FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Martin v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCA 893
ORDERS
NSD 1406 of 2017 BETWEEN: PEDRO SUAREZ MARTIN
Applicant
AND: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION
Respondent
JUDGE:
LEE J
DATE OF ORDER:
15 JUNE 2018
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The application be dismissed with costs.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
LEE J:
A INTRODUCTION & BACKGROUND
By amended originating application filed in November 2017, the applicant…
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- Case
- [2018] FCA 893
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court first addressed the apprehended bias contention, noting that the Minister had participated in media interviews expressing certain views on visa cancellation. Despite this, the court found no evidence of apprehended bias, concluding that the Minister's decision-making process remained impartial. Regarding the alleged policy, the court held that the Minister did not apply the policy suggested by the applicant. Even if such a policy existed, the court found that the Minister had engaged in an active intellectual process by considering the applicant's criminal conduct, the risk to the Australian community, and various other factors in making the decision. The court emphasized that the weight to be given to different considerations is a matter for the decision-maker alone, and thus, the court could not substitute its judgment for that of the Minister.
The court also rejected the contention that the Minister failed to give proper, genuine, and realistic consideration to the applicant's case. It was established that the Minister had considered the applicant's criminal history, the risk of reoffending, and mitigating factors such as remorse and family ties. The court found that the Minister's reasons demonstrated a thorough evaluation of the applicant's circumstances and a proper application of the relevant criteria under the Migration Act 1958 (Cth).
Ultimately, the court dismissed the application, finding no jurisdictional error in the Minister's decision. The Federal Court ruled that the application be dismissed with costs, as outlined in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The application be dismissed with costs.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
For the foregoing reasons, looked at individually and cumulatively, the Apprehended Bias Contention must fail. E.2 Genuine Consideration Contention The applicant contended that the Minister failed to give proper, genuine and realistic consideration to his case on the basis that the Minister applied the alleged policy that the Minister had to rule out the possibility of further offending. As can be seen, this ground relies upon the success of the applicant to make out the existence and application of the policy in the present circumstances. Allegations of a failure to give “proper, genuine and realistic” consideration need to be evaluated carefully so that they do not morph into impermissible merits review: Carrascalao v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCAFC 107; (2017) 252 FCR 352 at 360-361. In Carrascalao, the Full Court observed that the legal obligation to give consideration to the merits of the case had to be meaningful, in the sense of being “proper, genuine and realistic”. The question with which the Court is concerned, as explained in Carrascalao at 361 [35] and 364 [46], is whether the Minister engaged in an “active intellectual process” in considering the merits of the applicant’s case. I reject the applicant’s contention for two reasons. First, and as explained above, I do not consider that the Minister applied the ‘policy’ alleged by the applicant. In any event, even if the Minister applied some sort of policy, the applicant has not established that the Minister failed to apply his mind properly to the particular factual circumstances of the applicant’s case. Secondly, and in any event, the weight to be given to a matter is for the decision-maker alone, and invitations for the Court to consider the weight given by the Minister may ultimately invite merits review. The applicant places undue emphasis on the concluding remarks of the Minister. As is well known, the reasons are to be considered as a whole: Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Wu Shan Liang (1996) 185 CLR 259 at 271-272. The Minister is entitled to form a view about the nature of offending and his reasons demonstrate consideration of the applicant’s circumstances, including his offending. The Minister not only considered the applicant’s criminal conduct and the risk to the community, but also matters favourable to the applicant, including, for example, remorse (at [29]), acceptance of responsibility for his actions (at [32]), ties to Australia (at [55]-[63]), the best interests of his son, and his niece and nephew (at [44]-[52]), hardship to family and the extent of impediments if removed (at [58]-[70]). The words “could not rule out the possibility of further offending” in [74] must be read together with the reasons as a whole, including the weighing exercise at [11]-[43]. Plainly, in the context of the Minister having found at [43] that there was an “ongoing likelihood” that the applicant would reoffend, the wording at [74] builds on that finding.