HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA
GLEESON CJ,
McHUGH, GUMMOW, KIRBY, HAYNE, CALLINAN AND HEYDON JJGARRY SEAN MULLIGAN APPELLANT
AND
COFFS HARBOUR CITY COUNCIL & ORS RESPONDENTS
Mulligan v Coffs Harbour City Council [2005] HCA 63
21 October 2005
S502/2004ORDER
Appeal dismissed with costs.
On appeal from the Supreme Court of New South Wales
Representation:
G O'L Reynolds SC with R J M Foord and J C Hewitt for the appellant (instructed by Martin Bell & Co)
M T McCulloch SC with S P W Glascott for the first respondent (instructed by Phillips Fox)
J E Maconachie QC with B M Green for the second to fourth respondents (instructed by Crown Solicitor for New South Wales)
Notice: This copy of the Court's Reasons for Judgment is subject to formal revision prior to publication in the Commonwealth Law Reports.
CATCHWORDS
Mulligan v Coffs Harbour City Council
Torts – Negligence – Duty of care – Breach of duty – Foreseeability of risk of injury – Local authority – Power of care, control and management of natural reserve – Person suffered injury when diving into a body of water – Whether a reasonable local authority would have erected signs warning against the dangers of diving – Relevance of obviousness of risk to questions of duty and breach.
Marine Parks Act 1997 (NSW).
GLEESON CJ AND KIRBY J. This appeal was heard together with Vairy v Wyong Shire Council[1]. In our reasons in that case we made some general remarks about the role of precedent in decision-making on the issue of breach of duty in negligence actions. We would incorporate them by reference in these reasons, and would add the following in relation to arguments that were put to the Court by reference to what was described as a "calculus".
[1][2005] HCA 62.
Reference is often made to the "Wyong Shire Council v Shirt calculus". In that case[2], Mason J referred to the way in which a tribunal of fact might determine what a reasonable person would do by way of response to a foreseeable risk. As he made clear, he was describing a process of factual judgment. He referred to such factors as the magnitude of the risk, the degree of probability of its occurrence, the expense, difficulty and inconvenience of taking alleviating action, and any other conflicting responsibilities of the defendant. These, he said, were matters to be balanced out in making a judgment about reasonableness. The later use of the word "calculus" to describe this passage is unfortunate. A calculus is a method of calculation. What is involved in the process to which Mason J was referring is not a calculation; it is a judgment. In Ridge v Baldwin[3], Lord Reid observed that "[t]he idea of negligence is ... insusceptible of exact definition". Moreover, depending upon what may be involved in the concept of conflicting responsibilities, in some contexts, of which the present is an example, to treat what was said in Shirt as an inflexible…
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- Case
- [2005] HCA 63
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The central legal issues before the High Court were whether the respondents owed a duty of care to the plaintiff and, if so, whether they breached that duty by failing to erect signs warning of the risk of striking submerged objects in the channel. The court was required to consider the foreseeability of the risk of injury and the relevance of the obviousness of the risk to the questions of duty and breach in the context of a local authority's management of a natural reserve.
The High Court, in dismissing the appeal, reasoned that the presence of sand dunes (bedforms) in the tidal channel was a natural and well-known phenomenon, subject to constant change due to tidal movements. The court found that the proliferation of these bedforms was within normal and naturally occurring limits for a tidal estuary of that nature. Applying principles of negligence, the court concluded that a reasonable local authority would not have been expected to erect warning signs in these circumstances, as the risk was not so specific or unusual as to warrant such a measure. The obviousness of the potential for submerged objects in a tidal waterway was also a significant factor in determining that no duty to warn had been breached.
Orders
Orders of the court
Appeal dismissed with costs.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
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Decision
Reasons for decision
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Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Established by: GLEESON CJ, KIRBY J, HUGH J, GUMMOW J, HAYNE J, CALLINAN AND HEYDON JJ
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