FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
HZCP v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCA 1803
File number: WAD 300 of 2017 Judge: BROMBERG J Date of judgment: 20 November 2018 Catchwords: MIGRATION - applicant’s visa cancelled on character grounds under s 501(3A) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (“Act”) – decision not to revoke cancellation decision pursuant to s 501CA(4) of the Act – application for judicial review of a decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (“Tribunal”) under s 476A of the Act – whether Tribunal’s decision affected by an error of law – discussion of authorities and principles relevant to whether the Tribunal may look behind or impugn the conviction or sentence that is a precondition to the exercise of power – whether the applicant’s evidence to the Tribunal was inconsistent with the essential factual elements of the offence or findings of the sentencing judge – whether there was “no evidence” for findings of fact made by the Tribunal – whether Tribunal made findings of fact that were irrational or illogical - jurisdictional error not established – appeal dismissed Legislation: Migration Act 1958 (Cth), ss 501(3A), 501CA Cases cited: Australian Postal Corporation v D’Rozario [2014] FCAFC 89
Beckner v Minister for Immigration, Local Government and Ethnic Affairs (1991) 30 FCR 49
Degerli v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs [1981] FCA 250 (23 December 1981)
Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZMDS (2010) 240 CLR 611
Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Daniele (1981) 5 ALD 135
Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Gungor (1982) 4 ALD 575
Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Ali (2000) 62 ALD 673
Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v SRT (1999) 91 FCR 234
MZZUG v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] FCA 1151
Re Du Pont v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs [1983] AATA 180
Secretary to the Department of Justice and Regulation v Bhatia [2018] VSC 500
Secretary to the Department of Justice and Regulation v LLF [2018] VSCA 155
Zeims v Prothonotory of the Supreme Court of New South Wales (1957) 97 CLR 279
Date of hearing: 20 August 2018 Registry: Western Australia Division: General Division National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights Category: Catchwords Number of paragraphs: 108 Counsel for the Applicant: Ms S Kelly Solicitor for the Applicant: Victoria Legal Aid Counsel for the First Respondent: Ms C Symons Solicitor for the First Respondent: Australian Government Solicitor Counsel for the Second Respondent: The Second Respondent filed a submitting notice ORDERS
WAD 300 of 2017 BETWEEN: HZCP
Applicant
AND: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION
First Respondent
ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL
Second Respondent
JUDGE:
BROMBERG J
DATE OF ORDER:
20 NOVEMBER 2018
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The application is dismissed.
2.The applicant pay the costs of the respondent.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
BROMBERG J:
INTRODUCTION
The applicant is a 31 year old citizen of Sri…
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- Case
- [2018] FCA 1803
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court examined the authorities and principles relevant to the Tribunal's ability to examine the circumstances surrounding the commission of the offence or matters relating to the trial itself. It was established that the Tribunal cannot contradict or go behind a conviction and examine the facts upon which it is based, but it could review the circumstances of the conviction for a purpose other than impugning the conviction itself. The court found that the Tribunal's decision was not affected by an error of law. The court concluded that the Tribunal's assessment of the seriousness of the applicant’s prior conduct and his risk to the Australian community was appropriate, and the applicant's evidence did not contradict the essential factual elements of the offence or findings of the sentencing judge. Therefore, the appeal was dismissed.
The final orders of the court were that the application be dismissed and that the applicant pay the costs of the respondent. The court's decision emphasised the importance of respecting the finality of convictions and the role of the Tribunal in assessing the nature and gravity of the applicant’s criminal conduct without assessing the propriety of the conviction or the fairness of the trial.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The application is dismissed.
2. The applicant pay the costs of the respondent.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The judgment of the Court of Appeal in LLF was recently followed by Richards J in Secretary to the Department of Justice and Regulation v Bhatia [2018] VSC 500 at [53]. Consideration I would respectfully adopt the distillation of the case law described by Beach, McLeish and Niall JJA in LLF. On that basis the applicable principles are these: (1)Where a previous conviction is the foundation for the exercise of power by the decision-maker, no challenge can be made to the fact of the conviction (or sentence, as the case may be) or to the essential facts on which it was based, but the circumstances of the conviction may be reviewed for a purpose other than impugning the conviction itself.(2)Where the exercise of the power is not founded on the conviction, then the essential facts underlying the conviction are not immune from challenge and the conviction is only conclusive of the fact of the conviction itself, albeit there is a heavy onus on a person seeking to challenge the facts upon which the conviction is necessarily based. The second principle is not applicable here. The conviction in question in this case was a precondition to the decision under s 501(3A) of the Act and the exercise of the power by the Tribunal. The applicant’s reliance on that principle as articulated at [43] in Ali is therefore misplaced. As Branson J made very clear at [43], that paragraph is only relevant to cases that fall within the second principle described above. Insofar as the applicant submitted that the observations of Fisher and Lockhart JJ in Daniele (at 138-139) stand for the proposition that the Tribunal, in the category of cases covered by the first principle, is entitled to examine for itself facts necessarily found by the jury or findings essential to the imposition of a sentence and to restrict that entitlement would impermissibly introduce a doctrine equivalent to issue estoppel into Tribunal proceedings, those submission must be rejected. When properly considered in their full context, the statements of Fisher and Lockhart JJ upon which the applicant relied assume a different and more nuanced application. In particular, their Honours comments were preceded by the statement that (at 138): There are powerful reasons of public policy why the Tribunal cannot ignore the conviction or seek to set it at nought. That is not to say that the circumstances surrounding the commission of the offence or matters relating to the trial itself cannot be examined by the Tribunal. However, such examination is for the purpose of enabling the Tribunal to make its own assessment of the nature and gravity of the applicant’s criminal conduct and not for the purpose of assessing the propriety of the conviction or the fairness of the trial. Whether these circumstances and matters a susceptible of examination and the extent of that inquiry will vary from case to case. Their Honours then went on to make the following statement (at 139):… It is our opinion that the Tribunal is entitled to consider all evidence. It will attach appropriate weight thereof in its task of evaluating the conduct of the applicant but not for the purpose of assessing the propriety of the conviction.