Deans v Maryborough Christian Education Foundation Ltd

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SUPREME COURT OF QUEENSLAND

CITATION:

Deans v Maryborough Christian Education Foundation Ltd [2019] QCA 75

PARTIES:

DEBBIE ANN DEANS
(appellant)
v
MARYBOROUGH CHRISTIAN EDUCATION FOUNDATION LTD
ACN 069 844 211
(respondent)

FILE NO/S:

Appeal No 8810 of 2018
DC No 1093 of 2017

DIVISION:

Court of Appeal

PROCEEDING:

General Civil Appeal

ORIGINATING COURT:


District Court at Brisbane – [2018] QDC 123 (Farr SC DCJ)

DELIVERED ON:

3 May 2019

DELIVERED AT:

Brisbane

HEARING DATE:

5 February 2019

JUDGES:

Sofronoff P and Gotterson and Morrison JJA

ORDERS:

1.   Appeal dismissed.

2.   The appellant is to pay the respondent’s costs of the appeal on the standard basis.

CATCHWORDS:

TORTS – NEGLIGENCE – ESSENTIALS OF ACTION OF NEGLIGENCE – STANDARD OF CARE – where the appellant was employed by the respondent as a specialist schoolteacher – where the appellant fractured her left patella after she slipped on a grape while walking through a foyer outside classrooms where junior school students were having “fruit break” – where the learned trial judge applied the liability provisions of the Workers’ Compensation and Rehabilitation Act 2003 (Qld) in determining whether there was any breach of duty of care owed to the appellant – where the learned trial judge found that the risk of an employee sustaining an injury by slipping on a piece of fruit while walking through the foyer area of the classroom block when a fruit break was occurring was not foreseeable under s 305B(1)(a) of the Workers’ Compensation and Rehabilitation Act 2003 (Qld) – where the learned trial judge found the risk of injury was insignificant – where the learned trial judge also found that a reasonable person in the position of the defendant would not have taken the precautions suggested by the appellant – whether the risk of injury was foreseeable – whether the risk of injury was not insignificant – whether the respondent breached its duty of care to the appellant

TORTS – NEGLIGENCE – CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE – where the respondent pleaded that the risk, which was denied, was an obvious risk for the purpose of a finding of contributory negligence – where the appellant argued that the respondent essentially conceded that the risk was foreseeable – where the learned trial judge rejected the appellant’s argument – whether the respondent conceded that the risk was foreseeable under s 305B of the Workers’ Compensation and Rehabilitation Act 2003 (Qld) in its the plea of obvious risk for the purposes of s 305H

Workers’ Compensation and Rehabilitation Act 2003 (Qld), s 305B(1)

Meandarra Aerial Spraying Pty Ltd v GEJ & MA Geldard Pty Ltd [2013] 1 Qd R 319; [2012] QCA 315, cited

COUNSEL:

R A Perry QC, with J M Sorbello, for the appellant
G W Diehm QC, with S P Gray, for the respondent

SOLICITORS:

Morton & Morton for the appellant
HopgoodGanim Lawyers for the respondent

  1. SOFRONOFF P:  I agree with the reasons of Gotterson JA and the orders his Honour proposes.

  2. GOTTERSON JA:  The appellant, Debbie Ann Deans, was employed…

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Details
Case
[2019] QCA 75
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the matter of Deans v Maryborough Christian Education Foundation Ltd, the Court of Appeal considered a case where the appellant, a specialist schoolteacher, suffered a fractured left patella after slipping on a grape in a foyer outside classrooms during a junior school "fruit break." The central issue was whether the respondent, the appellant's employer, breached its duty of care, and if so, to what extent. The appeal also addressed whether the risk of injury was foreseeable and whether it was insignificant, alongside the issue of contributory negligence.

The Court of Appeal examined the principles outlined in the Workers’ Compensation and Rehabilitation Act 2003 (Qld), specifically s 305B, which provides that a person does not breach a duty to take precautions unless the risk of injury was foreseeable, not insignificant, and precautions would have been taken by a reasonable person in the circumstances. The learned trial judge found that the risk of injury was neither foreseeable nor significant, and thus, the respondent did not breach its duty of care. Furthermore, the judge rejected the appellant's argument that the respondent's plea of obvious risk implied an admission that the risk was foreseeable.

The evidence presented by the respondent included testimonies from the Principal and the head of the junior school, who both confirmed that there were no reports of injuries related to fruit breaks or slipping in the foyer area. They also detailed the measures taken to ensure general cleanliness and the introduction of the fruit break policy. The trial judge concluded that the risk of slipping on fruit was not reasonably foreseeable and that a reasonable person in the respondent's position would not have taken additional precautions. The appeal was dismissed, and the appellant was ordered to pay the respondent's costs of the appeal.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. Appeal dismissed.

