its judgment, held that the law should generally be construed according to the ordinary meaning of the words it uses, having regard to their context and legislative purpose. The court held that where a mental state is referred to, it should be construed as an actual mental state unless the context indicates a constructive or attributed mental state. The court further held that the conditions necessary to attract penalty tax under section 226L were met in this case, and that the tax shortfall arose because the taxpayers treated money expended on their investment in the ACM project as deductible expenditure on revenue account. This characterisation was not dependent on the status of the ACM project as a scheme to which Part IVA applied within the meaning of section 177D.
In light of the above findings, the court set aside the decisions of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal and the Commissioner of Taxation, allowing the applicants' objections against their amended assessments for the year ended 30 June 1996. The parties were granted liberty to apply for any consequential orders within seven (7) days.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The decisions of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal given on 19 August 2005 dismissing the applicants’ applications for review are set aside.
2. The decisions of the respondent on 6 March 2005 disallowing the objections lodged by the applicants to their amended assessments for the year ended 30 June 1996 are set aside.
3. The objections of the applicants against their amended assessments for the year ended 30 June 1996 are allowed.
4. The parties have liberty to apply for any consequential orders within seven (7) days.
Background
Background to the litigation
The applicants first objected to the amended assessments issued by the Commissioner of Taxation. After these objections were disallowed, the applicants applied to the AAT for a review of the disallowance decision. The AAT dismissed the applicants' applications for review, leading the applicants to seek judicial review of the AAT's decisions in the Federal Court. The case was heard and determined by the Federal Court, which reviewed the AAT's decisions and the Commissioner's disallowance of the objections.
Decision
Reasons for decision
1. Whether the money expended on the ACM project was deductible expenditure on revenue account or capital expenditure.
2. Whether the scheme in question was a tax avoidance scheme within the meaning of Part IVA of the Income Tax Assessment Act 1997 (Cth).
3. Whether section 226L of the Income Tax Assessment Act 1997 (Cth) applies when the tax shortfall is due to the Commissioner’s action under anti-avoidance provisions.
Held
1. The money expended on the ACM project was held to be capital expenditure rather than deductible expenditure on revenue account.
2. The scheme in question was found not to be a tax avoidance scheme within the meaning of Part IVA of the Income Tax Assessment Act 1997 (Cth).
3. Section 226L of the Income Tax Assessment Act 1997 (Cth) was held not to apply when the tax shortfall was due to the Commissioner’s action under anti-avoidance provisions.
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Established by: FRENCH J
In my opinion these authorities are consistent with the proposition that the law should generally be construed according to the ordinary meaning of the words it uses having regard to their context and legislative purpose. Where a mental state is referred to it should be construed as an actual mental state unless the context indicates a constructive or attributed mental state. Constructional considerations The conditions necessary to attract penalty tax under s 226L established by that provision were as follows: 1. The taxpayer has a tax shortfall for a year.2.The shortfall was caused in whole or in part by the taxpayer treating an income tax law as applying in relation to a scheme in a particular way.3.The scheme was a scheme within the meaning of Pt IVA that was entered into for the sole or dominant purpose of enabling a person to pay no tax or less tax. 4.The scheme is not one in relation to which ss 224, 225, 226 or 226AA apply. The effect of the fourth and last mentioned condition was that s 226L does not apply to cases in which the tax shortfall exists as the result of action by the Commissioner under anti-avoidance provisions of the ITAA of the kind referred to in ss 224, 225, 226 and 226AA. While the shortfall to which the section applied must be caused by the taxpayer’s treatment of income tax law as “applying in relation to a scheme in a particular way” it does not flow from the Commissioner’s characterisation of the scheme as a tax avoidance scheme whether under Pt IVA or any other provision of the Act nor upon any action by the Commissioner consequential upon such characterisation. The purpose of s 226 was referred to by Ryan J in Krampel Newman v Commissioner of Taxation (2003) 126 FCR 561 at [120] where his Honour quoted with approval an observation by counsel based on the Explanatory Memorandum that: ‘… s 226L is intended to apply the same level of penalty as s 224, 225 and 226 for schemes entered into for the sole or dominant purpose of avoiding tax, but in respect of which the Commissioner has not applied any of the anti-avoidance provisions because the schemes are ineffective under the ordinary provisions of the ITAA eg s 51.’ In this case the tax shortfall arose because the taxpayers treated money expended on their investment in the ACM project as deductible expenditure on revenue account. It was, in the light of the Full Court decision in Vincent 124 FCR 350, capital expenditure and therefore not deductible. That characterisation did not depend upon the status of the ACM project as a scheme to which Pt IVA applied within the meaning of s 177D. The schemes in relation to which s 226 applied were tax avoidance schemes within the meaning of s 224. The definition of “tax avoidance scheme” in s 224(2) had two elements. The first was that it be “a scheme within the meaning of Part IVA”. That picked up the definition of “scheme” in s 177A. Importantly, a “scheme within the meaning of Part IVA” was not thereby “a scheme to which Pt IVA applies”. The latter category is defined in s 177D and is a subclass of schemes within the meaning of Pt IVA. It is limited, inter alia, by the requirement that “it would be concluded that the person, or one of the persons who entered into the scheme or any part of the scheme did so for the purpose of enabling the relevant taxpayer to obtain a tax benefit in connection with the scheme …”. The section does not require an inquiry into the actual mental state of the taxpayer or anybody else concerned with the scheme but rather into what “would be concluded” about purpose after consideration of the eight factors listed in the section.