HZCP v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

HZCP v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCA 1803

File number: WAD 300 of 2017
Judge: BROMBERG  J
Date of judgment: 20 November 2018
Catchwords: MIGRATION - applicant’s visa cancelled on character grounds under s 501(3A) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (“Act”) – decision not to revoke cancellation decision pursuant to s 501CA(4) of the Act – application for judicial review of a decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (“Tribunal”) under s 476A of the Act – whether Tribunal’s decision affected by an error of law – discussion of authorities and principles relevant to whether the Tribunal may look behind or impugn the conviction or sentence that is a precondition to the exercise of power – whether the applicant’s evidence to the Tribunal was inconsistent with the essential factual elements of the offence or findings of the sentencing judge – whether there was “no evidence” for findings of fact made by the Tribunal – whether Tribunal made findings of fact that were irrational or illogical - jurisdictional error not established – appeal dismissed
Legislation: Migration Act 1958 (Cth), ss 501(3A), 501CA
Cases cited:

Australian Postal Corporation v D’Rozario [2014] FCAFC 89

Beckner v Minister for Immigration, Local Government and Ethnic Affairs (1991) 30 FCR 49

Degerli v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs [1981] FCA 250 (23 December 1981)

Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZMDS (2010) 240 CLR 611

Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Daniele (1981) 5 ALD 135

Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Gungor (1982) 4 ALD 575

Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Ali (2000) 62 ALD 673

Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v SRT (1999) 91 FCR 234

MZZUG v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] FCA 1151

Re Du Pont v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs [1983] AATA 180

Secretary to the Department of Justice and Regulation v Bhatia [2018] VSC 500

Secretary to the Department of Justice and Regulation v LLF [2018] VSCA 155

Zeims v Prothonotory of the Supreme Court of New South Wales (1957) 97 CLR 279

Date of hearing: 20 August 2018
Registry: Western Australia
Division: General Division
National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 108
Counsel for the Applicant: Ms S Kelly
Solicitor for the Applicant: Victoria Legal Aid
Counsel for the First Respondent: Ms C Symons
Solicitor for the First Respondent: Australian Government Solicitor
Counsel for the Second Respondent: The Second Respondent filed a submitting notice

ORDERS

WAD 300 of 2017
BETWEEN:

HZCP

Applicant

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION

First Respondent

ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL

Second Respondent

JUDGE:

BROMBERG  J

DATE OF ORDER:

20 NOVEMBER 2018

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The application is dismissed.

2.The applicant pay the costs of the respondent.

Note:    Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.


REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

BROMBERG J:

INTRODUCTION

  1. The applicant is a 31 year old citizen of Sri…

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Details
Case
[2018] FCA 1803
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of HZCP v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection involved an applicant, HZCP, whose visa was cancelled on character grounds under the Migration Act 1958 (Cth). HZCP sought judicial review of a decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (Tribunal) not to revoke the cancellation decision. The key legal issues were whether the Tribunal's decision was affected by an error of law and whether the Tribunal could look behind or impugn the conviction or sentence that was a precondition for the exercise of its power. Additionally, the court considered whether HZCP's evidence to the Tribunal was inconsistent with the essential factual elements of the offence or findings of the sentencing judge, and whether there was "no evidence" for findings of fact made by the Tribunal or if those findings were irrational or illogical.

The court examined the authorities and principles relevant to the Tribunal's ability to examine the circumstances surrounding the commission of the offence or matters relating to the trial itself. It was established that the Tribunal cannot contradict or go behind a conviction and examine the facts upon which it is based, but it could review the circumstances of the conviction for a purpose other than impugning the conviction itself. The court found that the Tribunal's decision was not affected by an error of law. The court concluded that the Tribunal's assessment of the seriousness of the applicant’s prior conduct and his risk to the Australian community was appropriate, and the applicant's evidence did not contradict the essential factual elements of the offence or findings of the sentencing judge. Therefore, the appeal was dismissed.

The final orders of the court were that the application be dismissed and that the applicant pay the costs of the respondent. The court's decision emphasised the importance of respecting the finality of convictions and the role of the Tribunal in assessing the nature and gravity of the applicant’s criminal conduct without assessing the propriety of the conviction or the fairness of the trial.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The application is dismissed.