2. The appellant is to pay the respondent’s costs of the appeal on the standard basis.

Background

Background to the litigation

The appellant, a specialist schoolteacher, was employed by the respondent, Maryborough Christian Education Foundation Ltd. The appellant fractured her left patella after slipping on a grape while walking through a foyer outside classrooms during a "fruit break" when junior school students had fruit. The incident occurred at a school where teachers were responsible for the cleanliness of their classrooms and the foyer area. The linoleum flooring in the foyer was replaced with carpet in early 2016. There had been no reported injuries associated with fruit breaks or from slipping in the foyer area before the incident.

The case came before the court on appeal from a decision of the primary judge. The primary judge found that the respondent did not breach its duty of care to the appellant. The appeal focused on the primary judge's application of the Workers’ Compensation and Rehabilitation Act 2003 (Qld) to determine if there was a breach of duty of care.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Other witnesses’ evidence: The respondent adduced evidence on liability from Ms AM O’Brien, the Principal of the College at the time when the Incident occurred. Ms O’Brien gave evidence that for regular recess breaks, teachers were rostered to areas. They would patrol their area and ask students to pick up litter or pick it up themselves to ensure general cleanliness.[6][6]AB186: Tr2-6 ll5-16. Apart from that, the need for cleanliness of the grounds was impressed on the teaching staff. In an overall way teachers in the three classrooms accessible from the foyer were responsible for the cleanliness of their respective classroom and the foyer area.[7][7]AB192: Tr2-12 ll22-27. The fruit break was held within the classroom. It had been instituted before she commenced employment with the College. There had been no report to her of any injury associated with a fruit break. Nor had there been any reported injury from slipping in the foyer area outside junior school classrooms where a fruit break was held.[8][8]AB186: Tr2-6 ll30-37. Ms O’Brien gave evidence that in early 2016, the linoleum flooring in the foyer was replaced with carpet. The reasons for the replacement were that it was the original flooring; it was about 17 years old; and it had become discoloured.[9][9]AB187: Tr2-7 ll15-30. In cross-examination, Ms O’Brien agreed that there were no specific rosters for fruit breaks.[10][10]AB192: Tr2-12 l15. Evidence was also adduced from Mr G Bentley who was head of the junior school (prep to year five) at the College at the time of the Incident. He had worked at the College for more than 20 years and had taught prep to year three classes. He gave evidence that the fruit break was introduced “approximately eight years ago”. It took place at the start of the day.[11][11]AB199: Tr2-19 ll14-43. Once children were in the class and the roll was marked, they would be directed to get their fruit. They would go to their bags, retrieve the fruit and then bring it back into the classroom. Typically, the break would last five minutes during which they would eat the fruit and be read a story or be led in devotions. When the break finished, children who had not finished would be asked to place their remaining fruit back in their bags. Any food scraps would be placed in a bin in the classroom.[12][12]AB199: Tr2-19 l45 – AB200; Tr2-20 l13. Mr Bentley confirmed that the bags were stored on bag racks in the foyer area. To his knowledge, there had been no report of a person slipping in that area.[13] Usually, children would bring in whole fruit for the break.[14] Grapes were not excluded.[15] Occasionally, the fruit would be packed in a container.[16][13]AB202: Tr2-22 ll9-13[14]AB201: Tr2-21 ll44[15]AB203: Tr2-23 l32.[16]AB201: Tr 2-21 ll45-46.The pleaded cases with respect to liability In her pleading, the appellant identified the classroom from which she exited with the chart book as F3. The respondent’s relevant knowledge and the particulars of breach alleged against it were pleaded in paragraphs 6 and 8 of the Further Amended Statement of Claim as follows:[17][17]ASC: AB39, 40.“6.Prior to the Incident, the defendant was aware that:(a)the foyer area adjacent to F3 is a high volume pedestrian traffic thoroughfare;(b)children between the ages of five and six years old would access the area during the “fruit break” and traverse the area with fruit and other snacks;(c)it had no system of cleaning the foyer area following “fruit break”…8.The Injury was caused by the defendant’s breaches of its obligations and duties pleaded at paragraphs 3 and 4 above as the defendant failed to:(a)take reasonable for the plaintiff’s safety;(b)establish, maintain and enforce safe methods and systems for the plaintiff to carry out her employment;(c)supervise the plaintiff so as to ensure she carried out her employment safely;(d)warn the plaintiff of the possibility of injury to her in carrying out her employment and instruct her in methods of work to avoid the possibility of such injury;(e)provide a safe work environment within which the plaintiff was required to perform her duties;(f)not require the plaintiff to perform work where the defendant knew, or ought to have known, that the carrying out of the work may cause injury to the plaintiff;(g)failed to implement a system of inspection and cleaning following “fruit break” when it knew, or ought to have known, that there was a high probability of slip hazards being created in the area due to the fact that five and six year old children were carrying fruit through the area;(h)failing to make arrangements for the five and six year old children to store their “fruit break” snacks in an area that was not a high traffic pedestrian area.”

