Brisbane Youth Service Inc v Beven

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SUPREME COURT OF QUEENSLAND

CITATION:

Brisbane Youth Service Inc v Beven [2017] QCA 211

PARTIES:

BRISBANE YOUTH SERVICE INC
ABN 83 967 756 338
(appellant)
v
LINDSEY CALVERT BEVEN
(respondent)

FILE NO/S:

Appeal No 8547 of 2016
SC No 6170 of 2014

DIVISION:

Court of Appeal

PROCEEDING:

General Civil Appeal

ORIGINATING COURT:


Supreme Court at Brisbane – [2016] QSC 163 (Atkinson J)

DELIVERED ON:

22 September 2017

DELIVERED AT:

Brisbane

HEARING DATE:

12 May 2017

JUDGES:

Sofronoff P and Gotterson and McMurdo JJA

ORDERS:

1.   Appeal dismissed.

2.   Appellant to pay the respondent’s costs of the appeal on the standard basis.

CATCHWORDS:

TORTS – NEGLIGENCE – ESSENTIALS OF ACTION FOR NEGLIGENCE – DUTY OF CARE – REASONABLE FORESEEABILITY OF DAMAGE – PARTICULAR CASES – AS BETWEEN EMPLOYER AND EMPLOYEE – where the appellant is an organisation that provides counselling and other support services to homeless and drug affected young people – where the respondent was hired by the appellant to work as a family support worker – where one of the appellant’s clients was a young woman, T, with a history of making sexual advances towards staff of the appellant – where the respondent was assigned to work with T – where the respondent’s role was to act as an advocate for T and to deliver an educative program to T – where senior staff members of the appellant questioned whether T was an appropriate client – where T eventually indecently touched the respondent at a meeting at government offices that had been organised by the appellant – where the respondent developed a major depressive disorder as a result of the assault – where the respondent had a pre-existing vulnerability due to childhood sexual abuse and this increased the severity of her impairment – whether the risk of harm to the respondent was reasonably foreseeable

EMPLOYMENT LAW – LIABILITY AT COMMON LAW FOR INJURY AT WORK – VOLUNTARY ASSUMPTION OF RISK – where the respondent was aware of T’s behavioural history but agreed to work with T – whether the respondent accepted the risk of suffering an injury of the kind she suffered – whether the risk of this kind of injury is inherent in the nature of social work

EMPLOYMENT LAW – LIABILITY AT COMMON LAW FOR INJURY AT WORK – INJURY OCCURRING IN COURSE OF EMPLOYMENT – where the respondent was required to provide support services to homeless and at-risk youth – whether the respondent’s injury resulted from the performance of duties as envisaged by the employment contract

EMPLOYMENT LAW – LIABILITY AT COMMON LAW FOR INJURY AT WORK – PARTICULAR CASES – PRECAUTIONS TO PREVENT INJURY – where s 305B of the Workers’ Compensation and Rehabilitation Act 2003 (Qld) provides that a person does not breach a duty to take precautions against a risk of injury unless the risk was foreseeable, the risk was not insignificant and a reasonable person would have taken precautions – where T had a history of making sexual advances towards staff of…

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Details
Case
[2017] QCA 211
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of Brisbane Youth Service Inc v Beven, the respondent, who was employed as a family support worker by the appellant, Brisbane Youth Service Inc, alleged that she suffered a major depressive disorder as a result of being indecently touched by one of the appellant’s clients, T. The respondent sought damages for negligence against the appellant, claiming that it failed to take reasonable care to prevent her from being injured in the course of her employment. The primary judge found in favour of the respondent and awarded damages. The appellant appealed to the Queensland Court of Appeal, which found in its favour.

The central legal issue in this case was whether the appellant owed a duty of care to the respondent to protect her from the risk of harm from T, and whether this duty was breached. The appellant argued that the risk of harm to the respondent was not reasonably foreseeable, and that the respondent had voluntarily assumed the risk of injury when she agreed to work with T. The respondent, on the other hand, argued that the appellant should have taken reasonable precautions to prevent her from being harmed, such as discontinuing its provision of services to T. The court had to determine whether the risk of harm to the respondent was reasonably foreseeable, and whether the appellant should have taken precautions to prevent this harm.

The Queensland Court of Appeal held that the appellant did not owe a duty of care to the respondent to protect her from the risk of harm from T, and that this duty was not breached. The court found that the risk of harm to the respondent was not reasonably foreseeable, and that the respondent had voluntarily assumed the risk of injury when she agreed to work with T. The court also found that the risk of this kind of injury was inherent in the nature of social work, and that the appellant was not required to take precautions to prevent this risk. The court concluded that the appellant should not have been found to have breached its duty to the respondent, and that the respondent’s claim should have been dismissed.

The Queensland Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal and ordered that the appellant pay the respondent’s costs of the appeal on the standard basis.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. Appeal dismissed.

2. Appellant to pay the respondent’s costs of the appeal on the standard basis.

Background

Background to the litigation

For the reasons that follow, I conclude that the discontinuance of all services to her was not the only reasonable response. The appellant should not have been found to have breached its duty to the respondent, and the respondent’s claim should have been dismissed.The primary facts The respondent began to provide services to this young person (whom I will call T, as the trial judge did) in October 2010. By then T had been a client of the appellant for about 18 months. T had “self-referred”[28] to the appellant in circumstances where the Department of Communities (Child Safety Services) (which I will call the Department) had decided that T was unfit to have the care of her young child. (T’s second child was born in June 2009.) In April 2009, a Child Protection Order was made for that child by a magistrate. The Department’s records referred to T as having “a history of violence, self-harm, suicide attempts, instability and sexualised behaviours”.[29][28]As the judge described it at [2016] QSC 163 at [29].[29][2016] QSC 163 at [29]. Over the following 18 months, the appellant provided services to T, principally through two of its employees, Ms Turner and Ms Christie. Each experienced considerable difficulty in helping T, mainly because of T’s drug use, poor mental health and, on occasions, threatening and sexualised behaviour. Each diarised her experiences with T in notes which were kept in the appellant’s files and tendered at the trial. By August 2009, Ms Turner recorded that she had had to ask T not to touch her because T was “continuously trying to make physical contact,” and that this had made T angry. Another employee of the appellant, Ms McFadyen, recalled that at a regular weekly meeting of what was called (within the appellant), the Young Families Team, Ms Turner reported that T had told her that she had fantasised about killing Ms Turner and performing a sexual act on her dead body. In September 2009, the Young Families Team saw fit to notify the Department about T’s increasing drug use, deteriorating mental health and threats of self-harming. The Team discussed whether the appellant should withdraw its services, but it was decided that instead, some more limited support would continue to be provided. This was communicated to T by a letter, which Ms Turner and another employee took with them to T’s home. T responded angrily. Ms Turner concluded that she could not ignore T’s threats and that consequently, she would no longer provide support for T in T’s home. This meant that T was excluded from the particular service which the appellant called its “Parents YES program”. That was not the only service which T was then receiving from the appellant. Ms Christie, whose role was as a drug intervention worker, continued to work with T. Ms Christie testified that T had told her that she wanted a sexual relationship with Ms Turner. Although T had been removed from the program which was managed by Ms Turner, T continued to attempt to contact her, by telephone or text message, suggesting that they commence a sexual relationship. Ms Turner told T that her behaviour was unacceptable.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

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Decision

Reasons for decision

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Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

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