HBY v WBI & Anor

Case [2020] QDC 81


DISTRICT COURT OF QUEENSLAND

CITATION:

HBY v WBI & Anor [2020] QDC 81

PARTIES:

HBY

(Applicant/Appellant)

v

LAP

(First respondent)

and

CONSTABLE WBI

(Second respondent)

FILE NO/S:

DC No 4040 of 2018

DIVISION:

Appellate

PROCEEDING:

Appeal

ORIGINATING COURT:

District Court at Brisbane – Unreported, 31 May 2019

DELIVERED ON:

14 May 2020

DELIVERED AT:

Brisbane

HEARING DATE:

6 May 2020

JUDGE:

Moynihan QC DCJ

ORDER:

In relation to the second respondent’s application filed 14 April 2020:

The application is allowed. 1.     

The orders of Judge Koppenol of 31 May 2019 are set aside. 2.     

The appellant pay the second respondent’s costs on the standard basis.3.     

In relation to the appellant’s application made on 6 May 2020:

The application for the appeal to be heard afresh to permit cross-examination on documents 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 16, 17, 18, 19 and 20 is dismissed. 1.     

The application for the appeal to be heard afresh to permit cross-examination on documents 7 and 13(a) is reserved to the Judge hearing the appeal. 2.     

The costs of the application are to be determined by the Judge hearing the appeal.3.     

CATCHWORDS:

APPEAL – PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – QUEENSLAND – POWERS OF COURT – INTERLOCUTORY ORDERS SET ASIDE OR VARIED – where a domestic violence order was made against the appellant in 2018 – where a judge of the District Court heard an interlocutory application and ordered that the appeal in the District Court was to be heard afresh in whole in accordance with s 168(2) of the Domestic and Family Violence Protection Act 2012 (Qld) – where the second respondent applies that the order be discharged – whether the discretion has miscarried?

APPEAL AND REHEARING – NATURE OF THE APPEAL – DOMESTIC AND FAMILY VIOLENCE PROTECTION ACT 2012 – whether the appeal ought to be heard afresh in part?

District Court of Queensland Act 1967 (Qld) s 118
Domestic and Family Violence Protection Act 2012 (Qld) s 3, s 4(1), s 105, s 164, s 165, s 166, s 168, s 169(2)
Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999 (Qld) r 667(2)

Adam P Brown Male Fashions Pty Ltd v Philip Morris Incorporated & Anor (1981) 148 CLR 170
Australia Meat Holdings Pty Ltd v Higgs [2006] QDC 081
Commonwealth of Australia v Albany Port Authority [2006] WASCA 185
Fox v Percy (2003) 214 CLR 118
FY v Department of Child Safety [2009] QCA 67
GKE v EUT [2014] QDC 248
Jennifer Glover, Separate Representative v Director, Child Protection Litigation & Ors [2016] QChC 16
Ratten v The Queen (1974) 131 CLR 510

WBI v HBY & Anor [2020] QCA 24

COUNSEL:

A Hoare for the applicant/appellant
P McCafferty QC for the second respondent

The  first respondent appeared on her own behalf

SOLICITORS:

PHV Law Solicitors and Consultants for the applicant
Queensland Police Service Legal Unit for the second respondent
The first respondent appeared on her own behalf

Introduction

  1. The second respondent applies to set aside the interlocutory order of his Honour Judge Koppenol…

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Details
AGLC
HBY v WBI & Anor [2020] QDC 81
Case
[2020] QDC 81
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The appellant, HBY, appealed against a domestic violence order made against them in 2018, which was upheld by the District Court. The second respondent, WBI, applied for the domestic violence order to be discharged. The matter came before the Supreme Court of Queensland where the second respondent sought to discharge the domestic violence order, and the appellant sought to have the appeal heard afresh to permit cross-examination on certain documents. The court had to decide whether the discretion exercised by the District Court judge had miscarried and whether the appeal should be heard afresh in part.

The court considered the provisions of the Domestic and Family Violence Protection Act 2012 (Qld) and the discretion given to the District Court judge under s 168(2) of the Act. The court noted that the judge exercised their discretion in ordering that the appeal be heard afresh in whole, and the court was required to consider whether the discretion had miscarried. The court also considered the second respondent’s application to discharge the domestic violence order. The court held that the discretion had not miscarried and the orders of the District Court judge were set aside. The court further held that the appellant’s application to have the appeal heard afresh to permit cross-examination on certain documents was dismissed, except for documents 7 and 13(a), which were reserved to the Judge hearing the appeal.

The court allowed the second respondent’s application to discharge the domestic violence order and set aside the orders of the District Court judge. The court also dismissed the appellant’s application for the appeal to be heard afresh in part and ordered that the appellant pay the second respondent’s costs on the standard basis. The costs of the application were to be determined by the Judge hearing the appeal. The application for the appeal to be heard afresh to permit cross-examination on documents 7 and 13(a) was reserved to the Judge hearing the appeal.

Orders

Orders of the court

In relation to the second respondent’s application filed 14 April 2020:

The application is allowed. 1.

The orders of Judge Koppenol of 31 May 2019 are set aside. 2.

The appellant pay the second respondent’s costs on the standard basis.3.

In relation to the appellant’s application made on 6 May 2020:

The application for the appeal to be heard afresh to permit cross-examination on documents 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 16, 17, 18, 19 and 20 is dismissed. 1.

The application for the appeal to be heard afresh to permit cross-examination on documents 7 and 13(a) is reserved to the Judge hearing the appeal. 2.

The costs of the application are to be determined by the Judge hearing the appeal.3.

Background

Background to the litigation

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Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

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Decision

Reasons for decision

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Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

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