Decision

Reasons for decision

By way of a Reply, the appellant denied the contributory negligence alleged against her in paragraphs 7(e)(5) and 7(i)(3) of the Further Amended Defence.[21][21]Reply paragraph 2; AB 1 51.The judgment at first instance The learned primary judge found that the appellant, when walking in the foyer area, stepped on a grape on the floor, slipped and fell.[22] He also found that her left patella fractured as a result of the fall.[23] His Honour noted that it was not in dispute that an employer, such as the respondent, owes a non-delegable duty of care to its employees to take reasonable care to avoid exposing them to unnecessary risks of injury.[24][22]Reasons [10].[23]Reasons [11].[24]Reasons [12]. The issue to which the learned primary judge next turned was whether the respondent had breached its duty of care to the appellant. His Honour referred to common law principles for determining whether a duty of care had been breached as enunciated by Mason J in Wyong Shire Council v Shirt,[25] namely, that it is first necessary to consider whether a reasonable person in the defendant’s position would have foreseen the risk of injury and, if so, then to determine what a reasonable person would do by way of response to the risk.[26][25](1980) 146 CLR 40 at 47-48.[26]Citing per Bowskill QC DCJ in Rudd v Starbucks Coffee Company (Australia) Pty Ltd [2015] QDC 232 at [147]. The learned primary judge observed, correctly, that the provisions of the Workers’ Compensation and Rehabilitation Act 2003 (Qld) (“WCRA”) must be applied when determining whether there had been a breach of duty to take care owed to the appellant. His Honour set out the general principles in s 305B and the other principles in s 305C WCRA. He adopted the general principles as the relevant frame of reference for his consideration of the appellant’s claim. Those principles are as follows:“(1)A person does not breach a duty to take precautions against a risk of injury to a worker unless—(a)the risk was foreseeable (that is, it is a risk of which the person knew or ought reasonably to have known); and(b)the risk was not insignificant; and(c)in the circumstances, a reasonable person in the position of the person would have taken the precautions.(2)In deciding whether a reasonable person would have taken precautions against a risk of injury, the court is to consider the following (among other relevant things)—(a)the probability that the injury would occur if care were not taken;(b)the likely seriousness of the injury;(c)the burden of taking precautions to avoid the risk of injury.” The learned trial judge then posed a series of questions which addressed the principles. The first question posed was: “Was the risk of injury foreseeable?” His Honour identified the relevant risk as one that an employee might sustain an injury because of slipping on a piece of fruit whilst walking through the foyer area of the classroom block at the time a fruit break was occurring.[27] His answer to the question was that he was not satisfied that the risk was reasonably foreseeable.[28][27]Reasons [23].[28]Reasons [39].

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The primary judge began by noting that the respondent, as an employer, owed a non-delegable duty of care to its employees to take reasonable care to avoid exposing them to unnecessary risks of injury. To determine whether a breach of this duty occurred, the primary judge referred to the principles enunciated in Wyong Shire Council v Shirt for assessing whether a duty of care had been breached. These principles required the court to consider whether a reasonable person in the respondent's position would have foreseen the risk of injury, and if so, what a reasonable person would do by way of response to the risk. The primary judge then applied the provisions of the Workers’ Compensation and Rehabilitation Act 2003 (Qld) to the case, specifically s 305B and s 305C, which detail the conditions under which a breach of duty to take precautions against a risk of injury may occur. The primary judge concluded that the risk of an employee sustaining an injury by slipping on a piece of fruit while walking through the foyer area of the classroom block when a fruit break was occurring was not reasonably foreseeable. This was based on the evidence that there had been no prior reports of injuries from such a cause, and the procedures in place for maintaining cleanliness during fruit breaks. The primary judge also found that the risk, if it existed, was insignificant. In reaching this conclusion, the primary judge considered the probability of the injury occurring, the likely seriousness of the injury, and the burden of taking precautions to avoid the risk of injury. The primary judge further determined that a reasonable person in the respondent's position would not have taken the precautions suggested by the appellant, given the lack of foreseeability and insignificance of the risk. The binding legal principle established by this decision is that, in the context of workplace safety under the Workers’ Compensation and Rehabilitation Act 2003 (Qld), the foreseeability and significance of a risk are critical factors in determining whether a breach of duty of care has occurred. This case reinforces the importance of these factors in assessing employer liability for employee injuries in the workplace.