2. The applicant pay the costs of the respondent.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

Grounds 1 and 2 of the application are closely related and may be dealt with together.The Tribunal’s Decision Grounds 1 and 2 are directed at demonstrating error in the Tribunal’s reasoning in respect of the seriousness of the applicant’s prior conduct and his risk to the Australian community. It was not in dispute that those are considerations that the Tribunal was entitled to take into account in deciding whether to revoke the cancellation decision. In the context of considering the seriousness of the applicant’s prior conduct, at [41] of the Tribunal’s reasons, the Tribunal set out a comprehensive extract of the sentencing remarks of the trial judge. Those remarks recorded the findings of the trial judge, including that:(1)the applicant found the metal bar and armed himself with it;(2)the applicant wielded the metal bar as a weapon;(3)the applicant hit the victims in the head with the metal bar and that one of the victims was hit with such force that he was knocked down and rendered momentarily unconscious;(4)as the applicant had used the metal bar in the attack, the applicant was culpable for the charges of unlawful wounding; (5)there was no evidence that either of the victims said or did anything which might have provoked the applicant’s attack upon them; (6)all four men went to the house where the attack occurred with the specific intent of inflicting harm on one of the victims; (7)it was unclear what the motivation of those involved in the attacks was; and(8)of the four men involved, the applicant was the most culpable in terms of the injuries he inflicted, although it was difficult say who of the four men was more culpable in terms of leadership and organisation. The Tribunal observed at [41] that the trial judge’s remarks demonstrated how serious the trial judge viewed the applicant’s criminal conduct. At [42]-[43] the Tribunal then recorded the applicant’s oral evidence in relation to the conviction and noted that, in the course of his oral evidence to the Tribunal, the applicant had indicated that he was deeply remorseful for what had occurred but strongly denied that what happened was as described by the trial judge in the sentencing remarks. Those paragraphs are central to the Grounds 1 and 2 of the application, and are as follows:[42]In oral evidence before this Tribunal, HZCP indicated that he was deeply remorseful for what had occurred. He strongly denied, however, that what had happened was as described by the judge. In his words, he tried to break up a fight, acted in self-defence when approached in a threatening manner, and had little to do with the second assault (he certainly did not use the mental bar, as found by the judge).[43]The Tribunal cannot contradict or go behind a conviction and examine the facts upon which it is based: Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Gungor (1982) 4 ALD 575; Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Daniele (1981) 5 ALD 135; Re Milnar v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (1997) 48 ALD 771; Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Ali (2000) 62 ALD 673 at [41] to [45]. However, that is not to be taken as denying the right of the applicant to present to the Tribunal matters pertaining to a conviction provided that they do not contradict the facts upon which a court found in arriving at a conviction: Re Du Pont v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs [1983] AATA 180

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The judgment of the Court of Appeal in LLF was recently followed by Richards J in Secretary to the Department of Justice and Regulation v Bhatia [2018] VSC 500 at [53]. Consideration I would respectfully adopt the distillation of the case law described by Beach, McLeish and Niall JJA in LLF. On that basis the applicable principles are these: (1)Where a previous conviction is the foundation for the exercise of power by the decision-maker, no challenge can be made to the fact of the conviction (or sentence, as the case may be) or to the essential facts on which it was based, but the circumstances of the conviction may be reviewed for a purpose other than impugning the conviction itself.(2)Where the exercise of the power is not founded on the conviction, then the essential facts underlying the conviction are not immune from challenge and the conviction is only conclusive of the fact of the conviction itself, albeit there is a heavy onus on a person seeking to challenge the facts upon which the conviction is necessarily based. The second principle is not applicable here. The conviction in question in this case was a precondition to the decision under s 501(3A) of the Act and the exercise of the power by the Tribunal. The applicant’s reliance on that principle as articulated at [43] in Ali is therefore misplaced. As Branson J made very clear at [43], that paragraph is only relevant to cases that fall within the second principle described above. Insofar as the applicant submitted that the observations of Fisher and Lockhart JJ in Daniele (at 138-139) stand for the proposition that the Tribunal, in the category of cases covered by the first principle, is entitled to examine for itself facts necessarily found by the jury or findings essential to the imposition of a sentence and to restrict that entitlement would impermissibly introduce a doctrine equivalent to issue estoppel into Tribunal proceedings, those submission must be rejected. When properly considered in their full context, the statements of Fisher and Lockhart JJ upon which the applicant relied assume a different and more nuanced application. In particular, their Honours comments were preceded by the statement that (at 138): There are powerful reasons of public policy why the Tribunal cannot ignore the conviction or seek to set it at nought. That is not to say that the circumstances surrounding the commission of the offence or matters relating to the trial itself cannot be examined by the Tribunal. However, such examination is for the purpose of enabling the Tribunal to make its own assessment of the nature and gravity of the applicant’s criminal conduct and not for the purpose of assessing the propriety of the conviction or the fairness of the trial. Whether these circumstances and matters a susceptible of examination and the extent of that inquiry will vary from case to case. Their Honours then went on to make the following statement (at 139):… It is our opinion that the Tribunal is entitled to consider all evidence. It will attach appropriate weight thereof in its task of evaluating the conduct of the applicant but not for the purpose of assessing the propriety of the conviction.